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ABSTRACT 
This study is concerned with an analysis and evaluation of Marx's conception of technology and technological change under 
capitalism. The examination of Marx's conception revolves 
around a radical inter retational issue: namely, the notion of "technology as capital'?. 
The study begins with a survey of views showing the problem of 
definition of technology. The basic problem considered is as 
follows: Technology has long been treated as a crucial 
"variable" in the analysis of social change, yet there is not 
only a problem of definition and conception, but also that 
technology's strictly physical/technical character is often 
regarded as "outside" of the domain of social studies 
(belonging, for example, to the fields of engineering and 
physical sciences). Indeed, when commenting on Marx's view, 
what is invariably stressed is the "neutrality" of technology 
as a productive force, as a mere factor of production, and the 
significance of the social mode of technology's employment and 
utilization as such in his theory of capitalism, 
This study's principal thesis, however, is that, for Marx, 
technology (but more specifically, machinery or the mechanized 
technological system), as it functions in the process of 
production, acts as capital. This role, it is suggested, is 
grounded on the fusion of the technical and the social 
functions of machine technology. The presentation and 
development of this thesis is based on a detailed analysis and 
critical investigation of Marx's writings on technology under 
capitalism. An evaluation of Marx's conception of technology 
and technological change is then given after a discussion and 
examination of alternative interpretations and views provided 
on "Marx and technology" by a selected number of highly 
influential scholars. 
In conclusion, it is found that the examination of Marx's 
conception tends to support the thesis of this study. 
It is 
shown that in Marx the role of technology as capital 
is not 
simply dependent on the manner in which technology or the 
system of machinery is employed and utilized, nor 
is it 
considered by Marx as merely a factor of production. In short, 
for Marx, industrial technology is neither "neutral" nor is it 
"ary an governed by its own "inner laws". It is, on the contlL 
essential functional moment, and objective manifestation, of 
the social power of capital to command labour. It 
is reckoned, 
moreover, that despite certain problems and a need 
for 
updating, Marx's conception of technology as capital 
does 
contain some extremely valuable insights and useful 
observations, and a degree of comprehensiveness 
lacking in many 
other theoretical constructs, and thus should 
be considered at 
least as an alternative basis for further sociological research 
on the role of technology in the domain of advanced systems of 
production. 
Contents 
General Introduction... 
A Review of Literature: Problems of Definition ... 000000*00i-Xxi Chapter One: The Concept of Productive 
Introduction ... 1. A Preliminary Observation ................................. 3 2. Marx1s Criticism of the Saint-Simon School 
and Friedrich List on "Productive Forces"................. 10 
3. The German Ideo and the "Nature" of 
the Productive Forces ..................................... 17 4. Productive Forces: "Determinism" and "Primacy ............... 23 
5. Productive Forces versus Relations of Production? ......... 40 Summing Up and An Evaluation ................................. 58 Chapter Two: Alienation and Technology ........................ 76 Introduction ................................................. 76 1. A Preliminary Observation. oooooooo*eeoooooooooo*eoooo***o*78 2. Alienation and Technology ................................. 82 3. Marx's Alienation: A Brief Comparison of Views ............ 104 Summing Up and An Evaluation ................................ 139 Chapter Three: Capitalist Production and Technology ......... 152 Introduction ................................................ 152 1. A Preliminary Observation ................................ 157 2. Commodityq Value-Form and Technology ...................... 160 3. The Labour Process and Technology ........................ 170 4. The "Social Purpose" of Production and Technology ........ 189 5. The Use-Value Character of Capital and Technology ........ 200 6. The Production of "Relative Surplus-Value to 
and Technology-909O&O66696*8609 .......................... 212 7. From Co-operation and Manufacture to Machinery: 
The Development of Capitalist Technology ................. 222 8. A Contradiction in Marx's Writings on Machinery .......... 244 9. Technological Systems as Fixed Capital ................... 265 
10. Marx on Technology in Capitalism: 
Comments on Two Alternative Interpretations ................ 290 
Summary and Evaluation.. ooeoooooo*ooooooo*oo ................ 346 Chapter Four: Marx on the Development of Productive Forces 
and Technological Change under Capitalism ................... 357 
Introduction... 357 :::::: 360 1. A Preliminary Observation.. oooo***oeo*oeoooo***ooooooo 
2. The Extraction of Surplus Labour and 
Technological Change ..................................... 
365 
3. Technological Development and Change: 
Contradiction and Crisis ........................... 0*0 ... 
378 
4. Alternative Interpretations of Marx on Technological 
Development, Crisis and Contradiction .... 394 :::::: 452 An Evaluation and Summing Up ........ 
General Conclusion .......................................... 
461 
Appendices (1-4) ................ 
Notes and References ... 
Bibliography.... 00 ......... 
General Introduction 
This study is concerned with an evaluation of Marx's 
conception of technology under capitalism. The 
examination of Marx's conception revolves around a 
radical interpretational issue: namely, the notion of "technology as capital". 
The question of Marx's views on technology has been 
debated for a long time, but more often as a side- issue rather than as a subject matter in its own 
right. The number of studies written about, or 
referring to, the technological phenomenon is, also, 
simply countless. Many of these works refer to Marx's 
ideas on technology, sometimes explicitly and often implicitly. To my knowledge, however, there has been 
no thorough and detailed critical examination of his 
conception of technology. What exists are references 
to various selected passages, or a general outline of 
his basic model for technical change, or analysis of 
capitalist production and the labour process as such. 
When a detailed examination is made, it is often 
restricted to Marx's discussion of "machinery". 
Most critics and students of Marx tend to concentrate 
on the different aspects of his economic, 
sociological, philosophical, and/or political 
theories, with technology always tagging along. This 
is not to belittle such studies; nor am I in any way 
implying that no one has recognized the significance 
of technology for Marx. Far from it; every critic and 
student of Marx has been at pains, for different 
reasons, to point out the prominent role of 
technology in Marx's theories. 
What has not been done, or at least not done 
adequately, is a step by step systematic 
investigation of the problematic of technology in 
Marx's works and subjecting his views specifically on 
technology t o critical scrutiny - moving from his 
concept of " productive forces" to his conception of 
"alienation" and "division of labour" to his views on 
"machinery" and such concepts as "constant" and 
"fixed capital" with technology as a central issue . 
Needless to say that a full treatment of this subject 
isq of course, an immensely difficult task, 
particularly because of the problem of covering the 
enormous amount of materials involved. What I aim to 
do here, therefore, is to limit my discussion to a 
critical examination of Marx s conception of 
production technology under capitalism. And, of 
course7 it is only becaLi-se of this 11-mitation of the 
subject matter to capitalist production technology 
n 
that the thesis proposed in this study revolves around the interpretational issue of the notion of of technology as capital". 
This n, otion, however, involves an immediate problem: the definition of the two concepts of 
I 
capital and technology. That is, what is meant by 'technology" 
and how does one define "capital"? This is not merely 
a general problem, but one which is also specific to Marx. Since I am in this study concerned with Marx's 
conception, I shall therefore here concentrate on this problem within his writings, and as for the 
general problem of the definition of the concept of technology, for example, this is briefly covered in a 
review section only. 
Insofar as technology is concerned, a major problem is that there is no definition of the term to be 
found in Marx. In fact, the concept of technology 
appears in Marx less frequentl as the term "technology", but invariably as 
ýinstruments" 
of 
labour or production, "machine and/or machinery", "means of labour"; often also enmeshed in broader 
concepts such as "productive forces", "means of 
production", "constant capital" and "fixed capital". 
What is, then, required is an investigation; that is, 
an attempt t09 so to speak, "excavate" Marx's 
conception of technology from within his writings9 
and also a need for a critical examination of the 
various and different terms Marx uses for 
"technology". Why does Marx, for example, uses the 
terms "instruments" or "means" of labour in certain 
parts of his writings, and broader concepts, like 
"constant" or "fixed" capital in other parts? Can the 
different terms used be justified theoretically? Andq 
even if so, do they contribute in any way to a better 
understanding of the problematic of technological 
phenomenon under capitalism? 
One thing is, however, quite clear in Marx: namely, 
that Marx is concerned, one could say almost 
exclusively, with production technology. And, insofar 
as his works on capitalism are concerned, he is 
specifically concerned with machine technology. For 
him there is a strict and definite distinction 
between "tools" and industrial machines - and the 
distinction is both technical and social. Moreover, 
there is no doubt that in Marx, production technology 
is viewed quite narrowly as objects, things, or 
physical means of labour - he often refers to them as Idead labour". 
As simply a bench-mark, a point of departure, we can 
start with a tentative understanding of technology in 
III 
Marx as follows: "Technology" refers to the 
objectified power of human labour (both mental and manual, knowledge and activity) actually functioning in the process of production, according to the 
requirements of social production, for the purpose of transformation of the subject of labour (natural 
substances, raw materials, etc. ) into a product (whether for direct or for productive consumption), 
and/or to enable the performance of a service. 
Now, to begin with, the modern concept of technology, 
at least for many authorities today (e. g. Noble, Freeman, among many others) and in everyday speech, 
not only covers a far broader range of devices, etc., but it is also and often used for a range of 
activities, processes, knowledge, and so on (see the 
review section on this point), rather than being 
restricted to physical objects or things as means of labour, as in Marx. 
Te "definition" given aboveg therefore, leaves out 
of account many items, aspects and categories 
commonly associated with a general notion of 
"technology". For example, it excludes weapons (i. e. 
the actual instruments of destruction, armaments, 
etc. ), domestic and non-productive appliances (e. g. 
the fridge, cooker, etc. ) - that is, all items, 
articles, and products destined for and used for the 
purpose of direct consumption or used for other than 
strictly production purposes. 
Also aspects which are excluded are: processes (e. g. 
actual operations and activities), organizations 
(i. e. institutions, firms, etc. ), non-objectified 
knowledge (e. g. "ideas" that have not as yet been 
transformed into means of production), and such like. 
These have their on specific status in Marx's schema. 
It also excludes objects, instruments, etc., which 
are not actually functioning in a process of 
production (i. e. are not in current use as means of 
production). For example, a spinning-mule was a 
production technology at the (historical) time that 
it was being utilized and functioned for spinning 
cotton; but it is no longer a technology of 
production. 
Moreover, this definition excludes methods of 
production, forms of organization of labour and 
processes (e. 'g the Just-in-Time, Taylorism, etc. ). 
Although there is no doubt that such methods of 
labour or production are not "technology-free", 
nonetheless, for Marx, methods of production and 
forms of organization of labour in themselves are 
0 
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A second meaning is much broader, it refers to the 
physical and human aspects. The basic argument is 
that since no "technology" can function without the 
involvement of human beings, and therefore forms a 
part of certain human activities, "technology" must 
mean the combination of human activities and objects. 
Thus Marcuse (1941, p. 414) argues: 'We do not ask for 
the influence or effect of technology on the human 
individual. For they are themselves an integral part 
and factor of technology, not only as the men who 
invent or attend to machinery, but also as the social 
groups which direct its application and utilization. ' 
A very similar position to Marcuse is taken by Noble 
(1979b and 1984). He argues that technology is 
essentially a 'human phenomenon' it is 'thus a social 
process'(1979b, p. xxii). One major objection to both 
Marcuse and Noble with this regard, is that if one 
defines technology as a "social process", then one 
would have to equate "technology" with the process of 
production itself. In that case why use the term 
"technology" as such? And, further, if "technology" 
is defined in terms of the human, physical objects, 
and as a process, how can one use such an all- 
embracing concept in the different and specific 
analyses of the various aspects of social life, and 
avoid confusing the elements, interactions, and 
processes involved? 
A third meaning, I have already mentioned, includes 
knowledge, etc., as part of technology. With this 
definition we are close to a meaning of technology as 
technique. However, it seems to me more helpful if we 
were to make a distinction between the concept of 
"technology" and that of "technique". In this 
distinction "technique" refers to the know-how as 
V 
machinery, of the objects themselves, and yet also be 
- and at the same time -a sociii-l relation of production? 
If "capital" is a social relationship -a set of relations and a process of relationships between human beings (groups or classes of people) - then how can it be at the same time an object (a thing), a 
machine or a systern of machinery, as well as also 
representing the value of that object? Is not this a 
contradiction? 
A machine is a capital asset; an amount of money is invested in purchasing a given system of machinery; in this sense one could say that the machine, or the 
system of machinery, is "capital". But could one then 
move from this premise to the notion that the machine 
- and by implication therefore any form of industrial 
production technology - is thus a "social relation" 
also? How can an object, a thing, be regarded as 
such? 
Certainly, people work with machinery (they relate to 
it), but if the work process can rightly be defined 
as a social relationship because of the fact that 
groups of workers work together and also relate to 
those in control of the production process, can one 
also regard the use of machinery itself (or the use 
of production technology), in the very strict sense 
of "man and machine", of a human being using an 
object as technology for production purposes, as a 
social relationship? And, what is more, can one 
regard the technology in itself, in its physical- 
material sense, as not merely capital as asset, but 
as capital as a social relation of production? 
In general, the idea of capital as being an asset 
which can generate an income for its owner is hardly 
controversial. Therefore, if one says that 
"technology as capital" means that, say, a machine is 
purchased and used to generate an income for its 
owner, then that should pose no immediate problem. 
However, we are confronted with a major problem 
because Marx goes beyond this idea. For him capital 
'is not a thing, but rather a definite social 
production relation, belonging to a definite 
historical formation of society, which is manifested 
in a thinj and lends this thing a specific social 
character. (Capital, III, ch. 48, p. 814) Thus, as far as 
the notion of "technology as capital" is concerned, 
here in this latter definition, we have what is the 
core of the problem. 
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In all forms of social production, technology can be regarded as an asset; its use in one way or another is meant to generate an income for its owner. This is 
also true, of course, under capitalism. But ' according to Marx, within the capitalist mode of production proper the technology as asset takes on a specific social character; a character which not only 
signifies its basic role as a means of production, or 
as a means of generating an income for its owner, but 
also as a means that ensures the continuous 
reproduction of the specifically capitalist relations 
of production. 
To be sure, technology is a means of making "goods", but as such an asset it embodies, for Marx at any 
rate, a particular relation between those who 
own/control it and those who do not, such that not 
only goods are made, but also the specific social ("property") relations which engender such a process 
of production are themselves continually reproduced. 
We have therefore what is, in a sense, a twofold 
character: Technology as an asset (a means of 
production) and as a social entity. Or, to put it in 
Marx's own language, technology has a material 
content (as means of production) defined and 
inseparable from its specific social form or 
character (as capital). In other words, although 
analytically the content and the form can be 
distinguished, in its functioning mode there can be 
no separation of the content from the form - they are 
fused. Technology, as it is used to produce goods, 
also thereby produces (reproduces) and reinforces the 
relations between the capitalist and the worker. 
Technology is thus not only a "capital asset", but 
also, and as such an asset, is a manifestation of 
capitalist social relations. 
And here the form of production technology with which 
Marx is chiefly concerned is not a simple tool, or 
even a complex instrument of the type which Max Weber 
refers to as an "apparatus" (see Weber, Theory of 
Social & Economic Organization, p. 2107-, but, 
specifically, machine technology or the production 
technology of industrial capitalism. And the 
technical distinction between the two forms of 
technologies is crucial to their social 
characteristics. It is only with industrial machine 
technology that production technology can be said to 
be, insofar as Marx is concerned at any rate, a 
manifestation of capitalist relations of production. 
Now, how and in what sense can one say that machine 
technology is a manifestation of capitalist 
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relations? If one were to examine a single machine ' or even a system of machinery, look as one may, there is no sign or evidence of such a manifestation. The 
machine appears as it is, a machine, an instrument, a complex of moving parts, metals, and so on. And even if one were to take its capital value, the amount of 
money invested in producing and purchasing it; that is also simply an amount of money which as such can hardly be taken as a manifestation of capitalist 
relations - it is capital, but as accounting capital. 
A crucial point here - and what at this stage should be regarded as merely a guiding principle until this issue is investigated - is the distinction between 
modern machine technology and pre-machine 
instruments. The technical transformation of 
instruments of production into machine technology, 
signifies a transformation of the social form, the 
specific social character, of production technology 
as capital. The essential aspect of this proposition 
is contained in a statement made by Max Weber, who, 
like Marx, makes a clear and substantive social 
distinction between tools as well as pre-machine 
complex instruments (or as he calls them, an 
apparatus) and modern machines. He states: 'The 
distinction is that the apparatus works as the 
servant of man while in modern machines the ir-n-verse 
relation ho '(Weber, General Economic History, 
p. 302, my emphasis) 
According to my interpretation of Marx, the notion of 
"technology as capital" signifies the commanding role 
of machine technology because it embodies within its 
designed structure and functional principles the 
social function of capital as a relation of 
production. Capital's social relation: is manifested 
in modern machine technology and lends this form of 
production technology a specific social character: 
machine technology works no longer 'as the servant of 
mant(Weber); with modern machinery, production 
technology is 'turned into independent powers' that 
'confront' (Marx, Capital, III, p. 815) workers 
within the process of production. With all pre- 
machine forms of production technologies, 
irrespective of the particular mode of appropriation 
and control (Asiatic/despotic, "f eudal" , or 
whatever), labour used the technology, and in the 
immediate, direct sense (i. e. at the point of 
production) labour was in command of the technology - 
production technology was a means of labour in the 
strict sense of the term. With modern industrial 
machine technology (and even more so with the so- 
called "post-indus trial" production technology), the 
Vill 
reverse seems to be the case: Machines command labour, and not the reverse. 
It is this "inverse relation" that holds the key to an understanding of the notion of "technology as capital". We know that on this latter point, Marx held a similar view to that of Weber's stated above; but how does he come to explain it? And, perhaps, more to the point, is my interpretation, my proposition of the notion of technology as capital, justified in terms of Marx's conception? 
The questions, of course, need to be thoroughly investigated, and Marx's writings critically examined to see whether or not the notion of "technology as 
capital" is firstly, an accurate (or at the very least, a reasonably accurate) interpretation of Marx's conception, and secondly, to determine its 
validity. 
This is thus the key issue, the principal problem, of 
the study. In the process of investigating Marx's 
writings on this issue, the arguments he had advanced 
on the role and status of production technology under 
capitalist production relations, or as a 
manifestation of "capital", can then be critically 
examined and finally evaluated. And the evaluation 
takes into account some of the most important recent 
alternative interpretations and analyses of Marx on 
technology. 
In this study I have concentrated on only a few major 
authorities on the subject of technology and Marx on 
technology. 
One of the most influential interpretations of Marx 
on this issue is best exemplified by the works of 
G. A. Cohen, William Show, and others of similar 
ersuasion. This, what can be called "orthodox" or 
traditional", interpretation tends to suggest not 
only the "primacy" of the productive forces, but 
indeed the deterministic role of technology,., 
According to this "technological-determinist 
interpretation, for Marx, productive forces (and 
often even technology as such) are not only the 
motive and determining factor in history, but also of 
social relationships, and even more specifically, 
relationships at the point of production. Although, 
in the more sophisticated versions of this 
interpretation (e. g in Cohen), it is not denied that 
Marx is deeply committed to the principle of "social 
determination" of technological phenomenon, what is 
stressed (as being Marx's position) is not merely the 
Ix 
distinction, but, indeed, the separation of the technical/material from the social form. 
In this reading of Marx, "technologX" is viewed as something which, though not " 
"outside of society is 
not in itself" (or not , by of nature::, by its 
properties, and in iF-s "materiality ) social. Technology is part of the "material substratum" and as such it mediates between n ature and society - i. e. it is to do with material production (abstractly 
speaking and in generaT). And _ , thus, f-o-r this reason , technology, being subject to the laws of "material 
production" (the "interchange with nature"), causally determines social relations. 
This issue is clearly important to the thesis set forth in this study. There is a fundamental difference between such an interpretation of Marx (and specifically in terms of his conception of 
production technology under capitalism) and my 
proposition of the notion of technology as capital. 
In evaluating Marx's views, this point therefore 
needs to be examined, the "orthodox' interpretation 
of Cohen et. al. scrutinized - though, the fault or 
the problem may indeed lie in Marx himself, and the 
issue may, perhaps, be incapable of final proof or 
disproof. 
A different interpretation of Marx on technology - 
and this is more specifically related to capitalism - 
suggests that for Marx it is not technology as such 
(i. e. the form of technology as machine technology in 
its technical structure, design and as it functions 
in the process of production) which is either 
deterministic or of fundamental significance. What is 
crucial for Marx, it is claimed, is the mode of its 
employment and utilization. 
This particular interpretation is best exemplified by 
the work of Braverman. It is enveloped within a 
general understanding of Marx's view on the 
imperative role of social relations and the notion of 
social form. Thus, according to this "social 
determ'inistic" interpretation, for Marx technology 
does not determine social/work relations, it is in 
fact the social (capitalist) relations that determine 
and produce technology. 
Braverman, and others of similar persuasion, in 
rejecting a "technological-determinist" 
interpretation of Marx, place a great deal of 
emphasis on the notions of "control" and ", owners It 
of technology. Production technology, and 
specifically machine technology, in itself is then 
x 
viewed as not essentially an important problematic 
which concerns Marx, except in the sense that he 
tried to point out the "fetishistic" or the "reified" 
manner in which technol 0 gy tends to be perceived by 
active individuals (i. e. subjectively) in modern 
society. And the technical aspects (e. g. on 
machinery) considered by Marx, in for example Capital 
volume I, were intended as little more than providing 
a "technical description", at best to give a better 
understanding of machine technology from a 
perspective of material production in general. Such a 
technical "description" of the machine "'in itself", 
it is then implied by Braverman and others, has 
little direct value for the understanding of the 
social role of machine technology. 
In other words, technical aspects and characteristics 
of modern industrial machinery (i. e. its commanding 
power over labour, its labour displacement aspect, 
and so on), according to such a reading of Marx, are 
used by capital (or, more narrowly, by the capitalist 
management of firms) to its own advantage. The 
problem is not, at least in essence, the built-in 
technical aspects and the design of modern production 
technologies, but who controls the technology. And 
only because of this power of control, because of the 
power of the "master" (the capitalist) and his/her 
ownership of technology, is the latter a part of 
capitalist relations. By implication, therefore, the 
problem can be reversed: remove capitalist control 
(and ownership) and substitute it by "social 
ownership" ("workers control") and machine technology 
thereby becomes a "servant of man". 
With this mode of interpretation of Marx, the 
question of the specific character of machine 
technology is assumed to be (even if only by 
implication) merely incidental to Marx's theory of 
capitalism. The machine is simply that, a means of 
produc. tion; its social signification is a function of 
the specific capitalistic mode of appropriation and 
control - i. e. the manner it is employed and utilized 
within the capitalist form of organization of 
production. The problem revolves around the question 
of "misappropriation" and not, specifically at least, 
a critique of the very form of production technology 
also. 
Such an interpretation of Marx on technology is 
clearly at odds with the proposition of technology as 
capital put forward in this study. Did Marx view 
machine technology as simply a means of production? 
And, despite denouncing its most cruel and inhuman 
aspects, did he regard it as something "neutral"? Is 
XT 
machine technology for Marx, as it wereq innocent or 
tainted? 
The issue needs to be examined; the assertions made by Braverman and others need to be looked into and 
compared to what Marx wrote on the issue before an 
evaluation can be made. And it may well be that the 
proposition submitted here cannot be substantiated, 
or that in critically evaluating Marx's conception, 
it may prove to be difficult to make a final and 
definitive judgment on the issue. Perha P. s, it may be 
found that the counterpoise of 'technological 
determinism" and "social determinism", in respect of 
Marx's conception, is a mistake and/or that Marx's 
views on production technology are too ambiguous to 
enable a clear-cut judgment to be made. 
Whatever the case, I shall attempt to present, at the 
very least, a reasoned set of arguments and a 
rational and balanced discussion on the subject. 
The study begins with a survey of views and 
literature on technology showing the general problem 
of definition of this concept. It then presents a 
detailed analysis and critical examination of Marx's 
writings specifically related to production 
technology. Each chapter is then followed by an 
evaluation of the main points raised in relation with 
a critical discussion of a selection of commentators 
who have discussed Marx's notion of technology. And, 
finally, in the General Conclusion, I shall present a 
general evaluation of Marx's conception of 
technology. 
Before I proceed, however, it is important to point 
to, what can be called, the problem of "language" in 
Marx. As many commentators have pointed out, Marx's 
writings are often quite difficult to understand. One 
major difficulty with Marx is the all-embracing 
nature of his work - his work is a complex of 
philosophical, economic, social, and technical 
concepts. A further problem is that he often presents 
his arguments in a philosophical, Hegelian or his own 
post-Hegelian dialectical language. Even in his 
social and economic writings he invokes concepts, and 
introduces arguments and ideas, which are not only 
cast in the language of his time, but are deeply 
coloured by his own version and understanding of the 
dialectic method. 
This problem of language makes the task of 
interpretation, of presentation of his views, and, 
hence, also of a critical examination of these, quite 
complicated and difficult. It generates the danger of 
xii 
misinterpretation. Nevertheless, these are complications and problems which I hope will not pollute the main thrust of the arguments to be 
presented in this study. 
Now, although Marx's ideas need to be "translated" into a more accessible idiom, as some writers have 
suggested (and even attempted), sometimes this can 
prove to be not only difficult to do, but could also 
result in at best an oversimplification, and at worst 
misinterpretation and even misrepresentation of his ideas. There are also certain concepts and ideas that 
cannot be "translated" into the idiom of our time - 
at least it is beyond my capability to do so! And 
thus, as Bottomore et. al. 
I 
(in A Dictionary of Marxist Thou4hts) pofnt o there are some cases, 
more particularly in economics and philosophy, where 
technical terms are unavoidable and some previous 
knowledge is assumed. '(see Editors' Introd. ) 
Nonetheless, where "translation" is proved to be 
beyond my ability and the use of technical terms 
unavoidable, every effort is made in this study to 
reduce this language difficulty either through a 
process of explanation in the text or comments and 
references in a footnote. 
Finally, given the current political and intellectual 
atmosphere, given, that is, the collapse of Soviet 
Communism and the intellectual challenie of neo- 
liberalism (as exemplified by Fukuyama's 'The End of 
History"), and thus given that Marxism has been 
officially declared dead in the East and its obituary 
written and re-written in the West, it may well be 
asked, why spend much time, ink and effort on Marx 
and why his ideas, even on the limited subject of 
technology, should still be taken seriously? Here we 
cannot fully address this question with respect to 
Marx's general thoughts and ideas. What can be said 
is that whatever the outcome of the present "crisis 
of Marxism", it would be extremely irrational and 
irresponsible to deny the importance of Marx's 
contribution to and influence over the whole range of 
social sciences. For this reason alone (even if no 
other, and despite the failure of this or that 
version of Marxism), Marx's work has, we suggest, a 
continuing relevance. But this is even more 
specifically the case, we believe, with respect to the 
issue of technology. Thus, however many reservations 
and objections one may have with respect to Marxism, 
we thinkt Marx's own ideas and insights on technology 
remain potentialilvaluable - and particularly in terms 
of social or sociological studies of technology - 
and hence require serious critical attention. 
I 
A Review of Literature: Problems of Definition 
The study of technology has been, until recently, 
more or less confined, with few exceptions (e. g. 
Lewis Mumford's 1934, Technics and Civilization 
[19631) to "engineering" disciplines, or as merely an 
aspect of the social sciences. However, since about 
the 1950s, there has been a growing move, 
particularly in the United States, towards the 
sociological and historical study of technology as a 
distinct discipline in its own right. For example, 
history of technology is now a well recognized and 
practiced academic subject in the US and many other 
countries. 
it is nevertheless still an infant academic 
discipline, and there is as yet no singly recognized 
definition of the concept of technology. However, the 
usage of the many different, and often contradictory, 
definitions of the concept is not merely related to 
the infancy of the discipline as such, but at least 
in part also due to the complexity of the reality of 
the technological phenomena, and the different 
subjective and philosophical positions of the various 
observers of the relationship between technology and 
society. 
Etymologically, the term "technology" is derived from 
the Greek word, techne , which is itself 
based on the 
Indo-European stem tekhn-, meaning (perhaps) 
"carpentry" or "woodwork". The Greek, techne, from 
which the English "technology", the French 
"technique", and the German "technik"(for a useful 
discussion of the meaning of technology on the 
Continent, see Salomon, 1984), have been derived, is 
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commonly held to mean, "art" or "craft" (sometimes 
also translated as "skill")(see Mitcham, 1979). 
The first usage of the term "technology", or one of 
its cognates, according to Mitcham (ibid. p. 175), is 
made by Aristotle. Layton's (1974) definition of 
technology as "knowledge", seems in agreement with 
the often stated view that both for Aristotle and 
Plato, the term "techne" refers to some form of 
special knowledge which gives character or essence to 
human activity. For Aristotle, as Mitcham (1979, p. 175) 
points out, "techne" means 'a habit (or stable 
disposition to act in a specific manner with a true 
[consciousness] concerned with (or ordered 
toward) making (the human production of material 
objects)'. I shall discuss the Aristotelian notion of 
technology more fully later,, in AppenJI)c 1ý in 
relation to Marx's conception, since Aristotle's 
works had had a great influence on Marx. 
However, it suffices to state here that one needs to 
make a clear distinction between the classical 
notion of "technology" as "techne", which reflects 
the state of the reality of the form of production at 
the time, and the notion of technology as 
"knowledge", even if expressed as both visual and 
tactile (see Ferguson 1977), applied to our own age, 
which has hardly anything in common with classical 
Greece. Nevertheless, the influence of Aristotelian 
notion of "techne" is certainly unquestionable. 
Kingsley Davis (1966, pp. 435-6), for example, defines 
technology as that part of the 'cultural heritage' 
which 'contains the application of knowledge', 
by 
contrast to 'science' representing 
'a systematic 
knowledge of nature. That is, according to Davis, 
'technology. -is the application of rule-of-thumb 
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rather than systematic knowledge. ' And, while the 
I end of scientific activity is truth... technology has 
a utilitarian goal. ' Thus, Davis seems to adhere to 
an etymologically derived definition of technology - 
i. e. to the classical notion of "techne". 
But as Caws (1979, p. 237, n. 3) says: 'Etymological 
analyses are helpful because they show how terms are 
articulated and sometimes how they have changed, not 
because classical usage supports our own. ' Caws 
himself defines technology as a purposive and 
planned, 'relatively complex, probably collaborative, 
structured sequence of praxes. '(p. 235) The emphasis 
here is more on purposive structured activities, 
rather than knowledge, skill, and know-how. But this 
leaves open the question of the type of activity; can 
technology then be defined as any kind of purposive, 
planned, structured activity? Moreover, since 
purposive activity must imply some kind of special 
knowledge possessed by the actor(s), thus already 
including knowledge, skill, etc., where does the 
objectification, the subject as well as the means of, 
'structured sequence of praxes' fit into the 
definition of technology? 
According to MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985), 'the word 
"technology" has at least three different layers of 
meaning. '(p. 3) One meaning refers to the purely 
physical aspect, i. e. technology as a physical 
object. This comes close to Marx's conception of 
technology. Although, as I shall discuss later, Marx 
very rarely uses the term "technology", preferring to 
use a number of different concepts, which incorporate 
and express "technology", for specific purposes. 
W 
IV 
A second meaning is much broader, it refers to the 
physical and human aspects. The basic argument is 
that since no "technology" can function without the 
involvement of human beings, and therefore forms a 
part of certain human activities, "technology" must 
mean the combination of human activities and objects. 
Thus Marcuse (1941, p. 414) argues: 'We do not ask for 
the influence or effect of technology on the human 
individual. For they are themselves an integral part 
and factor of technology, not only as the men who 
invent or attend to machinery, but also as. the social 
groups which direct its application and utilization. ' 
A very similar position to Marcuse is taken by Noble 
(1979b and 1984). He argues that technology is 
essentially a 'human phenomenon' it is 'thus a social 
process'(1979b, p. xxii). One major objection to both 
Marcuse and Noble with this regard, is that if one 
defines technology as a "social process", then one 
would have to equate "technology" with the process of 
production itself. In that case why use the term 
"technology" as such? And, further, if "technology" 
is defined in terms of the human, physical objects, 
and as a process, how can one use such an all- 
embracing concept in the different and specific 
analyses of the various aspects of social life, and 
avoid confusing the elements, interactions, and 
processes involved? 
A third meaning, I have already mentioned, includes 
knowledge, etc., as part of technology. With this 
definition we are close to a meaning of technology as 
technique. However, it seems to me more helpful if we 
were to make a distinction between the concept of 
"technology" and that of "technique". In this 
distinction "technique" refers to the know-how as 
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methods actually used in order to set technology'into 
motion. This does not mean the use of the word 
"technics", as Lewis Mumford (1964) uses it, instead 
of technology. Nor is it identical to Ellul's (1965) 
definition of "technique" as 'the 
_totality 
of methods 
rationally arrived at and having absolute 
efficiency ... in every field of human activity. 
'(See 
Ellul, 1965, "Note to the Reader"). For in Ellul 
"technique" includes "technology" within its 
definition: 'Technique certainly began with the 
machine. ' And: 'The machine is solely, exclusively, 
technique; it is pure technique... '(ibid. pp. 3 and 4) 
However, Elster (1983) has attempted to introduce a 
distinction between technique and technology. And 
also, according to Kaplinsky (1984), one should make 
a precise distinction between these two concepts. 
Although it should be noted that Gerth and Wright 
Mills (1954, p. 30) had already attempted to set down a 
basic definitional distinction: "'Technology" refers 
to the implementation of conduct with tools, 
apparatus, machines, instruments, and physical 
devices of all sorts. ' And "technique" 'refers to the 
skill, dexterity, or expertness with which persons 
meet their role demands*' 
For Kaplinsky, and for Stewart (1978), technology is 
defined 'in its widest sense as a set of knowýedge in 
a particular area which provides the principles under 
which applications can be developed. 
' The problem 
with this is that it tends to blur the 
boundaries 
between technology and "science". Technique, by 
contrast, is defined by Kaplinsky 
(1984, p. 170), as 
the 'specific, concrete ways of combining people, 
machines and inputs to produce particular products or 
services. ' 
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These definitions appear to be clear in themselves, 
but when we come the the physical objects used 
(machines, devices, etc. ) the problem of usage and 
definition still remains. Thus, we can see the 
problem of usage in Kaplinsky himself, when he 
distinguishes microelectronics as technology, and, by 
contrast, numerically controlled machine tool, or 
computer-aided design system, as 
technique. (ibid, p. 171) But how can N/C machine tools 
be considered as 'specific, concrete ways of 
combining people'? And if microelectronics is 
technology does Kaplinsky mean the principles 
(science) of electronics, or the instruments? If it 
is the former, as indicated by his definition given 
above, then why use the term technology, why not just 
the "Science" of microelectronics? And there is still 
a problem of definition for Stewart 
(1973, p. 103): 'Techniques of production are ways of 
producing goods - generally machines. '(my emphasis) 
But then according to this definition "technique" is 
'ways' and means ('machines'); so what is the 
distinction between "technique" and "techno I logy"? 
This lack of precise distinction has led Clive Bell 
(1973, p. 125) to a suggestion of the possibility of 
the redundancy of the concept of technology. Firstly, 
Bell defines "technique" as 'any bundle of inputs 
which will yield a given level of output. ' But on the 
basis of this extremely vague definition (for such a 
bundle includes raw and auxiliary materials which 
have -surely nothing to do with "techniques" or 
"technology") he then states: 'What constitutes a 
technology is altogether more elusive. It might be 
argued, for example, that a technology is no more 
than the pool of those techniques which are currently 
available. ' However, Bell continues, 'either this 
a- - 
*I, Vil 
definition [of technology-RRI is inadmissible because 
it precludes the possibility of making distinctions 
between any subset of techniques and the rest, or the 
concept of a technology is quite redundant. ' 
The problem of definition becomes even more complex 
and confused as we come to its usage by writers in 
different fields. Boserup (1981) uses such a broad 
definition of technology that includes, as she says, 
'agricultural methods, sanitary methods, 
administrative techniques, and literacy. '(ibid. p. ix) 
For Talcott Parsons technology 'involves values, 
norms, collectivities and role-expectations', and he 
maintains that 'as part of the social structure it 
should be analyzed in these terms. '(1960, p. 125) In 
his consideration of the 'three levels of the 
organization of rational action', Parsons regards 
technology as 'The first of these, the most 
elementary ... involving the mobilization of resources 
for the attainment of a single given goal, by an 
individual actor or a collectivity. '(1951, p. 549) And 
technology for him 'always involves two aspects or 
sets of factors, those pertaining to the conditions 
of success, and those concerning the "cost", which is 
ultimately the sacrifice of alternative goals 
involved in the expenditure of resources for the one 
in question. '(ibid. pp. 549-50) 
But from a different perspective and from within a 
different discipline, Freeman (1974), for example, 
states that: 'Strictly speaking, as the word itself 
implies, technology is simply a body of knowledge 
about techniques. '(p. 18, n. 1) Yet not only are we back 
to the etymological problematic (i. e. that of 
"techne", etc. ), but that, in any case, this hardly 
defines "technology", for it merely begs the question 
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of what kind of knowledge, and what does "technique" 
mean in this case? Although to be fair, Freeman does 
mention that 'it is frequently used to encompass both 
the knowledge itself and the tangible embodiment of 
that knowledge in an operating system using physical 
production equipment. '(ibid. ) 
Boyle et al (1984, p. 4) also define technology as 'the 
knowledge, skills and equipment used for various 
purposes, including industrial production: it thus 
covers both "software" and "hardware". ' But the 
problem of application still remains: what form of 
knowledge, skill, etc. can be called "technology"? Is 
philosophy, sociology, etc. , 
"technology"? They are 
certainly forms of human "knowledge". But even if we 
say that only that knowledge is "technology" which is 
concerned with production, then is it technology only 
when it is actually used in a process of production, 
or can one call such knowledge "technology" even when 
it is not applied and used in production? The 
question, therefore, is: what kind of knowledge is 
included in the definition of technology? What role 
and form should "knowledge" have, and in what 
particular kind of human activityý in order that it 
can be defined as "technology"? 
For Singer et al ("Preface", 1954/1958, p. vii)2 
technology is taken to cover 'the field of how things 
are commonly done or made, extending it somewhat to 
describe what things are done or made. ' This 
definition has been criticised by many, for example 
by Kranzberg and Pursell (1967a) as being so wide 
ranging in scope that it could apply to almost 
anything and everything; for instance even 
legislation could be included here. 
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Kranzberg and Pursell themselves, though stating that 
technology 'cannot be defined with precision', define 
the term as 'man's effort to cope with his physical 
environment ... and his attempt to subdue or control 
that environment by means of his imagination and 
ingenuity in the use of available 
resources. '(1967a, pp. 4-5) They reject what they call 
the 'popular' understanding of technology as 
machines, etc. (p. 5)9 as to limited. They insist that 
the term 'deals with human work, with man's attempts 
to satisfy his wants by human action on physical 
objects. ' As they emphasis the "work" aspect, they 
thus include both organization and the 'purpose of 
labor' in the definition of technology. (p. 6) 
In this there seems to be a similarity between the 
above definition and Gordon Childe's (1954), though 
there is inconsistency in Childe's usage of the term. 
He defines the term as 'the study of those 
activities, directed to the satisfaction of human 
needs, which produce alterations in the material 
world. In the present work the meaning of the term is 
extended to include the results of those 
activities. '(p. 38) The statement is not clear as to 
whether "technology" is the 'study' of, or the 
'activities' themselves. In later pages Childe refers 
to the fact that technologies 'are produced by groups 
of men'(e. g. p. 40). If technologies are produced by 
'men', then are they activities, or objects, or 
studies, or all of these, which are 
'produced'? 
Galbraith (1972) 9 among othersq 
"updates" the 
definition as 'the systematic application of 
scientific or other organized knowledge to practical 
tasks'. (see Chapt. 2) The emphasis here is not so much 
on the form of knowledge 
(i. e. scientific, etc. ) but 
K 
on the form of activity (organizedg rational, etc. ) 
and application of knowledge. For some writers 
technology must explicitly refer to organization and 
people as well as machinery, etc. (or "hardware"). 
Thus, according to Naughton (1979) the term means, as 
with Galbraith's, the application of scientific and 
other organized knowledge to practical tasks by some 
ordered system which involve people and hardware. 
However, Pacey (1983, 
'science within techno 
technology deals 'with 
organisms [and he does 
definition of the term 
include "liveware" as 
White (1949, pp. 366-7): 
means of articulation 
'material systems'. 
p. 6 and 7) not only includes 
logy', but insists that, since 
processes dependent on living 
not mean people here-RR], the 
should be 'enlarged further to 
well as hardware'. While for 
'Technology is the mechanical 
of.. man and cosmos', as two 
This 'articulation', or as Habermas (1972, p. 33) puts 
it (I believe more accurately), this 'unity of the 
social subject and nature' takes place in what is 
commonly (and often broadly) referred to as 
"industry". And behind all of the various and 
different definitions of "technology" there is some 
underlying assumption about the role that technology 
has in "industry" and hence in society. There is, I 
think, some correlation between the definitions of 
technology and the underlying assumptions of its 
role, but also a large degree of inconsistency 
in the 
application of the definitions given. And 
in this 
connectiong as with the various definitionsq there 
are a number of different schools of thought on the 
role of technology in 
"industry" and society. 
However, notwithstanding the large number of 
differences and the variety of perspectives, for the 
sake of simplicityg we can identify two (extremely) 
broad traditions: "technological determipism" and 
of social determinism". 
Technological determinism was coined by Thorstein 
Veblen to describe the shaping of basic decisions by 
the existing technological system, rather than by the 
traditional processes based on value systems, etc. 
Like all traditions it encompasses a range of 
perspectives from the "extreme" to various diluted 
forms. Thus, according to some writers within this 
tradition, technology impinges on society from the 
outside. According some others it is an autonomous 
entity; it shapes the character and nature of 
"industry" (broadly defined) and society, as well as 
it causes social change. 
White, perhaps the most celebrated technological 
determinist, maintains that: 'The technological factor 
is.. the determinant of a cultural system as a whole. 
It determines the form of social systems, and 
technology and society together determine the content 
and orientation of philosophy. '(White, 1949, p. 366) 
Technology is, therefore, for White 'the independent 
variable, the social system the dependable variable. 
Social systems are therefore determined by systems of 
technology; as the latter change, so do the 
former. '(ibid. p. 365) The same perspective is held by 
Large (1980 and 1984)t who claims that the 
microelectronic technology of today will condition 
the nature and form of our contemporary society. It 
is2 according to Large, actually causing a 
fundamental change and producing a new form of 
society. 
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When we come to the analysis of the organization of 
work and production, the notion of technological 
determinism is even more strongly adhered to. 
Authorities on the Industrial Revolution, for 
example, such as Landes (1969), and certain 
industrial sociologists (for example, Blauner 1964) 
tend to strongly emphasise the "impact" of technology 
on industrial activityq and its determining role in 
industry. 
For Blauner, working on the relationship between 
alienation and types of technology - and defining 
alienation on the basis of 'personal experience' of 
job satisfaction (i. e. from a 'socio-psychological' 
view)(see 1964, p. 15) - workers' behaviour and 
feelings are determined by the technological 
framework of the process of work. Blauner defines 
technology as 'the complex of physical objects and 
technical operations (both manual and machine) 
regularly employed in turning out the goods and 
services produced by an industry. ' And more 
specifically, he continues, 'Technology signifies 
primarily the machine system, the level and type of 
mechanization, but it includes also the technical 
"know-how" and mechanical skills involved in 
production. '(ibid. p. 6) For Blauner, 'technology, more 
than any other factorg determines the nature of job 
tasks performed. *'(p. 8) However, 
'the impact of 
technology is greatest with respect to 
powerlessness'(p. 169) -as one of four aspects of his 
concept of alienation. (for a discussion of this 
school of industrial sociology see Silvermanv 19709 
Chapt. 5) 
0 Many writers within this broad tradition of 
technological determinism are to some degree or other 
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influenced by a particular interpretation of Marx 
(including Blauner, see for example his discussion on 
Marx, pp. 3-5). In most cases, by taking technology to 
be synonymous with Marx's concept of "forces of 
production" (see, for example, Burns 1969), they 
regarded the progress and development of technology 
as the primary force behind social change. Within 
Marxism itself, the technicist school tends to regard 
technology as beyond class struggle (Reinfelder 1980, 
gives details of this school). 
On the issue of Marx's alleged "technological 
determinism" there are a number of positions taken by 
different students of "marxology". Gouldner, for 
example, states that for Marx 'technology's 
neutrality enables it to be transferred to a 
socialist system. '(1980, p. 269, my emphasis) It is 
certainly true that, for Marx, a new social system 
would necessarily inherit the previous system of 
technology. Or, to put it another way, material 
elements of a new social system are born within the 
womb of the old form of society. But no where does 
Marx, at least as far as I am aware of, uses the 
notion of the "neutrality" of technology - which has 
itself great ideological connotations. 
For Show (1978), and with Cohen (1984), the primacy 
of the productive forces is of fundamental importance 
in Marx. This is sometimes taken by many critics and 
followers of Marx as a form of technological 
determinism. But the conceptual distinction between 
"productive forces" and "technology" is often 
overlooked; and Marx's conception ( as opposed to a 
"definition") of technology is almost completely 
neglected. As Rosenberg (1976 and 1982) has 
forcefully argued, it is a mistake to attach a 
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"vulgar" (generally taken to refer to the stance 
taken by writers such as White 1949) technological 
determinist position to Marx. In his words, 'it is 
easy to demonstrate that Marx subscribed to no such 
simplistic view. '(1981, p. 11) And in fact many Marxist 
writers have challenged the so-called "orthodox" 
Marxist thesis of the primacy of the forces of 
production, asserting the priority of social 
relations over productive forces (see, for example, 
Anderson 19749p. 204; Bettelheim 19769pp. 86ff; 
Althusser and Balibar 1977, pp. 233ff). 
An influential group, writing with a certain tint of 
"technological determinism", is the so-called "post- 
industrial society" theorists (see Kumar 19869 
Chapt. 6). A number of intellectuals, mainly among 
academics (particularly in sociology) but also 
outside of the academic tradition, began to develop a 
radical critique of the dominant tradition of 
"progressive" industrialism with its emphasis on 
stability and continuation of the established 
industrial order. On the basis of the fantastic 
advance of science and technology (in particular the 
development of computers, etc. ), and the increasing 
contradiction and crisis within the existing 
industrial system, these writers not only challenged 
the previous generation of social theorists, but also 
attempted to produce new ideas and visions of a 
future "Post-industrial" order. (See, for example, 
Bell 1973; Touraine 1971; Brzezinski 1977; Toffler 
1970 and 1981) 
In this there is a certain general agreement between 
these and other writers from the "old" liberal 
tradition. Though not at the "extreme" end of 
technological determinist tradition, Galbraith (1972) 
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also places a great deal of emphasis on the influence 
of technological development on the rise of a 
technocratic stratum. And both Ellul (1965) and 
Maynaud (1968) had, of course, already stressed the 
critical importance of the so-called technical 
experts in the social order. But Ellul's definition 
of "technique" (which I have already referred to) is 
so wide-ranging that on the basis of his definition 
it would be difficult to regard him as a strict 
"technological determinist". Although the arguments 
produced throughout his book clearly puts him in that 
tradition. For example: 'It is useless to rail against 
capitalism', Ellul argues, for capitalism 'did not 
create our world, the machine did ... The machine took 
its place in a social milieu that was not made for 
it, and for that reason created the inhuman society 
in which we live. '(1965, p. 5) 
This inconsistency in the application of the 
definition given, to the analysis provided, is also 
visible in some other writers on technology. For 
example, while Kranzberg and Pursell (1967a) see 
technology as "neutral"; that is, as they say , 
technology 'per se can be regarded as either good or 
bad, depending on the use which man makes of 
it'(p. 705). They nevertheless go on to state 
that: 'technology builds a bridge. It is a rigid 
structure, going from point A to point B. The 
rigidity of the bridge restricts man before he sets 
foot on it; he can go only from point A to point B on 
the bridge. '(P-706) 
0 In opposition to the notion of technological 
determinism a strong argument is put forward by a 
number of writers that view technology as in some 
sense the product and result of a certain system of 
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social relations. As Noble (1984, p. xiii) states: 'the 
process of technological development is essentially 
social.. Beyond the very real constraints of energy 
and matter exists a realm in which human thoughts and 
actions remain decisive. ' If for Winner (1977, pp. 57- 
73) "technology shapes technology", for Noble 
(1979a, p. 19) behind technology lies the 'very social 
relations' that are being affected, 
I would argue, that perhaps Winner and Noble are both 
right. For technology is not only shaped by a certain 
system of social relations, but also by the already 
existing technological system-. Every generation 
inherits a given set of instruments and methods or 
techniques of production and on that basis new 
technology and techniques are produced or previous 
11tools" and methods modified. Thus existing 
techniques and technologies do provide a basic 
framework for further intellectual and imaginative 
developments (for an interesting discussion see Edge 
1974-75, and Schon 1963). Moreover, not only a given 
device is part of, and integral to, a social system, 
it is also, generally, part of a system of 
technologies (see, for example, Hughes' discussion of 
Edison and the development of electricity industry, 
19719 1983 and 1985). 
It is interesting that within the broad tradition of 
"social determination", some writers have developed a 
more specific and controversial thesis that 
'technical things have political qualities. '(Winner 
1985, p. 26) For Winner, technologies contain political 
properties in two ways: Firstly, in the way technical 
instruments and systems are designed and arranged in 
order to become 'a way of settling an issue in a 
particular community. ' Secondly, technologies that 
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are 'inherently political', that is 'man-made systems 
that appear to require, or to be strongly compatible 
with particular kinds of political 
relationships. '(p. 27; for an earlier argument on more 
or less the same theme see Mumford 1964)Winner's (see 
1977) position on technology is very close to that of 
the Frankfurt school; especially to writers such as 
Marcuse (see 1968 and 1969a) and Habermas (1971, see 
pp. 81-122) who argue that science and technology in 
the West are elements of a framework of control and 
domination over nature and people. It is not that 
domination, according to Marcuse (1968, pp. 166ff), is 
merely perpetuated and extended through technology, 
'but as technology'. 
And for Marcuse, and in fact many writers of the 
Frankfurt school, technology is the major vehicle of 
reification. The fetishism of technology and the 
basic relations of alienation which underlie 
capitalist production relations, seem to be viewed 
not as the product of wage-labour/capital relations, 
but that of "industry", or technology, as such (for a 
criticism of this position see Colletti 1976, pp. 134- 
140). The social determination of technology is taken 
as a general notion, rather than the specific meaning 
that Marx had developed, as I shall attempt to show 
in this study; namely that technology should be 
viewed not merely as a social product, but as 
capital. 
For some recent writers, opposed to technological 
determinism, it is the "labour process" and the 
capitalist-worker relations which are crucial in 
understanding the role, function and implications of 
technology. By far the most influential recent work 
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on this score is Harry Braverman's Labor and Monopoly 
Capital (1974). 
A cen tral theme of Braverman's book is that the 
development of "scientific management" was directly 
linked to the process of scientific and technological 
revolution. The combination of these two developments 
together played an integral part in the rise of 
monopoly capitalism as a distinct phase in the 
developmental process of the capitalist mode of 
production. This process involved the transformation 
of the conditions of the subordination of labour: 
From formal subordination characteristic of early 
capitalism to real subordination of the later modern 
industrial capitalism. 
The importance of this transformation, for Braverman, 
was the manner in which the working class came to be 
dispossessed of even its limited degree of control 
over the process of work. This process of 
dispossession was achieved, according to Braverman, 
through both organizational changes and technological 
developments which produced a process of deskilling 
and homogenization of labour. For Braverman, contrary 
to what has been alleged by some of his critics, the 
process of dispossession is explicitly an essential 
aspect of the process of capital accumulation. 
Braverman's book has generated a host of critical 
responses. Many critics have concentrated on his 
"objectivist" notion of the working class; the fact 
that he allegedly fails to take adequate account of 
the essential role of the class struggle in the 
determination of the course of the development of the 
labour process (see, for example, Palmer 1975; 
Nichols 1977; Friedman 1977a; Jacoby 1977). 
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Braverman, according to Schwarz (1977, p. 162), tends 
to ignore the role of the working class as both 
active and problematic 'within the mechanism of 
accumulation. ' Coombes (1985, p. 183) also refers to 
1 the relative. absence of the role of class struggle 
in determining the processes' which Braverman 
analyses. 
This "f ai lure" to recognize the role of class 
struggle, according to these critics, leads Braverman 
into implying that capital's domination of labour is 
complete and almost absolute. Thus, according to Tony 
Elger (1979, p. 60): 'For Braverman the process of 
degradation of work and the disciplining effect of 
the reserve army of labour together appear to produce 
a virtually inert working class, unable to pose any 
substantial problems for capital either within 
production or beyond it. ' And, in this context, 
Friedman (1977a and 1977b) insists that working class 
resistance should not be neglected as a force which 
causes accommodating changes in the production 
process - and it should be added also in technology. 
But a further criticism levelled at Braverman is in 
respect of his conception of technology Braverman, 
according to Burawoy (1985, pp. 50-4) is not altogether 
clear on the question of the "neutrality" of 
technology. There is no doubt that Braverman gives 
some conflicting statements with regards to the 
character of technology under capitalism - or on the 
question of the specific social/technical aspects of 
technology-(see 1974, e. g. pp. 281-2 and 230) However, 
what is on the whole certainly clear from his work is 
that his conception (both implicitly and explicitly) 
revolves around the manner of employment and use of 
instruments, machines, etc., as technologies - what 
Xx 
is crucial for him is the social and not the to technical" aspect of technology. This is a 
conception which, it seems to me, is at odds with 
that of Marx's. 
Thus, in conclusion, we have seen that despite the 
varying emphasis on specific aspects of the 
technological phenomenon, the "definition" of 
technology seems to vacillate between some form of 
activity and process, knowledge to do with the latter 
or of how to make and apply artifacts, the physical 
objects or artifacts themselves, or a combination of 
these. There is certainly a "problem" of definition. 
And this problem is not confined to one or the other 
schools of thought or traditions; it actually runs 
through all of these. 
The definition of concepts changes, of course, with 
the historical changes that take place in the social 
reality which a concept is meant to convey. Take the 
example of "bureaucracy", which in reality had 
existed in the ancient Chinese, Persian, etc. social 
systems. But what it meant then, its role, function, 
and form in those ancient civilisations, has little 
to do, for instance, with Weber's concept of the 
rational bureaucracy. 
Similarly with technology; what it signifies today 
should reflect the reality of its role, fun ction, and 
form in the currently existing and dominant social 
system. It is not the case that the various 
definitions given above are "wrong" in themselves. 
The important point is whether they correspond to the 
reality of the technological phenomenon today, and 
thus whether their usage aids and advances our 
understanding of this reality. 
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Therefore, for example, Marx tends to "def ine" his 
conception of technology through a process of 
examination and explanation of the subject he iý 
investigating, rather than giving a once for all, or 
a universally applicable definition of the term. 
Whether this method of arriving at a "definition" 
through a process of enquiry, is valid and justified 
or not, ultimately depends on the correspondence 
between the particular conception of technology and 
the reality it reflects or expresses. 
Chapter One 
The Concept of Productive Forces 
Introduction 
In this chapter I intend to examine Marx's concept of 
"productive forces" as afirst move towards an 
understanding and evaluation of his conception of 
technology. Although the concept of productive forces 
is clearly central to Marx's entire theoretical and 
intellectual framework, there is no "definition" of 
this concept to be found in any of Marx's works. The 
concept belongs to Marx's "theory of history", or 
rather, to the set of ideas and propositions Marx 
(and Engels) developed and set forth on the general 
evolution of human society, the process of change and 
development of human history. 
Though these ideas and propositions are often 
referred to and regarded by some writers as a 
to theory", they were never actually formulated into a 
coherent theoretical system by Marx himself. What we 
have in Marx is not a finished theory of history as 
such, but a number of general statements containing 
certain propositions and ideas; what is called a 
materialist conception of h. In fact, as 
McLellan has pointed out, this conception 'was viewed 
[by Marx himself-RR] more as a method or approach 
than as a fully developed system of ideas. 
'(see 
1971, p, 123) Thus also with the concept of productive 
forces: it is widely used by Marx, but we have no 
coherent and rigorously developed analysis and 
formulation of the concept to fall back on, And 
henceg to begin with at least, the problem of 
interpretation and the difficulty of application: the 
I 
concept - its precise meaning, its status and role, 
and how it sliould be applied, and so on - has been a 
major subject of debate and controversy almost ever 
since it was first proposed. 
Aside from the difficulty of interpretation, and so 
on, a problem that is directly related to the subject 
of this study is that the concept is both broad in 
itself - covering a number of different elements 
involved in the productive process - and often used 
broadly by Marx himself. What therefore needs to be 
done is not only to look into Marx's writings and to 
investigate his use of the concept, but also to look 
at and critically examine the concept itself in order 
to ascertain its relevance or otherwise with regards 
to the issue of the role of technology under 
capitalism according to Marx's view as well as its 
relevance to the notion of technology as capital. 
I shall begin this task by looking at some of Marx's 
works and attempt to extract, by means of an analysis 
of his writings on the subject, what I believe to be 
a reasonably accurate "meaning" of the concept of 
productive forces. I shall, however, confine the 
discussion presented in this chapter to those aspects 
of Marx's vieývs which are mainly concerned with, and 
relevant to, the basic objective of this study - 
bearing in mind the limitations mentioned in the 
"General Introduction". After a critical examination, 
and a discussion of some commentators on this 
particular subject, I shall then make an evaluation 
of the concept and attempt to ascertain its 
usefulness or otherwise for the understanding of 
Marx's conception of technology. 
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A Preliminary Observation 
In Marx's writings there are two distinct (though not 
separate) meanings which come across in the use of 
the concept of productive forces: One usage refers to 
certain social/material forces that Marx considered 
as essential not only to the functioning of the 
production process but also to the process of 
historical development and change of the social 
system of production. These, what I call historic and 
general s. ocial forces of production entail elements, 
categories, relations and agencies that go well 
beyond the merely technical or strictly material 
factors involved in the immediate and direct 
production process. 
Moreover, for Marx, in the different phases of human 
historical evolution different set of institutions, 
agencies and categories may act as a force of 
production. The state is one example which Marx seems 
to have considered as such a force of production in 
certain historical periods; the role of money (in 
its broad social sense) is another example which 
seems, at least implicitly, in some of Marx's 
writings, to have also been considered as having 
acted at certain times as such a force. 
This historical and general notion of productive 
forces, though not strictly relevant to this study 
and certainly a major cause of ambiguity in Marx's 
writings related to technology, is, however, 
important, I would suggest, as simply a recognition 
of the fact that for Marx, contrary to some of his 
followersý it is not a question of setting forth a 
fixed "definition" of productive forces which would 
be applicable under any and all circumstances. To use 
ý-t 
Marx's words from the Second Thesis on Feuerbach, 
wha t set of relations, categories, etc. , can be 
defined as a force of production is 'not a question 
of theory but a practical question'. That is, what 
category, etc., constitutes a force of production 
depends on particular historical conditions and 
circumstances, and can be ascertained only by an 
empirical observation of its role in the particular 
social system of production. 
Therefore I must here emphasise that the explanation 
presented in this chapter is only in relation to my 
particular examination of the conception of 
technology found in Marx which is specific to his 
theoretical analysis of the capitalist mode of 
production, and is not intended as a general rule 
necessarily applicable to other modes of production. 
Included as integral to his general notion of social 
forces of production, is Marx's second usage of the 
concept of productive forces which has a much 
narrower and more strict meaning. In this study it is 
this second usage which is significant. In this 
second usage only those elements which are essential 
to the actual functioning of the immediate production 
process, factors and elements which contribute 
"materially" within the work process and to 
production of "goods" (use-values) - including 
services - are forces of production. This strict 
meaning of productive forces excludes, therefore, all 
such elements which are not used in the act of 
productiong though they may be, and are, necessary 
for production to take place. 
The term was taken by Marx from classical political 
economy - from the expression of 
"productive power" 
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used by Smith and Ricardo. (1) And 
Smith and Ricardo, "productive 
expression primarily concerned with 
aspect of labour's productivity or 
improve output. It was on the 
quantitative expression that Marx 
term, as Therborn has pointed ot 
concept. '(2) 
we f ind that in 
power" was an 
the quantitative 
the capacity to 
basis of this 
transformed the 
it, 'into a new 
The term used by Marx, and generally translated as 
"produ ctive forces", is "Produktivkrafte". (3) The 
literal translation of this term is, however, 
"productive powers". But what is essential to Marx's 
'new concept' is not the quantitative aspect but the 
qualitative characteristics of "productive power". 
Marx's conception is concerned with the qualitative 
character of the ways and means of facilitating (and 
improving) labour's productivity. (4) In other words, 
the expression "productive power" as found in 
classical political economy, came to be later 
developed by Marx to refer to a whole complex of 
methods, power/capacities, material means 
(material/technological), facilitating the 
functioning and improvement of the social process of 
production. 
The distinction between the quantitative and 
qualitative aspect is important with regards to 
Marx's conception of the role of technological 
development and his views on the relationship between 
the latter and social/historical change, and even 
more particularly in relation to his 
ideas on the 
role and advance of production technology under 
capitalism -a point that will 
be looked at later on 
in the chapter on technological change and 
development. Suffice it to point out here, that there 
seems to be an ambiguity on Marx's position with 
regard's to the distinction between the notion of the 
If. growth" of productive capacity (i. e. in 
quantitative sense) with that of the "development" of 
productive forces (i. e. qualitative advance). Thus, 
are the two notions 'identical', or did Marx make a 
distinction between them? For example, according to 
David Conway (5): 'The growth of human productive 
capacity which Marx claims has occurred through 
history is identical with what Marx often calls the 
development of the productive forces. ' This matter 
and its significance, at least in terms of evaluating 
Marx's conception of technological change will be 
examined later. 
The development of the classical expression 
"productive power" into the 'new concept' of 
productive forces was heavily influenced, I believe, 
by two of the most important philosophical sources 
influencing Marx's intellectual outlook: namely, 
Aristotle and Hegel. I have briefly examined some of 
Aristotle's and Hegel's main observations and 
propositions relevant to the subject matter of this 
study - in Appendices I and . 
2- respectively. There is 
no doubt in my mind that Aristotle's notion of techne 
and Hegel's observations on the notion and process of 
objectification were of crucial significance to 
Marx's concept of productive forces and therefore 
also to his conception of technology. 
Aristotle's techne, for example, involves the same 
set of elements and categories as in Marx's concept: 
techne is the power which of necessity (e. g. because 
of the four causations mentioned in Appendix I) 
involves a fusion of knowledge as "skill", motion as 
purposive activity, and instrumental-material 
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conditions, which only as such can facilitate the 
actualization of the form, its realization as a 
product. (see Appx. I) It is, in other words, a 
conception which is identical to Marx's concept of 
productive forces. For the concept in Marx not only 
involves the saine categories, but signifies a similar 
fusion, or unity, of these. 
In Marxt the skill and activity are taken on board 
with the categories of "labour power" and "labour"; 
other elements are, in essence, the same: instruments 
(production technology), materials and other 
instrumental-material conditions. Marx's concept of 
the productive forces, like Aristotle's techneq is 
concerned with the general condition of every social 
form of production or "industry". And, as I shall try 
and show later on, when Marx comes to his ideas and 
analyses of production technology under capitalism, 
it is on the basis of this general condition that he 
develops his proposition on the " 
separation (or 
stabs traction") and externalization involved in the 
process of production which Marx took over from 
Hegel, particularly from the latter's ideas on the 
process of objectification. 
If for Aristotle (and the reality of his time) the 
process of production was precisely a 
'making' 
process as expressed in the very idea of techne; 
for 
Marx, though the concept of productive forces refers 
to that general condition, the actuality of the 
process under capitalism no longer reflects that 
fusion signified by the concept, but in fact, 
according to him, there is with capitalism what 
Hegel 
called the 'abstracting process' 
(on this see 
Appx-II). And for Marx this abstracting process 
begins with the separation of labour from the means 
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of production, and with this, and as a result of it, 
the social form of the elements and categories 
involved in the productive forces is fundamentally 
transformed. 
With this 'abstracting process' we come to the 
question of what Marx called the "relations of 
production". Here I shall only give a very brief 
explanation of this expression for the purpose of 
clarifying the basic distinction between the forces 
of production and social relations of production. 
Once again, however, there is a certain difficulty in 
the way the term "relations of production" is used by 
Marx. On many occasions, Marx tends to use the term 
to cover not one but two sets of relations. However, 
a critical examination of this problem, and the 
arguments for or against it, does not concern us here 
- the matter is not strictly relevant to this study. 
Suffice it to point out here, that when considering 
the labour process as such (the process of producing 
"goods" or services, or what Marx calls use-values), 
there is a set of relations which reflects the 
particular technical requirements of instruments, 
skill, techniques and methods, etc., and the manner 
of their combination (the mode of combination of the 
different elements of the productive forces in 
operation). Now, these we can call _technical 
relations of production. But, for Marx, such 
technical relations depend and are conditioned by the 
dominant relations that regulate access to and 
control over the productive forces and the very 
conditions of production; or what he often refers to 
as the social relations of production. 
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However, unless otherwise qualified Marx's term 
refers, strictly speaking, to this latter 
understanding. Thus, we have the following 
"definition": The concept of "relations of production" 
is an expression which, in its more strict sense, 
refers to the dominant set of relations which signify 
effective socio-economic control over the productive 
forces and the conditions of production. The concept, 
therefore, takes into account economic ownership, as 
distinct from legal ownership; it also stresses 
overall control rather than immediate control as a 
result of, for example, mere possession or-use of the 
productive forces. 
With this preliminary observation in mind, we can now 
proceed to look at the way Marx explains and develops 
his concept of productive forces, and what 
significance this has for the understanding of his 
conception of technology. I shall begin from some of 
Marx's early writings and leave out his later 
writings (e. g. in Capital, Grundrisse, etc. ) on the 
productive forces to be discussed in later sections 
which are more directly concerned with production 
technology in Marx. 
Although these early writings are heavily influenced 
by his critical outlook on philosophy and he has not 
as yet, in some of them at least, developed the 
various concepts borrowed from classical political 
economy and from Aristotle and Ilegel into what can be 
called (in the strict sense) Marxian concepts, 
nonetheless, as I shall attempt to show, his 
conception of "productive forces" contains, even at 
this stage, important insights for the understanding 
of his later works on production technology. 
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In his early writings no less than in his "mature" 
writings, Marx is concerned with the historical 
specificity of the forces of production under 
capitalism. He is concerned with the specific social 
character that these forces assume because of the 
particular social relations of production which 
dominate the entire social system of wealth creation. 
I believe this latter point to be an issue which is 
of fundamental importance to an understanding of 
Marx's conception of technology. And I shall, 
therefore, mainly concentrate in this chapter on 
clarifying this issue. 
2. Marx's Criticism of the Saint-Simon School 
and Friedrich List on "Productive Forces" 
If in Marx's early writings we are provided with only 
some vague hints as to what constitutes a productive 
force, there is nevertheless the beginnings of some 
insights (merely embryonic) towards propositions on 
the conditions of the functioning and mode of 
existence of productive forces. This we can see in 
relation to Marx's criticism of the Saint-Simon 
school and even more clearly from that of, for 
example, Friedrich List. (6) 
For Marx, the Saint-Simon school not only 'glorified' 
the productive power of 'industry', but 'confused' 
the productive force created and developed under 
capitalism with the latter conditions. As he writes: 
'the force that industry creates 
unconsciously and against its will 
is put to the 
credit of present-day industry and the two are 
confused'. (7) 
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In this passage, however, it seems that Marx is 
himself guilty of vagueness and ambiguity insofar as 
the use of the term 'industry' is concerned. What is 
the distinction between the 'industry' which 
'creates' these forces and the 'present-day' 
industry? He seems to have a twofold meaning of 
'industry' in mind. On the one hand 'industry' in the 
general sense of the system and conditions of 
productive activity or production; and on the other, 
it is also used by Marx here t0 refer to the 
capitalist conditions of production (i. e. 'present- 
day industry'). What Marx ,I would su ggest, is 
attempting to explain (though far from clearly and 
unambiguously) is the distinction between the 
specific social (and historical) form that productive 
activity and production take under capitalismg and 
'industry' as such, i. e. as the general conditions of 
human productive activityq or the 'making' process 
according to the Aristotelian viewq for example. 
For as he elaborates further: The forces of nature 
and the social forces which industry brings into 
being (conjures up), stand in the same relation to it 
as the proletariat. ' And, furthermore, he continues: 
'Today they are still the slaves of the bourgeois, 
and in them he [the "bourgeois"-RR] sees nothing but 
the instruments (the bearers) of his dirty (selfish) 
Just for profit; tomorrow they will break their 
chains and reveal themselves as the bearers of human 
development.. '(8) 
However, leaving aside his antipathetical remarks 
towards the bourgeoisie, insofar as the analysis in 
this chapter is concerned what is of immediate 
importance is how he viewed the 'forces' which 
'industry' conjures up (whatever he actually meant by 
/I. ' 
the term 'industry'). Four points stand out here: 
Firstly, that the productive forces are the property 
of the 'bourgeois' - Marx says: they are its 'slave'. 
Secondly, that productive forces are 'instruments' 
used to expand wealth. Thirdly, that Marx includes 
both the 'forces of nature' and 'social forces' as 
such instruments, as productive forces. And finally, 
according to him, the social character or form of the 
forces of production is determined by capitalist 
conditions of production. 
Concerning tli--*Ls final point, Marx makes a number of 
remarks whicli point to the shaping of these forces by 
capitalist relations: 'the bourgeois', he writes, 
'separates them from man and so distorts (transforms) 
them... '(9) And again, the form/character of 
productive forces is the result of 'the spell cast on 
industry'(10) and of 'the present-day conditions of 
existence that industry gives to these forces. '(11) 
In his criticism of List, Marx's remarks on the 
character of productive forces are more to the point: 
'Modern political economy', he writes, 'starts from 
the social system of competition. Free labour, that 
is to say, indirect slavery which offers itself for 
sale, is its principle. Its primary propositions are 
division of labour and the machine. And this can be 
given its highest development only in the 
factories.. '(12) Taking the remarks just mentioned 
and those referred to above, the character and 
constituents of the productive forces can now be 
somewhat more clearly identified. The social 
component of these forces, and that which is 
essential to the capitalistic character of these 
forces, are derived from the form of labour as 'free 
labour' (or wage-labour). The technical components, 
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according to Marx, are the method or technique of 
labour organization within the modern factory system 
and machinery (i. e. the technologies of modern 
industry). 
It is interesting also that in this criticism of 
List, Marx seems to recognize as valid the notion of 
the inseparability of the conception of productive 
forces and that of capitalist conditions. Thus in 
response to List's criticism of the classical school, 
he writes: 'If the "School" made no "scientific 
elaboration" of the theory of productive forces 
alongside and separately from the theory of exchange 
values, it acted in this way because such a 
separation is an arbitrary abstraction, because it is 
impossible and cannot go beyond general phrases. '(13) 
For List, the forces of wealth creation are both 
different and more important than wealth. It is 
important to note here that the term "wealth" was 
often used as a reference to capital. Marx is 
therefore not objecting to the merely "analytical" 
distinction between the forces of production and 
wealth creation, but to the theory that separates 
these forces from capital,, and makes one or the other 
into what he calls a 'phantom'(14). Thus, we have the 
following remark: 
'Some light is already thrown for us on the essence 
of the present-day "productive forces" by the 
fact 
that in the present state of affairs productive force 
consists not only in, for instance, making man's 
labour more efficient or natural and social forces 
more effective, but just as much 
in making labour 
cheaper or more unproductive 
for the worker. Hence 
orce is from the outset determined by 
exchange value. 
'(15) This latter point is of crucial 
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significance, as we shall see in later chapters, in 
relation to Marx's views on the role and function 
of production technology under capitalism. 
If for List the "causes" of wealth creation (capital 
production) - i. e. the "causes" being the productive 
forces - are quite different from wealth or capital 
itself; for Marx, this is not a simple matter of a 
difference between "cause and effect", between the 
productive force as "cause" and wealth or capital 
creation as "effect". As he explains: 'But if the 
effect is different from the cause, must not the 
nature of the effect be contained already in the 
cause? The cause inust already carry with it the 
determining feature that is manifested later in the 
effect. '(16) In other words, the "cause" or the 
productive forces, according to Marx, 'must already' 
have certain features which enables the production of 
wealth (the "effect") in the social form of capital. 
And it is from this standpoint of the determination 
of the character of productive forces by capital 
('exchange value') - something which we find more 
fully developed in Marx's later works, as we shall 
see later - that Marx criticises the degradation of 
"man" into a mere "force" of production of wealth 
(capital): 
'In order to destroy the mystical radiance which 
transfigures "productive force", one has only to 
consult any book of statistics. There one reads about 
water-power, steam-power7 manpower, horse-power. All 
these are "productive forces". ' And he tauntingly 
questions: 'Is it a high appreciation of man for him 
to figure as a "force" alongside horses, steam and 
water? '(17) 
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Therefore, even at this stage of his intellectual 
development, Marx had already formed some basic views 
as regards the process of degradation ("deskilling") 
of labour caused, according to him, by the one-sided 
development of productive forces under capitalism, 
as the following passage reveals: 
'Under the present system, if a crooked spine, 
twisted limbs Ia one-sided development and 
strengthening of certain muscles, etc., make you more 
capable of working (more productive), then your 
crooked spine, your twisted limbs, your one-sided 
muscular movement are a productive force. If your 
intellectual vacuity is more productive than your 
abundant intellectual activity, then your 
intellectual vacuity is a productive force, etc., 
etc. If the monotony of an occupation makes you 
better suited for that occupation, then monotony is a 
productive force. '(18) 
This is an essential proposition which he later 
elaborated in Capital volume one. 
Thus to sum up the main points so far: 
The essential point which Marx is making is that 
once human beings are characterized as 'exchange 
values' - i. e. as free labour, labour for sale, as 
commodities, or as he puts it, as 
'a "thing"'(19) for 
sale - then the 'whole of human society becomes 
merely a machine for the creation of wealth. 
'(20) And 
this social characteristic of capitalism transforms 
(or according to Marx 'distorts') the character and 
form of productive forces. 
Moreoverg we have seen that Marx recognizes not only 
technique (the method of organizing labour) and 
production technology 
(the machine), but also the 
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productive power of free labour as constituents of 
it productive forces". 
From early on therefore two insights can be discerned 
in Marx: (a) Marx's concept of productive forces is 
far from identical with that of "technologyll. And 
this is important to bear in mind in relation to his 
alleged "technological determinism" which I shall 
come to later. And (b) he recognizes a definite link 
between (a conditioning of) the productive forces and 
the historically specific social form of wealth 
creation under capitalism. 
However, the essential point raised by Marx - on the 
question of 'free labour' - is, at this stage in any 
case, neither supported by empirical/historical 
evidence, nor, indeed, by what could be regarded as a 
substantial argumentation of the issue. What we have 
here is no more than a mere set of statements of a 
still half-baked idea, heavily coloured by the school 
of political economy. In short, the statements 
reflect, I would submit, little more than the 
beginnings of the recognition of the relationship 
between the social form of labour and of wealth 
creation (hence of production) and the specific 
character of the productive forces. Up to this point, 
therefore, it would seem that Marx's conception of 
the productive forces is still undeveloped. And at 
best one could only detect what amounts to no more 
than a few signs of an emerging break with the 
expression of 
"productive power" as found in 
classical political economy. 
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3. The German Ideology and the "nature" 
of the Productive Forces 
The concept of productive forces appears as even 
more of a problematical issue in The German Ideology 
than in Marx's other works. And this despite the fact 
that this work sets forth Marx's (and Engels') first 
proper theoretical formulation of the materialist 
conception of history, in which the concept of 
productive forces has a decidedly fundamental place. 
True that the bulk of the work is concerned with a 
thorough criticism of German idealist philosophy; but 
precisely for that very reason one would have 
expected, if not a "definition", at least a broad 
explanation of such a vitally important concept (in 
terms of Marx's materialist theory). There can 
obviously be no denying that such a laps in 
intellectual (and theoretical) rigour is and has been 
a major cause of confusion on the meaning of 
productive forces. 
Nevertheless it is from 
German Ideology that we ca 
partial it might be) on 
forces as conceived by 
relevance of which becomes 
interpretational notion of 
(the first 
n throw some 
the nature 
Marx (and 
apparent in 
technology 
part of) The 
light (however 
of productive 
Engels); the 
relation to my 
as capital. 
The problem, stated simply, is concerned with the 
question of Marx's social/material categorization of 
"forces of production". I am of course well aware 
that this problem is central to Marx's philosophical 
framework and is a highly complex issue that has been 
a subject of much debate and criticism among a whole 
number of different schools of thought, the 
discussion of which is not only beyond my competence 
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but goes well beyond the scope of this study. What I 
intend to do here, therefore, is to give only a brief 
examination of this problem, and only insofar as it 
is relevant to the clarification of the main thesis 
of this study. 
The stated premises of the materialist conception of 
history are: 'the real individuals, their activity 
and the material conditions of their life'. (21) And 
the 'essence' of the materialist conception is given 
as Isocial being', that is, 'individuals, not as they 
may appear in their own or other people's 
imagination, but as they actual are, i. e., as they 
act, produce materially, and hence as they work under 
definite material limits, presuppositions and 
conditions independent of their will. '(22) 
This notion of "social being" has a great 
significance in Marx's thoughts. (23) It does not 
simply refer to the existence of individuals in 
11society" and their participation in "nature", but in 
fact to the unity of the material/natural (i. e. the 
fact of "being" as such) and the social. The 
existence of 'real individuals' is at once one of 
material/natural and social existence. And that the 
objective conditions (material/natural conditions) 
must already include the subject . 
Creal 
individuals'). For without the subject (the principal 
premise), objective conditions 
(or "materiality") 
becomes purely metaphysical. (24) For Marx, I would 
suggestq this notion is not a philosophical 
generalization, but a practical and methodological 
guide to every field of investigation 
insofar as 
human society is concerned, including the nature 
(and 
role) of productive forces. 
Iq 
The designation of the fundamental and primary 
conditions of human existence by the term "material"ý 
for example - as in the expression 'material 
productive forces' - is not a reference to the 
"superior" status of the "material" as against the 
"social". Since from the outset and, from Marx's 
materialist conception, axiomatically, the "material" 
productive forces are, in their very distinctiveness 
(their material property, physical and technical 
structure), social. Marx's purpose is not, however, 
to confuse the "material" distinctiveness of the 
productive forces and the "social"q but to establish 
their material distinctiveness as social 
determined. 
For Marx the principal and primary distinguishing 
factor of the existence of 'real individuals' and 
their 'activity', that which expresses and reflects 
the essence of their 'social being', rests on the 
relationship between them and nature which is 
mediated by their 'physical organization'(25) in the 
act of productione 
Thus, for him the notion of I social being' 
necessarily includesq as an inescapable nature- 
imposed condition, the activity of individuals in the 
production of life (i. e. 'social being' itself): 
'What they are', according to Marx (and Engels), 
'therefore, coincides with their production, both 
with what they produce and with how they 
produce. '(26) 
As far as Marx is concerned, therefore, we cannot 
separate it production" from 
"social being". Production 
is the production of life; the forces of production 
are all those 
"forces" which the very fact of social 
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existence (i. e. 'social being') itself creates. In 
setting out the premises of the materialist 
conception of history in The German Ideology, Marx 
attempts to define the materiality of human life as a 
social process (in opposition to both philosophical 
idealism and mechanical materialism). The importance 
of this in relation to the forces of production is in 
this that they cannot haveg according to the 
materialist conception itself, a causal priority 
over human life as a social process (27), for the 
simple reason that the "forces" are only forces of 
production because of their social determination: 'The 
form of intercourse determined by the existing 
productive forces at all previous historical stages, 
and in its turn determining these, is civil 
society. '(28) 
However, the propositions set out in The German 
Ideology fail to go beyond the conception of the 
unity of the material and the social. In a sense, 
what we have here is a general notion of "social 
determination" - that is, a simple statement: it is 
the social relations that determine a "something" as 
a force of production. Yet, we also have the 
determining role of production. At the same time, we 
are told by Marx that productive forces have an 
objectivity or are material (both in the 
philosophical sense and in actuality). How can this 
be, and what does it mean? 
There is no denying that life involves (obviously) 
the production of means of life; nor can one deny 
that life and production are necessarily social. And 
that social production, of course, involves certain 
objective (natural/material) 
"f orces". But, then, 
does the fact that the act of production is social 
t/ 
necessarily mean that the forces involved in that act 
are socially determined? There are, of course, 
certain forces that one could say areq as it were, 
inherently socially determined - and undeniably so. 
The most obvious is what Marx called "labour power". 
But then, what of "water-power" or "wind", and so on? 
These forces are certainly objective, natural; but 
are they socially determined? 
Certainly, in the sense of harnessing these natural 
forces, one could make a case that when and because 
they are harnessed, then they are 'Isocially 
determined". But, even then there is a problem: is it 
the wind or the instrument that harnesses it (e. g. 
the windmill) which is socially determined? In short, 
where do we draw the line? And this applies not just 
to wind-power or water-power, but to a whole complex 
of factors involved in the act of production. This is 
a problem, in other words, that concerns the question 
of the nature of productive forces. And it is a 
problem that, except in a very broad and general 
sense, is not tackled in The German Ideology. 
Thus, if the materialist conception set down in this 
work can be considered as crucial to Marx's 
development of the 'new concept' of productive 
forces, and indeed to his later conception of 
technology, it is, I believe, accurate in a 
methodological sense only. In other words, as 
far as 
the thesis of this study is concerned, it is only on 
that basis that it is possible to deduce a number of 
general points from the propositions contained 
in 
The German I-deology: 
All elements of the productive forces 
(and hence 
technology), for Marx, are inextricably bound up 
with, and defined by, the social: 
'civil society', as 
22'. 
Marx writes, 'is the true focus and theatre of all 
history.. '(29) If the productive forces have 
of primacy", or if production technology has in modern 
times become a "determining" force, the "causal" 
factor is not to be sought in these "forces" as 
independent or autonomous entities, but in the 
'theatre of all history', in civil society. The 
nature of productive forces, at least in a general 
sense and tentatively, is considered as not merely 
material, natural, technical, or physical, as 
separate from the social. It is in all its various 
aspects of "being-in-itself" social. 
But Marx's conception, at this stage, does not help 
us understand the role of the different elements of 
the productive forces in the capitalist (or any 
other) process of production. For the practical 
purpose of examining (empirically) the social and/or 
the individual labour process, the concept of 
productive forces, as used by Marx up to this point, 
is of little use. Since it does not specify the 
operation and function of particular factors involved 
in the production process* Its usefulness is, 
therefore, limited to the alternative approach that 
one can take as a starting point - e. g. we can start 
not with production technology as something purely 
material/technicalg but as a social productive 
(material/technical) factor. And thus, in examining 
the operation of the labour process and specifically 
from a sociological stance, one important issue 
is, 
then: can or should one consider production 
technology as merely "passive", as simply something 
being used technically? Is it a "servant" or a 
11master"q or what? 
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4. Productive Forces: "Determinism" and "Primacyll 
It is in The Poverty of Philosophy(30) - which is in 
fact a polemical work, a critique of Proudhon's 
Philosophy of Poverty - that we find the first 
"economic" references as regards the concept of 
productive forces. The term "economic" here, as in 
Marx generally, is an indirect reference to the 
capitalist system of production, exchange, etc. We 
see in this work, more than any other previous 
writing, a move towards the conceptual breakdown of 
the components of "productive forces" - referring to 
the "means of production", "instruments of 
production", "machinery"ý etc. - and towards a first 
(though still sketchy) "explanation" of the 
"determinism" and "primacy" of the productive forces. 
In criticising Proudhon's statement that 'it is man's 
free will that gives rise to the opposition between 
use value and exchange value', and his conception of 
the 'free producer', Marx points to the two basic 
limitations as regards the concept of "free will" 
even as concerning the 'master' of the means of 
production (i. e. the capitalist). On the one hand he 
refers to the determining condition of exchange and 
lience monetary constraint (i. e. that everything 
produced has to be sold, and is produced for sale 
within a competitive system), on the other, he refers 
to the level of the development of the productive 
forces. And he writes: 
'The producer7 the moment he produces in a society 
founded on the division of labour and on exchange. -is 
forced to sell. M. Proudhon makes the producer master 
of the means of production; 
but lie will agree with us 
that his means of production do not depend on 
free 
will. Moreover7 many of these means of production are 
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products which he olets from the outside, and in 
modern production he is not even free to produce the 
amounts he wants. The -. icttial degree of development of 
the productive forces compels him to produce on such 
or such a scale. '(31) 
In this passage he is, of course, referring to the 
systemic limitation of "freedom" which affects both 
the capitalist producer and the worker; a limitation 
which is based and conditioned by the relationship 
between the capitalist and the worker not as 
individuals but as class agents. Marx's concept which 
expresses this class relationship is the concept of 
"relations of production" previously mentioned - 
these relations are, according to Marx, 'social 
relations based on class antagonism': 'These 
relations', Marx writes, 'are not relations between 
individual and individualq but between worker and 
capitalist, between farmer and landlord, etc. Wipe 
out these relations and you annihilate all 
society.. '(32) 
It is, for Marx, these specific, historically formed 
social relations (i. e. capitalist relations of 
production) that condition both the particular manner 
of use and application of productive forces, as well 
as the specific form of their development. It 
is the 
capitalist relations which define what 
"forces" are 
or are not productive; and, further, what 
is meant by 
"productive" as such. This is crucial if we are to 
avoid the kind of generality which 
is so often 
attached to the terin 
"productive" or the concept of 
"productive forces"(33), which is, I would suggest, 
far from Marx's intention. The problem which 
for 
Marx is of critical and fundamental importance - and 
this is the very essence of his criticism of 
Proudhon 
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in The Poverty of Philo - is the historical 
explanation of the social conditioning and determination of productive forces. 
In his criticism of Proudhon's ahistorical 
to explanation" of the growth of human productive 
powers, of surplus and of wealth, under capitalism, 
as a result of the invention and application of 
techniques and technologies - which Proudhon 
"explains" in terms of the Prometheusian myth - Marx 
is at pains to show the concrete and empirically 
verifiable historical condition of such an expansion 
of productive powers and wealth. 
First of all what are the factors and elements, as 
constituents of the productive forces, which have 
enabled the augmentation of the productive power of 
labour? According to Marx (and there is general 
agreement on this score among both the classical 
economists as well as others including Proudhon 
himself) these are: 'the division of labour [here Marx 
is referring to the method of dividing labour as 
propounded by Adam Smith, and not to the social 
division or occupational stratification -RR1j the 
application of machineryq the exploitation of natural 
forces and scientific power.. ' It is these 
techniquesq technologies, and scientific capabilities 
that have brought forth the 'multiplying' of 'the 
productive forces of men'. (34) 
And the concrete example Marx gives is as follows: 
'In 1770 the population of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain was 15 million, and the productive 
population was 3 million. The scientific power of 
production equalled a population of about 
12 million 
individuals more. Therefore there were, altogether, 
16 
15 million of productive forces. Thus the productive 
power was to the population as 1 is to 1; and the 
scientific power was to the manual power as 4 is to 1. 
'In 1840 the population did not exceed 30 million: 
the productive population was 6 million. But the 
scientific power amounted to 650 million; that is, it 
was to the whole population as 21 is to 1, and to 
manual power as 108 is to 1. 
'In English society the working day thus acquired in 
seventy years a surplus of 2,700 per cent 
productivity; that is, in 1840 it produced 27 times 
as much as in 1770. '(35) 
What Marx is at-tempting to show here, I would 
suggest, is not the multiplying of "man'S11 productive 
forces (i. e. of human society in general), but that 
of an actual, historically conditioned society. He 
translates the scientific power of production (i. e. 
the use of techniques and technologies) in terms of 
an equivalent force of the productive population, and 
gives the ratio of the technological power to manual 
power, not in order to show how much the productive 
power of production 
' 
in general has been multiplied, 
but how much the productivity of wage-labour has 
increased because of the specific social conditions 
of capitalism. 
Thus, could one suppose, as Marx remarks, 'that the 
English could have produced this wealth without the 
historical conditions in which it was produced, such 
as: private accumulation of capital, modern division 
of labour, automatic workshops, anarchical 
competition, the wage system - in short, everything 
that is based upon class antagonism' ?, It is, for 
Marx, these socio-historical prerequisites which must 
2q 
be taken into account a 
conditions of existence 
productive forces and 
labour. '(36) 
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Although we come across this issue throughout Marx's 
writings, as we shall see in later chapters, it is in 
some of his writings of the 1840s, and particularly 
in The Poverty of Philosophy, that we come across 
certain passages which have now become the "standard" 
quotations given by all commentators (both critical 
and supportive) on this issue. Perhaps by far the 
most famous (or by some accounts infamous and 
notorious) passage is the following: 
'Social relations are closely bound up with 
productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces 
men change their mode of production; and in changing 
their mode of production, in changing the way of 
earning their living, they change all their social 
relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the 
feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the 
industrial capitalist. '(37) 
In this passage we have what appears as a 
"one-sided" 
cause and effect type of 
determination; the 
"productive forces" determine the 'mode of 
production' and thereby also social relations. 
The 
last sentence in fact appears to go even 
further; for 
it asserts that technology (in the forms of the hand- 
mill and steam-mill), rather than the forces (i. e. 
techniques, scientific power as well as technology) 
of production, is directly (Marx says 'gives') 
"responsible" for the existence of a particular form 
of social relations. 
The meaning of "primacy" (and "determinism") thus 
appears as unidirectional and causal in the 
analytical or formal logical sense (as opposed to 
Marx's own dialectics). And in this sense the 
productive forces appear to have "priority" over 
social relations. In other words9 it could be said 
that what Marx is saying here is that, it is not the 
'society with the feudal lord' which 'gives you' the 
hand-mill, nor the 'society with the industrial 
capitalist' that 'gives' the steam-mill, but in fact 
the particular technology in question. In short, 
apparently the "causal" connection and order cannot 
be reversed. It is social relations which are 
established 'in conformity' with the given 'material 
productivity'(38) and not the reverse. 
If for many critics of Marx, as well as "orthodox" 
supporters, the sentence concerning the "hand- 
mill/steam-mill" statement is an example of Marx's 
"technological" interpretation of historical 
developmentq for many "non-orthodox" Marxists, as 
well as non-Marxists sympathetic to Marx, the 
statement is merely an aphoristic assertion 
'tossed 
out'q in the words of Rosenberg, 
'in the heat of 
debate.. '(39) In other words, Marx's statement is 
"technologist" even if it is only an "aphorism". The 
argument that one should 
dismiss such an statement on 
the grounds of polemical writing or as 
due to 'the 
heat of debate' is simply to wash one's 
hands of the 
ýZq 
basic problematic. That Marx was inexorably committed (whether rightly or wrongly) to the "primacy" of the 
productive forces, both in his early and mature 
writings, is unquestionable. That such a commitmentg 
particularly in the form of the aphoristic assertion 
mentioned above, appears to "contradict" his equally 
intractable commitment to the socio-historical 
understanding and explanation of all aspects of human 
life, however, needs to be faced and explained. 
Thus it is important to take a slight digression at 
this point in order to clarify this apparent 
to contradiction". For this has obvious implications 
for the evaluation of Marx's conception of technology 
and the thesis of this study. 
I would suggest that Marx's aphorism ('The hand-mill 
gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam- 
mill, society with the industrial capitalist') in 
fact does not contradict his socio-historical stance, 
but we can only grasp this if we examine the 
statement both within the context it was written and 
from the advantageous position of his more developed 
views on productive forces, particularly as he 
developed his theory of capitalist mode of 
production. For and this is worth re-emphasising 
again and again Marx's entire intellectual life was 
wholly dedicated to the unravelling, understanding, 
explanation and critique of capitalism. And even when 
he digresses, as he often does, from his essential 
topic into previous historical developments and 
forms 
of societies 
(e. g. feudal, "Asiatic", ancient 
Greek/Romang etc. ), it is always 
in order to 
illuminateg by means of a comparative overview, the 
historical specificity of the capitalist mode of 
production. 
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This statement has in fact, I would suggest, more to 
do with the intention of asserting the difference 
between two social forms of: (a) authorit Z and 
domination over society; and (b) extraction and 
appropriation of surplus; than affirming the 
determinism of technology. The technological aspect 
of it (the references to the mills) is intended both 
to "correct" (at leas t in terms of Marx's 
materialist conceptiong whether one agrees with it or 
not) and to make concrete, the idealist and abstract 
Hegelian philosophy of history, which Proudhon 
attempted to use in his discourse on economicsq as 
well as, at the same time, to refute the position 
taken by classical economists that capitalist 
relations are 'fixed, immutable, eternal 
categories'(40); categories which Proudhon takes as 
'abstract thoughts' and #social relations in the 
underst I- to which Marx strongly objects. For, 
Proudhon categorically states: 'We are not giving a 
history according to the order in timev but according 
to the sequence of ideas. '(41) 
There has certainly been diverse and conflicting 
views, interpretations and explanations concerning 
this statement. One factor that I believe needs to be 
taken into account, which in my opinion has 
contributed to such conflicting and diverse views and 
has made the task of interpretation even more of a 
problem than it normally is, is Marx's actual wording 
of the sentence and its translation. 
Just to show the 
difficulty involvedq let me point out that the 
statement originally appears 
in French as follows: 'Le 
moulin a bras vous 
donnera la societe avec le 
suzerain; le moulin a vapeur, 
le societe avec le 
capitalisme industrial. 
'(42) While here, as it can be 
seeng Marx uses the 
future tense of the verb "to 
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give" (i. e. donnera), in the English edition, 
however, this has been translated into the present 
tense: 'The hand-mill gives Vou ... ' This use of the 
present tense rather than the future, I would 
suggest, can alter the meaning intended, or at least 
can result to certain differences in interpretation. 
Thus, for example, one could say that: The hand-mill 
11will give youll ., 'feudal lord', which may be 
interpreted to suggest that such an instrument 
conveys (or confers) a symbolic message which 
immediately brings to mind a particular form of 
relationship; as for example, the longbow "will give 
you" an image of English military relations during 
the Middle Ages. However, the phrase 'the hand-mill 
gives you'... 'feudal lord' may suggests a direct 
technological causal connection. 
Whatever the case may be, the point that I would like 
to make is that no interpretation and explanation can 
be infallible. Thus, the explanation I am about to 
present should be taken in the form of a proposition, 
and I do not claim with absolute certainty that it 
expresses precisely Marx's intended meaning (which we 
shall never know), nor that it is the final and 
definitive word on this subject. 
Nevertheless, it is certain to me that the wording of 
the above mentioned aphorism is neither accidental 
nor simply produced 
'in the heat of debate'; it is, I 
would maintain, intentional. It says: 
'The hand-mill 
gives you [or rather, will give you] a society with 
I it. I the feudal lord and not a 
"feudal society , the 
steam-mill' does not 
'give you a it capitalist 
society"q but a 
'society with the industrial 
capitalist'. 
(43) The distinction is important, and 
is not semantic or a play on words. 
(44) It is a 
distinction that focuses on, what Marx considers to 
be, the most essential relation in society, i. e. that 
relation which determines the form of extraction and 
appropriation of surplus. As Marx was to write later: 
'The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus- 
labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines 
the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows 
directly out of production itself and, in turn, 
reacts upon it as a determining element ... It is 
always the direct relationship of the owners of the 
conditions of production to the direct producers -a 
relation always naturally corresponding to a definite 
stage in the development of the methods of labour and 
thereby its social productivity - which reveals the 
innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire 
social structure.. '(45) 
It is this 'hidden basis' which Marx is pointing to 
in the above mentioned aphorism; i. e. he is referring 
to the relations of production and not the 'entire 
social structure'. Whether one agrees or disagrees 
with Marx's theoretical views and methodology, it 
cannot be denied that he was at least a 
"reasonably" 
competent social scientist for him to be well aware 
of the fact that the concept 
(and reality) of 
"feudal" or "capitalist" socieýy (i. e. 
'the entire 
social structure') involves far more complex 
relationsq institutions, etc., than the mere 
existence/domination of the 
'feudal lord' or 
'industrial capitalist'. 
Let us now analyse this statement according 
to three 
interrelated criteria: 
(A) Methods of Labour and Social Productivity: 
The 
comparison of the 
different technologies of the 
'hand-mill' and the 'steam-mill' is used 
here as 
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short-hand for the difference in the level of social 
productivity, i. e. the amount of surplus that can be 
extracted and appropriated Zýiven the differences in 
the level of development of the methods of labour 
which corresponds to the use of the different forms 
of technologies (the different "mills"). Thus, in 
, 
The 
Poverty of Philo I Marx writes: 'Labour is 
organized, is divided differently according to the 
instruments it has at its disposal. The hand-mill 
presupposes a different division of labour from the 
steam-mill. '(46) It is clearly obvious that by the 
term 'division of labour' here Marx does not mean the 
social divisioný or social stratification7 but the 
technical division and method of labour. 
There is nothing unusually Marxian in this statement; 
nor does it even smell of technological determinism. 
It is a kind of statement on the technical division 
and method of organization of labour that one can 
find in Adam Smith, etc., as well as similar types of 
such statement in every course book on management of 
production, on technology, etc. The hand-mill is a 
simple instrument, its use (and this can be verified 
empirically and historically) requires no more 
developed division of labour than that of a peasant 
family-household, and it was used as such; its 
productive potential was limited. The steam-mill, on 
the other hand, presupposes a radically 
different 
organization of direct labour 
(as evident from the 
historical records of the period of industrial 
revolution in Britain) which required a 
detailed 
division of collective labour; 
its productive 
potential in quantitative 
terms and in terms of 
surplus extraction was 
incomparably greater than the 
hand-mill. 
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(B) Ownership-Possession and Control: The structural 
simplicity and hence its inexpensiveness (simply 
because of the lower level of technical knowledge and 
materials that went towards its production), as well 
as the simplicity/ease of use, and lower cost of 
operations, of the hand-mill in comparison to the 
steam-mill (with a far greater technical and 
11scientific" knowledge and materials incorporated in 
its development and manufacture; as well as the 
enormously greater operating costs and complexity of 
use) entails a radically different social structure 
of ownership-possession and control of the two 
instruments. Thus, while the hand-mill could be 
owned/controlled by peasant family-households 
independently; the steam-mill already presupposes the 
formation and accumulation of a great deal of wealth 
(capital) as a prer quisite of its development. 
In short, it presupposes the historical development 
of mercantile capitalism (the formation and dominance 
of merchant capital), as it also presupposes the 
development of the early manufacturing method of 
organization and division of labour based on a new 
social form of labour as wage-labour, which Marx so 
often referred to in all his 
"economic" writings. 
Indeed, only a few pages from his reference to the 
11mills"q Marx criticises Proudhon for not taking into 
account the historical preconditions 
for the 
development of industrial technology and workshops. 
And he writes: 'The growth of the market, 
the 
accumulation of capital, 
the modification in the 
social position of the classes, 
a large number of 
persons being 
deprived of their sources of income, 
all these are 
historical preconditions for the 
formation of manufacture.. 
'(47) 
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Given these presuppositions, the actual application 
and use of the steam-mill transforms its owner into 
an industrial capitalist. The why and how of this 
transformation - that is, the transformation of 
merchant and early manufacturing capitalist into an 
industrial capitalist proper - are based on the 
particular technical requirements which the 
qualitative character of the new mechanical 
technology of the steam-powered mill (as an example) 
imposes on the internal organization of the labour 
process ( the creation 0f modern industrial 
workshops). It is the translation of a social 
function into a technical one. 
(C) Form of Authority-Domination: By taking the 
points raised in (A) and (B) into account, it is then 
possible to see why the social form of authority and 
domination - the form of social relationship involved 
in the process of extraction and appropriation of 
surplus - cannot but also be radically different in 
the case of operating units of production using a 
hand-mill and those using a steam-mill (as examples 
of qualitatively different technologies 
technologies which operate and function according to 
different sets of technical and functional 
principlesq the use of which therefore entails 
different forms of productive activity and methods of 
labour). 
With the hand-mill (or any technology of that type of 
qualitative characteristics) 
it is the direct 
producer which has control over 
the instrument. A 
non-producer 
(the particular authority) has no direct 
control over the technology 
itself and its use, hence 
no direct control over 
the manner (method) and amount 
of labour performed 
by its user(s), and therefore no 
ar 
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direct control over the appropriation of the surplus 
produced at source, at the point of production. The 
direct technical control (management) of the labour 
process is simply too costly and impossible, since 
such an undertaking requires direct supervision of a 
vast network of peasant family-households who are 
each independently in possession (or own/control) 
this particular instrument. The appropriation of 
surplus under such conditions of production requires 
direct political (military) control over the entire 
structure and community of a given network of 
productive units - it requiresp what Marx called, the 
use of "extra-economic coercion". 
It is in this sense that the hand-mill (again as an 
example of the type of technology being used) 'gives' 
(or 'will give') one conceptually the association of 
what was once the form of authority and domination 
which is exemplified by feudal lordship (the 'hidden 
basis' of the 'entire social structure' of feudal 
society). What is important here, therefore, is that 
the particular characteristics of the instrument 
being utilized (and hence the level of development of 
productive forces), entails the non-separation of the 
direct producers from the material conditions of 
production ( i. e. non-separation from the means of 
production), which thus entails a particular social 
form of labour and relationship between the direct 
producers and non-producers 
('rulers and ruled'). And 
the 'hand-mill' conveys to us and brings to our minds 
the "image" of those social productive conditions. 
By contrast, the steam-mill 
(given the 
presuppositions stated above) 
is directly controlled 
(owned) by the industrial capitalist; the method of 
labour which its use necessitates requires 
the direct 
A, 
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management of the performance of labour in detail. 
The application of this form of production technology 
(as against the hand-mill) and the social mechanism 
of the labour process it entails - i. e. the technical 
division of labour within the workshops based on such 
forms of technologies - demands a direct control over 
the labour process itself and the undisputed 
authority of the industrial capitalist over workers 
under his/her command. The use of the steam-mill 
already presupposes the separation of the direct 
producers from the means and conditions of 
production. 
This form of production therefore does not require 
the use of " ex tra- economic coercion" or the direct 
political (military) methods of appropriation. The 
form of authority and domination of the industrial 
capitalist - corresponding to the application of the 
industrial methods and technologies, as exemplified 
by the steam-mill - is direct and undisputed at the 
point of production (which feudal form of authority 
lacks). A form of authority which, however, appears 
as merely technical and economic 
(managerial), as 
against the directly political 
form of feudal 
lordship. Thusý the 'steam-mill' will give us an 
image of the social form and conditions of the rule 
of the (early) industrial capitalisto and obviously 
not of the feudal 
lord or even the merchant 
capitalistg etc. 
It is to this distinction that, I would suggest, 
Marx 
is referring in the case of the comparison 
of the two 
vomills",, It is a distinction which 
Marx considered as 
important for the understanding of 
the historical 
specifiCitY Of capitalism 
and to which he was to 
refer time and again 
as the following passage 
from 
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C2PLtal volume III shows: 'The authority assumed by 
the capitalist as the personification of capital 
, 
in 
the direct process of production, the social function 
performed by him in his capacity as manager and ruler 
of production, is essentially different from the 
authority exercised on the basis of production by 
means of slaves, serfs. etc. '(48) 
In the aphorism which I have attempted to analyse, 
technology is made responsible not for the social 
C from "feudalism" to "capitalism" - which is 
unfortunately one of the ways the sentence is often 
misinterpreted - nor is it meant to explain the 
#entire social structure' of feudal or capitalist 
societies. (49) It is meant, I would suggest, as a 
short-hand illustration of the material/technological 
conditions of production which corresponds (both in 
reality, or historically, and by conceptual 
association) to two historically specific social 
forms of authority and domination of the direct 
process of production (the specific social form of 
relationship involved in the extraction and 
appropriation of surplus) which, in Marx's way of 
thinking, form the essential domain within and as a 
result of which not only products are producedq 
but 
definite social relations are constantly and 
systematically reproduced. Indeedý the passage which 
contains the aphorism mentioned actually 
begins as 
follows: 1M. Proudhon the economist understands very 
well that men make clothq 
linen or silk materials in 
definite relations of production. But what 
he has not 
understood is that -these 
definite social relations 
are just as much produced 
by__men as 
-linen, _ __flax,. 
etc-'(50) 
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Although, of course, one may disagree with such a 
reductionism and criticise Marx for his use of the 
hand-mill in order to illustrate his case - rather 
than, for example, "land" as the dominant means of 
production under the feudal system. But then he was 
attempting to make his point by comparing like with 
like, using the example of the technique of "milling" 
(i. e. what is in the abstract the same basic and 
general productive activity, "milling" as such) 
under two different developmental levels of the 
productive force of technologyq which the use of 
"land" as an example would not have conveyed. 
In any case, this brings us back to the question of 
the "primacy" (and the "determinism") of the 
productive forces. According to my reading of Marx so 
far, for Marx, productive forces do not and cannot 
have a dynamics of their own as independent from the 
activity of the "real individuals", of "men" as 
"social beings" - and this is a point which is 
implicitly contained in the above discussion of the 
"mills" also. it is human activity itself, in the 
making and realization of life (of social being) 
which has created, discovered, harnessed, and 
developed these forces - that is, all the mental and 
physical powers 
(capacities), instruments, 
techniques, etc., which determine, as it were, the 
orbit of social life. 
This idea that for Marx productive 
forces do not 
possess a dynamics of their own 
independent of social 
productive activity appears 
to be at odds with the 
interpretation presented by some commentators. 
It may 
be said to contradict 
Marx's often repeated 
statements on the primacy 
of the productive forces. A 
question that may also 
be asked is that if productive 
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forces, according to the above accounty cannot have a dynamics of their own independent of social 
productive activity and hence social relations, then 
can it still be claimed that they can have a 
deterministic role? 
For some commentators that is not possible and they 
object to any notion of determinism and primacy: 
among these commentators some argue that Marx's views 
on this issue are plainly mistaken; others maintain 
that for Marx there is a "dialectical" relationship 
between forces and relations of production; and still 
others claim the forces of production are in essence 
relati"ons of production, the question is therefore 
misguided in any case. 
But there are also some commentators who defend 
Marx's notion of primacy. According to these 
commentators the primacy of the productive forces was 
taken by Marx to mean precisely the opposite of the 
above interpretation: productive forces for Marx, it 
is claimed, possess a dynamics of their own and are 
independent of social productive activity (or 
"economic" activity). 
In order to help clarify this issue, in the 
following 
section I shall look at some of the 
different views 
presented, concentrating more specifically at 
this 
stage, however, on the arguments presented 
in the 
defence of the latter interpretation. 
5. Productive Forces versus Relations of 
Production? 
A core problem within 
Marx's materialist conception 
is the relationship between the productive 
forces and 
the relations of production. 
His ideas on this 
4.1 
relationship appear in one form or another throughout 
his corpus, and are crucial to his conception of 
technology under capitalism. 
Insofar as the latter conception is concerned, the 
problem can be stated, simply, as follows: Marx's 
assertion that productive forces have primacy over 
the relations of production seems to contradict his 
own views that it is the capitalist relations of 
production that are responsible for (determine) not 
only the specific social character but also the 
development of the productive forces. 
An unfortunate response to this problem by some 
Marxists has been to invoke the idea of the so-called 
"dialectical" relation between the forces and 
relations of production. But this will not do. For 
although Marx was, of course, deeply committed to the 
dialectical method and rejected the simple cause and 
effect logic of inquiry, it would be quite wrong to 
hide behind the term "dialectics" every time we come 
across a proposition in Marx which seems ambiguous, 
contradictory or inconsistent. There is a problem 
which can either be explained or we need to accept 
that there can be no explanation based on Marx's 
writings, and there is therefore a need to look 
elsewhere to examine whether it can be supported or 
rejected. We cannot simply rely on a type of 
explan ation that rests on a vague idea of an ongoing 
interaction between the forces and relations of 
production, a kind of 
it truism" stating the 
"dialectical" interaction of technology and society, 
and so on. 
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Here I am not suggesting that there is not an 
"interaction" between forces and relations of 
production. What I am suggesting is that this idea 
cannot be a simple substitute for an explanation. We 
can, of course, insert by way of a qualification, and 
following from Engels' later letters, the idea of 
determinism 'in the last instance'- which Althusser 
and his followers used as a way of "resolving" the 
problem. (51) But this latter point is hardly an 
explanation; it in fact avoids the problem. It is 
not only far from clear what this idea of 'in the 
last instance' is supposed to mean, but it also 
fudges the issue. (52) What is more to the point, at 
least as far as the subject of this study is 
concerned, this is certainly not what we can find in 
Marx's writings. For there is no doubt that Marx is 
categorical: productive forces determine and they are 
primary - and not simply 'in the last instance'* 
An alternative approach is to redefine the concept of 
"productive forces". There has been a number of 
different attempts and conflicting re-formulations. 
However, one common response has been to collapse the 
two different concepts of "forces" and "relations" of 
production into an essentially undifferentiated set 
of relations. tie can see this in the following two 
passages from, respectively, an essay by Etienne 
Balibar and also from a major work by David Noble: 
Balibar states: 
'But from the theoretical point of view, the 
"productive forces", too, are a connexion of a 
certain type within the mode of production, in other 
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words, they, tOO9 are a relation 
production... '(einphasis in the original)(53) 
Noble, too, makes a similar point - though using 
somewhat different terms: 
'The classical Marxian view of the role of technology 
in capitalist society is more subtle and compelling. 
Here the fundamental relationship between society 
(social relations) and technology (forces of 
production) is a dialectical one, and thus, in 
essence, an identity... '(54) 
Let us leave aside the mistaken view that a 
"dialectical" relation between the two connotes 'an 
identity' of the two rather than as in Marx's 
dialectics their unity - this is a philosophical 
question that does not concern us here. There are, 
however, two difficulties which does concern us here: 
Firstly, both the above writers claim that this is 
the Marxian view, and yet Marx's texts are quite 
silent on this point of so-called 'identity'. Marx 
uses two different concepts, and despite his many 
weakness and lapses of rigour in the definition of 
the two concepts, there is no textual justification 
for the collapsing of the two concepts. We can, of 
course, say that Marx was wrong and the two are 
identical; that is well and fine, but it would not be 
justified, valid or proper to claim it as "Marx's" 
view (right or wrong). 
of 
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Secondly, and more to the point, if the forces and 
relations are 'in essence' an identity, or, what is 
basically the same, that the forces are a 'relation 
of production', then we come across a number of other 
problems, particularly in relation to Marx's 
references to ideas of "correspondence" and 
"contradiction" between forces and relations of 
production. For both the latter ideas can only apply 
if there is a distinction, but not an identity, 
between the forces and relations. Thus, if "forces of 
production" are "relations of production" how would 
one explain the idea, in Marx, of contradiction and 
also development of "forces" as well as social 
historical change? By attempting (falsely) to "solve" 
one problemg this would seem to me to create many 
others. 
There is also the slight question of what is the 
point of having two different concepts in any case? 
Why use the term "technology"(as in Noble) or 
"productive forces"(as in both Noble and Balibar)? 
And if they are meant to refer to two distinct set of 
I relations' (thus the need to use different concepts, 
it may be claimed) ttien, we are, essentially and as 
far as Marx's writings are concerned, back with the 
same old problem - namely, which set is determinant 
and primary? 
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A different approach taken has been to meet this 
problem head-on - that is, simply putp to defend 
Marx's view on the determinism and primacy of the 
productive forces as nothing short of a brand of 
"technological determinism". The defence of 
productive-force determinism is as old as Marxism 
itself but a more recent re-f ormulation of this, 
based on a thorough and systematic re-working of 
Marx's own ideas, is provided by G. A. Cohen. (55) 
Cohen's important work is concerned with Marx's 
materialist conception of history, and thus for this 
reason, much of his interpretation, analysis and 
arguments are not strictly relevant to the subject 
and thesis of this study. (56) There are however a 
number of issues which are and which therefore need 
to be looked at here, and at other relevant points in 
this study. 
A fundamental issue in Cohen's work, and one which 
directly concerns the discussion presented in this 
chapter, is the rejection of a social interpretation 
of the nature and characteristics of productive 
forces'. This issue is tied to Cohen's interpretation 
of Marx on the question of the determinism and 
primacy of the productive forces (and hence also of 
"technology") and which rests on his claim that in 
Marx we have a 'systematic opposition ... between the 
material and the social. '(57) Although his work 
contains a wide range of textual analysis, functional 
explanations and impressive analytical arguments, 
insofar as we are concerned here (i. e. not being 
concerned with a grand theory of history, but only 
dealing strictly with Marx's conception of technology 
under capitalism)9 it is this claim that is the main 
point of contention between his interpretation and 
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this study's interpretational notion of "technology 
as capital". 
The first claim Cohen makes in his technological 
interpretation is not onlY that for Marx 'productive 
forces are no sort of production relations'(58), but 
to argue, on the basis of Marx's 1895 Preface to A 
Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, 
that 'the productive forces are not part of the 
economic structure. '(59) And the economic structure 
for Marx, Cohen maintains, is 'the whole set of ... 
production relations' in a society. (60) 
It is to be noted that Cohen is not claiming here 
that there is merely a distinction between forces and 
relations of production, but that there is in fact a 
separation. Productive forces are separate from (not 
. part of) the economic structure of a society. 
They 
are a 'material substratum' separate and 
qualitatively different from the economic structure. 
We then have another claim: namely that the labour 
process or the technical relations of production, 
also, are not part of the economic structure because 
they, too, are 'material' relations and not social. 
But what is an 'economic structure'? We know what 
Cohen says, now let us see what Marx says in the same 
passage from the Preface which Cohen starts 
from. I 
shall first give the relevant passage quoted 
by Cohen 
from Marx, and then attempt a break-down analysis. 
Marx writes: 
'In the social production of their life, men enter 
into definite relations that are indispensable and 
independent of their will, relations of production 
which correspond to a definite stage of the 
ý05 
development of their material productive forces. The 
sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structureý the real basis, 
on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure ... 
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As Cohen says, it is unambiguous that here the 
economic structure is said to be the totality of 
relations of production. But Marx says: 'The sum total 
of these relations of production... ' Which relations 
are 'these' relations? Cohen maintains and argues 
(but is, I submit, unable to support his argument by 
clear and unambiguous textual references from Marx) 
that 'these' relations are social, relations of 
production on . As we have seen in my Introduction, 
sociýl relations are relationships of effective 
control and ownership as distinct from what are 
referred to as technical relations. And Cohen states 
categorically that technical relations, or as he 
calls them 'work relations', are not part of the 
economic structure according to Marx. He writes: 'Work 
relations are material relations of production, and, 
being material, they fall outside the economic 
structure. 1(61) 
But this is not what Marx says in the above passage. 
Marx says: 'In the social production of their life, 
men enter definite relations that are 
indispensable .... relations of production which 
correspond... ' etc. It is thus to 'these' definite 
relations that are indispensable to the social 
production of life that Marx is referring. There is 
no textual justification to nominate "social 
relations of production" as opposed to the "technical 
relations" as the only constituent of the economic 
structure. How is it possible to say that by 'these' 
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relations Marx means, and o means, "social 
relations" of ownership and effective control? 
We are, in fact, perfectly justified to say that in 
the social production of life work relations are 
definite relations that are indispensable, and it is 
therefore 'these' relations "alone" (i. e. technical 
relations alone) that must be included in the 
economic structure. 
Or, to put in a different proposition, we ca, n say 
that what Marx "means" by 'these' relations is both 
social and technical relations; that is, it is the 
two sets of relations together that must constitute 
an economic structure - after all Marx says: 'the sum 
total of these relations... ' 
There is no doubt that Marx makes a distinction 
between the productive forces and the relations of 
production (both the technical and the social). This 
point is textually demonstrable. But what I find 
extremely hard to accept is Cohen's interpretation 
that, for Marx, the forces are something only 
externa related to the economic structure and that 
only social relations ("ownership" relations) 
constitute the latter. There is, of course, a "good" 
reason for Cohen to exclude productive forces and 
technical relations from the economic structure, for 
otherwise his whole technological interpretation 
would collapse. For only if productive forces (and 
work relations) are externally related to the 
economic structure, is it in any way possible to 
claim that as such therefore they are subject to a 
set of laws, to a dynamics, which is different from 
the "historical" and the "social". (62) 
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His interpretation and the core of his arguments for 
this assertion are based on a peculiar reading of 
Marx's ideas on the relationship between nature and 
society. The following passage serves to illustrate 
this: 
'We are arguing, ' Cohen writes, 'that the familiar 
distinction between forces and relations of 
production is, in Marx, one of a set of contrasts 
between nature and society. Commentators have failed 
to remark how often he uses "material" as the antonym 
of "social" and of "formal", how "natural" belongs 
with "material" against "social". and how what is 
described as material also counts as the "content" of 
some form. (Other terms of the material vocabulary 
are "human", "simple", and "real", while "historical" 
and "economic" consort with "social". ) The upshot of 
these oppositions and identifications is that the 
matter or content of society is nature, whose form is 
the social form. '(63) 
For Cohen (or according to him, for Marx), the use of 
and the advance in productive forces are based on and 
derive d from "natural" impulses, or the interaction 
of "man and nature" - here two notions are conjoined 
as essential to the premise: 'human rationality, and 
the fact of scarcity.. '(64) - both of which are 
claimed to be "natural"(i. e. rationality and 
intelligence are "natural" to the human species; 
scarcity is a fact of "nature"). 
Cohen takes what Marx called the 'interchange with 
nature'(65) as content of history, as that which is 
essential anri unavoidable to all forms of society and 
under any economic structure (or social form, or 
social relations of production) - presumably a self- 
evident fact - but then he identifies this 'man- 
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nature' interchange with "material" production as 
separate from the social forms or the economic 
structure. And, it is, then, to this externally 
related "natural", "material" content that he 
attaches the productive forces (and their dynamics). 
Since no society can escape the interchange with 
nature, and since no such interchange (or "material" 
production) is possible without the productive 
forces, and, further, since, the combination of this 
interchange and the productive forces (or "material" 
production and "technology") are, according to Cohen, 
not part of the economic structure, then, it is the 
productive forces ("therefore") and not social 
relations that are primary. The productive forces 
have primacy and hence determine the form of the 
economic structure precisely because they belong to 
(are part of) the natural, material content. 
Productive forces belong to 'material production' as 
such, i. e. to that perennial and essential process of 
interaction between "man and nature", and not to the 
economic structure, they belong to a process which 
must take place irrespective of the form or type of 
economic structure. Thus, Cohen, by abstracting or 
externalizing "material production" (which includes 
work relations) and the productive forces from the 
historical, social forms, by assigning these to the 
realm of "nature and man", is in effect giving them a 
special status, a priority, which appears, self- 
evidently, as "natural". And as the content of socio- 
historic life, they must therefore prevail over the 
social forms (social relations of production) and as 
such they have primacy. 
Cohen accepts, and concedes, that for Marx, the 
content cannot exist without a social form. But, for 
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himq the content and the form areq once again, merely 
externally related (recall his use of the following 
words in the passage quoted above: fit material" 
against "social". .. "material" as the antonym of 
"social"... these oppositions... ' etc. ). Thus he 
writes: 'Material production does not occur in history 
except enveloped in a social form... '(66) The 
metaphor he uses here is quite revealing. The form is 
nothing but a wrapper (an envelop) that can be 
discarded without affecting the content. The social 
form appears as a packaging, it changes as a result 
of changes in the content but the reverse is not the 
case (at least not necessarily so, and not according 
to Cohen's method and logic of 'casual 
explanation'(67)). Particular social relations come 
into being because, and can remain dominant so long 
as, it is 'suitable' to the use and development of 
productive forces. It is, therefore, we are told, not 
the social relations that determine the character and 
advance of the productive forces. 
Thus, for example, production relations are 
capitalist at this moment in time because capitalist 
relations are suitable to the use and development of 
the productive forces at this moment in time, given 
the existing level of development of the latter. (68) 
The use and development of productive forces are not 
subject to the economic structure or the social form. 
As Cohen writes, here with reference to J. S. Mill and 
quoting him approvingly against Marx's criticism of 
Mill: 'One must separate the physical [read: "natural" 
or "material"-RR]] constraints on production from its 
contemporary market framework [read: "social form" or 
"economic structure"-RR], since "the conditions and 
laws of production would be the same as they are, if 
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the arrangements of society did not depend on 
Exchange, or did not admit of it. "'(69) 
Andy moreover, as Cohen is fully aware of the fact 
that material production, the use of productive 
forces, necessarily involves a set of relations (i. e. 
the labour process), and such relations (obviously) 
involve co-ordination/supervisory agents 
("management", capitalist or otherwise) and direct 
producers (wage-workers, or otherwise) and that 
therefore they are decidedly social and economic, if 
his technological interpretation, his 'primacy 
thesis', is to hold, logically at least, the 
technical relations (or twork relations) also must 
be ousted from the economic structure and placed 
alongside the productive forces. (70) And in order to 
do so, Cohen must designate them as 'non-social' too, 
and relegate them to the realm of Imaterial 
production' as such - these relations become, thus, 
'material relations of production' on . This 
d esocialised "labour process" thus includes, if one 
were to take Cohen's definition seriously, not "wage- 
workers" (or "serfs" or "slaves", etc. ), but "labour- 
power" as a constituent of the "material" productive 
forces - and the " labour- power" here is perceived as 
strictly a "material" property naturally belonging to 
human beingsq a characteristic which is "asocial". 
Whether Cohen's arguments for his brand of 'primacy 
thesis' - at the core of which lies his so-called 
'illuminating abstraction'(71) of separating the 
"material" from the "social" and "historical" - can 
be supported outside of Marx's framework and writings 
is debatable and requires an empirical examination of 
historical development (which is indeed equally true 
of Marx's conception however one may interpret it). 
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That ist however, not the concern of this study. But 
what does concern us here is whether or not his core 
argument is supported, as he alleges, by Marx's 
writings. I believe that it cannot be supported. To 
show this, I shall here only take one example of his 
citations from Marx which illustrates the dubious way 
in which he has used this (and other) passages from 
Marx to "support" his claim. 
Cohen quotes a passage from Capital, vol. III, which 
he asserts shows that Marx considered the "material" 
production (and hence also the material productive 
forces) as the 'asocial' content. (72) 
This is the way Cohen cites the passage: 
He first writes: '[Material production] Having 
"nothing to do with the social form"[Marx] it is' 
[then quoting Marx again] 
'the productive activity of human beings in general, 
by which they promote their interchange with nature, 
divested not only of every social form and well- 
defined character, but even in its bare natural 
existence, independent of society, removed from 
society ... an expression and confirmation of life 
which , the still non-social man 
in general has in 
common with the one who is in any way social. '(73) 
It is striking how much this passage contradicts my 
discussion and interpretation of Marx's early 
writings in this chapter. I have claimed (and 
textually supported this claim) that for Marx there 
can be no 'non-social man'; nor productive activity 
'divested' of social form; nor production and 
productive forces in their 'bare natural existence'. 
I have said that for Marx, productive forces (or, if 
you likeg "technolo, (,, ý, ") can never be 'independent of 
rz-f 
D7- 
society, removed from society'. And yet here in this 
passage Marx is apparently saying completely the 
opposite. This seems a clear and unambiguous support 
for Cohen's interpretation (against that being 
submitted in this chapter). 
However, before making too hasty a judgment, let us 
see what Marx actually says and in what context. 
First a word or two on the context: The passage in 
question is from a chapter entitled-*The T 
Formula. The "f ormula" refers to 'Capital-profit 
(profit of enterprise plus interest), land-ground- 
rent, labour-wages'(74). Rere Marx's objective is not 
only to criticise the economist's (classical 
political economy and what he calls "vulgar economy") 
confusion of material production in abstraction with 
the specific social form of production, as well as 
the mystification as portrayed by the trinity 
formula, but also, and what is far more to the pointp 
he is critical of the very abstraction Cohen himself 
makesq whict-i removes labour, land, means of 
production - in fact production and productive forces 
- from their specifically historical, social form. 
The tone of the whole chapter is sarcastic; Marx is 
mocking the economist's assumptionsý the formula, and 
the abstraction of labour as such, land as such, 
production as such, etc. - ridiculing the very 
perception of content separate from its social form. 
Now the passage as it appears in Marx: 
'And finally, as third party in this union [the 
trinity forrnula-RR]ý a mere ghost - "the" Labour, 
which is no more than an abstraction and taken by 
itself does not exist at all, or if we take ... the 
productive activity of human beings in general, by 
055 
which they promote .... 
1 etc. [The rest of the passage 
follows almost as it is given by Cohen. ](75) 
As it can be seen, Cohen has simply omitted the first 
four lines - he has disregarded them. But it is 
precisely in the first four lines that Marx's 
intention is given; and it is in these lines that 
Marx is ridiculing the very abstraction which Cohen 
asserts as essential to Marx's materialism. The 
"labour" that appears in the trinity formula is, in 
accordance with Marx's view, 'a mere ghost'; it is, 
as he puts it, "'the" Labour, productive activity in 
general, which as such 'an abstraction and taken by 
itself' - i. e. as labour in general - 'does not exist 
at all'. Marx is not saying here, as Cohen asserts2 
that there is such a thing as lasocial'(76) 
productive activity that belongs to the "material" 
realm as content separate from its social form. He is 
in fact mocking that very assumption! The "labour" 
that economists refer to is a 'ghost'2 so Marx claims 
(and rightly or wronglyq that is what he says). 
Moreover, we see a similar disregard for what Marx 
has actually written in a whole number of citations 
by Cohen, as well as the selection of sentences and 
passages (and, for the most part, these are taken out 
of their context) which only appear to favour his 
technological interpretation. He thus writes, again 
citing a few sentences from Marx, that the trinity 
formula 
'cites "capital, land and labour" as the three 
factors of production. For whereas "land" and 
"labour" designate material factors which "have 
nothing to do with the social form"[Marx-RR], 
"capital" is a social expression, designating means 
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of production in virtue of the capitalist form they 
assume at one historical stage. '(77) 
Once again, we need look no further than a paragraph 
before the one Cohen has taken the quoted sentence 
from to see that he has completely misread Marx. In 
that paragraph Marx actually says, by way of an 
introduction to what is to follow: 
'Wage-labour and landed property, capital, are 
historically determined social forms; one of labour, 
the other of monopolized terrestrial globe, and 
indeed both f orms corresponding to capital and 
belonging to the same economic formation of 
sOciety. '(78) 
Marx is not criticising the economists for including 
in the formula land and labour, which are supposedly 
non-social, along with capital which is social. He is 
criticising them for thinking that land and labour 
are simply (merely) material factors separate from 
their social form as wage-labour and landed-property. 
And this is precisely what Marx writes a few pages 
from the sentence quoted by Cohen: 
'In fact, since wage-labour does not appear as a 
socially determined form of labour, but rather all 
labour appears by its nature as wage-labour (thus 
appearing to those in the grip of capitalist 
production relations), the definite specific social 
forms assumed by the material conditions of labour - 
the produced means of production and land - with 
respect to wage-labour (just as they, in turn, 
conversely presuppose wage-labour), directly coincide 
with the material existence of these conditions of 
labour or with the form possessed by them in the 
actual labour-process... 
'(79) 
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As we shall also see later on in other chapters, Marx 
while distinguishing between the "materiality" of 
means of production, labour, etc. (or productive 
forces), does not, however, separate the "material" 
from its specific historical social form. What he 
does - for example with respect to the means of 
production, productive forces, etc. - is to explain 
these "material factors" as they actually exist in 
their historically specific social forms. And it is 
precisely because, according to Marx, material 
production and productive forces are socially 
determined - i. e. that it is the historically 
specific social form (the economic structure, if you 
like) that gives them reality - that under capitalism 
(and that is his chief concern) we do actually get 
'things'q productive forces in their materiality, 
that are endowed with power. The "independence" 9 the 
power and determinismg are not regarded by Marx as 
either the result or explainable in terms of some 
inner (natural) material dynamics (and laws) 
belonging to the productive forces in themselves (ort 
more narrowly, to technology). If there is such a 
determinism and primacy (which needs to be shown and 
verified) then Marx is at pains to show that it 
originates from the social form (and more 
specificallyq he maintains, from the capitalist 
form). 
Cohen's misinterpretation of Marx starts from the 
premise of the externality of productive 
forces from 
the social form; Marx's approach is to, on the 
contraryg start from the historically specific social 
form (e. g. in Capital,, I, he starts not with 
"use- 
value", the general, supposedly, 
it asocial" 
materiality of 
"goods", but with commodity, the 
specific social form of 
"goods" under capitalism), 
5? 
and from that premise he attempts to unravel why and 
how material productive forces (things, objects, 
human capacities, and basic relations) have in 
reality assumed such specific characteristics. 
Summing Up and An Evaluation of Marx's Conception of 
Productive Forces 
As I have attempted to show in this chapter, Marx's 
concept of the productive forces is far broader in 
meaning than the purely technological meaning which 
is often attributed to it. If we take Aristotle's 
conception of techne (see Appx. I) we have a basic 
premise for Marx's broad conception of productive 
forces. In his analysis of capitalism (and, I submit, 
only specifically related to capitalism), Marx, 
however, develops a narrower, more strict concept. 
But even this narrower concept is not strictly 
technological as such. It is still a broad concept 
that includes powers/capacities and productive 
knowledge, methods and techniques, as well as 
materials, instrumental conditions, and technological 
objects and devices. Its limitation is based on the 
specific social form of the productive forces as 
manifested in their technical function; an object, an 
idea, knowledge and/or method, etc., can be 
considered a productive force only when actually 
functioning in the capitalist process of production. 
There is, however, some difficulty with respect to 
certain constituents of "productive forces". One 
in 
particular which many commentators have mentioned 
is 
"science". The problem is not the inclusion of 
something "mental" 
('nonmaterial phenomena') within 
what is "supposed" to be 
"material" forces (as Bober, 
for exampleg has suggested (80)) One could argue that 
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any form of mental (intellectual) activity directly 
involved in the production process (and there are 
many such activities) can be counted as a force of 
production and such mental activity could in fact 
a Iso be placed under Marx's notion of " labour -power". 
But it could be said that one aspect of the problem 
is concerned with the claim that science, as Kumar 
writes: 'As a particular methodology as well as a set 
of substantive ideas... clearly belonged to the realm 
of the "superstructure"... '(81) Although, it should 
be noted that Harx does not ('clearly') treat science 
as a "superstructural" phenomenon (82), and neither 
Kumar nor anyone else can justify such an assertion 
from Marx's writings. And, furthermore, as Kumar 
himself points out, it is clearly evident that 
science has an enormous part 'in enhancing the 
productive power of society... '(83) 
Yet Kumar (among others) is right to point out to the 
existence of a dilemma as regards the identification 
of science as a productive force. And this brings us 
to the main aspect of the problem of science as a 
productive force. The difficulty here is somewhat 
similar to the problem mentioned earlier in this 
chapter in relation to wind-power, water-power, etc. 
That is, where do we draw the line? Is science as a 
"methodology" or as particular ideas, theories, etc. 
a productive force? In other words, in the vast field 
of "science" what can or cannot be considered as a 
productive force? For according to Marx's strict 
conception of productive forces something is a 
productive force (at least specifically under the 
capitalist mode of production) if it functions in the 
process of production. Not all scientific knowledge 
has or can have such a function. Of course, the 
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process of production involves far more than the 
purely "material" production of commodities, etc. , it 
necessarily includesq particularly in modern times, 
scientific research and development activities, 
mental and scientific labour of various kinds, etc. 
But what about pure science, theoretical physics, and 
such like endeavours? Such aspects of science do not 
enter the productive process directly; some may never 
be even applied to or used in the productive process. 
As Plamenatz had already noted a long time ago: 
I 
. most science is not practical; it is undertaken to 
solve not practical but theoretical problems; it aims 
at nothing more than knowledge. It may later be put 
to practical use; 'but it need not be. Often centuries 
pass before any practical use is made of a scientific 
discovery,... Science can make great progress, as it 
did in the ancient world, and yet affect productive 
techniques very little... '(84) 
There is therefore this practical problem that in 
attempting to use the concept of productive forces we 
are faced with the difficulty of demarcation, of 
deciding what is or can be a productive force. In the 
case of science - what aspect of it is a productive 
force? In the case of things like wind-power (etc. ) - 
is it the instrument (the windmill) or the power 
(energy) or what? In short, one could say that Marx's 
concept is both too broad and yet too strict. 
It 
includes categories and elements ranging from methods 
of labour (techniques of production), labour-power 
(productive power of mental and manual labour), 
productive knowledge 
( it science", research and 
development, etc. ), as well as instruments, 
materials 9 and material/instrumental conditions 
(factory buildings9 etc. ). Yet all categories and 
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elements which are to be considered as constituents 
of productive forces must have a definite function in 
the capitalist production process. 
Why, then, does Marx uses such a concept which is 
broad yet restricted to the domain of production? An 
obvious and simple answer is that he intended to 
identify only those specific categories directly 
involved in the immediate process of production as 
against all the other categories (elements, agencies, 
etc. ) which though necessary for social production to 
take effect are not, however, directly included in 
the process itself. But this locks us in an 
impermeable circle and, in any case, begs the further 
question of why would he want to distinguish between 
categories directly involved and those which he 
considered as merely necessary for the process to 
take effect? 
In this case, I would suggest, what is crucial for 
Marx is the attempt to identify the source of wealth 
creation or more accurately the source of "surplus", 
and particularly the specific social form of surplus 
extraction under capitalism. It should be remembered, 
as I have suggested previously in this chapter, that 
Marx's fundamental theoretical concern is the study 
of capitalism; Inis study was a voyage of discovery, 
as it were, into the intricate workings and secrets 
of the system. The concept of productive forces was 
developed as part of a set of conceptual tools in 
order to produceý in my opinion, a new methodology, a 
new critical approach - and particularly 
for the 
understanding of capitalism. 
The use of this concept should be seen 
in the context 
of the entire theoretical 
discourse that 
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characterized Marx's study of economics. An essential 
problem in this study was the source of wealth or the 
origin of "surplus". For example, for the Physiocrats 
the source was in agriculture alone; and more 
specifically, the power which creates the surplus 
(the "net product") resides within land itself 
(fertility of the soil, etc. ). All previous 
conceptions (e. g. the Mercantilists) tended to 
recognize the source of wealth and the origin of 
surplus in exchange and not in production. It was on 
the basis of the Physiocrats' identification of the 
productive process of agriculture as the origin of 
surplus that the classical school - beginning with 
Adam Smith - developed the conception that the source 
of wealth and surplus resides in all types of 
production and not simply in agriculture alone, or in 
exchange. 
But although the classical school had identified 
production (and indeed labour) as the source of 
wealth and surplus, it focussed not on its socio- 
historical specificity and determination, but upon 
the purely general material and technical factors 
(e. g. the technical aspects of division of labour, 
the use of machinery and means of production, 
accumulated stock of produce). 
Marx adopted the classical school's basic 
identi-fication of production (and labour) as the 
source of wealth (and surplus) as his point of 
departure, and on the basis of that the concept of 
productive forces is meant to specify the combination 
of elements involved in the production of wealth. 
With this conception, then, Marx specified the 
"simple" (basic) elements common to all forms of 
production - i. e. the elementary aspects of 
the 
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historical continuity of production. But the main 
issue for him, as opposed to the classical 
economists, is to define the specific social 
precondition and determination of the combination of 
these common elements and to locate within that 
combination the source of surplus under capitalism. 
An important issue for Marx is the role and status of 
each of the different elements of the productive 
forces in the process of creation and expansion of 
value (and surplus-value) and hence in the 
reinforcement of the socio-technical conditions 
(within the labour process) of the command over the 
direct producers. And since for him value is a social 
phenomenon specific to capitalism, he is concerned 
with the social significance of the material elements 
directly involved in the production process and their 
distinctive contribution to the creation and 
expansion of value (surplus-value) as a form of 
(indirect) domination. 
Although this does not eliminate the practical 
difficulty involved in the concept of productive 
forces which was mentioned above, it does provide an 
explanation in terms of Marx's 
fundamental 
theoretical concern. An essential point for Marx, in 
his analysis of capitalist production, 
is the 
appropriation of any force, natural or otherwise, 
by 
capital in its pursuit of self-expansion 
(production 
of surplus-value). In that case the particular 
force 
is then considered by him as a productive 
force. From 
this stand-point Marx sometimes 
does not seem to 
consider it a problem to even mix-up 
the general- 
historic concept of productive forces 
(the conception 
I have referred to above in section 
1 on "Preliminary 
Observations") with the strict concept applicable 
to 
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the elements directly used or functioning in the 
production process. Thus, for example, he writes that 
in the capitalist process of production, 'the forces 
of nature and science, the product of general 
historical development in its abstract quintessence - 
they confront the labourer as powers of capital. '(85) 
And again: 'Capital is therefore productive ... as the 
absorber and appropriator (personification) ... of the 
general social productive forces, such as 
science. '(86) 
What is evident from this is that, for Marx, the 
productive forces have a determining role only 
because they are themselves socio-historically 
conditioned, and even more specifically, because and 
insofar as 'they confront the labourer as powers of 
capital' . It is ,f or example ,f rom this basis that 
Marx considers the social specificity of the 
productive forces under capitalism. And, as we have 
seen in section 2, he refers to the shaping of these 
forces by capitalist relations - by the way they are 
separated 'from man' and transformed (or, as he says, 
'distorted') to conform with the prevailing (and 
dominant) social relations (more on this latter 
point, howeverg in the next chapter). 
And it is important to note here that, in his 
examination of the development, role and 
function of 
productive forcesq Marx from the 
historically 
given concrete social system. 
In the case of 
machinery (as we shall see in more 
detail in a later 
chapter)q his examination 
is based on, and already 
presupposesq the historically 
formed social system of 
capitalism. As Bertell 
Ollman has rightly 
observed: 'Capitalism serves 
Marx as his jumping-off 
point for an examination of anything 
that takes place 
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within it. As a beginning, capitalism is already 
contained, in principle, within the interacting 
processes he sets out to investigate as the sum total 
of their necessary conditions and results. '(87) 
However, while this latter point is crucial for an 
understanding of Marx's concept of productive forces 
(and also that of technology), it is also, and 
paradoxically, a key problem for an evaluation of his 
conception. For while there is clear evidence that 
Marx takes capitalism as his 'jumping-off point', 
there is also clear evidence of a tendency on his 
part to extend his propositions on the role and 
status of the productive forces well beyond the 
historical limits of capitalism. We have, for 
example, the schematic assertions of the famous 1859 
Preface (among other similar assertions) on the role 
of the productive forces in history as such. The 
concept often appears in Marx as a kind of short-hand 
substitute for an explanation, and this has lend 
itself to easy adoption by many Marxists (past and 
present) in whose hands it has become a disarmingly 
simple solvent, a panacea for any historical 
problematic that is difficult to deal with or to 
reconcile with Marx's (presumed) materialism. 
Takeg for example, the question of the development of 
productive forcesp which is beyond a 
doubt an 
essential idea that lies at the 
heart of Marx's 
conception of productive forces. 
Now, while there is 
no doubt that Marx was the 
first social theorist to 
have singled out (analysed, and theorized on) this 
issue as by far the most fundamental characteristic 
of the capitalist mode of production, 
and while he 
attempted to explain the why and 
how of such a 
development under capitalismg yet, although 
he 
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provides no concrete historical analysis, nor supply 
any sound theoretical argument (beyond a few 
valuable, but sketchy insights on "feudalism", or on 
Ancient societies e. g. in the Grundrisse, etc. ), he, 
nonetheless, repeatedly asserts the same principle of 
"development of productive forces" to be something 
akin to a "law" of human history as a whole. 
Insofar as the idea of "development" is concerned, I 
maintain, there is no substantiated argument provided 
by Marx that would persuade one to accept that such a 
principle of development of productive forces is 
applicable to and is the basis of the whole of human 
history. In other words, the proposition made by Marx 
was never tested by him beyond its application in his 
analysis of capitalism (which was never completed and 
what exists is itself subject to many reservations). 
It may well be applicable to the whole of human 
history, but that has to be shown, justified and 
verified empirically. And until such time, therefore, 
this idea can be taken seriously as only a 
hypothesis. 
Moreover, it is quite evident in much of Marx's 
writings that the concept of productive forces is not 
used discriminately. And if we focus our attention on 
the internal coherence of Marx's application of the 
concept, the "determinations" suggested appear to 
constitute a circle. On many occasions 
in fact, Marx 
uses the concept in such a way that 
it gives one the 
impression of being teleological. 
Now, it is presumably in order to remedy such 
deficiencies in Marx that Cohen 
has produced a set 
of argumentsý whicht 
however, at the end of it all 
and in essence, 
fall back on the notion of human 
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of rationality" - something which, I believe, would be 
impossible to verify empirically and historically. 
And something which, ironically, Marx would have 
probably been the first to object to. For when Marx 
applies, for instance, this idea of "development of 
the productive forces" to the concrete conditions of 
capitalism, the essential point he makes (as we shall 
see in a later chapter) is that such a development is 
based on the objective conditions of the capitalist 
system (surplus extraction, competition, and so on) 
and not on some abstract notion of human 
"rationality". 
How do we, then, appraise Marx's ideas on "primacy" 
and "determinism"? Once again, beyond certain general 
points (e. g. the social v. the material issue, and 
such like questions) a similar judgment as to the 
above case is applicable here, too. 
However, if we take MarxIs systemat 
capitalism, then, and only then, we 
some good grounds to work on - though 
problems which remain unresolved and 
while positive, are considered by many 
be equivocal. 
ic analysis of 
have at least 
there are many 
his arguments, 
authorities to 
But if we look into Marx's writings for explicit and 
sustained discussion of9 or for substantiated 
arguments in support of 
"primacy" and "determinism" 
of productive forces with respect 
to the many 
historically different social relations and 
conditionsq then we 
find them conspicuous by their 
absence. His comments and remarks on 
the actuality of 
historical change with respect to the role of 
productive forces contain 
little more than insights. 
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In this respect, therefore, I would suggest that the 
following general understanding is by far the most 
reasonable that can be discerned from Marx's ideas on 
this issue: 
The "primacy" of the productive forces over (as also 
their "determination" of) social relations for Marx, 
I believe, may be explained in this twofold sense 
that: 
On the one hand, they set the limit to the possible 
variations in productive activity that can be carried 
out at any particular historical stage in the 
realization and the continuous reproduction of 
"social being". Since, as we have seen in section 3 
above, for Marx the very concept of "social it 
already presupposes, by definitiong the socio- 
historical realization of human life as such, which 
is necessarily the result of human activity in the 
production of materials and social relations 
simultaneously. 
And, on the other hand, that the forces are not 
simply freely chosen but are acquired; since they are 
objects, powers, capacities, etc., developed and 
produced by whole generations of past human 
activities - activities which were themselves carried 
on under historically specific social conditions and 
circumstances, and on the basis of 
forces acquired 
from previous generations; and so on since time 
immemorial. 
Perhaps by far the most concise statement of Marx on 
this question of "primacy" of productive 
forces, is 
given in his letter to 
Annenkov. His explanation goes 
as follows: 
'It is superfluous to add that men are not 
free to 
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choose their productive forces - which are the basis 
of all their history - for every productive force is 
an acquired force, the product of former activity. 
The productive forces are therefore the result of 
practical human energy; but this energy is itself 
conditioned by the circumstances in which men find 
themselves, by the productive forces already 
acquired, by the social form which exists before they 
do, which they do not create, which is the product of 
preceding generation. Because of this simple fact 
that every succeeding generation finds itself in 
possession of the productive forces acquired by the 
previous generation, which serves it as the raw 
material for new productiong a coherence arises in 
human history, a history of humanity takes shape 
which is all the more a history of humanity as the 
productive forces of man and therefore his social 
relations have been more developed. Hence it 
necessarily follows that the social history of men is 
never anything but the history of their individual 
development, whether they are conscious of it or not. 
Their material relations are the basis of all their 
relations. These material relations are only the 
necessary forms in which their material and 
individual activity is realized. '(88) 
Thus, as a general proposition, the 
"primacy" of the 
productive forces, from my reading of 
Marx, is simply 
conceptualized in the 
historical sense. In the 
historical senseý for example, it would be absurd and 
impossible to imagine that we could have, say, the 
steam-mill without the previous 
developments of the 
hand-millq the water-mill, etc. - as any student of 
the history of technology will 
be able to confirm. 
What was discovered, created, 
developed and used in 
the pastq which no 
individual living in present-day 
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conditions could have had a part in or choice and 
control over, becomes the raw material for the 
development of new productive forces. 
There is also, in this general sense at least, some 
similarity between the notion of historical 
"determination" as "continuity" and the notion of 
"technology shapes technology" as propounded by some 
recent scholars on technology. (89) 
But, I would also suggest that, if we add to this 
"historical sense" Marx's insistence on defining the 
"material" (technical/physical) by the "social", then 
it is evident that Marx's conception is far removed 
from any notion of "technological determinism" 
(vulgar or sophisticated) as it is also far more 
involved than the idea of a kind of "social 
determinism" which tends to exclude the shaping 
("determination") of the technical aspects and 
functional principles of new developments in 
production technologies by the dominant socio- 
economic structure of, for example, capitalism. 
The picture, then, becomes far more complex than that 
given by, for example, the notion of 
"technology 
shapes technology". Thus, although the steam-mill, 
for instance, presupposes the technical development 
of the hand-mill 
(etc. ), it also necessarily 
presupposes not only the social 
form and relations in 
existence at the period of the 
hand-mill's use, but 
also the transformation of these social conditions 
and the birth and dominance of new circumstances. 
For the development of each new productive 
force is 
not simply conditioned 
by the technical knowledge 
past down 
from a previous generation 
(itself 
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conditioned by the specific social form and relations 
which existed in the past). That is only part of the 
picture. What is also crucial is that any such 
development is also conditioned not merely by the 
existing social relations and forces, but even more 
specifically it must meet certain socio-economic 
requirements, and in that sense it is socially 
conditioned to function and perform technically in 
accordance with the particular objective (or purpose) 
of the given economic structure. 
While therefore Marx is certainly proposing the 
11primacy" (and "determinism") of the productive 
forces, he is certainly not for one moment proposing 
that the productive forces can even be conceptualized 
as separate or independent of their historically 
specific social form. Something is considered a 
productive force only because of its function within 
a social system of production; a function (e. g. as a 
means of production) which by placing it in a certain 
relation to those involved in the process of 
production gives it its specific social form. This 
proposition is explained by Marx, for examplep as 
regards the use of "land" as a productive force 
(an 
instrument of production) under capitalismg which he 
distinguishes from both its social form as "landed 
property"q and in abstraction as 
"matter". Th 
. 
us he 
writes: 
'Land, so long as it is not exploited as a means of 
productiong is not capital. Land as capital can 
be 
increased just as much as all the other instruments 
of production. Nothing 
is added to its matterg to use 
M. Proudhon's language) but the lands which serve as 
instruments of production are multiplied. 
The very 
fact of applying further outlays of capital 
to land 
already transformed 
into means of production 
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increases land as capital without adding anything to 
land as matter, that is, to the extent of the land. 
M. Proudhon's land as matter is the earth in its 
limitation. As for the eternity he attributes to 
land, we grant readily it has this virtue as matter. 
Land as capital is no more eternal than any other 
capital. 
'Land as capital is fixed capital... 
'The representative of land as capital is not the 
landowner, but the farmer. The proceeds yielded by 
land as capital are interest and industrial profitq 
not rent ... 
'Briefly, land insofar as it yields interest is land 
capital, and as land capital it yields no rent, it is 
not landed property. Rent results from the social 
relations in which the exploitation of the land takes 
place. It cannot be a result of the more or less 
durable nature of the soil. Rent is a product of 
society and not of the soil. '(90) 
Here we see that Marx makes a distinction not on the 
basis of abstract "materiality" of a given productive 
force (in this case, land)q but on the basis of the 
social form which defines that "materiality" as a 
productive force; i. e. land as capital or land as 
landed property* 
Moreover, for Marx it is a sheer absurdity to imagine 
that the "productive forces" 
(hence also technology) 
can have a life of their own, and 
that the "social" 
(social form and relations) is an "externally" 
related phenomenon. 
From Marx's perspective, the 
recognition of the notion of 
"primacy", does not mean 
that productive forces 
(and of course technology) 
have certain "natural" 
impulses which propel them to 
causally determine 
the development of social 
. 
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relations independent of social and historical 
circumstances and conditions. 
In fact Marx provides a few examples in The Poverty 
of Phil which explains his position quite 
clearly. In the following passages he relates the 
division of labour to the instruments of labour: 
'The concentration of the instruments of production 
and the division of labour are as inseparable one 
from the other as are, in the political sphere, the 
concentration of public powers and the division of 
private interests. Englandq with the concentration of 
the land, this instrument of agricultural labourg has 
at the same time division of agricultural labour and 
the application of machinery to the exploitation of 
the soil. France, which has the division of the 
instruments, the small holdings system, has, in 
general, neither division of agricultural labour nor 
application of machinery to the soil. ' 
And he goes on to clarify this 'inseparable' 
relationship: 
'For M. Proudhon the concentration of the instruments 
of labour is the negation of the division of labour. 
In reality we find again the reverse. As the 
concentration of instruments develops, the 
division 
develops also, and vice versa. This is why every big 
mechanical invention is 
followed by a greater 
division of labour, and each increase in the division 
of labour gives rise 
in turn to new mechanical 
inventions. '(91) 
As it can be seen from these passages 
Marx is not 
concerned with a notion 
of "primacy" and 
"determinism" of productive forces in the sense of 
"which-comes-first" or 
"what-determines-what"; or 
7ýL 
which is "superior" to and has "priority" over the 
"other" 
, the it technical/material" or the 
"social/human". When he does claim, for example, that 
in England the 'invention of machinery brought about 
the separation of manufacturing industry from 
agricultural industry'(92), his claim is based on the 
concrete conditions, on his empirical investigation 
and understanding of the role and function of 
machinery as a productive force (or production 
technology) of capitalism; that is, machinery as 'one 
of the relations of our present economic 
system.. 1(93) 
This is not a claim based on the understanding of 
machinery in the abstract - "machinery" as some 
technical/material object independent of its social 
form and function. Nor is it an explanation of the 
implications of the technology of machinery which is 
derived from 'the misty realm of imagination and 
rises far above space and time. '(94) 
Now, according to my reading of Marx, it is with 
capitalism that the fusion characteristic of the 
"making" process, of productive activity, the art and 
knowledge and objective means of production - that 
fusion signified by the Aristotlian notion of techne 
and Marx's own general conception of social 
forces of 
production - breaks down and we have, what 
Marx 
referred to as an abstraction, a mystification as 
expressed, for example, by the 
Trinity Formula. The 
material productive 
forces are, then, as it were, 
socialized, and take on their 
historically specific 
social (capitalistic) characteristics. 
And for Marx, 
as opposed tog 
for example, Cohen, it is 
'in this economic trinity 
[capital-labour-land-RR] 
represented as the connection 
between the component 
ri if / -D 
parts of value and wealth in general and its 
sources, [that] we have the complete mystification of 
the capitalist mode of production, the conversion of 
social relations into things, the direct coalescence 
of the material production relations with their 
historical and social determination. It is an 
enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world, in which 
Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre do their 
ghost-walking as social characters and at the same 
time directly as mere things. '(95) 
I shall come to Marx's views on the specific role of 
machinery in a later chapter, but before those views 
can be examined it would be necessary, in the 
following chapter, to discuss Marx's views on the 
social origins of the abstraction or mystification 
that makes the elements of the productive forces, and 
more specifically production technology, 'do their 
ghost-walking, ' as Marx puts it2 I as social 
characters and at the same time directly as mere 
things. ' In short, we need to examine how, for 
example, an instrument of production, according to 
Marx, comes to assume its specific social character 
as capital -a productive force that functions as 
capital (its social character) and at the same time 
directly as a mere instrument, a means of production 
as such. And central to this problematic are Marx's 
views on the division of labour and alienation, which 
we must now turn to. 
76 
Chapter Two 
Alienation and Technology 
Introduction 
In this chapter we are concerned with Marx's views on 
the relationship between technology and the social 
phenomenon of alienation under capitalism. 
Marx's conception of "alienation" and his views on 
the conditions necessary for the estrangement or 
alienation of labour are directly connected to an 
important point that we came across in the previous 
chapter. There we found that for Marx, with the rise 
and development of capitalism, the socio-technical 
unity and fusion characteristic of past forms of 
"making" processes (as exemplified by the 
Aristotelian notion of techne) breaks down due to the 
separation of labour from the material conditions of 
production. Now we need to examine Marx's writings 
to see what he has to say about technology, "freed" 
from its previous social bonds, and its 
transformation into a so-called "alien" power. 
According to our interpretation of Marx, as presented 
in chapter one, with the historical development of 
capitalism, there appears a progressive abstraction 
of the social unity of labour and its material 
conditions (including, of course, technology), so 
that each of the elements involved in the labour 
process (as a "making" process) comes to be socially 
separated from the direct producer. This separation 
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as property is indeed a crucial aspect of what Marx 
regards as a condition of alienation. 
Howeverp under capitalism as also with any other 
system of production the combination of 
instruments, knowledge, productive activity and 
materials, within the production process, is a 
technical necessity. But then how and in what sense, 
we need to enquire, do instruments (tools) come to 
have what Marx often refers to as an 'alien power' 
over labour? What are, in Marx's view9 the 
signif icant conditions of the 'dominion of the 
estranged thing over man'? Is it property/ownership 
of the means of production as such, or are there any 
other conditions? Andq more specifically, what is 
Marx's view on the significance of technology's 
characteristics, form, and so on, to the process of 
self-alienation of the direct producer? 
These are just some of the questions that we need to 
try and examine in this chapter. The main concern of 
this chapter, however, is not a discussion of either 
Marx's views or the general ideas on alienation in 
itself. It is, rather, an attempt to extract an 
understanding of the development of Marx's conception 
of technology from his early writings concerned with 
the problematic of the alienation of 
labour under 
capitalism. Put more precisely, my 
intention is to 
explicate, examinev and critically evaluate, 
the 
basic premises upon which Marx came to 
develop his 
ideas and views on the dominant role and 
historically 
unique function of production 
technology within the 
capitalist process of production. 
rj 
For most commentators property/ownership and the division of labour are key factors in Marx's 
conception of alienation. However, without in any way denying or belittling the importance of these two 
factors, in this chapter I suggest that a vital 
aspect of alienation for Marx has to do with the 
technologies of production. 
Therefore, the central question that concerns us here 
is: what is Marx's view on the role of technology 
with respect to the alienation of labour? And to help 
along this examination (and my evaluation, too) I 
need to also take into account, discuss and examine a 
number of alternative views, interpretations and 
commentaries put forward on Marx's conception of the 
alienation of labour. 
1. A Preliminary Observation 
While I am not wholly convinced by the arguments 
(particularly by, for instance, Althusser and his 
followers(l)) which claim to show the existence of a 
radical "break" in Marx's views and ideas between his 
early writings and his later works - i. e. the two- 
stage distinction of Marx's works, one being the 
'Hegelian' and/or 'humanist' and by implication 
"unscientific" as represented by his early writings, 
while the other being the 
"mature" and often referred 
to as "scientific" as represented 
by, for example, 
Neverthelessq there is, of course, an 
element of truth in such a 
division, at least in the 
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sense that Marx like any social theorist developed 
his ideas, modifying and changing them as a necessary 
outcome of his continuous studies. 
Thus, in his early writings (e. g. in the 1844 
Manuscripts and The German Id ) his conceptions 
of property, the division of labour and technology 
appear to be less developed than in his later works. 
With respect to his concept of the division of 
labour, for example, its use is often so broad as to 
include not only occupational stratification or a 
vague reference to the detailed division within 
different "trades", but also, as Rattansi (2), for 
instance, has argued, to include social/class 
differentiations. Moreover, in these works, as I have 
already remarked in the previous chapter, his 
language is far more philosophical than in later 
works. This can be seen, for example, with regards to 
the concept of alienation. 
But it would be wrong to suggest that he regards the 
concept of alienation, or the various other concepts 
used in the early writings, as "purely" philosophical 
abstractions rather than having socio-historic 
signification. Or that because there is in such works 
no clear-cut distinction made between 
to class", 
"property" and "division of labour"ý that therefore 
there is on the part of 
"early" Marx a 
misapprehension 
(due to some abstract conceptual 
fusion) of class relations and the division of 
labour. For even in his "mature" writings he does not 
separate "class" or 
"property" from the division of 
labour; but rather he attempts to clarify the 
historical process and social conditions which 
bring 
forth the appearance of such a separation. 
The 
distinction which heq thereforeq comes to make 
in the 
so 
case of class/division of labour, for example, is 
between what he calls, the social and the technical 
division of labour. 
This conceptual distinction has its roots in Marx's 
concept of alienation, which is even in his "mature" 
work never "rejected" or side-stepped, but in fact 
developed and applied through the use of a framework 
of economically more precise categories and concepts. 
Although perhaps by far the most important category 
to be mentioned in this regard is money; another 
category, which we are concerned with here and which 
I believe could be shown to be equally as important, 
yet often by-passed, is technology* 
But what is characteristic of much of the 
commentaries on Marx's conception of alienation is 
that these concentrate (sometimes exclusively) on, 
for example, division of labour and property, tending 
to either completely disregard the role and 
form of 
technology or to regard technology as at best 
secondary and often largely quite 
incidental to the 
problematic of alienation. That 
Marx's early writings 
contain a far greater discussion of 
division of 
labour and property than of production technology as 
such is, of course, perfectly 
true. But it is far 
from the truth that he is somehow either unconcerned 
or less interested 
in the role and form of 
technology. 
The important pointq howeverý 
I would suggest, is how 
one "reads" his writings 
on the issue of alienation 
and the discussion 
he presents on the division of 
labour and property 
in relation to that issue. I 
submit that 
by focussing on one of the most important 
aspects of 
Marx conception of alienation - 
indeed, I 
21 
would say, the central aspect of it - namely, the 
process of separation of labour from the conditions 
of production, it then becomes possible to see the 
importance Marx attaches not only to the role of 
technology, but also even to the distinctive form of 
production technology under capitalism. And, 
moreover, it is then also possible to see the process 
of development and formation of his distinctive 
conception of technology as capital. 
In what follows, I shall therefore concentrate only 
on Marx's early ideas on various aspects of 
alienation of labour to try and show how and in what 
sense these ideas are directly related to Marx's 
notion of the separation of labour from the 
conditions of production (more details on this issue, 
and specifically with respect to Marx's early views, 
are provided in Appendix 3), and thus, also, how this 
particular focus helps to explain (even if only 
partially at this stage) at the very least the 
direction of Marx's thoughts on the issue of 
technology. On the basis of this investigation, I 
shall go on to firstly discuss and examine 
(specifically from a "technological" perspective) 
some alternative views on Marx and alienation, and 
then to give an evaluation of Marx's own views. 
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2. Alienation and Technology 
At first sight there seems to be no direct 
relationship between "technology" and "alienation". 
Such a relationship is particularly difficult to 
grasp if one were to conceptualize alienation in its 
purely psychological aspect in relation to 
individuals as individuals. It becomes even more of a 
problem to relate technology to alienation because of 
the latter concept's philosophical origins (as found 
in Hegel and Feurebach's critique of the formerg 
etc. ). Yet whatever "meaning" is given to the concept 
of "alienation", for Marx, in essence, it refers to 
It servility" to, or the sway of, inhuman powers 
(whether that of "God" as in religion, or objects or 
institutions as in social relations) created by human 
beings themselves. As David McLellan writes: 'In all 
fields the common idea was [for Marx] that man had 
forfeited to someone or something what was essential 
to his nature - principally to be in control of his 
own activities, to be the initiator of the historical 
process. In the different forms of alienation some 
other entity obtained what was proper to man. 
1(3) 
For the most part, however, the analysis and 
explanation of Marx's conception of alienation given 
by various writers (4) tend to make no direct 
reference to the role of technology as such 
(or in 
itself), and even when "technology" 
(as means of 
production) is considered 
it is merely one factor 
enmeshed within the 
"world of commodities". In this 
section, by contrast, 
I shall argue that for Marx 
production technology 
is a crucial condition of 
alienation under capitalism, which 
heq indeed, 
expresses - more specifically 
in his later works - by 
the notion of the domination of 
dead labour over 
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living labour in the process of production; that is, 
by the notion of technology as capital. 
The concept of alienation, which has a prominence in 
the 1844 Manuscripts, reveals not only Marx's 
critical view of the concept of division of labour as 
used by classical political economy, but his (still 
embryonic) thoughts on the relation between 
production technology and the division of labour. As 
Marx comments: 'The division of labour is the 
economic expression of the social nature of labour 
within estrangement. Or rather, since 
" 
labour is only 
an expression of life as alienation of life, the 
division of labour is nothing more than the 
estranged, alienated positing of human activity as a 
real species -act ivi ty or as activity of man as a 
s2ecies-bei_ng. '(5) This statement (though clearly 
philosophical and ambiguous as it stands) when 
analysed shows that Marx is already less than happy 
with the contemporary usage and notion of division of 
labour. In the first place, as against the 
conceptualization of the division of labour as 
something "natural", Marx is here emphasising the 
'social nature of labour' which is being economically 
expressed by the concept of the division of labour. 
And this 'within estrangement' or 'alienation#. 
In other words, here Marx is not concerned with the 
concept of division of labour in the abstract i. e. 
a concept applicable to all forms of society but 
that peculiar to capitalist production. It is the 
positing of alienated productive activity. 
It is, as 
he further remarks, the positing of 'human activity 
as___ýýecies activity in this 
its estranged and 
alienated form. 
'(6) The division of labour to which 
political economists refer 
is thus, according to 
Vf 
Marx, nothing but the expression of wage labour as 
the social nature of labour within alienation - i. e. 
within the estrangement or 
' 
separation of human 
activity from its objective (material) conditions or 
separation from the means of production. 
Nevertheless, at this stage, as it can be seen from 
the above statement just quoted, division of labour 
is only implicitly linked to the divorce of 
productive activity from its technological conditions 
(through the use of the concept of alienation). We 
have therefore a conception of division of labour 
which is decidedly broad; that is, while there is 
just a hint of the specificity of capitalist 
"technical" division of labour (as 'alienated 
positing of human activity') this is still well 
enmeshed within the broad concept of social division 
of labour or the distribution of labour as related to 
exchange relations and "private property". 
If however Marx's concept is still "undeveloped", 
there is the awareness on his part that there is 
something far more basic in the capitalist form of 
division of labour. This is evident from Marx's 
already formed opinion thatq 
I although private 
property [i. e. capital or capitalist relations -RR] 
appears as the basis and cause of alienated labour, 
it is in fact its consequence.. '(7) In other words, 
he is already going behind the appearance of 
generalized exchange into the realm of production. 
It 
is thus not the division of labour in general as 
expressed through 
'private property' that 'causes' 
the form of alienated labour, butq as 
Marx further 
remarks, 'the whole of 
human servitude ... involved in 
the relation of the worker to production'. 
(8) And in 
fact he is categorical that 
'all relations of 
g6 
servitude are nothing but modifications and 
consequences of this relation [i. e. the relation to 
production -RR]. '(9) 
Whatever the merit of this "reductionism", it is 
apparent that Marx seems to be thinking of the basic 
relationship established as a result of the combining 
of alienated labour (the activity of the wage-worker) 
and the technologies of production from which human 
activity has become separated (estranged) - i. e. the 
basic relationship established which is expressed by 
the capitalist form of the technical division of 
labour. Thus as he attempts at a self-clarification 
of the concept of division of labour in the 
Manuscripts of 1844, we can discern the traces of his 
later strict conceptualization of the relation 
between the detailed (technical) division of labour 
and production technology as it applies to 
capitalist production. 
Indeed, commenting on Say's remarks concerning the 
division of labour, Marx writes: 'The division of 
labour'[according to Say] 'is a convenient, useful 
means, a skilful application of human powers for 
social wealth, but it is a diminution of the capacity 
of each man taken individua . This last remark is 
an advance on Say's part. '(10) His approval of Say's 
last remark indicates that Marx is already thinking 
of the effect of the technical division of labour 
upon the worker - the "degradation" of his/her 
capacityo And his further comments about Mill's and 
Sharbek's conception of the division of labour, is, 
as far as we are concerned, even more revealing, He 
writes: 'Human labour is simply mechanical movement; 
most of the work is done by the material properties 
of the objects. Each individual must 
be allocated the 
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smallest number of operations possible. Fragmentation 
of labour and concentration of capital ... Meaning of free private property in the division of labour. '(11) 
The crucial point for us here is Marx's reference to 
the notion that 'most of the work is done by the 
material 
_properties of 
the 
-- 
objects'(my emphasis). 
Although, this is certainly not as yet a clear 
statement about the domineering role of machinery 
(technology) in the capitalist process of production, 
it is nonetheless a clear enough indication of Marx's 
thoughts in that direction. 
What is therefore important at this stage in Marx's 
thoughts is the attempt to point out the specific 
characteristics of, and relationship between, the 
division of labour and exchange in the modern 
capitalist world. The underlying condition that he 
refers to in this connection is the separation of 
labour from the means of production (or as he 
sometimes puts it, from the material conditions of 
production), which in fact became the main foundation 
block of his theory of capitalist form of production. 
But at this stage he expresses this condition by the 
concept of alienation. Thus he writes: 
'The consideration of the division of labour and 
exchange is of the highest interest7 because they are 
the perceptibl alienated expression of human 
act and essential powers as species-activity and 
species, -powers. '(12) 
The concept of alienation as used by Marx in the 1844 
Manuscriptsq I believe, expresses a far more 
substantive meaning than the domination of market 
forcesq of exchange, which is often over-emphasised 
by certain commentators. (13) In these early 
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manuscripts Marx has already recognized (even though 
not as yet in a developed form) the essence of 
alienation as the estrangement of labour from the 
material conditions of production. It is not simply 
the case, as Rattansi for example seems to argue, 
that 'like Smith's great work, Marx's Manuscripts 
are ... centrally concerned with the phenomenon of 
exchange.. '(14) He is in fact even at this early 
stage deeply concerned with production, and he is 
attempting to explain not simply the way 'the market 
dehumanises man' as Rattansi tends to emphasise(15), 
but the reasons Ehy that appears to be the case* 
And why do we have this peculiar appearance of the 
domination of exchange? Is it to be sought, as with 
Smith and other economists, in the "natural" fact of 
the division of labour? Or is there something more 
fundamental that we should look for? The answer to 
these questions does not lie, for Marx, in the 
'origins of exchange and the division of labour' - 
and that is precisely why he 'has little to say' on 
these issues. (16) Even in his later, "mature" 
writings Marx is hardly concerned with such 
"origins". (17) What he is concerned with is the 
particular social form of exchange and the division 
of labour under capitalism. And he uses the concept 
of alienation precisely in order to explain this 
phenomenal form (the "market") as a consequence of 
the specific form of capitalist production. (18) Marx 
therefore describes a crucial aspect of alienation in 
the following words: 'when more and more of the 
worker's products are being taken from him, when his 
own labour increasingly confronts him as alien 
property and the means of his existence and of his 
activity are increasingly concentrated in the hands 
of the capitalist. '(19) 
go 
What Marx is saying in this passage, I would suggest, 
is essentially what he later comes to identify as the "fetishism" of commodities, a phenomenon which has 
its roots not in the "marketplace", but within the 
social system of production, specifically conditioned 
by the separation of the means of production 
(technology, etc. ) from the labourer. The alienation 
of 'worker's products$ is not a reference to the 
process of exchange, of sale of commodities through 
the workings of the market. It is a reference to the 
act of appropriation (i. e. 'products are being taken 
from him'). And the term "products" here is used very 
precisely and strictly so as to specify an essential 
characteristic of capitalist production; namely that, 
it is not, as in past forms of production, the 
su product which is 'being taken' or 
appropriated, but the product of labour as such. The 
product is a commodity which as such belongs in total 
to the capitalist. 
Why does appropriation take this form? Why is it not 
the "surplus" that is appropriated but the product, 
the results of production as a whole? What makes it 
possible that under capitalism everything that is 
produced belongs not to the direct producers, the 
workers who produce these products, but to some other 
person, the capitalist? 
The first part of an answer to these questions 
provided by the passage quoted above, is that 'when 
his [the worker's] labour increasingly confronts him 
as alien property. That is to say that when the 
worker's productive activity itself is alienated or 
est from him/her - in the sense that the worker 
is unable to self-activate his/her life-activity. In 
shortg when productive activity has become an 
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abstraction and the labourer has become a "free" 
worker unattached to any communal or legal ties and 
hence he/she has become a private individual, a wage- 
labourer. But this aspect of alienation as 
estrangement (20) is based on a specific social 
condition which Marx in the above passage gives in 
the following terms: When 'the means of his [the 
worker's] existence and of his activity are 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 
capitalist. ' In other words - and this is the second 
part of the answer to the questions raised above - 
only when the means of production are divorced from 
the direct producers does the product in its entirety 
(including the worker's means of existence which 
obviously cannot be produced without access to the 
means of production) belong as of right to the 
capitalist. 
In essence therefore the roots of alienation lie not 
in the control over the mode of distribution of 
products (or the market mechanism), but in the 
control over the means of production, and more 
specifically - though Marx does not elaborate this 
point at this stage - in the control over the 
technologies of production. If the worker's own 
productive activity (as private labour) confronts 
him/her 'as alien property' it is because he/she 
lacks the production technologies (as well as 
materials) by means of which the worker can self- 
realize his/her life-activity. It is thus 
because the 
worker has become separated 
from instruments which 
make the realization of his/her 
labour possible that 
his/her inherent physical and/or mental capacities 
can only become realized if and when 
it is 
transferred or sold to another. The control of 
production technology 
is therefore of paramount 
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significance to the estrangement of labour. And it is 
from this basis, and because of the separation of the 
worker from the means and technologies of production, 
that the division of labour and exchange are, in 
Marx's words, 'perceptibly alienated expressions of 
human activity.. '(21) They are 'perceptibly alienated 
expressions' rather than the root cause of the 
estrangement of labour as human productive activity. 
Now, given this fact of separation, whatever the 
worker produces, though it is the objectification of 
his/her labour and the materialization of his/her 
physical and mental capacities, it is nonetheless an 
alien object insofar as the worker is concerned. As 
Marx puts it: 1the object that labour produces, its 
product, stands opposed to it as something alien, as 
a power independent of the producer. '(22) But what 
does Marx mean here when he says that the product of 
labour becomes 'something alien'? A first 
consideration, and an obvious one often made, is that 
he means that the product being a commodity does not 
belong to the worker and is produced for sale. There 
is no doubt that this is one of the most important 
aspects of Marx's conception of alienation. 
However, I would like to suggest here a somewhat 
different proposition in terms of the link between 
alienation and technology as conceptualized by Marx, 
which is in fact based on and derived from the fact 
of commodificationý but which takes into account what 
is crucial to Marx's conception of alienation, namely 
the fact that the object assumes 'a power independent 
of the p oducer. And here the question which is 
relevant to Marx's conception of technology, and 
hence to the thesis of this study is this: How can 
obiects9 but more specifically artifacts, 
qf 
instruments, or in shortq production technologies, 
assume powers independent of their producers and 
users? Marx provides the basis of (or the ground for) 
the answer to this question as follows: 
'If the product of labour is alien to me and 
confronts me as an alien power, to whom does it then 
belong? 
'To a being other than me. 
'Who is this being? 
'The ? It is true that in early times most 
production - e. g. temple buildingg etc. p in Egypt, 
India and Mexico - was in the service of the gods, 
just as the product belonged to the gods. But the 
gods alone were never the masters of labour. ee 
'The alien being to whom labour and the product of 
labour belong, in whose service labour is performed 
and for whose enjoyment the product of labour is 
createdý can be none other than man himself. 
'If the product of labour does not belong to the 
workerv and if it confronts him as an alien powerf 
this is only possible because it belongs to a man 
other than the worker... '(23) 
As it can be seen this statement merely refers to the 
general notion of "property" as the exercise of 
social power. If it provides, at least in a general 
way, an explanation for "why" the product of labour 
confronts the labourer as an 'alien power' (because 
it belongs to a non-labourer); it does not tell us 
how the product comes to confront the labourer 'as an 
autonomous power'(24). From this basis, however, Marx 
by looking at a different aspect of alienation 
provides (in a still tentative manner) an important 
insight based on his proposition that 'estrangement 
manifests itself not only in the result [i. e. the 
productIq but also in the act of production, within 
q2 
the activity of production itself. '(25) In other 
words, insofar as technology as a product of labour 
is concerned, something happens as a result of the 
social system of production, and in the act of 
production itself, which makes these objects in 
particular assume independent powers. Since, as we 
have already seen, for Marx the estrangement of 
labour is directly related to the separation of the 
direct producers from the means and technologies of 
production, and since productive activity becomes 
individualized as private labour, and is seen as 'a 
labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification'; it 
follows, at least according to Marx, that the 
performance of labour 'is therefore not [for] the 
satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy 
needs outside itself. '(26) 
At this point in Marx's early views, we have, 
therefore, two conditions for production technology 
assuming independent power and hence the alienation 
of the worker within the labour process: on the one 
hand, ownership of the instruments and means of 
production by someone other than the labourer 
himself/herself; and on the other, because of such a 
proprietorial relationship, the regulation and 
determination of productive activity in accordance 
with "external needs". 
There are, however, a couple of problems with respect 
to these two conditions. Firstly, there is the 
problem of the "influence" (or determining role) of 
what Marx refers to as external needs 
(labour is 'a 
mere means to satisfy needs outside itself'). If Marx 
points to the importance of this influence in 
relation to the notion of alienation and the social 
conditioning of the product of labour, and hence also 
q3 
of production technology as 'an autonomous power', he 
does not provide a reasoned argument why this should 
be so under capitalism alone. 
The difficulty here is that perhaps with the 
exception of "primitive" (wholly communal) forms of 
social production, whereby the satisfaction of the 
individual producer's needs is (or at least may be 
suggested to be) at once and directly the 
satisfaction of communal needs, in all other 
historical forms of production productive activity 
(labour) has been 'a mere means to satisfy needs 
outside itself'. In short, under all class systems 
labour has been forced labour of one kind or another 
and the satisfaction of the labourer's needs 
dependent (as Marx himself had always insisted) on 
the performance of (forced) labour for the 
satisfaction of needs 'outside itself'. Giveny for 
exampley the specific "feudal" structure of military- 
legal authority and system of obligationy if the serf 
did not satisfy his lord's needs (needs external to 
his/her) could he/she have been allowed to satisfy 
his/her own personal or familial/household needs? 
As a genera I rule, the answer is simply no. So why 
had not pi-oduction technology (or objects and 
products generally) assumed its alienated form or 
character before the rise of capitalism? 
It cannot Oierefore be right to assume that merely 
because the performance of labour is a mere means for 
the satisfaction of 'needs outside itself', that this 
fact (or assumption) can cause a radical 
transformation of the character and quality of 
production technology and bring forth its alienated 
form. The fact of forced labour and work for the 
satisfaction of some other's needs cannot 
in 
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themselves explain the presumption of autonomous 
power of production technology under capitalism. 
Either the proposition must be rejected or it must at 
least be shown that there is something specific to 
the needs of capital, and only peculiar to its mode 
of production, which brings about such a 
transformation of instruments of production. And even 
though we have references to the important role of 
exchange, in his early works Marx fails to show this 
with respect to production relations and production 
technologies; and with respect to this latter point, 
in these early works we are provided with general 
(and philosophical) propositions and insightsý but no 
substantive analysis. 
A second problem is to do with the general notion of 
"property" as the exercise of social power. As we 
have seen above, Marx asserts that the product of 
labour (and in our case, therefore, also technology) 
confronts the labourer 'as an alien power' because it 
belongs to 'a man other than the worker'. Production 
technology is thus 'an alien power' because it is the 
property of someone other than the worker. But here 
again, though Marx is referring to the capitalist 
form of property, he fails to spell out why such a 
phenomenon should be specific to capitalism and no 
other form of property relations. 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that if mere 
owners hip of means and instruments of production is 
to be regarded as the main causal factor behind 
alienation and behind production technology's 
apparent "independent", "autonomous" role and status 
(technology as 'an alien power'), then such a notion 
is arguably applicable to any and all forms of 
property relations in which a non-labourer owns the 
means and instruments of production. E. g. it is 
certainly the case that in pre-capitalist class 
societies certain instruments, and land in particular 
- as well as irrigation networks, for instance, in 
Asia, etc. - were owned by non-labourers (feudal 
lords, the state in Asia, priestly casts, and so on). 
Thus, either one would have to claim that such 
instruments of production confronted the pre- 
cal2italist direct producers as #alien powers' too, 
and therefore this aspect of alienation is not 
specific to capitalism but is a general phenomenon 
(as, for example, Hegel had proposed with respect to 
his conception of "objectification" - see Appendix 2 
on this), or one would have to go beyond the fact of 
ownership as such and spell out what is specific to 
capitalist relations, as distinct from all other 
previous social forms, which necessitate certain 
fundamental changes in the character, form and 
functioning of production technology so that it 
confronts the worker as an autonomous, alien power. In 
other words, from a general notion of ownership 
(private or state) there is no reason to suppose, 
therefore, that the alienation of labour is specific 
to capitalist relations alone. The fact of ownership 
of production technology cannot, I would submit, be 
taken as the chief reason for the dominant role and 
status of modern technology in the capitalist system 
of production (if that is the case). 
Although it was in his later works that Marx examined 
and spelled out the specificity of capitalist 
productive process, which I will be looking at in the 
next chapterg it is nevertheless possible to make a 
few suggestions with respect to the above issues, but 
q6 
this only as guide-line propositions which will be 
taken up and examined later* 
There are two interrelated points which need to be 
considered in relation to the issue of "external 
needs": Firstly, I would suggest, that Marx is here 
hinting - and this is what he later comes to 
elaborate fully - that the performance of labour is 
governed by capital's needs, or governed by the 
imperatives and exigencies of accumulation (i. e. 
"profit maximization", etc. ). Accumulation (as 
distinct from hoarding) is something quite -specific 
to capitalism - the blind unconcerted compulsion to 
grow; the necessity and promotion of growth by each 
firm (capital unit) under the pressure of competition 
by means of increasing investment and improvement of 
productivity. It is to this essential "need" that 
Marx, I suggest, is referring when he says, labour is 
'a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself. ' 
Though here the statement is far too generalg and for 
that reason if no other it is quite unsatisfactory as 
it stands. 
Secondly, I suggest that Marx is hinting at 
(something like) the following proposition: it is 
these external needs as the fact of accumulation (the 
profit motive, etc) which, by determining the 
relationship of labour to the conditions and act of 
production, alienates the worker in the sense that 
he/she no longer has any power of decision making as 
to the form, quality and quantity of his/her needed 
products. He thus says that labour is not for 
'the 
satisfaction of a need', i. e. for the direct needs of 
the worker as such. 
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However, if one accepts these aspects of my reading 
of Marx's conception of alienation, then an important 
conclusion, I would suggest, follows: namely that if 
the worker cannot take the ultimate decisions as to 
what form (etc. ) the product of his/her labour will 
take (and we are here particularly concerned with 
If products" as techno )q and that if such a 
decisi-on is in the final analysis based upon the 
exigencies of accumulation and the external needs of 
"profit making", then it is these external needs that 
must in one way or another become embodied and 
materialized in the form of technological objects 
labour produces. 
Since, sociologically, it is these external needs 
(capital's needs, the primacy of growth, etc. ) which 
by becoming an influential part of the whole process 
of socialization, part of the cultural and 
educational framework, and also therefore part of 
what Thomas Kuhn(27) has referred to as the 
scientific "paradigm, " (in the broad sense of a whole 
constellation of values, beliefs, etc., which is 
shared by the members of the scientific, and indeed 
the engineering, design, and other technical, 
communities), they become not only an internalized 
aspect of "social being", but precisely 
for that 
reason they also become the determining factor in the 
shaping of products as technologies. The worker's 
labour (scientific-intellectual as well as manual 
labour) thus produces technological products which 
have been socialLy shaped (conceived, designed, 
engineered, manufactured, and marketed) 
but in 
accordance with, and for the purpose of the 
satisfaction of, needs 
'outside' or 'external to the 
worker'(28) - in order to facilitate and promote the 
growth of capital* 
q. 9 
In this connection it is important to note that for 
Marx labour is an activity of objectification which 
although presupposes a distinction between the 
subject and the object, is an activity which has a 
transforming effect on the object and the subject. In 
the general sense, labour gives form to the objective 
world, but in that process the subject also 
transforms himself/herself. What is also crucial for 
Marx is that the process of objectification is the 
making of an object involving the materialization of 
the subject's purpose and meaning. As Carol Gould 
remarks, for Marx, 'Objects are therefore constituted 
or given meaning by the subjects. ' And the activity 
of objectification is 'essentially a ... meaning- 
giving activity, where an agent transforms objects to 
his or her purpose. ' In other words, in this sense, 
as Gould goes on, 'it is a teleological or 
intentional activity, and the objects created by the 
agent embody his or her intentions or purposes. '(29) 
But with the separation of the labourer from the 
objective conditions of production - i. e. with 
capitalism - we have the transformation of the 
subject: the labourer, as merely a wage-labourer, is 
no longer the subject or controlling agent (in the 
sense presupposed by the notion of techne or by the 
activity of objectification in craft production as 
such); he/she is, according to Marx at any rate, only 
a mere labour-powert or something that is used as a 
factor of production. With capitalism, the labourer, 
according to Marx, 'is only labour personified'; that 
is, 'labour which belongs to the worker as far as its 
hardship and effort goes and to the capitalist as far 
as it is a substance creating ever greater riches... 
' 
In short, as Marx goes on, Ithe worker appears as an 
element incorporated into capital within the 
qq 
productive process [or the process of objectification 
-RRI, as its living and variable factor. '(30) The 
subject or controlling agent, however, is the 
capitalist, the independent producer (or, indeed, 
the subject is capital). The objects, and 
technologies in particular, embody the capitalist's 
intention and purpose. In this sense, one could say 
that for Marx, the capitalist process of 
objectification involves the self-realization not of 
the labourer's needs as such (at least not directly 
or in an essential sense)ý but that of capital's or 
the capitalist's. 
On this point, it is, I believe, important to make a 
distinction between the general (philosophical) 
notion of the "subject" and the concrete notion of 
the subject under capitalism. The development and 
production of technologies as objects - the process 
of objectification which determines the structure 
and functional principles of the technological 
products - must therefore take into account what are 
in actuality and as they are perceived to be, the 
general (or to use an Hegelian term, the "universal") 
needs of the capitalist as the subject in the real, 
concrete world of 'many capitals' or many competing 
capitalists - or the compelling requirements of the 
particular form of productive system of formally 
independent competing "subjects" (i. e. of the needs 
of capital accumulationg growth, or profit making)e 
These . needs 
(requirements) are no longer direct 
social or personal (e. g. as the obligation between a 
serf and his/her lord is legal/personal and there is 
a direct social dependence); they are under 
capitalism societal and impersonal needs in the sense 
that they are not simply specific to each different 
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unit of production but are universal (and "rational") 
objective needs felt by every single productive unit 
(or by each individual capital or firm or each 
individual capitalist). Thus the structure and 
functional principles of these objects as 
technologies of capital production are based on and 
developed according to a socially directed 
, 
rational 
application of the basic laws of natural science; the 
applic ation and technical utilization of the 
discovery of natural laws and forces, and the 
development of human relations within and to nature 
which reflect the socio-historically defined 
"universalized" needs of capital as a set of 
production relations that determines the social orbit 
and environment within which the production and 
reproduction of human life takes place. 
As social objects, the structure and functioning 
principles of technologies must not only satisfy the 
basic purpose and priorities of the production of 
"goods" as use-values, but those of capital 
production (i. e. needs external to the worker, but 
needs which have become societal, objective and 
rational needs through which and only as a result of 
their satisfaction can the worker satisfy his/her 
needs - thus the social fact of alienation). Their 
structure is designed and constructed so that 
production technologies should function in such a way 
as to reflect and express the needs external to the 
worker in the act and process of production. Thus, 
the reference by Marx, even as early as 1844, to the 
fact that within capitalist production 'most of the 
work is done by the material properties of the 
ý. ts. '(31) The worker is therefore confronted in 2hiec 
the process of production by a social object which is 
a product of his/her labour but which because of not 
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only its particular mode of utilization and 
ownership, but more specifically because of its 
purposely designed structure, actually comes to 
dominate the worker. 
In this sense, I believe it is possible to say that, 
the product as technology comes to manifest an alien 
power. And this proposed explanation of the 
autonomous or independent power of the product as 
technology, I would suggest, is essential to the 
understanding of the following statement by Marx: 
'The externalization [Entausserua&] of the worker in 
his product means not only that his labour becomes an 
object, an external existence, but that it exists 
outside , independently of him and alien to him, 
and begins to confront him as an autonomous power; 
that the life which he has bestowed on the object 
confronts him as hostile and alien. '(32) 
This rather philosophical and still undeveloped idea 
is, in embryonic form, the basis of the notion of 
technology as capital, which I believe to be 
fundamental to Marx's conception of technology. It is 
a notion directly related to Marx's conception of 
alienation (which has its roots in Hegel's ideas on 
"objectification", "externalization" and 
"abstraction" - on this see Appendix 2). And here we 
have, as it were, a shift of emphasis from an almost 
exclusive linking of alienation with 
ownership/control to one that stresses the form and 
social character of production technology. In 
production technology, labour no longer recognizes 
its own subjective activity. The worker as the direct 
(or immediate) "subject" is 'estranged from' or 
alienated fromq technology as the object of his own 
making not merely because it is owned by another (a 
yII 
capitalist), but also because in itself it has become 
endowed with the will, purpose and intention of the 
capitalist (or capital). Technology, then, functions 
as capital; it is produced, according to Marx, to 
absorb and dominate living labour. 
The notion of alienation of labourg therefore, 
expresses a deeper meaning than the belonging of 
objects (technologies, etc. ) to a capitalist. The 
alienation of labour (that is, the means of 
production and subsistence being the property of the 
capitalist) only becomes actual, or it is realized, 
in the production process. And this realization is 
made possible when and because of the fact (at least 
according to my reading of Marx) that in the process 
of capitalist production proper (i. e. the industrial 
system) 'most of the work is done by the material 
properties of the objects'; that is, technology comes 
to function (in itself, by design) as capital. It is 
in this deeper sense that one should, I would 
suggest, understand Marx's following remarks: 
'The domination of the capitalist over the worker is 
thus the domination of the thing over man, of dead 
labour over living labour, of the product over the 
producer; for the commodities which become the means 
of domination (in fact over the worker) are 
themselves merely the results of the productive 
process, its products. '(33) 
And what is essential to this domination, and what 
Marx calls the "'process of alienation" of man's own 
labour'(34), is not only 'the fact that the material 
conditionsq indispensable to the realization of 
labour [i. e. above all else technologies -RR], are 
alienated from the worker', but, 
'what is more, 
[these] appear as fetishes endowed with their own 
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will and soul... '(35) We shall see later (in the 
next chapter) the link between this realization of 
alienation of labour and the form of technology as 
machine technology - machine technology as the 
"master" of labour, 
Howeverg insofar as I am awareq commentaries on (and 
criticism of) Marx's notion of alienation have 
concentrated almost exclusively on the worker's 
'self-estrangement', 'lack of job satisfaction", 
"feeling of powerlessness", and other variations on 
the same theme stressing the "individualistic" and 
psychological aspect of alienation with an "ultimate" 
reference to the worker's loss of control over 
his/her labour power, the labour process and, of 
course, the products of his/her labour, and this loss 
of control as a result of the ownership of the means 
of production by a capitalist class. Thusq the issue 
of technology, if and when it is related to 
alienation (often merely implicitly), is predicated 
on the basis and within the notion of property, and, 
therefore, what is stressed is merely the loss of 
control over the technologies of production because 
these do not belong to the worker. The specific form 
and social character of production technology in its 
own right, so to speakq is thus claimed to be less of 
an issue for Marx; property/ownership/controlq 
howeverg is his fundamental concern. 
Let us, therefore, briefly look at what some 
commentators have to say and how they have 
interpreted Marx on this issue. 
Io'f 
3. Marx's Alienation: A Brief Comparison of Views 
it is impossible to deal with the various 
interpretations of Marx's theory of alienation and 
the wide-ranging works that deal with the whole 
complex of conditions and aspects of alienation 
within the confines of this section, nor is it 
appropriate or relevant given that here we are 
specifically concerned with the technology-alienation 
problematic. What I have done here, therefore, is to 
select only a few commentators and have chosen to 
look at only a few basic issues which are, in one 
form or another, present in all interpretations of 
Marx's conception. 
Most interpretations of Marx's conception of 
alienation point to three basic conditions conducive 
to alienation: the division of labour; exchange or 
the market system; and the property system. And the 
main issues generally taken into account are: the 
issue of the ownership of the means of production 
which has been widely considered by many commentators 
as (sometimes) the sole or (often) the chief 
alienation-inducing condition for Marx; the issue of 
the relationship between the division of labour and 
the worker's loss of control at the point of 
production; and the issue of self-estrangement (or 
self-alienation), which is most often considered by 
many commentators in its psychological, spiritual and 
subjective aspect related to the work process (the 
feeling of powerlessness/job dissatisfaction, etc. ). 
Let usq then, begin with Alvin Gouldner and the issue 
of "ownership/property": Gouldner starts by stressing 
the basic distinction between Marx's notion of 
alienation and that of Hegel's. And he writes: 'Hegel 
Joe. 
had dwelt extensively on the importance of labor - 
although he had not dwelt on labor as a site of 
alienation and had instead stressed its liberating 
character. Marx accepts the fundamental value 
grounding of the Hegelian critique of alienation, 
namely, that humanity's proper estate is that of an 
-autonomous "subjectil, the locus and agency of action; 
but he rejects the Hegelian analysis of alienation's 
source. '(36) And he goes on to point out that not 
only the sources of alienation were different for 
Marx, but that Marx, unlike Hegel, asserts that 
alienation is a product of the historical development 
of capitalist relations: 
'For Marx, ' Gouldner remarks, 'the critical locus of 
alienation comes to be situated in the work place. 
The decisive form of alienation is now not that of 
man [as in Hegel-RR] but the worker's alienation from 
objects he produces and from the means of production 
with which he produces. ' And what is more, it is 
capitalism which is crucial to Marx's notion: 'Much of 
what Marx did... was to historicize and relativize 
Hegel's theory of alienation. Alienation is now no 
longer man's eternal condition but the product of an 
historical, special division of labour that had a 
beginning and whichg it is predictedg will also have 
an end when capitalism is supplanted by 
socialism. '(37) 
So much, then, for the distinction between Hegel and 
Marx; but how did Marx view the question of 
alienation under capitalist conditions? It 
is here 
that Gouldner, like most other commentators, grounds 
his interpretation of Marx on the issue of property. 
Thus, he writes: 'This alienation, Marx came to hold, 
was a result of property institutions essential 
to 
capitalismg centring on the 
division of labor in 
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which some - capitalists - own and direct the means 
of production and the purchase of the labour power of 
others - the proletariat - who are subject to their 
domination. For by reason of their ownership of the 
means of production, the capitalist can direct their 
use and also own the products they produce. '(38) 
Although in his discussion of Marx on alienation, 
Gouldner refers to the three basic conditions 
mentioned above (i. e. the division of labour, the 
market system, and the property system (39)) and 
makes some very important points, he, nonetheless, 
does not take into account or analyse the 
technological aspect of Marx's notion of alienation. 
(He does, of course, discuss technology in Marx at a 
later stage in his book as we shall see shortly - but 
even here there is no analysis of technology- 
alienation problematic in Marx's works. ) Control and 
ownership of the means of production (including 
production technology) is then for Marx, according to 
Gouldner, by far the most important issue. 
As I have mentioned, Gouldner does refer to the 
importance of division of labour for Marx as the 
source of alienation, but even this is, in Gouldner's 
interpretation, not a central factor in itself 
because 'Marx saw the division of labor as the 
grounding of the property system. 1(40) Thus, Gouldner 
maintainsq 'insofar as they [Marx and Engels] stress 
the role of the division of labor in inducing 
alienation. then this is still a half-Hegelian, 
transitional formulation, rather than a 
characteristically "Marxian" critique of 
alienation... '(41) And by implication therefore, for 
Gouldnerg the 'characteristically "Marxian" critique 
of alienation' rests on property, the ownership 
(and 
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control) of means of production. Gouldner's 
interpretation is, on the whole, based on Marx's 
early works, in which, as we have seen, Marx himself 
tends to stress the property factor. But, as I have 
argued, even in these writings Marx is also concerned 
to raise the issue of the alien power of instruments, 
products and technologies, and this (at least in some 
passages) with respect to their specific ('material') 
character in itself. Gouldner, however, does not 
either question or examine this aspect of Marx's 
notion of alienation. 
A similar verdict applies to Ali Rattansi's 
interpretation of Marx's conception of alienation, 
and this despite the fact that Rattansi is directly 
concerned with the problematic of the division of 
labour in Marx. According to Rattansi, insofar as the 
alienation of labour is concerned: 'Marx identifies at 
least two central dimensionsq the result and the act 
of production. Or, as he makes abundantly clear, 
class and the division of labour. '(42) And the link 
between these and alienation is stated as 
follows: 'alienation as class relations, as 
propertylessness, and alienation as a feeling of 
painful strangeness imposed by the division of labour 
in capitalist factory production. '(43) 
The 'product', Rattansi goes on to explain, is the 
result of production which is 'appropriated by 
another who grows ever more powerful through this 
process'(44). Thisq Rattansi maintains, is Marx's 
alienation-class-property linkage. But his statement 
as it stands does not warrant such an association 
with 'class relations'. For it begs the question: on 
what basis is the product appropriated, and why 
loý 
should 'this process' make the appropriator 'more 
powerful'? 
For Marx, as I have argued, this basis is the 
separation of labour from the material conditions of 
production. And the key to the appropriator's 
enhancement of 'power' is, according to Marx, 'that 
the object that labour produces, its product, stands 
opposed to it as something alien, as a power 
independent of the producer. ' That is, as capital: 
'domination of his product, of capital. '(45) 
What is missing throughout Rattansils discussion, is 
any examination and identification of the nature of 
the 'product' and the essential aspect of 
objectification as abstraction and externalization. 
The most important aspect of alienation (an aspect 
which Marx regarded as essential both in his early 
and later, "mature" works) is to do with the immense 
objective power created, or 'set up', by social 
labour which stands opposed, or 'over against', 
itself as one of its own 'moments' - i. e. capital in 
its various manifestations as labour-power and the 
means of production, includ production technology. 
Rattansi does not recognize the twofold meaning of 
the 'alienation' of the product in Marx: that of the 
product as means of production (technology, etc. ) and 
as means of consumption. As, for example, Jon Elster 
has pointed outq we need to distinguish 'between two 
classes of objects from which the worker is 
alienated: consumption goods and instruments of 
production. '(46) And since Rattansi fails to 
recognize thisq he simply associates this aspect of 
alienationg appropriation and 
'the loss of the 
product'g with the phenomenon of the market - and 
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maintains that this is in fact Marx's position: 'as 
with all aspects of alienation, for the young Marx 
the market dehumanises man. '(47) The point is that, 
for Marx (both 'young' and 'mature'), it is not the 
market as such but the capitalist mode of production 
that 'dehumanises man'. And a necessary factor 
(condition or dimension) of this 'dehumanization' is 
for Marx, as I shall explain in the next chapter, 
'the character of independence and estrangement which 
the capitalist mode of production as a whole gives to 
the instruments of labour... '(48) 
The appropriation of the product of labour 'by 
another' is, then, according to Rattansi, linked to 
exchange - this is a third condition, or, as Rattansi 
puts it, 'a third dimension of alienation': 'Marx's 
Manuscripts [of 1844-RRI are also centrally concerned 
with the phenomenon of exchange and if a third 
dimension of alienation is to be sought in Marx'. s 
thought at this time, then the exchange relationship 
is a much better contender than the idea of 
"self- 
alienation"... '(49) 
What is implicit here in Rattansi's interpretation is 
that 'the phenomenon of exchange' is more central to 
Marx's conception of labour's alienation under 
capitalism than the 
'idea of "self -alienation"'. But 
the appropriation of the product as a commodity under 
capitalism through the act and process of exchange 
is 
based, for Marx, precisely on the fact of the self- 
alienation of the worker. 
For Marx self-alienation 
has a priority, if you like, over 
the exchange of 
productsy over the market. 
For at the root of its 
meaning lies the notion of 
the abstraction of self- 
activity and the separation of 
the producer from the 
material conditions of production 
(estrangement from 
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nature and "man's" own self-activity in nature). And 
because of this separation the worker must constantly 
self-alienate himself/herself. In the economic 
language of Marx's Ca ital, this fact of separation 
means that the exchange of products and the market is 
conditioned by the sale of labour-power 
labour/capital exchange has a logical priority, at 
least for Marx. 
In other words, the direct producer alienates 
himself/herself (self-alienation) in a twofold sense: 
estrangement of his/her life's activity; and 
externalization of his/her essential being through 
the process of objectification in the act of 
production; that is why, for Marx, the product 
becomes a commodity. 'Exchangeg' writes the 'young' 
Marx, 'can only set in motion, it can do no more than 
confirm the character each of us bears in relation to 
his own product and hence to the product of the 
other. '(50) And, also the same principle is stated by 
the 'mature' Marx: 'Since, before entering on the 
process, his own labour has already been alienated 
from himself by sale of his labour-power [i. e. this 
is one aspect of self-alienation -RR]... the product 
of the labourer is incessantly converted, not only 
into commodities, but into capital... " 
into means of 
production that command the roducers. 
'(51) And this 
latter point is the other aspect of self-alienation. 
Self-alienation is, therefore, fundamentally 
important for Marx, but not so much in its 
psychological sense, rather because it means that the 
worker's productive activity 
(labour) no longer 
'belongs to his essential being' - i. e. labour is 
wage-labour; and that is the 
'character' or the form 
of labour which is only 
'confirmed' by the process of 
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exchange of products. It is a character which has its 
determination in the historical process of separation 
of the direct producer from his/her material 
conditions of production. As the 'young' Marx puts 
it: 'How could the product of the worker's activity 
confront him as something alien if it were not for 
the fact that in the act of production he was 
estranging himself from himself? After all, the 
product is simply the resume of the activity, of the 
production. '(52) 
And, thus also, self-alienation signifies that the 
worker is himself/herself, as it were, the producer, 
the creator of the very conditions of his/her own 
estrangement (alienation): 'Every self-estrangement of 
man from himself and nature is manifested in the 
relationship he sets up between other men and himself 
and nature ... In the practical, real world, self- 
estrangement can manifest itself only in the 
practical, real relationship to other men... So 
through estranged labour man not only produces his 
relationship to the object and to the act of 
production as to alien and hostile powers; he also 
produces the relationship in which other men stand to 
his production and product, and the relationship in 
which he stands to these other men. Just as he 
creates his own production as a loss of reality.. and 
his own product as a loss, a product which does not 
belong to him, so he creates the domination of the 
non-producer over production and its product. Just as 
he estranges from himself his own activity, so he 
confers upon the stranger an activity which does not 
belong to him. '(53) 
Hence 'alsog it should be added here that, for Marx, 
'de-alienation' can only come about through the 
worker's own self-activity and the result of that 
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activity (i. e. the development of the productive 
forces as well as self-emancipation, etc*), 
It is by taking self-alienation into account that we 
can see that Marx, even at this stage (contrary to 
Rattansi's misinterpretation), is already concerned 
to go behind the phenomenon of 'market forces' and 
exchange; that he is concerned to show what (in his 
opinion at least) political economy 'conceals' by 
'ignoring the direct relationship between the worker 
(labour) and production. '(54) It is this relationship 
which, for Marx, is the 'practical, real 
relationship' in which self-estrangement (self- 
alienation) manifests itself. Marx's mind's eye, so 
to speak, in the 1844 Manus (as in Capital), is 
on production, and not as Rattansi states on 'market 
forces'. (55) Though, admittedly, Marx's early 
statements on this are vague and one needs to read 
these statements with the aid of his later writings. 
Now, as I have pointed out, according to Rattansi, 
for Marx, 'the estrangement the worker experiences in 
the act of production' is 'imposed' by the 'factory' 
division of labour. (56) But an essential question 
that needs to be addressed is: what is so special 
(specific) about the nature of the 'factoryl - at 
least according to Marx - that brings about this 
'experience' of alienation? And the response to this 
question that can be found in Rattansi's discussion 
of Marx is based on the latter's views on property 
and the market forces: 'Marx postulates, ' Rattansi, 
for exampleý statesq la strong link between the 
development of the market and competition, on the one 
hand, and the subdivision of tasks in the factory on 
the other. '(57) Furthermore, Marx, Rattansi goes on, 
'links... the accumulation of capital, the subdivision 
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of tasks in the factory and the form of 
ownership. '(58) 
Without denying the importance of propertyp exchange 
and the market for Marx, this response is only 
partially correct. What about the instruments of 
production, the 'product' as technology? In the 
examination of Marx's views on the relationship 
between the division of labour and the alienation of 
labour, does not the role and form of production 
technology deserve to be taken into account (even if 
Rattansi's thesis is specifically concerned with the 
idea of 'the abolition of the division of labour' in 
Marx)? Rattansi, however, ignores the technology- 
alienation problematic, and this also perhaps 
explains, at least in part, his misinterpretation of 
Marx's views on technology which is indicated by the 
following statement: 'One of the limitations of Marx's 
own account in this context [of 'the possibilities 
for reorganising production and administration under 
socialism' -RR1, --- is the tendency to view the means 
of production as neutral. **'(59) And, more than thisq 
he goes on to claim that despite 
'Marx's theorisation that the relations of production 
provide the condition for and set determinate limits 
to the development of the forces of production, this 
form of analysis is rarely extended to include the 
notion that the very character of the instruments of 
production may be marked by the type of social 
relations that provide their conditions of existence 
and development. Thus, despite his repeated 
insistence that the emergence of capitalist relations 
of production preceded the development of 
industrialisationg Marx's characteristic remarks on 
machinery at no point imply that the presence of 
specifically capitalist relations and choices may be 
IN 
registered in the very design of these means of 
production. '(60) 
Howeverg a rigorous and careful reading of Marx's 
writings, even his early writings on alienationg 
shows that not only means of production, productive 
forces, or indeed production technology ('instruments 
of production'), were not, at least as a general 
rule, regarded by him as 'neutral', but that he was 
in fact concerned with the character and form of 
these under capitalism. It is, of course, perfectly 
true that there are ambiguities and problems in Marx 
(both in his early and later writings)l and that his 
conception of technology is, as it were, only 
embryonically present in his theory of alienation. 
There are also passages both in his early and later 
writings that are ambivelent towards this particular 
issue - and, indeedq one could find statements here 
and there, as we shall see in the next chapter, which 
seem to support such an idea of 'neutrality'. 
But as I have attempted to point out in this chapter, 
there is enough material in his early writings on 
alienation to indicate, at the very least, the 
direction of his thoughts on the issue of technology 
and the significance of the character of the latter 
insofar as the alienation of labour is concerned. 
And, moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
this interpretation of Rattansi (in his discussion of 
Marx's later, 'mature' works) is quite mistaken; his 
assertion that Marx does not take into account the 
form or character 'of production technology in his 
analysis of capitalist form of production is, I 
submit, false. Indeed, what is fundamental in Marx is 
the identification of the 'alien' or 'hostile' power 
of production technology with capital - i. e. 
'5. 
technology as capital - which Rattansi fails to even 
recognize, 
By contrast, however, we find such a recognition in 
Jon Elster's interpretation of Marx on alienation of 
labour. As Elster writes: 'In any productive process, 
Marx argued, all factors of production ultimately 
resolve into labor. He [Marx] distinguished between 
living labor and dead labor - the first being the 
labor expended by workers during the production 
process, the second the labor embodied in the means 
of production. '(61) Under capitalism these factors of 
the industrial labour process 'are perverted and 
distorted'. And, thus, for Marx, Elster goes on: 'the 
dead labor that is present alongside living labor in 
the production process appears as an alien and 
hostile power - as capital. '(62) 
This recognition of 'dead labor' as 'capital' is not, 
however, either examined in detail or explained by 
Elster. Why does Marx think that these factors of 
production 'are perverted and distorted' under 
capitalism? In what way or sense they are so 
'perverted and distorted'? What does Marx mean by the 
idea of 'dead labor' as 'capital'? 
These are questions that Elster seems to be quite 
unconcerned with, partly because of his own 
definition of 'alienation ... as the lack of a sense 
of meaning'(63), and partly because of his 
interpretation of Marx's concept of alienation as a 
phenomenon 'located 000 at the level of 
individuals'(64). On the whole, and despite the fact 
that he recognizes that 'one cannot really say that 
Marx had a psychological theory'(65), Elster 
approaches Marx's conception of alienation from the 
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individualistic and psychological aspect. Whether he 
is dealing with the problematic of exchange and the 
market in relation to the 'lack of autonomy'(66) or 
with alienation as 'absence of opportunity for self- 
realization'(67), Elster seems to be almost 
exclusively concerned with individual psychology, 
with 'desires', with 'feelings', with individual 
attitudes and beliefs. This is not to say that such 
considerations are absent in Marx. But what I would 
strongly suggest here is that for Marx the essential 
point was the attempt to locate the root of these 
subjective aspects of alienation in the objective 
conditions of capitalisme 
For example, in his Making Sense of Marx, Elster 
writes: '... the domination of dead labour over living 
labour may be linked to the phenomenon of 
exploitation, another major flaw of capitalism. It is 
in fact only by virtue of the capitalist's possession 
of the means of production that he can exploit the 
workers without the use of force or violence, beyond 
that necessary to protect private property in 
general. Or, more correctly: he can exploit them 
because they believe that his possession is 
legitimate, which they do because of their alienation 
from the means of production. This alienation may be 
taken to mean that the workers unthink accept 
the currently used means of production as being the 
property of the current generation of capitalists, 
ignoring that they are also the product of past 
labour. Org more plausibly, although aware that the 
means of production are the product of past workers, 
they accept the present capitalist possession as 
legitimate because the earlier generation of workers 
produced them with the help of the means of 
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production held to be the legitimate possession of 
the earlier generation of capitalists. '(68) 
This rather confusing passage is, I believe, 
concerned with the worker's (subjective) viewy 
belief, or mode of awareness and what may be called 
the ideological aspect of alienation/legitimation. 
The "objective" reason for the worker's acceptance of 
his or her predicament given seems to me to boil down 
to nothing else than proprietorial rights (past and 
present). But although there is no denying that from 
the social aspect property is, as I have said before, 
a vitally necessary factor for Marx, we need to know 
why and how workers continue (generation after 
generation) to accept the capitalist's possession or 
ownership of the means of production as legitimate. 
On this Elster's reasoning seems to me to be 
circular: he states that the capitalist 'can exploit' 
the workers 'because they [the workers] believe' that 
the capitalist's possession of the means of 
production 'is legitimate'. Why do they think in that 
way? They do so, he tells us, 'because of their 
alienation f rom the means of production. ' And that, 
he goes on to explain, 'This alienatýon may be taken 
to mean that the workers unthinkingly accept' such 
'possession'q propertyp as 'legitimate'. Why? Because 
'the earlier generation of workers' had also regarded 
the means of production as 'the legitimate possession 
of the earlier generation of capitalists. ' Now if we 
were to ask: why this 'earlier generation of workers' 
held such a belief? The answer woulq presumably be: 
they did 'because of their alienation from the means 
of production'. We thus have no real explanation of 
labour's alienation, but simply a move from 
jig 
alienation to subjective/ideological/legitimation 
aspect of property and back to alienation, and so on. 
The essential point in Marx's conception of 
alienation of labour, I believe, is not so much the 
idea that workers 'unthinkingly' accept capitalist 
property (ownership of the means of production) as 
legitimate. The essential point for him is why this 
is so and how the capitalist form of production tends 
to perpetuate and reinforce the very conditions of 
alienation. And a very important factor in the 
explanation of this "why and how" is the role and 
form (or character) of production technology. It is 
by no means the only factor, but it is one that needs 
to be taken into account, along with property 
(possession) and other factors, in order to avoid the 
circular argument referred to above. 
Thus even if workers are fully aware of the fact 
'that the means of production are the product of past 
workers'(Elster) ' the way production technology 
actually functions (Marx writes in the Grundrisse 
[p. 693]: 'the character of the production process 
itself, including its material elements and its 
material motion') is objectively alienating. At the 
point of production the 'dead labour' of modern 
production technology actually does dominate 
'living 
labour'. There production technology is an alien, 
hostile powerg and what is crucial for Marx, with 
respect to the alienation of labour, is the 
form of 
this technology as machine technology. 
It is this latter point that Elster fails to examine. 
He of course recognizes that for Marx, as he 
writes: 'The alienation from the means of production 
is the crucial structural fact that underlies the 
liq 
alienation from the means of consumption'. Since, as 
he goes on, 'it deprives the worker of his claim on 
the whole net product. Also, the dispossession from 
the means of production excludes the worker from full 
control of the work process and prevents him, 
therefore, from fully exercising his creative 
capacities. '(69) He thus mentions that for Marx the 
worker 'is made into a mere appendix of the 
machine'(70) (quoting a passage from the Grundrisse), 
but throughout his analysis thereafter he ignores the 
importance of the form and character of technology as 
machine technology in Marx's theoryg concentrating 
instead on the fact of 'dispossession', the 
'spiritual alienation' of the worker, and the issue 
of legitimation of exploitation because of 
alienation. 
For Marx 'dispossession' from the means of production 
does exclude 'the worker from full control of the 
work process', but unless we fully take into account 
Marx's repeated emphases with respect to the form of 
technology as machine technology, it would be 
extremely difficult to explain why capitalist 
ownership of the means of production should 'prevent' 
the worker, as Elster says, 'from fully exercising 
his creative capacities'. I can see no reason why the 
worker (who is obviously the one working with the 
technology) cannot be creative simply because someone 
else (the capitalist) owns the technology. Unless, 
that isq we take into account what is technically and 
functionally specific to machine technology as such - 
its specific designed structure and functional 
principles that facilitates the translation of 
capital's social power based on the ownership 
(possession) of the means of production into an 
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alienating technological power within the production 
process; thus, we have technology as capital* 
In other words9 'dispossession' has to become 
technologically enforced if it is to prevent the 
exercise of creative capacities. We need to make a 
clear distinction, as I believe Marx (and Weber, for 
example) did, between the form of modern industrial 
machine technology and the pre-industrial craft-tools 
in order to understand why and how it is that the 
exercise of creative capacity becomes difficult and 
often impossible (though, it must be said here that 
Marx sometimes exaggerates on this point; for even 
with some of the most advanced machinery there are 
certain types of labour which remain highly 
creative). It is only then that this particular form 
of technology (machinery) results in what Elster 
calls 'the spiritual alienation of the worker' at the 
point of production - this is, at least, my reading 
of Marx. And in fact the very passage which Elster 
quotes from Marx seems to support my interpretation. 
Marx, thusq writes: 'The appropriation of living 
labour by objectified labour - of the power or 
activity which creates value by existing for-itself - 
which lies in the concept of capitalg is posited, in 
production resting on machineryg as the character of 
the production process itselfq including its material 
element and its material motion... '(71) 
It is because of machinery (the specific form of 
technology as machine technology), and not simply 
because of ownership/property in itself, that Marx 
goes on to claim that: 'The production process has 
ceased to be a labour process in the sense of a 
process dominated by labour as its governing unity. 
' 
For Marxq then2 it is this form of technology that 
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completes and reinforces the alienation of labour, 
and it is because of the role and through the form of 
machine technology that capital 'prevents' the 
workers from 'fully exercising' their creative 
potential; thus we have, according to Marx, the 
alienation of labour at the point of production. 
Indeed, one of the most unambiguous passages on this 
point in Marx is precisely that which Elster quotes a 
part of. Although I shall deal at length with this 
issue in the next chapter, it is worth quoting a part 
of that passage which was left out by Elstero 
'In machinery, ' Marx continues, 'objectified labour 
confronts living labour within the labour process 
itself as the power which rules it; a power which, as 
the appropriation of living labour, is the form of 
capital. The transformation of the means of labour 
into machinery, as the means of its action, also 
posits the absorption of the labour process in its 
material character as a mere moment of the 
realization process of capital. The increase of the 
productive force of labour and the greatest possible 
negation of necessary labour is the necessary 
tendency of capital ... The transformation of the 
means of labour into machinery is the realization of 
this tendency. In machinery, objectified labour 
materially confronts living labour as a ruling power 
and as an active subsumption of the latter under 
itself, not only by appropriating it, but in the real 
production process itself... '(72) 
As it can be seen, for Marx, it isq therefore, not 
merely because the workers 
'believe' that the 
capitalist's possession of the means of production 
'is legitimate' - whether or not this perception and 
belief is 'unfounded' or a mere 'illusion'(73) - as 
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Elster interprets Marx, that the capitalist is able 
to exploit them. But also more profoundly for Marx, 
it is because the very 'social being'(Marx) of the 
worker, his life's activity as a worker, confirms the 
hostile, alienating power of capital through the 
functioning of production technology as machinery. 
But since Elster ignores what may be called the 
technological aspect of alienation in Marx, he fails 
to see, let alone examine, the extremely powerful 
role of technology as an alienation-inducing 
condition. 
Insofar as Marx's conception is concerned, Elster's 
understanding, therefore, is quite one-sided - it 
concentrates on the subjective aspects. This is in 
part related to one other factor which seems to me to 
be crucial to Elster's interpretation of Marx's 
alienation: namely, that Elster seems to make a 
distinction between what he calls 'the capitalist 
organization of industry' and 'the nature of 
industrial work'(74). He is, however, silent on what 
is meant by the 'nature' of industrial work, and how 
such a distinction between the 'nature' and the 
capitalist form of organization of industry (even iff 
one were to accept that there is such a distinction, 
which clearly Marx did not) can help further our 
understanding of the problems of alienation in 
present-day work conditions. Yetq since in reality, 
in the actuality of the day-to-day work processes, we 
cannot separate the so-called 'nature' of industrial 
work from its capitalistic organization, a 
fundamental aspect of alienation for Marx is 
precisely concerned with this very point of how, in 
Marx's own language, content and form of modern 
industry and industrial technology are related and 
I2: 
the significance of this for the alienation of 
labour. 
And, yet, it is precisely this (technological) aspect 
of alienation in Marx's writings which Elster fails 
to examine and evaluate. Even when he is considering 
Marx's alienation as 'the rule of capital over 
labor'(75), and in spite of some important 
observations, Elster, as I have mentioned, neglects 
to take account of the significance of the form and 
character of production technology in Marx in 
relation to the alienation of labour. What Elster 
does, however, is to provide a reference to Marx's 
views on the 'real subsumption' of labour under 
capital. That is, when, as he says, 'the capitalist 
moves into the process of production itself. '(76) And 
without any examination and explanation of the 
significance of this moveg and what it actually 
entails in terms of the role of techniques and 
technologies (at least in Marx's opinion)9 Elster 
merely states that: 'This development culminates in 
factory productiong in which the worker is reduced to 
an appendage of the machinery. '(77) 
Yet, as we have seen, the question is: how and why 
'the worker is reduced to an appendage of the 
machinery'? Why had not such an appendage taken 
place, according to Marx at any rate, in past, non- 
capitalist systems of production? It is here, as I 
have suggested, that the issue of the technical 
characteristics and form of production technology as 
machine technology is important to Marx. We can see, 
for example, that Elster recognizes that with 'real 
subsumption'9 capital, according to Marx, takes on an 
objectiveg 'tangible' force. Thus, he writes: 
'In the 
second stage [with 
'real subsumption'-RR] there is an 
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additional f orm of domination, in that the worker 
loses all autonomy and personal satisfaction from 
work. Capital is now more than a claim on surplus; it 
has become a tangible force that drains the worker of 
all energy and cripples all his talents. In Hegelian 
terminology, Objective Spirit dominates Subjective 
Spirit; in Marxist language, dead labor dominates 
living labor. '(78) 
Here we have the alienation (and domination) of 
labour ('alienation-as-subjection'(79)) linked to the 
rule of capital as a 'tangible force'. And, 
furthermore, this is a force which is actually 
created by labour itself in the form of, what Elster 
calls, 'capital goods' (i. e. means of production, 
technologies): 'The irony and tragedy, for Marx, ' 
Elster writes, 'is that labor becomes the means to 
its own enslavement. [i. e. self-alienation -RRI The 
capital. goods are products of human laborg which in 
turn come to dominate it. '(80) 
It is, therefore, not the case that Elster is unaware 
of the importance of the notion of objectification 
for Marx (i. e. dead labour as capital; 'capital 
goods' as the 'tangible force' dominating labour, 
etc. ). The problem is that even when he discusses 
$alienation-as-subjection' or indeed the question of 
'fetishism' as an aspect of alienation (81), he 
leaves out Marx's ideas on the form of production 
technology as machine technology and how crucial this 
form is to 'alienation-as-subjection', as well as to 
both the objective substantiation and ideological 
legitimation of the illusion that capital's power to 
produce and to dominate, as Elster puts it, 
'is a 
faculty inherent in it'(82) 
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It is important to emphasise here that Elster is 
specifically concerned with Marx's conception of 
alienation/fetishism; he is presenting his views, his 
interpretation, evaluation and criticism of Marx's 
conception and not merely dealing with the general 
problematic of alienation. And Marx attaches a great 
deal of importance to the role and form of production 
technology as machine technology. To ignore this 
aspect of alienation in Marx's work, even if one 
disagrees with him and rejects his ideas and 
propositions, is, therefore, quite unjustifiable and 
unacceptable. Having thus ignored the role and form 
of machine technology as essential to Marx's 
conception of alienation - i. e. as an alienation- 
inducing condition equally as important for Marx as 
other conditions - Elster is left, finallyq to invoke 
the notion of property2 of the ownership of the means 
of productiong as the social condition behind 
lalienation-as-subjection': 'Alienation adds to 
exploitation a belief on the part of phe workers that 
the capitalist has legitimate claim on the surplus, 
by virtue of his legitimate ownership of the means of 
production. '(83) 
On this particular point, Elster's interpretation 
hardly differs from most other commentators 
including, for example, Robert Blauner, who, in his 
study of alienation and the factory worker in 
advanced capitalist society, states that: 'According 
to Marxq it was the property relations of capitalist 
society which most basically contributed to the 
alienation of the employee... The worker was 
propertyless and had nothing to sell but his labor 
power. Because he had no legal or social claim to the 
product which he and hundreds of other workmen 
produced, he was alienated from the product of his 
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labor. Because the factory and its machines belonged 
to the capitalist, the worker was not likely to 
identify psychologically with the fortunes of the 
enterprise. And because the profits from his work 
would not benefit him personally, but only the 
capitalist, what motivation was there to work with 
energy and intelligence? From the property 
institutions of capitalism aroset theng a third 
aspect of alienation, the employee's sense of 
isolation from the system of organized production and 
its goals. '(84) 
Although, unlike Elster's, Blauner's study is not 
directly concerned with Marx's conception of 
alienation (its analysis or examination), 
nevertheless, there is no doubt that Marx's notion of 
alienation is the main backcloth to, and indeed casts 
its shadow over, Blauner's entire study. His 
perspective, however, is fundamentally different from 
Marx's it being a 1socio-psychological' 
perspective, 'in that alienation is viewed' by 
Blauner 'as a quality of personal experience which 
results from specific kinds of social 
arrangements'(85) and defined in terms of job 
satisfaction, or lack of itq experienced by 
individual workers in four different industrial 
settings. But this 'socio-psychological' perspective 
is heavily coloured by Blauner's technological- 
deterministic outlook - an outlook which he also 
attributes to Marx (or perhaps was influenced by a 
reading of Marx which saw him as a technological 
determinist). 
Now, with Blauner we have a move from property to 
technology as the most important single factor 
affecting the worker's state of alienation. 
'Reacting 
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to the rhythms of technology rather than acting in 
some independent or autonomous manner, ' Blauner 
writes, 'he [the worker] approaches most completely 
the condition of thingness, the essence of 
alienation. '(86) Here we have a statement which 
appears quite Marxian in tone - and it is the kind of 
statement which appears more akin to the so-called 
11mature" Marx than the "young" Marx of the 1844 
Manuscripts with his greater emphasis on property 
relations. 
However, while the tone of Blauner's statement might 
be "Marxian", the underlying conception is not. The 
main issue for Marx is not so much the 'impact of 
technology ... with respect to powerlessness' (one of 
several dimensions of alienation mentioned by Blauner 
(87)) of the individual worker, but, and 
fundamentally, why and how production technology as a 
social object created by labour (mental and manual) 
comes to have such an 'impact'. In this respect, when 
Blauner refers to Marx's notion of alienation - 
which reallý, concerns us here - he, like many others, 
seems to simply assert that in the final analysis it 
is 'the property relations' of capitalism which is 
for Marx the basic determining factor, even though 
his own investigation singles out technology itself 
as the most important factor: ltechnology, ' he writes, 
'more than any other factor, determines the nature of 
the job tasks performed ... and has an important effect 
on a number of aspects of alienation, '(88) And 
again: 'the character of the machine system largely 
determines the degree of control the factory employee 
exerts over his sociotechnical environment and the 
range and limitations of his freedom in the work 
situation. '(89) 
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Thusq although in Blauner's study, technology is, so 
to speak, the "prime mover", nevertheless, with 
respect to alienation, Blauner does not address the 
basic question of why technology should have such an 
'impact' in modern capitalist productive processes 
without having, for instance, the same 'impact' in 
other (past, non-capitalist) forms of productive 
process. Marx, on the other hand, does attem pt to 
address this question in his later works as we shall 
see, and not, I submit, simply on the basis of the 
ownership factor, but in fact by taking into account 
the transformation (and development) of production 
technology, and the relation between the technical 
and functional principles of industrial machinery and 
its specific social charactere 
Now, this technology/alienation issue is also a basic 
consideration of Langdon Winner's excellent study on 
the idea of 'technology out of control'. (90) Winner's 
discussion of Marx on this issue begins with the 
theme of 'autonomous' technology. 'Marx believed, ' he 
points out, 'that under the conditions of nineteenth- 
century capitalism, technology had taken on an 
independent, malevolent, lifelike existence and stood 
opposed to man as an alien and even monstrous 
force. '(91) Unlike many other commentators, Winner 
also fully recognizes that Marx's writings on the 
specific character of machine-industrial technology 
as a 'mechanical monster'(92) and its role in the 
productive process as a 
"master" rather than a 
"servant" of workers, 'are not mere instances of 
rhetorical excess. 
'(93) And, further, Marx's ideas on 
this scoreq as Winner rightly remarks, are 
'an 
outgro, wth of [his] theory of alienated 
labor. '(94) 
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Without however discussing the issue in detail, 
Winner also refers to Marx's view that with the 
development of capitalism the unity or fusion of 
social and material/technical elements of the 
productive forces (discussed in the previous chapter 
and referred to above in the introduction) breaks 
down. 'In the course of history, ' he writes, 'the 
original and proper relationship [of "technology", 
nature and "man"-RR] had gone wrong. Through a long 
series of technological and social developments 
culminating in the capitalist industrial order, men 
had fallen into a condition in which the means of 
life, freedom, and enrichment had evolved into forces 
of degradation, slavery, and death. '(95) 
He thus, more or less precisely, indicates what is an 
essential aspect of Marx's notion of alienation: that 
with the historical development of capitalism, 
humanity 'had become alienated from productive life, 
from their products, tools, labor, and their 
fellows. '(96) And that with and as a result of this 
separation (abstraction): 'Man the laborer continued 
to pour his humanity into an endless succession of 
products, but this process did not extend his power 
or satisfaction. Rather, it drained life's 
essence. '(97) It is on the basis of such an idea - 
that is, the 'alienated transference of life' - that 
for Marx the 'strange phenomenon'(98) of what Winner 
calls 'autonomous technology' appears. And in fact, 
according to Winner, we find in Marx's writings 'what 
amounts to the first coherent theory of autonomous 
technology. '(99) 
Howeverv on this latter point, I believe, Winner goes 
way off the mark, as it were. It 
it is quite 
incorrect to interpret Marx's conception of 
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technology under capitalism as a 'theory of 
autonomous technology'. And even if one were to be so 
inclined as to label Marx's conception of technology 
a 'theory' as distinct from his theory of capitalism, 
it is at the very least debatable to view it as a 
'coherent' theory - Winner, at any rate, has produced 
no arguments to support or substantiate such a claim. 
Indeed, contrary to Winner's assertion, it is 
precisely this idea of 'autonomous technology' which 
I believe Marx is at pains to refute. Here we should 
recall Elster's observation that for Marx, 'dead 
labor', production technology, 'that is present 
alongside living labor in the production process 
appears as an alien and hostile power - as 
capital. '(100) Technology, in other words, is not, 
according to Marx, 'autonomous', but a manifestation 
of capital in the process of roduction. 
Let us briefly see, nevertheless, what Winner means 
by 'autonomous technology'. This notion was actually 
taken, as Winner himself acknowledges, from Jacques 
Ellul's description of the 'autonomy' of technique in 
modern industrial society: 'Technique, ' Ellul asserts, 
'has become autonomous; it has fashioned an 
omnivorous world which obeys its own laws and which 
has renounced all tradition. '(101) From this idea, 
Winner proposes the term 'autonomous technology' 
which expresses the following conception of 
technology: 'that far from being controlled by the 
desired and rational ends of human beings, technology 
in a real sense now governs its own course, speed, 
and destination. 
'(102) 
A superficial reading of Marx on alienation may, 
perhaps, suggest a close affinity 
between his 
conception of technology as an 
'alien power' and 
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Winner's notion of 'autonomous technology'. But a 
careful reading of Marx, I maintain, will show that 
this is not so. Both in his early and (even more so) 
in his later works, Marx rejects the idea that 
technology 'governs its own course, speedq and 
destination', and he does so categorically. Indeed, a 
couple of paragraphs after stating that Marx had 
formulated 'the first coherent theory of autonomous 
technology', Winner changes his mind and all but 
withdraws his own statement: 'But, l he now 
acknowledges, lone should not go too far in 
attributing a theory of autonomous technology to Karl 
Marx. '(103) 
However, if the so-called 'coherent' theory is 
withdrawn, it is only, it seems, in order now to be 
replaced by 'a well-developed conception of 
technology out of control... '(104) Thus, it seems 
that according to Winner's reading of Marx on 
alienation and technology, the conception of 
technology for Marx is still one that retains the 
essential meaning of 'autonomous technology' - 
technology out of control. But, again, Winner seems 
to feel obliged to further qualify his view on Marx's 
conception: 'For Marx, ' he writes, 'the alienation of 
labor and the appearance of a massive, life-draining 
industrial mechanism cannot be considered 
independently of the historical class struggle, 
surplus value in industrial economics9 capitalist 
accumulation, and the social and political domination 
of the bourgeoisie. '(105) 
And no more than a few lines after the above 
qualificationg Winner reverses his earlier assertion 
and evaluation: 
'But Marx, ' now we are told, 'makes it 
clear that mastery over technology 
has not been 
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really lost. It has simply been removed to a small 
segment of the social order, the capitalist 
class. '(106) Thus, having first claimed that Marx had 
a coherent theory of 'autonomous technology', and 
then,. that no, he had only a well-developed 
conception of 'technology out of control', we are now 
effectively told that technology for Marx is not in 
fact out of control; it is indeed under the control 
of 'the capitalist class'. 
It appears, then, that technology does not 'in a real 
sense now govern its own course, speed, and 
destination' - at least not according to Marx's 
conception. But what is more, at the end of his brief 
discussion of Marx on the alienation/technology 
issue, Winner having been unable, I would suggest, to 
come to grips with Marx's conception of technology in 
Capital,, returns to Marx's early works and in quoting 
a passage from the 1844 Manuscripts, he concludes 
that the 'strange phenomenon' of modern industrial 
technology as an 'alien power' is for Marx a result 
of capitalist property. (107) Thus, what we get from 
Winner, after some twists and turns, is an 
understanding of Marx's ideas on technology and 
alienation which asserts, like the other commentators 
mentioned, that for Marx capitalist ownership is the 
determining factor lurking behind the 'strange 
phenomenon' of modern technology and the alienation 
of laboure 
But although one cannot deny the importance of 
property (of ownership) for Marx, 
it is, I believe, 
quite wrong to suggest that 
for him the property 
system is either the sole or even 
the chief 
alienation-inducing condition. 
True that in his early 
writings9 as I have already mentioned, 
this factor is 
133 
stressed (or rather, in my opinion, over-stressed) - 
and, as we have seen, there are problems and 
difficulties which Marx simply fails to consider in 
his early writings. But even in these writings, again 
as I have tried to point out, with respect to the 
question of alienation there are definite indications 
that Marx is concerned to look deeper into the mode 
of functioning of production and has provided certain 
important insights on the technology-alienation 
problematic. 
As already suggested, a key factor for the 
understanding of Marx's conception of alienation - 
something that is often neglected by many 
commentators - is to start with Marx's conceptual 
connection between the complete separation of the 
means of production from the direct producer and the 
final break up of the social fusion of productive 
forces, the historical split of the social unity of 
human productive activity and the material-technical 
elements of that activity in nature* This split and 
separation, I maintain, is, from Marx's standpoint, 
the fundamental source of alienation. A crucial 
aspect of this separation is, clearly, the ownership 
and control of the means of production by a non- 
labouring class. And as we have seeng it is this 
aspect which is deemed, by most commentators, to 
be 
essential in Marx's writings on alienation: 
i. e. that 
technology is owned and controlled by the capitalist 
class, and thus the 
'alien power' attributed to it is 
really nothing but the power of 
its "master" (the 
capitalist). The issue of technology/alienation, 
therefore, basically resolves itself 
for Marx, so it 
is claimed, on the fact of the capitalist 
form of 
property, followed on 
by the division of labour, the 
marketq and so one 
11211- 
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The problem is that if we concentrate on the fact of 
ownership of the means of production as such and 
ignore the specific character and form of production 
technology (and other "factors" of production), then 
it would be extremely hard to justify (logically, at 
any rate) why alienation of labour should not have 
been, so to speak, at its "absolute" limit with, say, 
slavery. Perhaps some would assert that that is 
indeed the case; and certainly if one were to take 
the fact of ownership as the only or chief factor, 
then it has to be said that Marx's assertion that it 
is under capitalism that alienation reaches its 
zenith is wrong. Since on the "logic" of ownership 
alone, alienation of the direct producer (labour) is 
far more complete under slavery than under wage- 
labour. For, as is well known, the slave, by 
definition, is a direct producer without 9 
period. The wage-labourer does not own the means of 
production, but, according to Marx himself, he does 
own his labour-power (which the slave does not). 
However, over and above certain other considerations, 
there is one essential factor that distinguishes the 
labour process (and hence the status of the 
"labourer" within it) in Classical antiquity from 
that in the contemporary world (capitalism). And that 
is, as G. E. M. de Ste. Croix has pointed out, 
'a 
technological distinction. '(108) Not only, as Ste. 
Croix writesq Classical antiquity2 as compared with 
modern capitalism, 
'was very undeveloped 
technologicallyq and therefore 
infinitely less 
peoductive. '(109) But the very character 
of 
production technology was 
fundamentally distinct. It 
is by taking account of the latter 
issue and 
precisely because of 
the socio-technical 
characteristics of modern 
industrial technology, I 
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submit, that Marx comes to regard the alienation of 
labour under capitalism, rather than under Classical 
antiquity and other pre-capitalist forms of 
production, as approaching its zenith. 
In other words, for Marx, the full force of 
alienation, so to speak, springs from the rule of 
capital not merely because of 'private property' and 
generalized exchange, but more importantly because of 
the revolutionization of production technology. And 
this latter is (at least to a large extent) connected 
to the breaking down of the barriers imposed on 
previous social forms of production by the form and 
character of the productive forces (e. g. land, or, in 
the words of Marx, 'natural instruments' - see 
Appendix 3). 
This point is put neatly 
Gouldner in his section on 
capitalism 'different frc 
Gouldner writes, 'is that 
from the limits of the lanc 
exist without constant] 
ins-truments of production, 
Frnmmiini. qt--I Manifesto. whi 
and concisely by Alvin 
"Technology". What makes 
preceding societies', 
t is released by capital 
"The bourgeoisie cannot 
revolutionizing the 
it is this, says the 
transforms the entire 
bourgeois era and society. 'ý11U) Andq moreover, 
Gouldner, without however analysing the issue in 
detail, touches on the crucial aspect of the 
distinctive form and character of 'the instruments of 
production' and the significance of this aspect to 
the controlling power of capital over labour and to 
the fact that 'the worker, alienated from them, is 
now constrained to work 
for a wage. ' As he writes: 
'The essential means by which the bourgeoisie 
"revolutionized" production and gained control over 
the instruments of production were closely related, 
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though not reduced, to the development of machinery. 
Without machinery, the bourgeois era would have been 
just one more class system. Ancient Greece also had 
wage labor both by freemen and slaves (who were 
rented out) and commodity production; what it did not 
have was machinery deliberately developed for and 
harnessed to production. '(111) 
What is at issue in this matter, then, is not merely 
the fact that technology is or should be a central 
issue in any examination of Marx's conception of 
capitalism and alienation (112), but that in fact one 
should also recognize the significance of the form of 
technology (as machine technology) for Marx, as 
Gouldner has rightly touched on. (113) For Marx, the 
'alien power' of technology is the power of the 
capitalist owner of the means of production, but this 
only in the sense, and insofar as, he/she is a 
personification of capital. Property is crucial to 
Marx's conception of the alienation of labour, but, 
for one thing, it is only one condition among a 
number of others, including the role and form of 
production technology, and, for another, only as a 
formal, legal, etc., expression of the social 
relations of_ production and not as a be-all and end- 
all ('ultimate', etc. ) condition. 
In other words, what I would suggest is important 
here, is a distinction between a conceptualization of 
'alien power' as the power which is conferred and 
conditioned structura (i. e. by the very structure 
and system of social relations), and a 
conceptualization which assigns such a power to the 
capitalist owner as an individual master of labour, 
etc. In his early writings (particularly in the 1844 
Manuscripts)q as we have seen, Marx is not too clear 
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on this distinction himself (e. g. he regards the 
'alien power' as the power of the owner as the 
'master', etc. ). In this case there is a visible 
distance between the Manus and Marx's later 
writings, particularly from the Poverty of Philosophy 
and the Communist Manifesto onwards. 
It must be noted here, that this distinction is 
central to Marx's theory of capitalism in which he 
views even the capitalist not as a free agent and 
regards the individual capitalist himself as 
alienated. It is not simply, then, that the 'alien 
power' is the power of the individual capitalist 
because he/she owns the means of production - which 
signifies, or at least implies, that as the owner he 
is a free agent and has free choice. The 'alien 
power' in fact is the power of capital, and not 
simply of this or that capitalist. What is crucial 
here is the conception of "capital" as a social 
relation of production, as a social system 
,, 
if you 
like. For Marx, the concept of "capitalist" is a 
Isocial status in production'. And even at the time 
of the Communist Manifesto he explains his conception 
of "capital" as follows: 
'Capital is a collective product, and only by the 
united action of many members, nay, in the last 
resort, only by the united action of all members of 
society, can it be set in motion. 
'Capital is, therefore, not a personal, it is a 
social power. '(114) 
For Marx, therefore, I submit, the 'alien power' of 
technology is the power of capital in the above sense 
of the concept. Within the production process, 
production technology is the most crucial technical 
manifestation of capital as a social power, a 
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manifestation of the rule of capital over labour, of 
the alienation and domination of labour* 
Now, let us briefly look at the implications of this 
proposition. There is a fine distinction between the 
two forms of conceptualization referred to above 
which is important to the understanding of Marx's 
conception of technology and the issue of 
technology/alienation: 
In the conceptualization of "ownership" in its 
general sense, technology is in the final analysis, 
nothing but a "means of production", a "tool", a kind 
of "neutral" object or device used (or misused) for 
the purposes of its owner (or controller). Under 
capitalism, it is owned by the capitalist, and its 
power 
, 
is the power of its capitalist owner - thus the 
alienation of the worker. By implications, if one 
were to envisage a change of ownership, from the 
capitalist to the worker, one would, presumably, 
thereby "abolish" the alienation of the worker. 
However, in the alternative conceptualization 
suggested above, technology takes on a specific 
social role in the mode of production. It is no 
longer, therefore, viewed simply or purely in its 
technical capacity as merely a "means of production", 
a mere "tool"; and it is certainly not regarded as a 
"neutral" object being used or misused; it has over 
and above its technical role a specific social 
function. It is certainly owned by the capitalist and 
not the worker, but it is itself, and in itself, an 
essential element in the exercise of social power at 
the point of production. And as such an element, the 
power it has in relation to the worker(s) is not 
simply the result of its ownership by the capitalist. 
1.3q 
What signifies its alienating role is that the 
specific socio-economic requirements (olneeds") of 
capital as a social power, or, as the social 
production relations, are built into its technical 
design. In short, the exigencies of capital and of 
technique and technology of production become 
inseparable (e. g. requirements of efficiency, 
productivity, etc., are at once social and technical 
requirements, and have a specific socio-economic 
definition - profitability, competitiveness, growthl 
etc. ) In this case, the change of ownership, from the 
capitalist to the worker, cannot in itself bring 
about an end to the alienation of the worker; what is 
also crucial is a radical development and 
transformation of production technology itself (or, 
as Marx puts it, the development of the material 
productive forces - though, as we shall see in 
chapter four, he is rather ambivalent on this issue). 
Although we shall be looking at these questions in 
the next chapter, it isq I believe, this latter 
proposition that more accurately reflects Marx's 
conception of production technology as an 'alien 
power'. It is on the basis of such an understanding 
of the connection between alienation and technology 
under capitalism that I shall be looking at Marx's 
views on technology in his writings on the capitalist 
system of production. 
Summing Up and An Evaluation 
For Marx the primary source of all wealth, of 'all 
instruments and subjects of labour', is nature. (115) 
Labour itself, as productive activity, is only a 
manifestation of a natural force, i. e. of labour 
power.. (116) In other words, for him, the original 
lqo 
conditions of production of materials of life appear 
as natural presuppos)-tions, the 'unity of living and 
active humanity with the natural, inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with 
naturel. (117) This metabolic exchange with nature is 
a process of the historic triumph of the necessity of 
labour over the unity of humanity and nature. (118) It 
is a historic process of the separation of the 
inorganic conditions of human existence from the 
active existence of humanity. (119) 
It is this historic process of separation which, 
according to Marx, needs explanation, and which 
brings forth not only the historic process of 
alienation, but a lso the movement towards de- 
alienation. In this a primary r ole is assigned to the 
development of the productive forces, both as an 
expression of the process of alienation and a sa 
necessary condition for the movement towards de- 
alienation. 
The separation of the inorganic conditions of human 
existence is, for Marx, $completely posited only in 
the relation of wage labour and capital. '(120) It is 
thus only with capitalism that labour (productive 
activity) becomes a fully alienated activity, or as 
Marx puts it, 'the activity of alienation. '(121) The 
complete separation is the positing of the material 
(objective) conditions of production as "private 
property", or as belonging to someone other than the 
direct producer. Under such a condition of 
separation, the production and reproduction of life 
entails not simply to labour, or be forced to labour, 
but the social necessity and objectively imposed 
compulsion to enter into an act of exchange. Thus 
life itself entails alienation, or the repeatable and 
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systematic sale of the human capacity and attribute 
(i. e. labour power) for the production of the 
materials of social life. 
If the 'metabolic exchange with nature' is mediated 
by labour, the latter itself requires the mediation 
of determinate objects used and formed as instruments 
of labour, i. e. production technologies. (122) The 
concept of alienation for Marx, I have suggested, has 
a direct link to the specific developmental features 
of production technologies under capitalism. If for 
Marx money 
, appears as 
the quintessential 
manifestation of alienation under capitalism, it is 
simply because, as he writes: 'In money the unfettered 
dominion of the estranged [my emphasis) over 
man becomes manifest. '(123) Money relationv in other 
words, is a manifestation of the servility of the 
worker to the social objects of his/her own making; 
and this above all else in the act and process of 
production. 
It is from within production - which Marx regarded as 
the most fundamental and central social structure - 
that alienation assumes its social underpinning. The 
root -of the power of the capitalist lies in 
production, where 'the purchasing power of his 
capital' (i. e. capital as money) is transformed and 
realized as 'the power to command labour'. (124) The 
power to command labour within the production process 
is actualized by the unfettered dominion of 
production technology over the labourer: 'The rule of 
the person over the person now becomes the universal 
rule of the thing over the person, the product over 
the producer. '(125) 
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Technology, in other words, takes on its own specific 
social role in the mode of production. It is no 
longer simply a technical mediatory object, merely a 
"means of production", a mere "tool"; and it is 
certainly not, therefore, a "neutral" object being 
used or misused; it has now over and above its 
technical role a specific social function. The 'power 
to command labour' - which belongs to the capitalist 
not simply as the individual owner of the means of 
production, but as the personification of capital as 
a social power - achieves a technical manifestation 
through the design and functioning of production 
technology. Through its development, production 
technology becomes itself . and in itself,, an 
essential element in the exercise of social power at 
the point of production. Andq thus, as such an 
element, the 'alien power' it has in relation to the 
worker(s) is not simply the result of its ownership 
by the capitalist as a proprietor as such. What 
signifies its alienating role is that the specific 
socio-economic requirements ("needs") of "the 
capitalist" (not in the sense of a personal 
proprietor, but in that of a social status in 
production), or, of the social production relations 
- i. e. capital - are built into its technical 
structure and functional principles by design. 
What is essential to Marx's conception, which it 
seems to me most commentators have not taken into 
consideration, is that for him the exigencies of 
capital and of technique and technology of production 
are inseparable. That is, the requirements of 
efficiencyý productivity, etc., are at once social 
and technical requirements, and have a specific 
socio-economic definition - e. g. profitability, 
competitiveness9 growtht etc. 
I q3 
Once we have the separation of the labourer from the 
means of production (i. e. the estrangement of labour 
- wage-labour), we thus have, according to my reading 
of Marx, a systemic basis for such a manifestation of 
technology as capital. This manifestation (technology 
as capital) is essential to the condition of 
alienation in the act of production (i. e. dead labour 
dominating living labour), which is itself both a 
reflection and a condition of the fact that, 
according to Marx, everything within society appears 
to be under the sway of inhuman powers. For 
capitalist society at large, this sway of inhuman 
powers appears in the fact that '. money is the 
sensuous, corporeal existence of that 
alienation. '(126) In the domain of capitalist 
production (the "labour process") production 
technology commands living labour. But, though the 
process of separation is essential to and the basis 
of the manifestation of technology as capital, it is 
only with the transformation of technology into 
industrial machine technology that production 
technology comes to express and represent the social 
power of capital (becomes a 'moment' of capital). 
For many commentators, however, the issue of 
alienation in Marx is linked merely to class, 
property, and to the division of labour and the 
organizational mode of the labour process (as we 
shall see in the next chapter, the latter linkage is 
particularly stressed by Braverman in his important 
work on the capitalist labour process). Moreover, 
often Marx's conception is interpreted as merely a 
"feeling" of estrangement (or merely in terms of the 
psychological aspect of "self-estrangement") produced 
by the nature of the division of labour (social and 
technical)q which is at best, I would submit, only 
lqý 
one side of the issue for Marx. What is invariably 
missing in the interpretations of Marx on the 
relationship between the division of labour, also 
property, and alienation is his ideas and insights on 
the role and form of production technology, 
It is, indeed, evident that Marx was quite early on 
certainly aware of the significance of the form and 
character of production technology (though in his 
early works there is an absence of analysis and his 
ideas are far from developed). In fact this 
recognition can be seen with respect to his 
references to the difference between the subdivision 
of labour within the workshop and the division of 
labour within society. In The Poverty of Phil 
(1846-7), for example, he is concerned to point out, 
in his criticism of Proudhon's notion of the 
division of labour, the link between the development 
of machinery (and modern industry) and that of the 
technical division of labour in the modern workshops. 
As he writes: 
'The separation of the different parts of labour, 
leaving to each one the opportunity of devoting 
himself to the speciality best suited to him -a 
separation which M. Proudhon dates from the beginning 
of the world - exists only in modern industry under 
the rule of competition. '(127) 
With the establishment and development of the 
subdivision of labour based on 'manufacture' as a 
method of production, we have both in principle and 
in actuality (historically speaking), according to 
Marx, the dawn of the domination of capital as a 
social relation of production. It is only after this 
social transformation, only after the change in the 
mode of production as a consequence of the change in 
lqý5 
the form of labour and the techniques (methods) of 
production, that production technology begins to 
assume a deterministic role in relation to labour, in 
production (i. e. it becomes an 'alien power', a 
I master' of labour rather than its servant). Thus, 
according to Marx, #the great progress of the 
division of labour began in England after the 
invention of machinery. '(128) 
Why Marx conceptualizes the role of production 
technology (and specifically machinery) in the 
capitalist mode of production in such a deterministic 
way is a crucial aspect of the issues which I shall 
be dealing with in the next chapter. 
Now, let us give a summary of a number of problems 
and difficulties in Marx's early writings. For 
example, when dealing with the division of labour as 
found in The German Ideology, what is not clear is 
the relation between the development of the 
productive forces (particularly of technologies and 
techniques) and Marx's description of the progressive 
extension and development of the division of labour. 
In that work (for details see Appendix 3) we find a 
definite ambiguity with respect to the technical and 
social division of labour and hence as regards the 
notion of the "primacy" of the productive forces 
which was discussed in chapter one. 
What is also important to state here is that, it 
seems to me, Marx fails to take adequate account of 
the complex of socio-political forces and relations 
that influenced and helped shape the capitalist 
socio-economic order. He is far more concerned, as I 
have repeatedly pointed out, with the process of 
abstraction and separation; with the process of the 
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dissolution of "natural social bond". Yet this is 
only one aspect of the historical process of social 
change to capitalism; for this change involved not 
only the process of "separation", which Marx heavily 
emphasises, but also, and one can say at the same 
time, the process of re-organization, of the 
formation of new social, political, and productive 
organizations, the significance of which Marx tends 
to underrate. We therefore find little in Marx on the 
connection between the development of socio-political 
organizations and what may be called the domain of 
technology. 
Hence, we see that even at this early 
( of philosophical". "Hegelian") stage, for Marx, 
technology appears as production technology only; it 
is all a matter of material production. Thus, 
although Marx's ideas on production technology as 
"alien/hos tile", has, in my opinion, a great deal of 
cogency and it is certainly a powerfully rich idea, 
and particularly useful in terms of the sociological 
investigation of the role of technology in 
production, there is, however, little analysis, by 
Marx, of the wider implications of this idea, and 
what is more, he has nothing much to directly 
contribute to an understanding of the complex role of 
technology outside of the domain of production. 
Marx, in his early writingsq and particularly The 
German Ideologyq also tends to place too great a 
stress on the idea of "localization" (isolation) as a 
factor undermining the advance and diffusion of 
technology (see Appendix 3). Though this may have 
been largely due to the lack of sufficient evidence 
available to him at the time. But there is now ample 
evidence (historical and archaeological) that shows 
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the extent of dif fusion of technology through even 
limited inter-action and intercourse among different 
peoples and Localities (e. g. through primitive trade, 
migration, etc. ). 
Nevertheless, It is also quite evident that the rate 
of diffusion of technologies (and techniques) was 
certainly (jui. te slow and the time scale quite 
extensive - as compared to the advance and diffusion 
of technology after the rise and domination of 
capitalism ii-i Europe. And, at any rate, in this case, 
the fundamental point that Marx seems to be stressing 
is that only when social intercourse becomes not 
merely systematic but a necessary function of the 
mode of production itself, will the development and 
diffusion of technology become themselves systemic 
and structural., and hence, it is only then that the 
advance of technology (technological development) can 
be assured, and have a high degree of continuity and 
permanence. 
With respect to the question of the connection 
between tile alienation of labour and the 
characterization of production technology as an 
'autonomous' and 'alien' power, I have pointed to at 
least one mai. n problem in Marx's early views. In his 
writings on alienation, Marx, according to my 
reading, gives two basic conditions for production 
technology ( the 'product' as means of labour's 
activity) a! -, -uming 'alien' and 'independent' power: 
proper ty/ow, i 4ip and the influence or determining 
role of 'external needs. 
But it seems to me (as I have indicated), these 
conditions are not in themselves wholly convincing. 
For it can be argued that in all class societies 
s* 
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labour has been 'a mere means to satisfy needs 
outside itself'(Marx) - this is certainly not 
something unique to capitalism. Nor is the ownership 
of the means of production (including technology) by 
someone other than the direct producer something 
exclusive to capitalism - which is the other 
condition given by Marx in his early writings. 
Therefore, even if we take into account Marx's 
references to the important role of exchange, 
without further qualification and explanation one 
cannot simply accept that on the basis of these 
conditions alone and as they are given in Marx's 
early writings, production technology (or even the 
'product' as such) confronts the labourer as an 
independent, alien power under capitalism. 
Either the whole idea must be rejected or it must be 
shown that there is something specific to the needs 
of capital, and only peculiar to its mode of 
production, which brings about such a transformation 
of instruments of production. With respect to this 
latter point, I have already made some suggestions, 
which I shall consider more fully in the course of 
the next chapter. 
The verdict, then, on Marx's early writings on 
alienation of labour, etc. - specifically with respect 
to the issue of technology - is that they can only 
provide guide-line principles, as it were, which, 
although undoubtedly important for the understanding 
of his conception of technology, cannot as they stand 
be taken as unprobelmatic. There are clearly, in my 
opinion, very important insights and propositions; 
there are also clear indications of the direction of 
Marx's thoughts on the role and form of technology 
with respect to the alienation of labour under the 
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rule of capital. In other words, in his early 
discussions of alienation (etc. ) Marx, as I have 
attempted to demonstrate, has seen - i. e. glimpsed 
but never analysed - the significance of the 
character and form of technology (e. g. as is evident 
from this statement: 1most of the work [within the 
capitalist process of production] is done by the 
material pro2erties of the object'(129)), as well as 
its social function in the production process of 
capital (this is something that most commentators 
fail to take into account). Even in his early 
writings, there is ample evidence against the idea 
that Marx regarded technology as "neutral", or that 
he viewed it as a phenomenon "governed by its own 
laws" - despite the vagueness of some of his 
statements. 
But this said, his conception of technology is merely 
embryonic at this stage; the ideas, insights and 
propositions on or related to technology often too 
philosophical and general; there is hardly any 
substantive and concrete socio-economic analysis of 
the relationship between technology, the alienation 
of labour, and capitalist processes of production. 
Yet, it would be a great mistake to dismiss Marx's 
early writings as unimportant to the understanding of 
his (later, developed) conception of technology. Nor 
is it, in my opinion, possible to come to grips with 
his later, developed conception, without an 
understanding of his views on alienation. For, as I 
have argued and tried to show in this chapter, it is 
his ideas on alienation which hold the key to the 
understanding of the notion of technology as capital. 
To recap, finally, I have argued in this chapter that 
for Marx the social phenomenon of alienation (the 
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self-alienation of the direct producer) under 
capitalism both reflects as it also conditions the 
role and function of production technology as an 
'autonomous' alien power within the process of 
production. Just as money becomes the most abstract 
universal expression of capital in society at large, 
so production technology becomes the most concrete 
manifestation of capital in the act of production. 
Thus, we have Marx's now famous dictum that capital 
relation essentially signifies the domination of dead 
labour over living labour. A view whichq however, 
should be interpreted, in my opinion, as referring to 
not only the social role of money (valueg exchange- 
value) as the ultimate manifestation in society of 
'the unfettered dominion of the estranged thing' 
(i. e. of accumulatedg past, labour or dead labour) 
'over man'(130), but also to the 'unfettered 
dominion' of production technology as objectifiedg 
past, accumulated labour or dead labourg over living 
labour in production. 
Insofar as Marx's theory of capitalism is concerned, 
capital is a social relation of production. Capital 
is, therefore, for Marx, not merely a sum of products 
as commodities, nor simply a sum of exchange values 
or of money. Neither is capital a set of instruments, 
means of production, technologies which serves labour 
(i. e. is used by labour). Capital 'consists in living 
labour se I all these accumulated forms of 
objectifiedg materialized labour. (131) The function 
and role of production technology is thus inverted; 
rather than being used by living labour, it uses the 
latter. And in this sense technology becomes a 
manifestation of a social power, and in the process 
of production it becomes itself as it functions an 
alien power - i. e. technology as capital* And it is 
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in this sense that one should read Marx's remark 
that: 'A cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for 
spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain 
relations. '(132) 
It is in his "mature" works (e. g. Capital, 
Grundrisse, etc. ), however, which Marx becomes more 
directly concerned with the technological phenomenon 
under capitalism. The task of the next chapter is, 
therefore, to examine and present Marx's developed 
conception of production technology. 
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Chapter Three 
Capitalist Production and Technology 
Introduction 
It was argued in the previous chapter that a 
fundamental condition for the domination of the 
capitalist mode of production is, for Marx, the 
separation of labour from the means of production. 
It is on the basis of this condition that Marx 
conceptualizes the alienation of labour and the 
I alien power' of production technology. This 
separation is in fact a historical process which 
involves the transformation of the mode and 
organization of labour as a "making" process. It is, 
as mentioned in the previous two chapters, a 
historical process of the break up of the social 
unity and fusion of productive activity and the 
material conditions of that activity (the social 
unity of human productive forces characteristic of 
and expressed by the Aristotlien notion of techne). 
In the "making" process as exemplified by both the 
if natural economy" of the peasant agricultural system 
and craft production (in its strict meaning of 
artisanry), productive activity and means of 
production are not only technically, but also 
socially united (fused). This social union and 
fusion became increasingly precarious, in Europe at 
any rate, from around the fifteenth century onwards. 
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the 
artisan producer, for example, had began to 
increasingly lose his economic independence as he 
became more and more dependent on the role of the 
merchant for the sale of his finished products. Yet, 
for all that and however precarious the craftsman's 
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overall economic status, for a fairly long time he 
remained the master of his tools and in control of 
his labour. The internal and technical division of 
labour of craft manufacturing workshops had began to 
change here and there and slowly, but the essential 
character of production technology being used had 
hardly changed at all. 
During a period of transition from the sixteenth to 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the 
greater domination of merchant capital and 
particularly the development and spread of the 
"putting-out" system, the artisan became 
progressively divorced from his tools and, with the 
advance of greater degree of division and 
specialization of labour, he had almost but lost the 
control over his own labour power. 
However, even with the more or less fully dominated 
It putting-out" system characteristic of early 
capitalism, when for all intents and purposes the 
capitalist putter-outer controlled access to the 
material productive forces (whether through the 
direct ownership of the means of production or 
through his control of the market for raw materials, 
products, etc., or for both the latter reasons), one 
cannot as yet identify this set of socio-economic 
relations as signifying the domination of capital at 
the point of production. '[Dluring the period 
between the 16th century and the epoch of Modern 
Industry, ' according to Marx, 'capital failed to 
become the master of the whole disposable working- 
time of the manufacturing labourers... 
'(1) 
Nevertheless, it is as a result of and during this 
long drawn out process that production technology 
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came to be developed and, according to Marx, 
transformed from its being an instrument or means of 
labour (a "tool") in the service of the direct 
producer (the artisan), into a hostile and alien 
power confronting and dominating labour, or into the 
"master" of labour, at the point of production. And 
this process of transformation of production 
technology from being a servant to becoming a master 
of labour is, as it was suggested in the previous 
chapter, an essential aspect of Marx's conception of 
the alienation of labour. 
It is indeed, as it was pointed out there, an aspect 
crucial to the very idea of self-alienation in Marx. 
The direct producers alienate themselves in the act 
of production by developing, transforming and 
producing the very technical objects and instruments 
which come to dominate and enslave them as these 
function in the process of production. This act and 
process of self-alienation is for Marx both a 
confirmation and a realization of productive 
activity subjugated to an alien goal 
(or to a need 
external to the needs of the direct producers). 
Through the act and process of self-alienationg the 
direct producer creates the very objective 
conditions of the domination of the non-producer 
over himself/herself. Private property may appear as 
the basis and cause of labour's alienationg but in 
fact, according to Marx (as it was mentioned in the 
previous chapter), it is a consequence of alienated 
labour. 
Thusq despite the development, or as some would say, 
imposi-tion of specialization and separation of 
tasks(2) under the putting-out system, despite the 
rigid discipline of the manufacturing method 
of 
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labour organization, despite even the ownership of 
the early workshops, millsp mines, etc., by 
capitalistic entrepreneurs of varying types, for 
Marx as it can be seen from the passage quoted 
above capital had failed to become the undisputed 
master of the labourer's entire disposable labour- 
time - that is, until the advent of Modern Industry. 
What is, however, so especial about Modern Industry, 
at least in Marx's opinion, that brings about the 
final mastery of capital over labour? What is, 
according to him, the specific characteristic of 
Modern Industry that meant the complete domination 
of labour by capital? 
It cannot merely be, as many commentators claim (as 
we shall see later in this chapter), the detailed 
division of labour, the extension and 
intensification of the specialization and separation 
of tasks; nor simply the form of property or the 
formal ownership of the means of production as such 
and in itself, or the mode of employment and 
utilization of production technology. For these 
conditions were already in existence, at least in 
essential aspects (e. g. the manufacturing division 
of labour described by Adam Smith and others), prior 
to the advent of Modern Industry. Yet, for Marx, 
during the transitional period, or as he says, 
'throughout the whole manufacturing period'(3), when 
we had specialization, separation of tasks, private 
ownership of various industries and workshops, 
capital actually (so we are told by Marx) failed to 
become the full master of the total working-time of 
the worker. 
1ý6 
That Marx viewed the conditions mentioned above as 
crucial to the domination of capital, is undeniable. 
But these are conditions that simply prepared the 
groundwork for the full mastery of capital; they are 
the conditions of, what Marx called, 'formal 
subsumption' of labour and not of the practical 
realization of capital's mastery. For Marx, 'formal 
subsumption' becomes 'real subsumption' only with 
Modern Industry. But why is this so, and what is, 
according to him, the specific characteristic of 
Modern Industry as distinct from all previous forms 
of productive processes that makes the realization 
of capital's mastery practical? 
It is, of course, well recognized that in Marx's 
view Modern Industry was erected on the foundation 
of machinery. It is the development of this form of 
production technology, then, that Marx regarded as 
essential to the 'real subsumption' of labour. It is 
with machinery that capital realizes and actualizes 
its social power directly within the process of 
production; dead labour dominates living labour and 
technology becomes a manifestation of capital. It 
is, as we shall see, with machinery that we have 
technology as capital (at least according to my 
reading of Marx). And this in the sense that 
production technology (in the form of machine 
technology) becomes not merely a means of labour, a 
technical factor or element of the labour process, 
but in factq and at the same time, an essential 
element of the exercise of social power at the point 
of production. 
The instruments of production, according to my 
interpretation of Marx, become a direct technical 
manifestation of capital's rule and this not simply 
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by the way they are used or employed (as some 
commentators assert), but because of their 
particular properties, technical structures and 
functional principles. Even in his early writings, 
as we have already seen, Marx touched on this very 
point when he wrote that in capitalist production 
proper (i. e. with the advent of Modern Industry), 
'most of the work is done by the material properties 
of the objects'(4). 
The central task of this chapter, therefore, is tc 
show, from Marx's writings, that he considers the 
notion of technology as capital specifically with 
respect to the form of production technology as 
machine technology, and also to examine his 
discussion and explanation of why it is with Modern 
Industry and machine technology that the 'real 
subsumption' of labour, the mastery of capital, 
becomes a social and a 'technical and palpable 
reality'. It is from such an examination, which in 
fact requires a close but more general investigation 
of Marx's theory of capitalist production, that an 
understanding of Marx's conception of technology 
under capitalism will be presented in this chapter. 
I shall then attempt a critical evaluation of this 
conception after a comparative discussion of two 
alternative influential interpretations of Marx's 
writings on or related to production technology. 
l.. A Preliminar Observation 
Throughout his life Marx was, both intellectually 
and politically, deeply committed to a critique of, 
and a struggle againstq capitalism. Although in this 
study I am not concerned with an analysis of Marx's 
political or economic theories, it is obviously 
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impossible to analyse his conception of technology 
without taking into account his theoretical critique 
of political economy and capitalism. 
In other words, it is at the very least extremely 
difficult to explain and evaluate Marx's conception 
of technology without some references to his views, 
propositions, and theoretical analysis of the 
economics of capitalism. This is particularly the 
case as regards his critical views on, for example, 
the concepts of "capital", "value", etc. , and even 
more specifically those of "surplus value", 
leaccumulation", and so on. 
Marx's "economic" (or rather, more accurately, 
socio-economic) concepts and propositions are, of 
course, extremely complex and highly controversial. 
An in-depth analysis of these is, obviously, beyond 
the scope of this study. And, it goes without saying 
that, to merely present an extremely brief 
discussion (perhaps more in the form of summary 
"definitions") of some of the key concepts can 
neither do justice to Marx's lifetime work on the 
development of these conceptst nor can it in any way 
deal with the difficulties and inadequacies involved 
in Marx's propositions which many critics, both 
within and outside of the Marxist traditiong 
have 
pointed too 
What I therefore intend to do is to look at and 
examine these concepts and propositions as 
they come 
up in Marx's works, but on 
from the perspective 
of, and in relation to, the 
issue of technology in 
Marx. The discussion of Marx's 
"economic" concepts 
(i. e. "value", etc. 
) is thus not intended to be 
either a "defence" or a 
"critique" of these concepts 
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as such (in themselves), but simply an unavoidable 
means of explaining the why and how of Marx's 
treatment of the technological phenomenon under 
capitalism, 
Moreover, it should be noted here that whether in 
his early writings, as we have already seen from the 
previous chapters, or in his "mature" works, Marx 
hardly uses the term "technology". His conception of 
technology invariably appears through the use of 
certain specific terms such as "instruments" of 
labour or of production, "means of labour", "machine 
and machinery", etc.; or is enmeshed in certain 
broader concepts such as the "productive forces" (or 
the "material" productive forces), "means of 
production", "constant capital" and "fixed capital". 
Although this may be partly due to the limited usage 
of the term "technology" at the time of Marx as 
compared to our own time, nonetheless, I believe 
there is also a more intrinsic reason for the use of 
the various terms mentioned above, as also for the 
enmeshing of "technology" within broader concepts 
which -I have mentioned. For, as I have already 
remarked previously, Marx is not in any of his works 
(early or "mature") concerned with the examination 
or the theoretical analysis of the concept of 
technology for its own sake. How and in what form of 
terminology the concept is used by him depends 
entirely upon the particular subject matter and 
socio-economic and historical context with which 
Marx is dealing. 
Thus, in order to explain and understand Marx's 
developed conception of the role and function of 
technology under capitalism, I shall proceed in this 
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chapter to examine each term and concept which Marx 
uses both in relation to the specific context in 
which each of these is applied and in relation to 
his overall theory of capitalist production. Only in 
this way, I believe, can one not only fully 
appreciate why Marx uses the various terms and 
concepts, but also arrive at a better understanding 
of his conception of technology. 
One final point to be noted here is that the 
discussion of these concepts in relation to 
technology is, obviously, only my interpretation of 
Marx and I do not claim it to be infallible, 
2.. Commodity, Value-Form and Techno 
In the first chapter of Capital (vol. I), in 
examining the nature of "commodity", Marx, though 
not directly referring to technology, provides some 
initial and important insights which are highly 
significant for the understanding and evaluation of 
his conception of technology. His examination of 
it commodity", however, is extremely difficult to 
follow (even Marx himself admits this in his 
Preface), and, for the most part because of his 
"dialectical" method, it appears quite 
disconcerting. Although starting with the simplest, 
most concrete material object 
(commodity), Marx 
introduces concepts that are highly abstract, the 
full understanding of which in fact requires much 
more knowledge and investigation than 
is provided by 
Marx in this chapter - we have, for example, as is 
the case with most of Marx's conceptions, no strict 
and rigorous definitions; treating concepts not 
in 
isolation (as distinct building blocks, for 
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instance), but as they are related to other concepts 
and within a process of investigation. 
What should also be mentioned before we proceed is 
that Marx's investigation (both its method and 
concepts developed and analysed) have received 
widespread criticism. And even if one is able to 
reject such criticism, what is certainly true is 
that this first chapter appears to be based on a 
priori concepts; concepts which are fundamental to 
Marx's system, but which cannot be fully grasped 
until much later in the course of Marx's analysis of 
the inner logic of capitalism. This is, therefore, 
one of- the problems that we have to struggle with in 
this section - though, I have tried to reduce the 
difficulty of language and method (at least insofar 
as possible). 
At any rate, as mentioned, in the first few pages of 
his chapter one, Marx refers to a number of 
important points, in relation to his investigation 
of "commodity", which I think can provide us with 
some initial insights into his thoughts on 
technology. Here we begin with two of the relevant 
proposals, which are contained in the following 
statement: 
'Every useful thing ... may be looked at from two 
points of view of quality and quantity. It is an 
assemblage of many properties, and may therefore be 
of use in various ways. To discover the various uses 
of things is the work of history. '(5) 
We can breakdown this passage into the following 
proposals: (a) The examination of the role and 
function of technology as a 'useful thing' needs to 
take into account not only the scale of its 
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operation and its size or magnitude, but also its 
qualitative characteristics. (b) The use of 'things' 
as technologies is conditioned by the historical 
process of the discovery of the utility and 
properties of 'things'. 
Concerning this latter point, a footnote by Marx 
clarifies his reference to the role of 
"history": 'The property which the magnet possesses 
of attracting iron, became of use only af ter by 
means of that property the polarity of the magnet 
had been discovered. '(6) In other words, if we 
extend the point being made here to the treatment of 
technology, although the actual property of a 
particular 'thing' is obviously important to whether 
or not it can be used as a technology, this 'thing' 
becomes of use as a technology only through a 
historical process of the development of human 
society and knowledge. 
This brings us to Marx's understanding of the 
utility of a 'thing' as a 'use-value'; and he 
writes: 'this utility is not a thing of air. Being 
limited by the physical properties of the commodity, 
it has no existence apart from that commodity... Use- 
value becomes a reality only by use or 
consumption. oo'(7) 
This passage contains two basic and simple proposals 
relevant to technology. - 
(a) The utility of a 'thing' 
as technology is limited by its physical properties. 
For example, it is obvious that one cannot use a 
hammer to saw a piece of wood. (b) The utility of a 
'thing', its use-value (or value in use), as a 
technology becomes a reality only when 
it is 
actually being used or productively consumed. 
A 
/ ý3 
cotton-spinning jenny was a technology (when it was 
being actually used as a machine for spinning 
cotton), but is no longer a technology since 
it has lost its social (economic) utility, since it 
is no longer being used for spinning cotton. 
On the basis of these proposals we can provide an 
elementary and general premise for the concept of 
technology: Technology is a socially useful 
functioning object, whereby its social usefulness is 
determined by its historically arrived at 
(discovered, developed and designed) physical 
properties (quality and quantity) and realized by 
its actual use and as it functions. According to 
this general premise, technology is a necessary 
object used in all forms of society. 
But in capitalist society, technology like any other 
'thing' is not simply a useful object, a use-value, 
but a commodity. As a commodity it is, according to 
Marx, both an object of utility, and, at the same 
time, a depository of value. (8) Technology as a 
commodity, therefore, has two aspects, 'a physical' 
aspect and 'a value-form'. The latter aspect of 
technology is something purely social, and, to use 
Marx's wordso 'not an atom of matter enters into its 
composition. '(9) Every product of labour, including 
technologyq is, according to Marx, 'in all states of 
societyv a use-value; but it is only at a definite 
historical epoch in a society's development that 
such a product becomes a commodity... '(10) and takes 
on a value-form. 
The identification of this 'value-form' of 
technologies is of great significance for an 
understanding of Marx's conception of technology 
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under capit, --iti-, ni. Without going into the details of 
Marx's theory of value, the value-form essentially 
expresses the form that technology necessarily takes 
as capital. This form has a number of implications 
and aspects which needs to be mentioned here: 
Firstly, it implies that technology circulates as 
value. In other words, since technology under 
capitalist conditions is not organically linked to 
labour, it is separated from the direct producersq 
access to technology is only possible through a 
process of exchange. And this in a twofold sense: on 
the one hand, access to technology is possible after 
the exchange between labour and capital (e. g. the 
hiring of wage-labour). Only after this process can 
the worker have access to the use of technology. On 
the other hand, technology must be bought and sold, 
and it must therefore be produced for exc 0 
Thus, secondly, the value of technology must be 
taken into account as it functions in the process of 
production, and must be recuperated or realized. 
These two implications, however, have a substantive 
effect on the very character and quality of 
technology. And as a consequence of these, we have 
a third crucial implication of the value-form of 
technology, which concerns the very materiality of 
technology as a means of labour. That is, the way 
technology is actually developed and designed. The 
value-form places certain specifically socio- 
economic demands and constraints on the design and 
development of technology, so that it can be used 
"effec'tively" (at the very least) in accordance to 
the prevailing social norms of 
"efficiency" and 
"productivity". I. e. technology's physical form and 
functional principlesq its properties and character, 
must not only 
(and obviously) satisfy the basic 
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technical, engineering requirements of particular 
operations it is meant to be used for and function 
in, but also, and at the same time, must be able to 
satisfy certain prevailing socio-economic 
requirements. 
The properties of any given technology are a 
designed feature that reflect a marriage of 
technique and the social. This character determines 
its socio-economic functioning according to the 
dominant social relations - that is, at least for 
Marx, according to the primary and basic goal of the 
subordination of living labour for the purpose of 
the self-expansion of value (or accumulation). 
Briefly and in simple terms, it is these 
implications of the value-form which gives 
technology its appearance of flautonomy" or 
"independence". The value-form of technology is the 
social manifestation of means of labour (of 'things' 
which mediate productive activity) which due to the 
specific f orai of social labour and hence its 
objectification 'appear as independent beings 
endowed with life, and entering into relation both 
with one another and the human race. (11) 
Value-form is the expression of the social reality 
of a system of production and exchange based on 
private labour and formally independent (competing) 
producing units (firms) which moulds technology's 
specific quality as mearis of labour 
(i. e. as a use- 
value or a useful mediating object in the act of 
production) and determines the limits of its 
physical properties 
(its materiality as an object of 
utility) and hence also its role and 
function. 
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The value-form - and this is clear from Marx's 
analysis of the commodity - does not mean that 
technology has lost its role and function as a means 
of production, as a mediatory object. It must at all 
times, of course, have such a role and function, for 
otherwise it can hardly be a technology. Just as any 
commodity can only have a value-form if and only if 
it has a use-value: 'nothing can have value, ' 
according to Marx, 'without being an object of 
utility. '(12) But what is important is that 
technology's role and function as means of labour 
(or production) is now conditioned by its (expected, 
or actual) effectiveness in terms of v* alue creation 
and expansion (in terms of profitability, or, for 
Marx, in terms of enabling the most efficient 
exploitation of living labour). 
Let me elaborate on this point: 
Adapting Marx's words given above, we can say that, 
technology as a useful mediatory object or as a 
means of labour lis a necessary condition, 
independent of all forms of society, '(13) Thus, 
viewing technology in this general sense, for Marx 
(and this is an uncontroversial point which is 
generally accepted): 'No production 
[is] possible 
without an instrument of production, even if that 
instrument is only the hand. '(14) 
However, what Marx is pointing to with regard to the 
value-form is that technology - as with any other 
product of "private" labour under social conditions 
of independent competing production units - only 
becomes something real (i. e. is realized as a means 
of labour) through its 
form as value. This has a 
twofold aspect: 
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On the one handy technology as a commodity has a form of appearance which is the opposite of its 
immediate being as a use-valuep as a means of 
labour; th, i t is, only through the representation of 
technology ' cl use-value as money does technology 
f irst becntm',, 1 moment (or, if you like, an element) 
of sociat [)ý., Jduction - i. e. put simply, it requires 
investment, It has to be purchased, and so on. It is 
in this mo ii ey -f orm that technology enters the 
circuit of capital, i. e. as constant fixed capital 
(which 1s [tall come to later). And it is in this 
form that technology's immediacy or concreteness 
(i. e. its pirticularity as a means of labour) takes 
a universal dimension, the universal form of value; 
that is, it hecomes not merely this or that type of 
"instrument" being used in particular production 
processes, but at the same time a societal 
phenomenon (again to put it simPlYP we talk about 
investments in technology as "capital-goods"g 
whereas at the point of production there are a vast 
number of different types of particular 
technolog. Les). 
On the other hand, technology's value-form reflects 
the social distribution and division of labour of 
independent commodity producers. In its immediate 
being, like any other commodity, technology is a 
use-value (, q- means of labour)(15). But precisely 
because it is a means of labour its character and 
quality, which determine the way it can be used and 
its mode of functioning and operation, cannot be 
indifferent to the specific social organization of 
production in which it is meant to act as a 
mediatory object. Its immediate being is realized as 
it is used (productively consumed) in relation with 
living labour and reflects the social form of the 
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relation 
production. 
established within the process of 
To summarize: The twofold aspect of the value-form of 
technology just mentioned, which refers to 
technology both within the process of production and 
as a part of the circuit of capital, and which is 
based on the inherent nature of commodities, 
distinguishes the specificity of the role, function, 
and status of technology under capitalism. From 
Marx's analysis of "commodity" (controversial as it 
is, and certainly fraught with difficulties of 
"dialectics") it is possible to gain some important 
insights which helps us understand his conception of 
technology. We have seen that, from Marx's 
explanation of use-value, the utility of technology 
is limited by its physical properties. And, further, 
that an object (a 'thing') is a technology only when 
it is actually in use (socially) as a means of 
labour. Technology is therefore first of all a 
socially useful functioning object. 
However, whether we accept or reject Marx's theory 
of value, I believe that, as I have attempted to 
show above, the issue of technology in Marx should 
be looked at from his "value" perspective and not 
merely in terms of its general notion as a mediatory 
object. It is from this perspective that we can 
begin to see the conception of technology as capital 
in Marx. Technology not as an abstract or general 
concept as such, but as a specific social 
phenomenon: 'Capital isq among other things, 
' Marx 
writesq 'also an instrument of production, also 
objectifiedg past labour. Therefore capital 
is a 
generalq eternal relation of nature' - 
but then he 
goes on: 'that isq 
if I leave out just the specifi 
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ty which makes "instrument of production" and 
llstored-u labour" into capital. '(16) 
Marx attempts to capture that 'specific quality' 
with his concept of the value-form of the product of 
labour, which, as he writes, 'stamps [capitalist] 
production as a particular species of social 
production, and thereby gives it its special 
historical character. '(17) If then technology is 
merely treated as something general, or simply as a 
means of labour as such, we are necessarily 
overlooking, to use Marx's words, 'that which is the 
differentia specifica' of its I value-form, and 
consequently of [its] commodity-form, and of its 
further developments, money-form, capital-form, 
etc. 1(18) 
However, the problem with Marx's concept of value- 
form is that it is a conception that invites us to 
consider the form of technology (or any other 
product) in relational terms, almost, one could say, 
to the exclusion of looking at technology as a 
particular 'thing'. In other words, with 
Marx's 
value-form applied to technology, though we may 
have 
a better understanding of the specific social 
character, role and function of production 
technology, we have hardly any understanding of 
technologies as particular functioning objects or 
systems. 
Thusq although the value-form 
proposition that attempts 
conventional generalization of 
(or only) a means of 
labour - 
kind of generalization that 
historical specificity - 
it noi 
of technology is a 
to overcome the 
technology as simply 
i. e. overcoming the 
admits no socio- 
ietheless seems to me 
1ý0 
to go to the other extreme of excluding the 
practical implications of particular types (and 
kinds) of technologies involved in qualitatively 
different production processes (e. g. it does not 
permit a distinction between, say, the technologies 
of the chemical industries, nuclear power, car 
manufacturing, etc., which may, and often do, have 
different implications for those who work in these 
industries). 
At any rate, it is from Marx's analysis of the 
commodity, and ultimately of the value-form, that we 
can now move on to an examination of technology as 
an essential feature of, what Marx calls, 'a state 
of society, in which the process of production has 
the mastery over man, instead of being controlled by 
him.. '(19) 
3. The Labour Process and Technology 
It is in Capital volume I, in the section dealing 
with the "Labour Process", that Marx gives his most 
precise and yet general definition of production 
technology. The terms he uses are "instruments" of 
labour, "implements"g "tools", etc. The use of these 
terms is not, however, arbitrary. The subject matter 
under investigation is concerned with the production 
of "use-value", i. e. production of materials of life 
as suchq that is, general production. 
(20) Here the 
specific. social form of production, or production of 
goods within a specific 
form of society, is 
abstracted away in order to explain the 
basic 
relationships and processes 
involved in 
production. 
(21) 
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Here Marx begins, of course, with "labour". And 
labour is considered as an activity, a process 'in 
which both man and Nature participate, and in which 
man of his own accord starts, regulates, and 
controls the material re-actions between himself and 
Nature. '(22) Therefore, before I proceed to examine 
Marx's conception of technology as related to the 
labour-process in general, it would be helpful I 
think to make some preliminary observations as 
regards Marx's views on "labour": 
It should be noted that the process and activity 
which Marx refers to as "labour" is not, as he warns 
us, that of 'those primitive instinctive forms of 
labour that remind us of the mere animal. ' But, 
rather, he presupposes 'labour in a form that stamps 
it as exclusively human. '(23) One essential 
characteristics of human labour, which Marx singles 
out, is that it is purposive as against merely 
"instinctive". It has, of course, been argued that 
Marx tends to make too fine a point on this issue, 
and that not all forms of productive activity 
(labour) are necessarily "purposive". (24) The 
importance of this point, however, is not in this, 
that human beings have "intelligence", the power to 
learn, inventq etc., as opposed to "mere" animals. 
For it is perfectly clear from studies (past and 
recent) of animal behaviour, that many species of 
animalsq too Y are capable of 
"inventing" and 
"learning"t etc. 
What Marx regards as 'exclusively human' is the 
labour of conception,, and labour as conscious 
activity. (25) Thus he writes: 'A spider conducts 
operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a 
bee puts to shame many an architect in the 
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construction of her cell. But what distinguishes the 
worst architect from the best of bees is this, that 
the architect raises his structure in imapination 
before he erects it in reality. At the end of every 
labour-process, we get a result that already existed 
in the imagination of the labourer at its 
commencement. '(26) 
However, as Elster (drawing on Benjamin Beck's 
Animal Tool Behavior has arguedy 'Marx erred' on 
this issue, since 'the capacity to work according to 
a mental plan' does not appear to be an exclusively 
human phenomenonm. (27) At any rate, although this 
point has been a main focus of attention, 
particularly by, for example, Braverman, and 
considered as an essential aspect of human labour, 
unless it is examined in relation to other (early) 
propositions made by Marx on this issue, one is 
forced to conclude, at the very least, that it is 
hardly a revelation of great significance to state 
that there is a difference (whether of "kind" or 
"degree") between human labour and the behaviour of 
other animal species. But I believe that, 
notwithstanding Marx's overstatements of this point, 
there is in fact more involved in this issue which 
is particularly relevant to his conception of 
technology and therefore needs to be further 
explored. 
To understand why Marx is raising this issue we need 
to go back to his early writingsq particularly to 
his conception of alienation. It is in his 1844 
Manuscript that Marx first deals with this issue, 
and it is here that we are given the 
basic reason 
for such a comparison. Let us therefore briefly look 
at the relevant passages. 
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According to Marx: 'The animal is immediately one 
with its life activity. It is not distinct from that 
activity; it is that activity. ' However, by 
comparison: 'Man makes his life activity itself an 
object of his will and consciousness. He has 
conscious life activity. It is not a determination 
with which he directly merges ... Only because of that 
[i. e. conscious life activity] is he a species- 
being. Or rather, he is a conscious being, i. e. his 
own life is an object for him, only because he is a 
species-being. '(28) 
The essential point of this passage is then 
clarified as follows: 'The practical creation of an 
objective world, the fashio of inorganic nature, 
is proof that man is a conscious species-being,.. ' 
And although, Marx continues, it is 'true that 
animals also produce .... they produce 
[however] only 
their own immediate needs or those of their young; 
they produce one-sidedly.. ' Butt what is significant 
about human labourt according to Marx, is that 'man 
produces univer ;.. man produces even when he is 
free from physical need and truly produces only in 
freedom from such need.. ' And since 'man produces 
universally' and '[he] is capable of producing 
according to the standards of every species and of 
applying to each object its inherent standard't this 
$conscious' as compared to 'instinctual' activity 
results in 'man freely 
(confronting) his own 
product. '(29) 
The usep or even the 'inventing' and making, of a 
tool by certain animals has an immediate and one- 
sided determination, 
it lacks universality. It is 
this aspect of Marx's comparison of and 
distinction 
between the human and animal productive 
behaviour 
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that Elster, for example, has failed to come to 
grips with. The animal's use or making of a tool is 
based on a determination with which it directly 
merges. The object made and used cannot confront the 
animal or become separated from its immediate life 
activity. Insofar as I am aware no scientific 
investigation and study of animal behaviour has 
produced evidence of tool using (or tool making and 
using) animals being "socially separated" from their 
tools nor that the tools being used by these animal 
gaining a mastery over their lives, confronting them 
and alienating and dominating them. 
However, human consciousness, conscious activity and 
conceptual powers of "man" , which transform 
immediate, one-sided activity into a universal form 
(whereby, according to Marx, the 'object of labour 
is therefore the objectification of the species-life 
of man'(30)), make such a social confrontation and 
separation possible. It is this specific issue which 
Marx is attempting to explain - though, admittedly, 
in a rather difficult and obscure philosophical 
language, and in a somewhat exaggerated fashion. And 
it is precisely this point that commentators, like 
Elster, have overlooked because of the fact that, in 
my opinion, they have neglected to fully examine 
Marx's writings from what can be called a 
technological perspective. 
What is more, whatever the rights and wrongs of the 
issue as raised by Marxq objectification cannot for 
the animal take the highest form of symbolic 
representation - i. e. both articulate speech and 
particularly the 
"externalization" of conceptual 
thought whether through written 
form or as in myths, 
storiesq art, etc. These 
highest forms of symbolic 
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representatinii are essential tools (what can be 
called "soft" technologies) of human labour-process, 
which as rroducts of humanity's activity can 
confront them through a process of separation as in 
the case of tlie division of functions (as well as, 
of course, 1)ý-, iri, g also the bases of the universality 
and continuity of human experience - culture). In 
short, it is because the driving force of labour is 
human con-Y -ciousness that there can be 
alienation: 'just because he is a conscious being, 
[man] makes his life activity, his being [or 
essence, "Wesen" a inere means for his 
existence. '('M 
Therefore, Lhe intention of Marx in raising this 
issue of the "uniqueness" of human labour is, I 
would suggest, neither to glorify human labour as 
such (or degrale the activities of the rest of the 
animal kin,. -,,, I -) iii nor t0 simply point t0 the 
difference between conscious" as against 
"instinctual" behaviour and activity, which is by 
some accounts wrong and in any case even if true is 
obvious an (A hardly a revelation. But Marx's 
intention, J submit, is to point out that it is 
human labour itself, because it is a purposive and 
0 conscious activityý which creates, through the 
__. 
j-jj_ectification (particularly conception process oL o 
and production of technologies, or more strictly in 
Marx's teruis that of the 2roductive forces - 
symbolic as well as material), not only the 
conditions oC alienation 
(specifically that of 
labour's separation from the means of production), 
but also the possibility of de-alienation 
(or the 
"re-unification" of humanity and inorganic nature). 
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In other words, the very creativity and universality 
of purposive human activity (human labour as such), 
the very multi-dimensional human capacity to perform 
an infinite variety of tasks (which Marx called 
"labour-power"), is, for Marx, the premise of human 
social development in and through nature -a 
historical process which is, however, realized not 
simply in thought ("ideally") but objectivelyý 
particularly through the interaction of society and 
technology. 
The most basic and fundamental social process in and 
through which humanity creates its life objectively 
and realizes itself as a 'species-being' - i. e. 
through which it transforms both the materials 
provided by nature and also human relations 
themselves - Marx calls the labour process. And, for 
Marx, this act and process of transformation both 
requires and helps to create certain mediatory 
objects without which the process cannot be carried 
out. In this process of transformation the work of 
conception - the working-out of ideas and the 
processes that take place in the imagination - is the 
starting point. This applies not only to the 
particular product producedt but also, obviously, to 
the development and construction of mediatory 
objects; since products arep in the words of Marx, 
'not only results9 but also essential conditions of 
labour. '(32) 
Therefore, according to Marx, leaving aside the 
bodily organs - hands, etc. - the first thing that a 
productively active human being possesses is 
instruments or technologies. And by using the terms 
"instruments", "implements", "tools", etc. , what Marx 
is attempting to do is to stress the inseparability 
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of technolýN, (-. v from human productive activity or human 
labour as suc. h. 
In this sense these terms are meant to convey the 
essential rote and function of technology. Looked at 
from his philosophical standpoint, derived from 
Hegel, it is the essence and not the form to which he 
is referring in his discussion of the labour-process. 
He makes this abstraction to clarify the meaning of 
technology ', ýn human society, so that at a later stage 
when techný)togy is looked at in specific socio- 
historical. ý-ontexts, the forms of appearances that it 
takes can be explained and unravelledq since in the 
reality oE social production, for Marxq technology 
always takes on different social forms. 
Only after the clarification of these points can we 
now proceed to state a definition of "technology" 
given by ý, Iarx, and he gives it, using the term 
"instrument of labour", as follows: 
'An instrument of labour is a thing, or a complex of 
things, which the labourer interposes between himself 
and the subject of his labour, and which serves as 
the conductor of his activity. He makes use of the 
mechanical, physical, and chemical properties of some 
substances in order to make other substances 
subservient to his aims. '(33) 
Thus having initially concentrated upon the crucial 
role of labourg of productive activity, and the power 
of human r-reativity and imagination, Marx then 
introduces "t-echnology" as not only the result and 
condition of hurnan productive activity as a process 
(i. e. the labour process)p but also as both the 
condition and indicator of the 
historical development 
of that process. 
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It is, then, quite clear that Marx is specifically 
concerned O-th a conception of "technology" as 
_production 
technology. And although one may be able 
to stretch the definition given above to cover any 
and all types of "activity" (as "labour"), and hence 
provide a wider, more general conception of 
"technology"; that ,I believe, will not reflect 
Marx's intention. His conception is strictly limited 
to such 'things' or objects which serve as the 
conductor of labouring activity in the production of 
materials of life. This limitation, it should be 
noted here, restricts the usefulness and application 
of Marx's conception of technology. 
Moreover, wliat should also be noted at this stage is 
that, despite Marx's concern to point out the 
interrelationship between labour, instruments, and 
the subject of labour, it is, nonetheless, clear from 
his writings that he tends to place a far greater 
emphasis on production technology, more particularly 
when dealing with the capitalist process of 
production, than other elements of the general labour 
process. 
Thus, we know that, according 
process involves the combina 
elements, or as he puts it: 'The 
the labour-process are 1, the 
man, i. e., work itself, 2, the 
and 3, its instruments. 1(34) 
to Marx, the labour 
tion of three basic 
elementary factors of 
personal activity of 
subject of that work, 
In the strictly technical sense, these basic factors 
are inseparable; one cannot speak of a "labour- 
process" without the combination of these elements, 
However, what form this combination takes and which 
of the three elementary factors assume a dominant 
Nq 
position within this combination depends on the 
social determination of the technical aspects and 
requirements of any (historically) given labour 
process. 
The labour process is viewed as a process of 
objectification, as a process of production. It is 
not simply a process of taking from nature, but of 
transforming nature. Marx makes this distinction as 
follows: 'Leaving out of consideration such re dy-made 
means of subsistence as fruits, in gathering which a 
man's own limbs serve as the instruments of his 
labour, the first thing of which the labourer [i. e. 
the producer as opposed to the "gatherer" -RRI 
possesses himself is not the subject of labour but 
its instrument. '(35) 
Gathering the fruits of nature, or what is already 
present in nature in finished form ready for direct 
consumption, certainly inv olves activity and perhaps 
the use of certain rudimentary forms of natural 
(either unfashioned or partially fashioned) materials 
as "instruments" (sticks, stones, etc. 
) - although it 
must be said here that Marx tends to ignore this 
latter aspect of the process of gathering - but does 
not involve a process of objectification or 
production. 
Gathering, in other words, even if natural objects 
are used, does not involve the objectification of 
human powers, the creation of products; 
it is 
therefore not in this sense, strictly speaking, 
according to Marx, a 
labour process. It is nature 
which has fashioned materials7 and 
the activity 
involved is merely one of taking. In gathering or the 
"taking" process, as against the 
labour process (the 
If 0. 
making process I have mentioned before in previous 
chapters), both the "instruments" and the end 
materials are naturally given. Thus, according to 
Marx, as 'the earth is his [man's] original larder, 
so too it is his original tool house. '(36) 
In the labour process, however, human activity, with 
the aid and mediation of technology, 'effects an 
alteration, designed from the commencement, in the 
material worked upon. ' And the important distinction 
is in this that: 'Labour has incorporated itself with 
its subject: the former is materialized, the latter 
transformed. That which in the labourer appeared as 
movement, now appears in the product as a fixed 
quality without motion. '(37) (This idea of 'fixed 
quality without motion', it is worth noting here, is 
of particular significance to Marx's later analysis 
of the technological conditions of production as 
"fixed capital", which I shall deal with in a later 
section. ) There is, for Marx, therefore a distinction 
between the two forms of processes - although both 
presuppose appropriation. (38) 
However, it seems that Marx tends to place an 
important emphasis on not simply the "use" but the 
fabrication of instruments as regards the distinction 
between, and perhaps even in the transition from, the 
merely "taking" process to the labour process proper 
- hence we have the role of objectification, the 
transformation, development, and realization of 
conceptual thought and imagination. Thus he writes: 
'No sooner does labour undergo the least development, 
than it requires specially prepared instruments. '(39) 
And after writing a few brief words on 
'stone 
implements and weapons'ý and the modification of 
animals 'by means of 
labour' (domestication) to be 
IýI 
used as instruments, he gives not merely the use, but 
also and particularly the fabrication of instruments 
as specific to human labour process: The use and 
fabrication of instruments of labour, although 
existing in the germ among certain species of 
animals, is specifically characteristic of the human 
labour-process, and Franklin therefore defines man as 
a tool-making animal. '(40) Here we should note once 
again that Marx is perhaps not strictly right on this 
point. It is at least arguable whether or not the 
making of tools is only specific to humans. (41) 
Be that as it may, given the general nature of his 
analysis at this stage, Marx seems to have in mind 
here a very general notion of production technology. 
But what is also clear here is that he is far more 
concerned with the role and function of objects as 
technologies than objects as "products". 
Technologies, rather than simply articles as 
products, are for him therefore the foundation 
blocks, or the skeleton, of economic forms. (42)And it 
is not merely a question of what has survived from 
the past. The issue for Marx here is the question of 
foundations: 'It is not the articles made, ' he writes, 
'but how they are made, and by what instruments, that 
enables us to distinguish different economic 
epochs. '(43) Indeed, for him, past and present 
technological objects can provide an indication of 
the level of development of labour or the process of 
producing articles 
(Marx's 'how they are made'). But 
what is more, for Marx, 
instruments of labour 'not 
only supply a standard of the 
degree of development 
to which human labour has attained, 
but they are also 
indicators of the social conditions under which that 
labour is carried on. '(44) 
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Having discussed the role of technologies in the 
general sense of "instruments of labour"i Marx seems 
to now, in the above quoted passage, point to the 
importance of their form and properties. Although he 
is still merely concerned with the notion of 
technologies as instruments, since he is still 
concerned with the labour process in general, 
nonetheless, it is clear that for him form and 
quality are certainly crucial "indicators" that need 
to be considered - this is consistent with and 
directly linked to his analysis of "use-value", which 
was mentioned in the previous section. Thus he 
writes: 'Among the instruments of labour, those of a 
mechanical natureý which, taken as a whole, we may 
call the bone and muscles of production, offer much 
more decided characteristics of a given epoch of 
production, than those whichg like pipes, tubs, 
baskets, jarsý etc., serve only to hold the materials 
for labour... '(45) 
But if the use or utility of an object is conditioned 
by its form and properties, then whether an object is 
to be considered a technology or not is dependent on 
its practical application. Previously I had mentioned 
that for Marx how an object is used is an important 
criterion of its character as technology; and I had 
also mentioned that "usage" , in the sense of 
"employment" and "application", is not a sufficient 
factor. For "usage", strictly speaking, refers only 
to the "subjective" aspect; that is, to make use of 
an object or employ it for a special purpose, e. g. as 
an instrument* 
With "usage" therefore the 
"objective" aspect is if 
not absent then at 
least ambiguous. Marx therefore 
introduces a further and a more 
decisive criterion 
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for a more exact definition of technology; namely, 
function, which stresses the objective side in the 
sense of the actual performance of the object as it 
is being used, or the "work" being done by that 
object. An example which Marx gives can perhaps help 
to clarifY this point. An animal can be used as an 
instrument in ploughing fields or 'for the production 
of manure'; or it can be used as 'raw material' to 
make beef products, etc. (46) Here particular usage 
determines whether this animal is an instrument or 
raw material. 
But this is only a view of the mode of use from the 
outside of the labour process. What also needs to be 
taken into account is what goes on inside the labour 
proces-s. For, from Marx's perspective, whenever 'a 
product enters.. into a new labour-process, it thereby 
loses its character of product, and becomes a mere 
factor in the process. (47) As a"f actor" of 
production, we are now concerned not only with an 
object's use or employment (etc. ), but also, and more 
specifically, with its function. Thus Marx adds this 
factor of "function" to his definition of technology, 
and he writes: 'Hence we see, that whether a use-value 
is to be regarded as raw material, as instrument of 
labour, or as product, this is determined entirely by 
its function in the labour-process, by the position 
it there occupies: as this varies, so does its 
character. '(48) 
With this we come to Marx's concept of "means of 
production". For Marx, means of production are the 
material and objective 
factors which are 
indispensable for the realization of production. 
These objective factors are of two distinct types, 
in 
a functional sense. 
Whatever the social conditions in 
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which production takes place, means of production are 
divided into: (a) means of labouro which embrace all 
such materials and objects that are utilized by the 
labourer as the artificial extension of his/her 
capacity for labour (labour-power) in a labouring 
activity. And (b) objects of labour, which include 
all such materials upon which labour is performed 
with the aid of means of labour. 
Thus we now have a different term which Marx uses for 
production technology; namely, means of labour. This 
term is, however, both broader and yet more strict 
and precise. It includes the instruments of labour 
such as tools, implements, etc., and production 
technology in the modern sense of machinery, and so 
on. But it also refers to instrumental conditions of 
labour; i. e. factory buildings, railway networks, 
canals, offices, etc. These latter, Marx writes, 
though 'do not enter directly into the [labour] 
process, ' nevertheless they are means of labour since 
'without them it is either impossible for it [the 
labour-process] to take place at all, or possible 
onlY to a partial extent. '(49) 
In other words, with the term "means of labour" Marx 
seems to be emphasising the systemic nature of 
technologies of production. One could say that the 
term "means of labour" basically refers, from a 
genera I standpoint and in abstraction from the 
specific social form of production, to the whole 
configuration of various networks of technologies and 
technical conditions as a technological system. 
Althoughgonce againjMarx does not clearly state this, 
but this is the meaning which comes across from his 
discussions of means of production, instruments, etc. 
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The differentiation of means of production into means 
of labour and objects of labour depends for Marx, as 
mentioned in relation to his concept of "instrument 
of labour", on the particular use and the specific 
function of the objects or materials in question. 
Moreover, as a general rule, means of labour or 
technologies have specific characteristics, forms9 
that are the result of past labour. And for Marx this 
latter point is also very important. As he remarks, 
'in the great majority of cases, instruments of 
labour show even to the most superficial observer, 
traces of the labour of past ages. '(50) 
To sum up so far: We have seen that Marx defines a 
"technology", at least in the general sense, as an 
object with the following qualities: (a) it must be 
objective and material; (b) it must serve as a 
conductor of labouring activity; (c) which is 
connected to (b), it is its objective function, as 
well as how it is used, in the labour process that 
gives it its status as technology; (d) it is purposely 
fabricated, it is an artifact, a social object; (e) it 
is, therefore, objectified labour or dead labour; 
that isq the result of the labour of past ages and 
the objectification of generations of both mental and 
manual productive activity. 
Nowq finally, we come to, what we consider to be not 
merely two additional qualifications, 
but two 
essential considerations: Firstlyg that technology 
is, 
and can only be, by definition a productively 
functionip& object. I suggest that this is basic and 
crucial for Marx, though 
hardly referred to by 
critics and supporters of 
Marx. For in many writings 
on technologyq there 
is a constant reference to the 
"employment" Of technology as against, and in 
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opposition, to technology "in itself"; as if one can 
call an object "technology" without it being actually 
employed and used. 
Marx makes this point in the following manner: 'A 
machine which does not serve the purpose of labour, 
is useless... Living labour must seize upon these 
things and rouse them from their death-sleep. 0, 
Again, he further states, 'their contact with living 
labour, is the sole means by which they can be made 
to retain their character of use-values [i. e. their 
character as technologies -RRIj and be utilized. '(51) 
This point, that technology should be considered as, 
by definition, something that is being used, and an 
object with a specific function, in a particular 
labour process, is clearly important in reference to 
the so-called "neutrality" of technology, or the idea 
of technology as distinct from the mode in which it 
functions and has "in itself" a specific function. 
And it is clearly also important for Marx, as he 
remarks: 'A spindle maintains itself as a use value 
only by being used up for spinning. If it is not, the 
specific form which is here posited in iron and wood 
would be spoiled for use, together with the labour 
which posited it and the material in which it did the 
positing. The use value of wood and iron, and of 
their form as well, are preserved only by being 
posited as a means of living labour, as an objective 
moment of the existence of labour's vitality. 
'(52) 
Secondlyt for Marx, in the course of productive 
consumption of the means of production, technology 
functions and is used to Sashion materials, it is 
never fashioned itself 
during that process. In the 
course of the labour process 
the instruments used may 
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be modified, but that is either incidental or due to 
wear and tear or because of change of purpose of 
production. Thus, for Marx, production technology is 
never itself intentionally at the receiving end, i. e. 
it is never fashioned and transformed into a product 
itself, 
Technologies are therefore productively consumed but 
they maintain their form during the process and for a 
number of cycles of production; any change of form 
takes place only as a result of wear and tear. This 
is a crucial qualification of production technology 
for Marx. Thus, instruments, toolsq machines, 
buildings, etc., according to Marx, 'are of use in 
the labour-process, only so long as they retain their 
original shape, and are ready each morning to renew 
the process with their shape unchanged. And just as 
during their lifetime, that is to say, during the 
continued labour-process in which they serve, they 
retain their shape independent of the product, so, 
too, they do after their death. The corpses of 
machines, tools, workshops, etc., are always separate 
and distinct from the product they 
help to turn 
out. 1(53) 
It is in this sense that technologies are considered 
by Marx as fixed means of production. And it 
is from 
this basis that he incorporates his concept of 
technology within his general theoretical 
framework 
dealing specifically with the capitalist 
form of 
production. Marx's definition of 
technology, as is 
quite clear from the 
discussion presented in this 
sectioný should not, 
therefore, be taken to be 
applic able to the complex world 
of technological 
devices and phenomena outside of the production 
process* 
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Moreover, as we shall see in later sections, when he 
comes to the analysis of the capitalist process of 
production proper (i. e. the production of value and 
surplus-value), Marx looks at technology no longer as 
a general instrument of labour, but more specifically 
in connection with the production of value. 
Marx's definition, in other words, cannot provide us 
with an understanding of the complexity of the 
reality of fnodern-day technological phenomena in 
society at lar&e (i. e. the relationship between 
modern technology and social life outside of the 
domain of production in its strict sense). It may, at 
best, and arguably, provide us with a basis for an 
approach towards a study of the role and function of 
technological devices and systems in the various and 
different fields of social life - but even then it 
requires, I believe, considerable modificationp re- 
formulation and updating. 
Thus, the conception of technology in Marx (which as 
we shall see is based on the notion of technology as 
capital, according to my interpretation at any rate) 
is strictly concerned with the character, role and 
function of technology in the production process of 
value and_surplus value 
(of capital), 
lgq- 
4., The "Social Purpose" of Production 
and Techno 
In the previous section I had looked at the way Marx 
conceptualizes the general notion of technology, 
presenting a definition of production technology 
based on a number of observations made by Marx in 
relation to the labour process in general. That is, 
a definition and conception of technology as a 
mediatory object (instruments or means of labour), 
which like the general notion of the labour process 
'is independent of every social phase... or rather, 
is common to every such phase. '(54) What was missing 
was the specific social form of technology, which 
can only be ascertained from its relation to the 
living and active labourer and hence from the 
specific social form of labour. And although I had 
mentioned in section 2, on "commodity and value-form 
of technology", that the process of production under 
capitalism is characterized by the production of 
commodities or value, strictly speakingg howeverg 
for Marx, capitalist production is essentially and 
specifically concerned with the production of 
11surplus value"o 
With the specifically capitalist form of production 
the "social purpose" of the labour process changes, 
and this affects not only the use or employment, but 
also the form and function of technology. In this 
section2 thereforeq I shall attempt to examine and 
present a discussion of Marx's conceptualization of 
technology, taking into account the specific 
"social 
purpose" of production under capitalism. 
However, in order to do this it would be necessary 
to give a brief explanation of what 
Marx regarded as 
jq-o 
being the essential conditions of the capitalist 
production process: The specifically capitalist form 
of production only becomes a social system of 
production as a result of the systematic purchase 
and sale of the capacity for labour, or the 
commodification of labour-power. Capitalist 
production, in other words, requires the historical 
creation of the free labourer (55) - essentially 
conditioned by the separation of labour from the 
means and conditions of production. 
Thus, capitalist production can only be initiated 
after the purchase of all the necessary factors of 
production; i. e. 'its objective factors, the means 
of production, as well as its subjective factor, 
labour-power. '(56) This form of production 
immediately exhibits two particular characteristics: 
'First, the labourer works under the control of the 
capitalist to whom his labour belongs.. ' And, 
secondly, 'the product is the property of the 
capitalist and not that of the labourer, its 
immediate producer. '(57) 
What however also becomes immediately apparent is 
that the social purpose of production changes as a 
result of the changed conditions and form of 
production. The purpose for the production of 
products is not merely one of producing use-values, 
articles or "goods", but use-values for sale, or 
"goods" as depositories of exchange-value, i. e. 
commodities. But more than this, the aim must be to 
produce a commodity which would have more value than 
the total value of the com modities purchased on the 
market (i. e. that of the means of production and 
labour-power) to initiate the process of production. 
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The aim is thus not only to recover the money paid 
out for the various "factors" of production, but 
also to obtain something more for the capitalist 
himself - i. e. a surplus in the form of . Thus 
the fundamental purpose of initiating each and every 
production procesS, and hence the fundamental 
purpose of social production (the sum total of the 
various independent units of production) for Marx is 
this: 'to produce not only a use-value, but a 
commodity also; not only use-valueg but value; not 
only value, but at the same time surplus -value. ' (58) 
The question of the validity or otherwise of Marx's 
theory of surplus-value does not concern us here-, 
whether he was right or wrong is a controversial 
issue much debated among both Marxist and non- 
Marxist economists social scientists. (59) What 
is generally agreed upon by most, if not all, social 
scientists is that the fundamental purpose of 
production under capitalism is profit. And no matter 
how one justifies, criticises, or defines it, 
"profit" is a form of surplus. Whether profit is 
regarded as the "just" deserve of the capitalist for 
his/her risks and efforts, or as due to the 
"exploitation" of the workers, and so on, is at this 
point irrelevant to the issue I am concerned with. 
The central point to note here is that the 
fundamental purpose of production is that of the 
production of surplus-value 
(industrial profit, or 
call it what you like). And this purpose, at 
least 
for Marxq influences and guides the behaviour of 
individual capitalists, their management of 
production processes, and their 
decision-making 
processes concerning 
both labour and technology. 
I 
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In the previous section on the "labour process", we 
saw that a specific characteristic of human labour 
or productive activity, for Marx, is that it is 
purposive. There we saw that Marx regarded the 
"labourer" as the producer, since he was concerned 
with the labour-process as such, or in abstraction 
from its specific social form. (60) And thus we saw 
that 'man' as the producer first creates in 'his 
imagination' what 'he' intends to 'erect' in 
reality. In other wordsp the producer 'realises a 
purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus 
operandi, an-1 to which he must subordinate his 
will. '(61) The labour process, the process of 
objectification, and hence the result, is therefore, 
according to Marxq 'designed from the 
commencement'(62) - it cannot be otherwise. (63) 
Under capitalism, it is not the labourerv nor 'man' 
in the abstractv who is the 2roducer (or, is the 
"subject" as discussed in chapter two in relation to 
the process of objectification and alienation); that 
is, in the sense of that "person" who must take the 
relevant decisions, or who 'realises a purpose of 
his own that gives the law to his modus operandi'. 
The labourer is certainly the direct or immediate 
producer, but not the producer, who is now the 
capitalist. It is, therefore, now the latter who 
must realise his/her purpose. The 
"labour process", 
the process of objectification, and hence the result 
(i. e. the product, whether as means of production or 
as end-product) must be 
'designed from commencement' 
in accordance with, and corresponding to, 
his/her 
purposee 
Marx therefore moves from purposive activity, the 
purpose of 
'man' in the abstract, or that of the 
I 
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'labourer' as the producer (i. e. the labourer when 
not divorced from his/her means of production), to 
the concrete reality of purposive activity under 
capitalism, the purpose of the capitalist as the 
producer. But we also saw that, according to Marx, 
'man' (in the abstract) o ctifies 'himself'; or 
the 'object of labour is.. the objectification of the 
species-life of man: for man reproduces himself not 
only intellectually, in his consciousness, but 
actively and actually, and he can therefore 
contemplate himself in a world he himself has 
created. '(64) This "abstraction" (on this Hegelian 
notion of the abstraction of consciousness and the 
latter's objectification see Appendix 2) is now made 
concrete; it is the capitalist who becomes the 
personification of the "objectified" forces which 
now express 'the species-life of man'. And the 
objectification of human labour thus appears in the 
social form of capital, whose personified 
representation is the capitalist. 
The objects of labour, whether as technologies, 
means of production, or as products, now appear as, 
and take the social f orm of , value; and within the 
production process as capital - objects apparently 
endowed with the "Will", 
"consciousness", and 
"purpose" of the capitalist as the producer. Thus, 
what is essentially the result of human 
labour (past 
and present), of the productive activity of 
direct 
and immediate producers 
(mental and manual), appears 
in fact to be reversed - as Marx commented, 
alienated, or 
'estranged labour reverses the 
relationship' between 
'man... his life activity... and 
the product of his life activity... 
'(65) That is, 
the result Of that activity - and 
this is 
particularly relevant 
in the case of technology 
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appears as the "work" of the capitalist, or as the 
result of the power of capital; and the result (in 
our case the "products" produced as technologies) 
naturally reinhodies not the purpose of 'man' in the 
abstract, but that of the concrete social master of 
the existing form of production, the capitalist. 
If thereý-ore the purpose of the capitalist is 
essentially the production of surplus-value (or 
profit), t1hen both the objective factors, in 
particular the technological system, and the 
subjective factor (labour-power), must be made to 
function, and used, in such a way as to enable the 
satisfaction of that purpose. The designed structure 
of the object desired must embody the purpose of its 
utilization and function. Simple as this principle 
appears to be, nonetheless it applies to the most 
complex of technological issues. According to 
Wiener, the father of Cybernetics, for example, 'the 
structure of the machine.. is an index of the 
performance that may be expected from it. (66) And 
what is more , as regards "purpose", Wiener 
forcefully remarks: 'Not only can we build purpose 
into a machine, but in an overwhelming majority of 
cases a inachLne designed to avoid certain pitfalls 
of breakdow Ti will look for purpose which it can 
fulfill. 1(617) 
The same principle applies equally to the structure 
of the labour process, the organization of labour 
and the combination of living labour and production 
technology (or dead labour). Thus technology must be 
made (designed and constructed) to 
function not 
simply as , ýn instrument 
in the service of labour, 
but as a force of production which 
labour serves. 
With "prof-It" (surplus-value) as the purpose of 
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social productiong the technological structure of 
the "labour process" comes to be 'designed from 
commencement' as a structure which subsumes living 
labour; living labour serving objectified, 
materialized labour. (68) 
Even from the I general' form of capitalist 
production, according to Marx, #the means of 
production, the material conditions of labour.. do 
not appear as subsumed to the labourer, but the 
labourer appears as subsumed to them. He does not 
make use of them, but they make use of him. And it 
is this that makes them capital. Capital employs 
labour. They [technologies-RRI are not means for him 
to produce products, whether in the form of direct 
means of subsistence, or means of exchange, 
commodities. But he is a means for them 
[technologies -RR partly to maintain their value, 
partly to create surplus-value.., '(69) 
However, what is crucial in Marx is that the 
capitalist's purpose and aim is not considered as 
something merely subjective, or, as it were, 
dependent on an individual's attitude, it is not 
simply a psychological phenomenon as such. 
Capitalism being a social system of independent 
units of production, or being made up of independent 
(autonomous) producersq whose social interdependence 
is achieved by means of their interaction in a 
process of exchangeg through the mechanism of 
compýqtitionq makes the subjective, 
individual 
purpose and aim for profit 
into a compulsive, 
objectively enforced social phenomenon. 
(70) 
For Marx, therefore, the essential point is not that 
capitalists as individuals set out 
deliberately and 
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intentionally to design, create, and construct 
technological systems to control and dominate their 
particular workforce - though that may indeed be the 
final outcome. But what is essential for him is 
that, to be and remain a capitalist one is compelled 
to act in such a way; what appears as deliberate and 
intentional from an individual standpoint, is 
actually, because of competition, something 
systemic. It is in this sense that Marx constantly 
refers to the technological phenomenon (instrumentsý 
means of labour, machineryg etc. )2 and also the 
technical structure of the "labour process" and 
methods and techniques of labourg 'as something 
extraneous and objective, 'g and hence as capital 
Thus, for example, Marx writes: 'with the development 
of the specifically capitalist mode of production, 
it is not only these directly material things (i. e. 
means of production-RR] that get up on their hind 
legs to the labourer and confront him as "capital", 
but [also] the forms of socially developed labour - 
co-operation, manufacture (as a form of division of 
labour), the factory (as a form of social labour 
organized on machinery as its material basis) - all 
these appear as forms of the development of 
capital.. In fact.. the use for productive purposes in 
machine industry of forces of nature and science 
alongside the products of labour - all this 
confronts the individual labourers themselves as 
something extraneous and ob ective, as a mere 
form 
of existence of the means of 
labour that are 
independent of them and control them [the labourers- 
RRI 9 
just as the means of labour themselves 
[confront themýl in their simple visible form as 
materials; instrumentsq etc., as 
functions of 
. 
SýanjLal and consequently of 
the capitalist. '(71) 
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To recap so far: For Marx, therefore, it is not 
s imply the manner 0f employment, or use, of 
technologies which transforms these from mere 
instruments and means of labour into impersonal, 
objective and material agencies of control and 
subsumption of living labour. The problem he 
addresses goes deeper than this; what is crucial is 
the manner in which the social purpose of 
production, production for "prof it" I or more 
accurately for Marx, the production of surplus- 
value, becomes an overriding principle of the 
developmental process of technology. And technology 
is actually developed, designed and constructed to 
function as an objective moment of the capitalist 
relations of production, as an impersonal agency of 
domination and control of living labour: 'with the 
development of machinery, ' Marx writesq 'the 
conditions of labour seem to dominate labour also 
technologically while at the same time they replace 
labourg oppress it, and make it superfluous in its 
independent forms. '(72) 
The "machine" is designed and developed not only to 
be used as an "instrument" of labour, but also to 
function as a technological means of control in 
relation to the labourers. And although, according 
to Marxt the 'capitalist who makes use of a machine 
need not understand it', nonetheless because of the 
systemic determination of the development of 
machineryq the 
'science realized in the machine 
appears as capital in relation to the 
labourers. '(73) 
Howeverg even if one were to accept that the 
motivation for 
"profit" (or, more accurately for 
Marxy for surplus value and hence the 
'self- 
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expansion of value' or growth) - being the fundamental social purpose of capitalist production 
(as discussed above) - has a conditioning effect on 
the development, design and construction of 
produc tion technology, hence also on the social 
choices of technology, it would be wrong to assume 
that in having (supposedly) exposed the basic aim of 
production, Marx has thereby also exposed the 
reality of how technology is shaped or the reality 
that informs the processes of technological 
development. 
Moreover, whether or not Marx's ideas on this issue, 
as presented above, is taken as merely an exposition 
of the essence beneath the surface of the reality of 
the process of technological design and development 
(or, as it were, "the reality behind the reality"), 
it is, nonetheless, still extremely hard to accept 
the overpowering role which Marx tends to attach to 
"profit" (surplus-value extraction and growth or 
accumulation) in the determination of the role, form 
and character of technology. Though, he does not 
state it in absolute, categorical terms, there is a 
basic assumption in Marx that such a social purpose 
is decisive at all times and at all levels. Reality 
is, of course, far more complex than the model Marx 
constructs, in which the directing and 
determining 
motive is the extraction of surplus-value and 
the 
gaining of profits. 
This is not to say that such a motive or social 
purpose is not operative or not 
dominant - in my 
opinion it is. But that 
in the real world of 
designingg developing and making technologies not 
only many other 
factors come into play, but, more 
importantlyg the 
dominant social purpose ("profit" 
lqq 
making and maximization) 
it is often challenged 
process itself); it is, 
decisive and this for 
is invariably compromised; 
(e. g. from within the work 
in short, never completely 
both social and technical 
reasons. 
Thus, the notion of technology as capital, here in 
part based on and derived f rom the social purpose of 
capitalist production, is an idea that rests on the 
stringency of Marx's assumptions or, in fact, on the 
extreme abstraction (and some would argue, 
simplicity) of his theoretical constructs (e. g his 
model as found in Capital vol. I). We need to, in 
other words, keep this fact in mind that the 
connection I have proposed in this section between 
the notion of technology as capital and the dominant 
social purpose of capitalist production (profit, 
surplus-value) isq in my opiniong contingent on 
certain of Marxis theoretical constructs 
(particularly, his propositions on value and 
surplus-value) which are at the very least highly 
controversial. 
At any rate, since this study is concerned with 
Marx's conception of technology, from within his 
theoretical framework one thing is abundantly clear: 
the social purpose of capitalist production (i. e. 
the production of surplus value) comes to be 
expressed at the point of production technologically 
- that isq not simply according 
to the way 
production technology is used or employed, 
but as 
technology functions and because of its developed 
characteristics and structured properties. 
In this 
sense2 Marx refers to technology 
(and specifically 
machine technology) as a 
'moment' of capital. We now 
therefore need to examine this 
idea in Marx in part 
. Zc 
to see the way he constructs his conception of 
technology and also in order to see what other (and 
additional) propositions and arguments he provides 
on the notion of technology as capital. 
5. The Use-Value Character of Capital 
and Technology 
What I attempted to show in the previous section was 
that for Marx the fundamental social purpose of 
capitalist production comes to be expressed over and 
above the juridical and property relations - i. e. 
the ownership of the means of production, or the 
relationship established between commodity owners - 
within the process of production itself not simply 
through the control over the technical conditions of 
production, but in fact technologically - i. e. 
through the development (conception, design and 
construction) of technology itself. From this 
perspective, production technology in itself (by its 
designed propertiesý by its very character, as it 
were) becomes for Marx a 'moment' 
(or an "element") 
of capitalist relations of production. As such a 
'moment' technology is therefore more than a mere 
factor of production. The issue to be considered in 
this section is the way Marx conceptualizes the 
forging of technology as a "factor" of production as 
such and as a 
'moment' of capital. (74) 
As is well known and as I have already mentioned on 
a number of occasions, Marx 
defines "capital" as a 
social relation of production; 
but not howeverg in 
the words of Marx himself, as 
'a simple relation, 
but as a process, v in whose various moments 
it is 
always capital. 
'(75) And as suchp capital therefore 
has, according to Marx, 
'a double character, since 
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it consists of commodities' . (76) It is important 
therefore to recognize this 'double character' of 
capital in conjunction with its systemic nature as a 
social relation of production. It is also of great 
significance for the understanding of Marx's 
conception of technology under capitalism. 
This 'double character' is explained by Marx as 
follows: 'l. Exchange-value (money); but (as] self- 
expanding value, value which - because it is value - 
creates value, grows as value, receives an 
increment. This [growth] resolves itself into the 
exchange of a given quantity of materialized labour 
[i. e. money-RR] for a greater quantity of living 
labour. ' This self-expansion of value is, however, 
dependent on capital's other character as: '2. Use- 
value; ' and here it [capital-RR] shows itself through 
its specific relation in the labour-process. But 
precisely here it is no longer merely material of 
labour and means of labour [my emphasis-RR] to which 
belongs labour, which have absorbed labour, but 
along with labour also the , 
social combinations and 
the development of the means of labour corresponding 
[my emphases-RRI to these social combinations. 
Capitalist production first develops on a large 
scale - tearing them away from the individual 
independent labourer - both the objective and the 
subjective conditions of the labour-process, but it 
devýtýs them as powers [my emphasis-RR] dominating 
the individual labourer and extraneous to him. '(77) 
What Marx is, in other words, saying h( 
the "use-value" character of capital, as 
labourg or technologies, is not 
accidentalq or a 
"naturally" given 
characterp but, on the contrary, 
it 
are is that, 
in means of 
something 
or evolved' 
is in fact 
lot 
developed to corres[)ond to the changed form of 
social combination. That, moreover, this "use-value" 
character, or, what is the same, the qualitative 
aspect of rneans of labour in their 'specific 
relations in the labour-process', becomes itself 
(technologically) ,a force compelling surplus- 
labour'(78) - surplus labour being, for Marx, the 
substance of surplus-value, and hence the sole basis 
of the growth of value, or capital as self-expanding 
value, i. e. the other character of capital. 
When therefore some of Marx's followers, as for 
example with Braverman(79), rightly point out and 
criticise the "fetishistic" manner in which some 
observers of the technological phenomenon under 
capitalism (for example Jacques Ellul as perhaps one 
of the most outstanding representatives of such 
writers (80)) have come to, as Braverman puts it, 
'attribute to machinery the powers over humanity 
which arise in fact from social relations'(81); 
they, nevertheless, seem to themselves ignore the 
use-value character of capital which is highly 
significant for an understanding of Marx's 
conception of technology under capitalism. (I shall 
come to Braverman's view of Marx on technology later 
in this chapter. ) 
When we take into account the use-value character of 
capital, we see that, for Marx unlike for some of 
his followers, the exigencies of capital cannot be 
disentangled or separated (except purely in the 
abstract) from those of the existing and functioning 
technological system. Within the process of 
production capital's "needs" become translated and 
transformed into technical "needs" of production - 
just as we have, according to Marx, a metamorphosis 
. 
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of value (money) into use-values (objects), both are 
different aspects of one and the same process, and 
both are essential for the self-expansion of value 
at the end of the process of production. What are, 
therefore, often called "technical needs" of 
production are inseparable from the socio-economic 
exigencies of capital. For production technology, as 
a functioning and not as an abstract "object", is, 
what Marx would call, a moment of capital. 
However, the reference by Marx to the means of 
labour (technologies) as use-value character of 
capital is not a reference to the "purely" material 
determination of these as 'things' - i. e. it is not 
a reference to 'the material existence of these 
means of production as means of production' (82). 
Technology as such a use-value moment of capital has 
a 'categorical determinateness'(83) as a use-value. 
In other words, technology is still certainly a 
means of labour as ever before, as it is also, self- 
evidently, a product of labour and hence a use- 
value; but now it has a quality (a use-value form) 
which 'is no longer merely ... means of labour to 
which belongs labour'. (84) Now the quality (the 
structural features and the functional principles) 
of production technology as a use-value moment of 
capital must enable it to function and be used, in 
the words of Marx, as a '. means for the exploitation 
of labour', as a 'means of appropriating surplus- 
labour, and hence confront labour as powers 
belonging to capital. '(85) 
The 'determinate social character of the means of 
production in capitalist production - expressing a 
particular production relation.. '(86) - i. e. the 
social form of production technology in the 
2-olf 
capitalist production process (hence as a use-value 
moment of capital) -I would suggest, only appears 
to be extinguished, or to seemingly become something 
"purely technical" (a mere "factor") and common to 
all forms of production. It therefore appears (and 
this is the way Braverman, mistakenly in my view as 
we shall see later on, seems to consider the issue 
of technology) that capital (the capitalist) is 
to merely" using (or employing) the technical 
peculiarities of, for example, machinery 'for its 
own end' and that capital's requirements of 
to efficiency" are not integrated into the very design 
of technology, or are somehow distinct from 
'technique' as such. (87) But for Marx the social 
form, or the formal character of technology, is not 
in fact extinguished even within the capitalist 
production process. As he remarks, after his 
analysis of the 'material moment' of capitalist 
production process: 'It will be seen, ' he thus 
writes, 'that even within the production process 
itself this extinguishing_of the formal character is 
merely a semblance [my emphasis here-RR]. '(88) 
Technology, whether simple or complex as in the case 
of "the machine", is not simply, as Braverman (in 
his interpretation of Marx) remarks, a 'mere product 
of human labour and ingenuity, designed and 
constructed by humans and alterable by them at 
will.. '(89) The machine, according to my 
interpretation of Marx, is a product of social 
relations, specifically that of capitalist 
relations. It is not "human" labour in general or 
abstract which has created, designed, and 
constructed the machine; the machine, on the 
contrary, is the product of a socio-historically 
developed form of "human" labour - i. e. it is a 
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product of intellecti-ial and manual wage-labour hired 
by and under the overall control and direction of 
the capitalist as the subject of the process of 
objectification (the process of production). 
At any rate, when t1arx speaks of the use-value 
character of capital (i. e. the means of production 
within the capitalist process of production), he is 
not simply referring to "pure" technique and the 
mere "materiality" of production technology in 
abstraction from value-form. If according to Marx, 
capital 'as a form consists not of objects of labour 
and labour, but rather of values'(90), this does not 
mean that for Marx tl-ie form or value character of 
"objects" posited within the production process is 
simply discarded. But that the form or value 
character of, say, technology, manifests itself 
through the mediating "materiality" by means of 
which capital can realize itself: Value enters as 
subject. Labour is purposeful activity, and the 
material side therefore j2resupposes that the 
instrument of labour has really been used as means 
to an end.. '(91) rhat 'end' is the creation of 'a 
higher exchange value'(92), or what Marx more 
strictly calls 'self-realization' of capital, which, 
for him, 'includes preservation of the prior value 
[i. e. the preservation of the value of means of 
production, production technology, etc., as inputs- 
RR], as well as its inultiplication. '(93) 
For Marx, thereforeq the productive consumption of 
technology as use-value neither means the absence 
of the value-form of technology, nor that its being 
a use-value is not determined by exchange-value. In 
fact according to him, 'the use value here is itself 
determined by exchange value. ' And thus, Marx 
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remarks: 'In no moment of the production process does 
capital cease to be capital or value to be 
value.. '(94) 
Thus, to conclude this section, as it can be seen, 
for Marx, production technology (and other factors 
of pr-oduction) enter the production process as 
value. Technology therefore cannot simply be viewed 
as a material/technical object, pure and simpleg or 
as a mere "factor" of production as such. What must 
be taken into account is its quality, or use-value 
form or character, which corresponds to the 
prevailing social conditions of production. A use- 
value character which changes as the social 
conditions of the self-realization of capital 
changes. In simple terms, the quality of production 
technology both determines as it also must respect 
what is often called the "market" situationg or more 
precisely, of competition (the interaction of "many 
capitals"). Here, therefore, it is not merely how a 
"machine" is used, but how it is designed to 
function under the given social condition of the 
process of self-realization of capitals 
To clarify this Marx gives a simple example which 
demonstrates the point neatly: 'If a self-acting mule 
is the implement in general use for spinning, it 
would be absurd to supply the spinner with a distaff 
and spinning wheeloee Otherwise the spinner would be 
found to spend more time in producing a pound of 
yarn than is socially necessary, in which case the 
excess of time would create neither value nor 
money. '(95)In other words, the "self-acting mule" as 
a form of technology for spinning is not only a 
"factor" of production in the process of producing 
yarn, but it is (or at least was at the time that it 
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functioned and was used as such a technology) also a 
socially necessary moment of capital. It iis as such 
a moment that this technology (rather than 'distaff 
and spinning wheel') enables the self-expansion of 
value. Thus, although both the "self-acting mule" 
and the "spinning wheel" are means of labour, use- 
values in, or "factors" of, production, the 
qualitative change (the change and distinction in 
the use-value character) of the technologies becomes 
highly significant, for Marx, to their role and 
functioning as capital - i. e. as a moment or as a 
use-value character of capital, 
Technology as capital, therefore, signifies not so 
much a transition, but as a movement in which 
capital transposes itself, and in this alteration of 
form posited by itself within the production process 
capital remains what it is. The notion of technology 
as capital refers to the concatenation of socio- 
economic forces and constraints that in objectified 
form (i. e. technologically) discipline living labour 
as if they are an externally imposed power (thus, as 
an alien power). 
It could be objected, however, that Marx's 
connection between the "use-value" character and the 
"value-form" of capital seems to be at odds with, 
for example, one of his own statement that appears 
in A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Econota (1859), which goes as follows: 'To be a use- 
value is evidently a necessary prerequisite of the 
commodity, but it is immaterial to the use-value 
whether it is a commodity. Use-value as such, since 
it is independent of the determinate economic form, 
lies outside the sphere of investigation of 
political economy. '(96) The sentence underlined in 
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this passage, then, appears to contradict the 
discussion presented in this section. Itj moreover, 
seems to support the interpretation of commentators 
such as Braverman, that technology as a use-value 
being used (utilized) in the production process is 
regarded by Marx as being 'independent of the 
determinate economic form' - i. e. independent of 
capital as that form or independent of value- 
form. (97) 
It is interesting also, by the way, to note here, 
that Sweezy, who was a close collaborator of 
Braverman and whose theory of monopoly capital the 
latter attempts to further develop in his Labor and 
Monopoly Capital, has this to say on this very 
point: 'Marx, ' Sweezy claims, 'excluded use- 
value... from the field of investigation of political 
economy on the grounds that it does not directly 
embody a social relation... '(98) 
We have thus a problem of interpretation of this 
question of the connection between use-value and 
value-form, which is, of course, quite relevant to 
the issue of technology and to Marx's 
conceptualization of its role, character and 
function within the capitalist production process. 
For, if Sweezy, Braverman, etc., are right that Marx 
did not think that 'use-value', hence in our case 
production technology as it functions, 'directly 
embody a social relation', then my interpretation of 
Marx based on the notion of technology as capital is 
wrong or thatq at best, there must be a discrepancy 
in Marx's thoughts on this issue. 
We therefore need to very briefly look at this 
problem, but only to the extent that it is relevant 
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to the thesis of this study. And it must be stated 
here at the outset that although I shall here 
attempt to provide some grounds (as found in Marx) 
in support of my interpretation, this attempt does 
not eliminate many difficulties and discrepancies 
one finds in Marx's writings on the question of use- 
value/value-form. Marx of course seems to have 
thought that he had correctly formulated the problem 
as found in classical political economy and indeed 
had succeeded in resolving it. But from the 
controversy still surrounding this issue it is clear 
that that is certainly not the case. 
In any case, as a first consideration what should be 
taken into account on this issue is the question of 
Marx's philosophy and methodology. Once again, these 
are problematic issues in Marx, an adequate 
discussion of which is obviously beyond the scope of 
this study. (99) For our case it is sufficient to 
state the point as follows: Marx following Hegel 
does not treat form (i. e. in our case the value-form 
as the social form of technology) as something 
external in relation to the content (i. e. in our 
case the use-value character of production 
technology as it functions and as is used). From 
this philosophical stance capital as the social 
form 'materializes itself' - if I may paraphrase 
Hegel'(Science of L)- and in technology as its 
use-value character gives 'itself self-identity and 
persistence. ' 
But, since we are here concerned with a dispute over 
the interpretation of Marx, even leaving aside this 
philosophical/methodological point of contention, we 
can point to Marx's statement criticising Adolph 
Wagner's misinterpretation of his views on use- 
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value: 'Only an obscurantist, ' Marx writes, 'who has 
not understood a word of Capital, can conclude: 
Because Marx, in a note to the first edition of 
C, overthrows all the German professorial 
twaddle on "use-value" in general, and refers 
readers who want to know something about actual use- 
value to "commercial guides", - therefore use-value 
does not play any role in his work. '(100)And in 
fact, as he further comments: 'with me use-value 
palys an important role completely different than 
[it did] in previous [political] economyt but that, 
nota bene, it only comes into the picture from the 
analysis of given economic forms9 not from helter- 
skelter quibbling over the concepts or words "use- 
value" and "value". '(101) In other wordst for Marxq 
it is not a question of looking at, sayý technology 
from its "purely" material aspect as use-value. It 
is, on the contrary, a way of conceptualization of 
technology specifically in relation to the social 
form of production (or as use-value character of 
capital). 
For Marx, it is not only essential to grasp "use- 
value" (whether of technology, or anything else) as 
I the mere objectification of human labour, as the 
expenditure of equal human labour-power... '(102) But 
also that this objectification takes place within a 
historically specific social relation. A use-value, 
then, is not the material elements of an object. It 
is 'an objective character of the 91 that is, 
according to Marx, I as a character which pertains to 
it materiallyý although this objectivity does not 
appear in its natural formo,, '(103) Marx's reference 
to the use-value is not to the nuts and bolts, the 
metal and the wood, of technology, so to speak. It 
is a reference to the characteristics of a 
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particular 'thing' as a production technology. But 
because technology has an objective character, this 
does not mean that its "use-value" thereby, for 
Marx, 'does not directly embody a social relation'. 
as Sweezy claims. 
Marx may of course be wrong on this point, but that 
is not the issue here. The issue is that Sweezy 
claims that according to Marx use-value does not 
embody a social relation. It is this interpretation 
which I submit is unwarranted. Indeed, in the 
passage from Contribution (1859) quoted above (only 
one sentence of which is also quoted by Sweezy), 
Marx actually goes on to state that: 'It [i. e. use- 
value -RR] belongs in this sphere [i. e. 0f 
investigation of political economy -RR1 only when it 
is a determinate form itself. '(104) (Sweezy does not 
either refer to or quote this latter sentence. ) 
According to Marx, then, and finallyp use-value as 
the objective character of a 'thing', is itself a 
determinate f orm. Applying this to the issue of 
technology under capitalising one can say that: 
technology as a use-value (an object of utility, a 
mediatory object, a means of labour) is itself in 
its objectivity a determinate form, The use-value 
character does not therefore simply refer to the 
materiality of the 'thing' as such 
(the wood, the 
metal, etc. ) as opposed to, or as separate from, the 
social, or in the sense that it does not embody a 
social relation. It is in fact a reference to an 
objective moment of capital as a social relation of 
production. It is only this latter relation that 
gives technology as a use-value its determinate 
form. 
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6. The Production of "Relative Surplus-Value" 
and Techn 
In this section I shall be looking at Marx's 
explanation of what he regards as the immanent 
inclination and constant tendency of capital to 
heighten the productivity of labour by means of the 
transformation of the form, quality and structure of 
production technology; the change in the use-value 
character of technology as a moment of capital. 
If, as we have seen, at least according to my 
interpretation of Marx, technology is not only a 
"factor" of production, but at the same time also a 
moment of capital, then its form, quality and 
structure should both express and reflect the needs 
of capital as self-expanding value. And we have seen, 
if only briefly, that for Marx (rightly or wrongly) 
this expansion of value is achieved through the 
process of creation of surplus-value ("profit"). 
But, according to Marx, 'as soon as we deal with the 
process of production from the point of view of the 
process of creation of surplus-value', then 
production technology is 'at once changed into means 
for the absorption of the labour of others. '(105) 
This is a change, however, in the role of production 
technology; from being a productive force being 
utilized by the labourer or as the material element 
'of his productive activity' (as a means of labour), 
it is transformed into a power which consumes living 
labour-power 'as the ferment necessary to [its] own 
life-processq and the life-process of capital [which] 
consists only in its movement as value constantly 
expandingg constantly multiplying itself. '(106) 
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This change of role is expressed through the 'simple 
transformation of money into the material factors of 
the process of production, into means of production, 
[which] transforms the latter into a title and a 
right to the labour and surplus-labour of 
others. '(107) What this transformation signifies is, 
what is often referred to as, the "f ormal" 
subordination of labour. That is, while the role of 
technology is changed immediately as a result of the 
llf ormal" subordination of labour (or 'formal 
subsumption'), its form, quality and structure have 
not been as yet transformed: 'At first2' Marx remarksg 
'capital subordinates labour on the basis of the 
technical conditions in which it historically finds 
it. '(108) 
However, capital's 'movement as value constantly 
expanding.. itself I (i. e. the character of capital 9 
mentioned in the previous sectiong as self-expanding 
value) 'is impossible without an increase in the 
productiveness of labour. '(109) But to achieve this, 
Marx asserts that: 'The technical and social 
conditions of the [labour] process, and consequently 
the very mode of production must be revolutionised, 
before the productiveness of labour can be 
increased. '(110) In other words, not only the 
organization of labour, but the form, quality and 
structure of technologies of production need to be 
revolutionised. Marx captures this need for 
revolutions in technology and technique by what he 
calls the production of relative surplus-value. 
For Marx a fundamental feature of the capitalist mode 
of'production is the production of relative surplus- 
value. Although, as mentioned before, I am not in 
this study concerned with the validity or otherwise 
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of Marx's theory of surplus-value, what is certainly 
unquestionable is the significance of the concept 
(particularly in the form of relative surplus-value) 
for Marx's conception of technology under capitalism. 
We therefore need to, if only very briefly, see what 
the concept of relative surplus-value meant for Marx, 
and in what way it ties in with his views on 
technology. 
According to Marx's theory, the working-day - or the 
total time a worker is actually active in a 
production process (or the labour-time) - is made up 
of two portions: One part represents what Marx calls 
necessary labour-time, which is simply the time taken 
during the production process for the worker to 
reproduce the equivalent of the value of his/her 
labour-power (or loosely and in terms of money, 
his/her "wages"). The other part is simply the amount 
of time spent by the worker over and above what is 
necessary to reproduce that value (or his/her 
"wages" (111)) , which Marx calls surplus 
labour-time 
(it is this latter which is, for Marx, the substance 
of profit, interest, rent, etc. ). 
There is, however, a great deal of controversy over 
this "division", for in actuality, and according to 
Marx himself, there is no separation, in time or 
space, between these two components of the working- 
day. In other words, the worker is paid for the whole 
of the working-day, the duration of which is not 
divided or separated, but continuous (e. g. eight 
hours of labour for go much wages, according to a 
contractual agreement). Nor is the quantity of 
products produced at the end of that time, which 
belongs to the capitalist in total, physically 
divided up into a "necessary" and a "surplus" 
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portion. Although Marx, of course, does produce 
detailed arguments to support his, what is sometimes 
called "abstract", division of labour-time. But 
whatever the merits of his arguments it is not an 
issue which concerns us here. 
The essential point here - not withstanding or 
underestimating the problems and difficulties 
involved - is that according to Marx's theory, the 
relatio between the two component parts of the 
working-day, and the proportional "division" of 
labour-time into necessary and surplus, are not 
either socially or naturally fixed* Although one part 
can be held constant while the other portion can be 
altered, it is also the case that a change of 
magnitude in one, obviously, affects a change in the 
other portion. Thus, for example, if necessary 
labour-time is reduced, then ipso facto there must be 
an increase in surplus labour-time (and, of course, 
the reverse also holds). And since, for Marx, surplus 
labour is the substance of surplus value - and as he 
writes, 'surplus value is always equal to the 
relation between the whole working day and that part 
of the working day necessary to keep the worker 
alive'(112) - and since, according to him, surplus 
value is the prime motive of capitalist production, 
it therefore follows that what the capitalist is 
interested in is the greatest possible increase of 
surplus labour-time. 
The increase in surplus labour-time, and hence of 
surplus value, can be effected, according to Marx, in 
two basic ways; either by means of the prolongation 
of the working-day itself - though not exclusive, 
this is generally the main characteristic feature of 
early capitalism - in that while total labour-time 
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increases absolutely, necessary labour-time remains 
constant. (113) There is, therefore, an absolute 
increase of surplus value, which neither requires nor 
involves any change in either the techniques or 
technologies of production. This increase, which Marx 
calls the production of absolute surplus-value, is 
simply due to the extension of the duration of the 
working-day. 
Although a simple method, this way of increasing 
surplus value has its limits and cannot be carried on 
indefinitely. The first obvious limit is the physical 
one; though the proportional division of the working- 
day is not fixed, the working-day itself has a 
naturally impassable limit - it cannot obviously 
exceed, for any individual labourer, 24 hours of 
labour. But then no human being can work for long the 
full 24 hours. It has therefore a second limit which 
is physiological; i. e. "over-long" hours of labour 
leads to deterioration in health, etc. And this 
brings us to the third limit, which is social; over- 
long hours of labour results in an increase in the 
intensity and extent of social struggles by the 
working class over the duration of the working-dayg 
and, moreover, the deterioration in health and/or 
other drawbacks of long hours of labour tend to 
have, 
at one point or anotherp a negative effect 
(both in 
terms of quality and efficiency) upon production. 
Thus not only because of the pressure of the working 
class, but also because of the 
interest of 
capitalists themselves, the duration of the working- 
day comes to be socially (and legally) fixed 
(hence, 
the Ten Hours Billý and subsequently, for exampleg a 
socially fixed period of 8 hours, etc. 
) 
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Given these limits mentioned, the alternative method 
is to bring about a change in the ratio of necessary 
to surplus labour-time; or to reduce necessary 
labour-time, thereby increasing surplus labour-time 
relatively. Marx called this method the production of 
relative surplus-value. (114) This can be achieved 
either by the reduction of the quantity of "goods" 
(use-values) the labourer requires and consumes, or 
by the reduction of the 
_time 
socially necessary to 
produce the same amount of "goods". The former method 
has its limits, having basically similar effects 
(both social and physiological) as to the 
prolongation of the working-day, and has a negative 
effect on the expansion of the "market", on demand, 
and hence on economic growth. But the latter method 
(altho. ugh it has an ultimate limitt which we do not 
need to go into) encounters neither the social nor 
the physiological limits mentioned. By reducing the 
time socially necessary to produce the quantity of 
"goods" workers require and consume, what is 
effectively achieved is a reduction in the value of 
labour-power, without necessarily reducing wages (in 
fact the latter can increase, so long as it is as a 
result of a decrease in necessary labour-time - 
increase of productivity)* 
However, as llarx writes: 'Such a fall in the value of 
labour-power implies.. that the same necessaries of 
life which wn-re formerly produced in ten hours, can 
now be produced in nine hours. But this is impossible 
without an increase in the productiveness of labour. 
For example, suppose a shoemaker, with given tools, 
makes in one working-day of twelve hours, one pair of 
boots. If he must make two pairs in the same time, 
the productiveness of his labour must be doubled; and 
this cannot be done, except by an alteration in his 
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tools or in his inode of working_, or in both. Hence, 
the conditions of production, i. e., his mode of 
production, and the labour-process itself, must be 
revolutionized. '(115) 
Thusq in conclusion: By the alteration of technology 
and techniques (and progressively) it becomes 
possible to have a fixed or constant, or in fact a 
shorter, working-day and yet produce the same or 
greater quantity of commodities. By changing the 
form, quality and structure of production technology 
- as for example instead of the "spinning wheel", 
applying the "self-acting mule", to give one of 
Marx's favourite examples - it becomes possible to 
curtail necessary labour-time technologically, and 
the increase of surplus labour-time thereby achieved 
appears to be due not to the social relations of 
capitalist production as such, but "simply" a result 
of the changed technical conditions of production 
itself. 
But what has in effect happened is that through the 
alteration of production technology (and technique) 
the social aspect of capital becomes fused with the 
technical aspect of production. What is socio- 
economically required (the reduction of necessary 
labour-time) is then translated into the 
technological framework of production. By design and 
development, the form and quality of technology comes 
to incorporate the social needs of capital. And, 
moreovert the form and quality of technology must be 
progressively altered, as every improvement and 
modification of technology, when generalized due to 
the mechanism of competition, brings forth a new 
standard or social norm of productivity, or a new 
"level" of sociallynecessary labour-time. 
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Thus, according to Marx, as the 'extra surplus-value 
[profit-RRI vanishes, so soon as the new method of 
production has become general, and has consequently 
caused the difference between the individual value of 
the cheapened commodity and its social value to 
vanish'(116), the form of technology and techniques 
need to be changed, improved or modified so as to 
increase surplus value (profit) once again, by 
reduci ng necessary labour-time below its now new 
social "level". 
These ideas are directly related to Marx's conception 
of technological change, which I shall discuss and 
examine in the next, and final, chapter of this 
study. Here I would merely point out that Marx's 
theory of relative surplus-value does not (nor 
perhaps was it intended to) cover the complexity of 
the process of technological development and change. 
The problem is that while in theory Marx's ideas on 
the relation between the production of relative 
surplus-value and the progressive qualitative advance 
of technology appears quite simple and attractive, it 
is, however, as an accurate reflection of the reality 
of capitalist development of technology, flawed in 
many respects. One major objection, I would suggest, 
is that it fails to take account of the time gap that 
exists between the design and development of 
technology and its actual application at the point of 
production. A few other objections directly connected 
to the latter can also be mentioned here: 
From Marx's basic 
capitalists can at 
technology they deem 
market. That, howeve 
(and as a rule it is 
propositions it appears that 
any time find the particular 
to be most "efficient" on the 
r, may or may not be the case 
perhaps unlikely that it is the 
case). Insofar as the design and development of 
technology is concerned, Marx seems to me to ignore 
the fact of protective measures that restrict the 
availability of new technology (at least for some 
time); any capitalist worth his name would attempt to 
protect a new invention (e. g. by patent and/or other 
means) in order to safeguard what advantage it 
provides him/her in the battle of competition. True 
that aspects of this are covered by Marx, but there 
is no substantive analysis of the issue. 
And thus, finally, in my opinion, Marx does not, 
beyond some precocious and suggestive observations 
and hints, adequately deal with the complex linkage 
between the two main features of what is involved in 
the transformation of the material conditions of 
capital production; namely, the link between 
revolution in and diffusion (generalization) of 
technology. That is, on the one hand, the improvement 
and development of technology andq on the other, the 
process of adoption, practical application, on the 
basis of what may be considered at any given time to 
be the best practice technology. 
What is, nevertheless, significant about Marx's 
observations with respect to the production of 
relative surplus-value, is not merely that Marx, 
unlike many of his contemporary (and even later) 
social theorists, places technology at the centre of 
his theoretical systemg but that he poses and 
attempts to provide some theoretical grounds for the 
basic question concerning the nature and changes in 
the quality (character and properties) of technology 
and the way these changes relate to capital's 
domination of labour. Granted that there are 
weaknesses in his proposition on relative surplus- 
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value; that many issues are not considered and many 
observations are tossed out without further 
development. But for all that, I suggest, his 
insights are important enough to be considered, at 
the very least, as as tart ing point for a 
sociological examination of the present-day's vastly 
more complex technological reality. 
At any rate, what is certain is that, for Marx, it is 
the method of production of relative surplus-value 
which underpins the very dynamic nature of the 
capitalist mode of production, and explains the root 
cause of the constant revolutions in technology (and 
technique). Herein also lies, therefore, the reason 
for the significance Marx attaches to the 
tetchnological phenomenon under capitalism - and not 
merely in how technology is employed, but to the 
form, quality and structure of technology as a 
functional moment of capital. I. e. over and above the 
role of production technology, its ownership and 
employment by the capitalist, what is essential to 
the notion of technology as capital, which Marx also 
stresses, is the form, the physical/technical 
character of technology; the importance of the power 
of the material conditions in relation to labour: 
'Capital'9 Marx writesq 'is productive of value only 
as a relationg in so far as it is a coercive force on 
wage-labour, compelling it to perform surplus-labour, 
or spurring on the productive power of labour to 
produce relative surplus-value. In both cases it only 
produces value as the power of labour's own material 
conditions over labour when these are alienated from 
labour.. '(117) 
In what way does Marx explain his proposition that 
'labour's own material conditions'q particularly 
technologies and technological systems, become a 
'coercive force' which compel the labourer 'to 
perform surplus-labour'? The explanation he provides 
is given by means of a general analysis of the method 
of labour organization and technique of production 
which are developed under capitalism as a consequence 
of the drive for surplus-value, and which, for Marx, 
form the basis for the development machine industrial 
technology and hence the transformation of production 
technology into capital. 
7. From CO-02eration and Manufacture to Machinery: 
The Development of Capitalist Technology 
I had mentioned previously that for Marx with the 
capitalist mode of production and the estrangement 
(alienation) of labour (or wage-labour), purposeful, 
conscious productive activity comes to be divorced 
from the labourer and becomes a function of the 
capitalist. This means that in the case of the 
"choice" of technology and technique - that is, 
whether or not these are of the "right" quality, and 
are therefore, at least, consistent with the given 
socially necessary standard of productivity - it is 
the capitalist who is responsible and must make the 
relevant decisions. And Marx seems to have this point 
in mind when he writes: 'But whether the material 
factors of the process are of normal quality or not 
[i. e. according to the prevailing social norm -RR], 
depends not upon the labourer, but entirely upon the 
capitalist. '(118) 
We have also seen that although the decisions 
(e. g. 
the "choice" of technology) are individually made 
by 
the capitalist owners 
(or the management, etc. ) of 
particular units of production, 
they are, for Marx, 
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socially conditioned and systemically enforced 
(through the mechanism of competition and, at a 
deeper level, because of the competition or struggle 
between capitalists and workers). The subject that I 
am concerned with in this section is how Marx 
theoretically examines the results of these 
"decisions", and how he explains the process from 
"co-operation" and "manufacture", and on that basis 
the rise of machinery and modern industry - i. e. the 
development of the specifically capitalist 
technological structure of production. In other 
words, we need to look into Marx's views on the 
organization of labour at the point of production as 
a first step in his discussion and explanation of the 
socio-technical transformation of production 
technology from being merely "means of labour" into 
means for the exploitation, control and domination of 
labour, into a master of labour, into capital 
(technology as capital). 
It should be noted here, before we proceed to the 
main subject matter of this section, that for reasons 
of space and because the subject has already been 
quite widely and adequately covered by others (e. g. 
Braverman, among many others), we cannot present a 
full discussion of Marx on of co-operation", 
"manufacture"g etc - we shall only give a synoptic 
view of the main, and relevant, points. 
CO-02eration(119): Ti-ie first point of significance for 
Marx as regards the method of production is the human 
basis of capitalist production, and the quantitative 
character, i. e. the relatively larger number of 
labourers employed by each individual capital, which 
distinguishes the capitalist method from previous 
ones. (120) At first, therefore, the technological 
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structure of production is basically unaffected. The 
instruments, tools and implements, developed under 
previous social conditions, are simply employed. The 
principles of the techniques of production are also 
inherited, with the important exception of the 
quantitative increase of labourers. Therefore, with 
regard to the actual 'mode of production itself, ' 
Marx comments, 'manufacture, in its strict meaning, 
is hardly to be distinguished, in its earliest 
stages, froin the handicraft trades of the guilds, 
otherwise than by the greater number of workmen 
simultaneously employed by one and the same 
individual capital. The workshop of the mediaeval 
master handicraftsman is simply enlarged. '(121) 
However, despite the fact that the technological 
structure has not changed, the quantitative increase 
of labour has a number of important effects which 
become, cumulatively and progressively, a significant 
force in the transformation of technology and 
techniques: 'Even without an alteration in the system 
of working, ' according to Marx, 'the simultaneous 
employment of a large number of labourers effects a 
revolution in the material conditions of the labour- 
process. '(122) 
With the employment of a larger number of labourers 
comes the need for larger buildings as workshops, for 
storage of raw materials as well as end products, 
better transportation facilities to enable relatively 
larger carriage of goods, and so on. Therefore, what 
Marx calls, the "instrumental conditions", or what 
can be called the technological infrastructure, begin 
to change. And the change should be considered not 
simply in terms of individual or isolated cases, but 
towards the consolidation of technological networks 
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and the establishment of an infrastructural 
(technologi cal) system. 
Now as to the qualitative transformation of 
technique: With the simultaneous employment of a 
large number of labourers under one roof - with co- 
operation - not only the method of organization of 
labour, not only the method of the configuration of 
the various distinct operations involved, but also, 
therefore, the methods of co-ordination and 
supervision are affected and begin to change. Though 
the change in such techniques of production appears 
at first at a simple and basic level, nonetheless, it 
is an important change in the form and quality of the 
social combination and structure of the labour 
process, which transforms the latter into a 
capitalist labour-process. 
According to Marx, therefore, by 'the co-operation of 
numerous wage-labourers, the sway of capital develops 
into a requisite for carrying on the labour-process 
itself, into a real requisite of production. '(123) In 
other words, simply because co-operation is 
established by the hiring of labourers as wage- 
labourers, the capitalist's role becomes not merely 
something socially imposed from the outside, external 
to the process, but, on the contrary, as a necessary 
functional aspect of production as such: 'That a 
capitalist should command on the field of production, 
is now as indispensable as that a general should 
command on the field of battle. '(124) The capitalist 
thus becomes the subject of the process of 
nbiectification - or. as Marx Puts it: 'Once a 
function of capital, it acquires special 
characteristics. '(125) 
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That is to say that, the technique of co-ordination 
and supervision - which is a common feature of any 
form of co-operation - when it becomes a method of 
directing combined wage-labour changes and acquires a 
new form and a distinct quality. There is a fusion of 
technique and what is a form of social authority; or 
social authority over production becomes incorporated 
into the technique of co-operative production (the 
technique of "management"), which, therefore, 
expresses that form of authority as a necessary 
technical function of production itself - i. e. as a 
form of control. (126) And, for Marx, the control of 
the capitalist is two-fold 'in substance'(127); i. e. 
technical and social. (128) 
Co-operation, however, particularly as it develops, 
generates the need for a form of organization of 
direct labour which allows capital's social control 
to be expressed technically and organizationally. The 
technical form of organization of direct labour (of 
the workshop) becomes hierarchical, or what Max 
Weber came to identify more accurately (although 
later and in the context of the general and more 
developed forms of social organization under 
capitalism) as the "rational bureaucratic" form of 
organization. (129) 
To sum up so far: Co-operation, as Marx himself 
repeatedly statedq is, one could say, as old as human 
society. The control (co-ordination, supervision) of 
large-scale co-operation of labour - what Lewis 
Mumford calls 'human mega-machines'(130) - again as 
Marx himself points out, well precedes the rise of 
the capitalist. What is crucial for Marx, therefore, 
is the development of the socio-technical method that 
enables the control or management of 
"free" labour, 
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Indeed, as Pollard mentions: 'Like the generals of 
old, they [the early capitalists -RRI had to control 
numerous men, but without powers of 
compulsion: indeed, the absence of legal enforcement 
of unfree work was not only one of the marked 
characteristics of the new capitalism, but one of its 
most seminal ideas. '(131) 
However, having surveyed Marx's views on "co- 
operation", it is important to note here that he has 
little to say on the particular and actual 
operational techniques of supervision and of control 
and management of labour. That the capitalist has 
the authority, that he is in overall control, tells 
us nothing about how in practice he/she (or his/her 
"agent") controls the performance of labour. Marx is 
far more concerned with the general socio-economic 
explanation of "co-operation", than with the strictly 
technical aspects of its application. 
What is in fact involved here is, essentially, the 
development of ways and means of labour discipline. 
The question, which Marx at this stage hints at but 
does not develop in relation to what he calls the 
capitalist form of co-operation, is how the 
"subjective" element of production (living labour) 
came to be shaped so that it at once respected the 
twin objectives of "cost constraints" ("capital 
accounting"g etc. ) and the presupposition of "free" 
labour, the performance of labour on a voluntary 
contractual basis. The development and transformation 
of technology, as we shall see, is for Marx linked to 
this very problem of the social struggle for the 
shaping and control, or management, of labour. 
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Manufacture: We have seen that for Marx the 
capitalist form of co-operation and the technique of 
organizing work is not due to the development of 
technology, but essentially due to a transformation 
of social combination and conditions of production. 
We have also seen that, according to Marx, with co- 
operation the organizational structure of the 
labour-process begins to change. Combined "free" 
wage-labour requires constant supervision, and 
herein lies the rudimentary beginnings of the 
technical need for management and a hierarchical 
structure of supervision which combines the 
technical functions of direct and immediate co- 
ordination with the social function of maintaining 
and reinforcing the authority of the capitalist (or 
what Marx often called the 'despotism'(132) of 
capital). 
With capitalist co-operation and the manner that 
work is organized and controlled, therefore, we have 
the beginnings of the development of a specific form 
of division of labour within the structure of the 
production process itself. And, according to Marx, 
this division of labour, 'assumes its typical form 
in manufacture, and is the prevalent characteristic 
form of the capitalist process of production 
throughout the manufacturing period properly so 
called. '(133) 
Here I am basically 
"manufacture" as 
production. While 
inheritance of the 
forms of handicraft, 
the past forms of 
example of the devel 
concerned with Marx's views on 
a method and technique of 
this method involves the 
narrow technical basis of past 
it also results in a break with 
division of labour. A classic 
opment and transformation of the 
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division of labour under manufacture is that of the 
now famous "pin" making process. There is no need 
here to describe the process which Adam Smith gave 
in his The Wealth of Nations. The fundamental point 
is not only that it involved the separation of 
operations, but that these are performed by distinct 
hands, by different labourers. This process, 
therefore, involved not merely the breakdown of the 
labour-process, but the breakdown of labour itself 
into detail labour. 
Whatever the actual historical mode of its 
development, the main point for Marx is that 
manufacture is a technique of production that 
institutes a form of 'productive mechanism whose 
parts are human beings. '(134) That is, capitalist 
production begins not by transforming technology 
(the tools, implements, etc. ), which is simply 
inherited since such a development and 
transformation, according to Marx, as I have already 
mentioned previously, is a historical process and 
requires time and changes in the social conditions 
of production. Capitalist production in fact begins 
by transforming the direct producers, the labourers 
themselves, by means of techniques of organization 
and division of labour. 
It is, however, erroneous to conclude from this that 
Marx considered that capitalist production proper 
could become dominant, as we shall see later, 
without the transformation of production technology, 
or that, indeed, the form of the inherited 
technologies was unimportant in the determination of 
the technique of manufacture - which is our concern 
at this point. On the contrary, precisely because of 
the characteristics of the instruments of labour 
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inherited because of their simplicity and 
character as simple conductors of the labourer's 
activity, because the basic technologies of 
production are simply "means of labour" (in the 
sense explained in a previous section) and that 
functionally and techni 'the instrument itself 
is still .... intertwined with living labour.. '(135) - 
the technique and method of organizing the 
subjective "factor" of production is the only way to 
ensure an effective control over the use of the 
material conditions of production (the use of 
implements, raw materials, etc. ), and over the 
direct performance of labour. (136) 
But the technique of manufacture, which is based on 
the combination of 'specialized detail labourers' 
and their formation as a single collective unit of 
labour, or what Marx called, the 'collective 
labourer'(137), soon necessitates certain 
modifications in the already inherited tools and 
implements. The simple technologies of production 
being used need to be developed and changed as 
detailed functions and operations come up against 
certain difficulties as a 'consequence of the 
unchanged form of the implements' already at 
hand. (138) In other words, the technique of 
manufacture not only transforms the subjective 
"f actor" of production into a collectivity of 
'detail labourers', but by the institution of a form 
of division of labour based on specialized detailed 
labour transforms the technologies of production 
into a wide variety of specialized instruments. For 
Marx, thereforeq the specialization of labour and 
the specialization of instruments of labour become 
the characteristic feature of capitalist 
manufacture. (139) The technique of manufacture 
is 
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therefore crucial not only because it enables the 
enhancement of capital's control over labour (and 
because of specialization and the institution of the 
detailed division of labour it enhances the 
efficiency of the extraction of surplus labour), but 
also because it 'creates at the same time one of the 
material conditions for the existence of machinery, 
which consists of a combination of simple 
instruments. '(140) 
Nonetheless, however important is the technique of 
manufacture in economic and social terms, its 
principal limitation is, according to Marx, its 
'narrow technical -basis' - i. e. because of the fact 
that production based on the manufacturing method is 
utterly dependent upon the subjective "factor", upon 
the 'collective labourer'. Although the utilization 
of this method 'cripples' the individual labourerg 
although it generates a 'hierarchical gradation' of 
labour-powers, although it 'creates ... a simple 
separation of the labourers into skilled and 
unskilled', nevertheless9 according to Marx, 'the 
number of the unskilled labourers, owing to the 
preponderating influence of the skilled, remains 
very limited. '(141) 
While, therefore, with manufacture productivity and 
the power of capital increases, yet there is a 
tendency both for an increase in 'resistance' by the 
workers - particularly by 'the male labourers' and 
the more skilled - and for higher costs of skilled 
labour, longer apprenticeship, and, what is 
sometimes called, it restrictive practices", by 
certain groups of workers, of a rigid and sever 
regulation of recruitment and training in specific 
"craf ts" or trades. (142) Thus from within the 
production process itself, capital's control, 
according to Marx, comes constantly under the great 
pressure of workers' 'insubordination', and its 
dependence on the subjective "factor" of production 
increasingly limits its drive for greater growth, 
accumulation and profits. (143) 
However, manufacture itself had created both the 
social and material conditions for the overcoming of 
its own limited foundation - i. e. the specialized 
instruments and the workshops for the manufacture of 
these: 'One of its own finished creations, ' Marx goes 
on to point out, 'was the workshop for the 
production of the instruments of labour themselves, 
including especially the complicated mechanical 
appara. tus then already employed.. This workshop, the 
product of the division of labour in manufacture, 
produced in its turn - machines. It is they that 
sweep away the handicraftsman's work as the 
regulating principle of social production. Thus, on 
the one hand, the technical reason for the life-long 
annexation of the workman to a detail function is 
removed. On the other hand, the fetters that this 
same principle laid on the dominion of capital, fall 
away. '(144) 
As is evident from the above discussion, in his 
analysis of manufacture Marx tends to, implicitly, 
stress the idea of the "primacy" of the productive 
forces in the historical sense referred to in the 
first chapter of this study - i. e. the primacy and 
determination of productive forces as acquired 
forces. In particularl the instruments of labour 
(the tools and implements of handicraft), are simply 
taken over; yet they do have a certain determining, 
or conditioning, effect on the organization of 
labour. But such a determining effect is not viewed 
by Marx in a onesided manner. For as we have seeng 
with manufacture the instruments acquired begin to 
be transformed to suite the more specialised and 
particular operations now being carried on under the 
new organization of detailed labourers. 
We have also seen that despite the fact that with 
it co-operation" and 11manufacture" Marx refers to the 
'birth of capital' as a relation of production, he 
is concerned to point out that even under the 
manufacturing method capital has not as yet achieved 
its 'domination' within the production process 
itself, since it is still 'fettered' by the 
subjective factor, the skill and knowledge that 
belongs to labour. And despite the specialization of 
instruments, technology still had the basic socio- 
technical characteristic of a tool, or means of 
labour and not as yet that of capital - it was used 
by labour. This, however, changes according to Marx 
with the development of machinery. 
Machinery: The Specifically Capitalist Tech : We 
have seen that in the early beginnings of capitalist 
production, capital is decidedly concerned with the 
transformation of the subjective condition of 
production, and the alterations of tools and 
implements are merely the consequence of such a 
transformation. But the change of technique of 
organizing the performance of labour, dividing and 
sub-dividing labour and creating the detail 
labourerg at a certain stage, according to Marx, 
comes 'into conflict'(145) with the requirements of 
capital production and accumulation. The subjective 
principle of production becomes a barrier for the 
further growth of profits (or the further increase 
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of relative surplus-value), restricting capital's 
process of self-expansion. 
Capital is thus compelled by its relation to living 
labour(146), by the pressures from within the 
production process itself, to institute a radical 
transformation of the objective conditions of 
production - to revolutionize the technological 
basis of production. Thus Marx remarks: 'In 
manufacture, the revolution in the mode of 
production begins with the labour-power, in modern 
industry it begins with the instruments of 
labour. '(147) 
At first sight, and this is more particularly 
relevant to the early machinery, a machine appears 
as 'a complex tool' or simply a mere combination of 
tools (148); that is, a machine, when looked at from 
a "purely" technical perspective, appears as a 
"means of labour". However, for Marx, there is an 
'essential difference' between a tool as means of 
labour and a machine. (149) And the difference is 
both from an economic standpoint(150) and 
technologically in relation to human activity: 'On a 
closer examination of the working machine proper, we 
find in it, as a general rule, though often, no 
doubt, under very altered forms, the apparatus and 
tools used by the handicraftsman or manufacturing 
workman; with this difference, that instead of 
being 
human imj2 ements, they are mechanical 
implements. '(151) 
Two points are important here: Firstly, that Marx is 
concerned not with "the machine" in the abstract, 
but with the 'working' machine, i. e. production 
technology in the strict sense of a functi 
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object in relation to labour which involves not 
simply the displacement of power, but that of (a 
degree of) skill in the actual processing of, and 
the direct action of labour on, the material being 
worked upon. (152) (Aspects of this issue was 
discussed in an earlier section when I explored the 
definition of technology in Marx). Secondly, that 
the designed framework negates the characteristics 
of the tools incorporated as human implements; they 
are no longer means of labourg but means which are 
now technologically separated from labour: 'The 
machine proper is therefore a mechanism thatq after 
being set in motion, performs with its tools the 
same operations that were formerly done by the 
workman with similar tools. Whether the motive power 
is derived from mang or from some other machine, 
makes no difference in this respect. From the moment 
that 
-the 
tool proper is taken from man, and fitted 
into a mechanismy a machine takes the place of a 
mere implement. '(153) 
For Marx it is this technological separation of 
tools from the labourer - who have already been 
socia separated from the means of production - 
that lies at the heart of the "industrial 
revolution": 'The steam-engine itself, such as it was 
at its invention, during the manufacturing period at 
the close of the 17th century, and such as it 
continued. to be down to 1780, did not give rise to 
any industrial revolution. It was, on the contrary, 
the invention of machines that made a revolution in 
the form of steam-engines necessary. '(154) 
What is also crucial to mention here is that the 
social separation of labour from the means of 
productiong the commodification of labour-power, is 
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a presupposition; it is both historically and 
logically a necessary condition for the 
transformation of production technology. The 
transformation of labour into "free" wage-labour is 
the necessary antecedent of the process of 
industrial revolution. As Giddens remarks: 'It is of 
the first importance to see that the intersection of 
the commodification of exchange and of labour-power 
is what made industrialization possible, not the 
reverse. '(155) Thus, the industrial revolution 
placed this social separation upon a technological 
foundation, and specifically, at least for Marx, 
with the invention and development of machinery. 
The invention of the machine was a technological 
revolution which began the transformation of the 
form and character of production technology as a 
means of labour into technology as an objective 
("material" or rather technical) power over labour 
(or as Weber had put it, the machine as master of 
labour). It is this particular technological 
transformation that began the industrial revolution 
proper: 'The machine, which is the starting-point of 
the industrial revolution, supersedes the 
workman.. '(156) 
With the introduction of machinery, we have what 
appears, at first, to be a mere quantitative change 
in the process of production - an increase of output 
and scale of production. And the form of division of 
labour appears as before: 'Here we have again the co- 
operation by division of labour that characterizes 
Manufacture; only now, it is a combination of detail 
machines. '(157) However, although the technique of 
manufacture continues to furnish the organization of 
the production process, nevertheless 'an essential 
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difference at once manifests itself. '(158) There is 
in fact a qualitative transformation of the work 
process; it can no longer be regarded, strictly 
speaking, as a "labour" process as such. For while 
with manufacture every detailed operation and the 
whole process were 'previ-ously made suitable to the 
workman'(159), with machine production this is no 
longer the case. 
According to Marx therefore, production based on 
machinery has a qualitatively different 
characteristic to all previous forms of production 
processes in that it places the worker, as the 
subjective principle, on the side-lines. As he 
remarks: 'This subjective principle of the division 
of labour no longer exists in production by 
machinery. Here, the process as a whole is examined 
objectively, in itself that is to say, without 
regard to the question of its execution by human 
hands, it is analysed into its constituent phases; 
and the problem, how to execute each detail process, 
and bind them all into a whole, is solved by the aid 
of machines, chemistry, etc. 1(160) 
In practiceg of course, the full development of the 
factory system based on machineryq or what Marx 
called 'Modern Industry' - or technologically 
speakingt the system of mechanization - was a 
gradual process. For its development 
depended not 
only on the development of knowledge and 
'theory... perfected by accumulated experience on a 
large scale'(161)9 but also 'dependent on the growth 
of a class of workmen, who, owing to the almost 
artistic nature of their employment, could 
increase 
their numbers only gradually, and not by leaps and 
bounds. '(162) 
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The main stumbling-block for a more rapid advance of 
the system was that the production of machinery 
itself depended exclusively upon the work of 
craftsmen: 'Modern Industry was crippled in its 
complete development, so long as its characteristic 
instrument of production, the machine, owed its 
existence to personal strength and personal 
skill.. '(163) Thus, as Marx comments, 'apart from 
the dearness of the machines made in this way, a 
circumstance that is ever present to the mind of the 
capitalist'(164), the speed and volume of production 
would be limited, and this coupled with the cost 
factor restricts and reduces the rate of diffusion 
of machine technology. 
However, although the rate of diffusion was at first 
slow, 'at a certain stage of its development, Modern 
Industry became technologically incompatible with 
the basis furnished for it by handicraft and 
Manufacture. '(165) For as the system of machinery 
seized upon one process, branch, and sphere of 
production, it forced other, at first connected, 
processes, etc., to introduce the system. 
(166) And 
the technological revolution made possible by the 
development and application of machinery to 'the 
modes of production of industry and agriculture made 
necessary a revolution in the general conditions of 
the social process of production, i. e., in the means 
of communication and of transport. 
'(167) 
But as this radical change spreads 
(however slowly 
at first), there is a growth in the demand 
for more 
and better machines, for 
larger and more 
sophisticated mechanical devices. The consequence of 
this spread of the new technological revolution, 
according to Marx, is that: 
'Modern Industry had 
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therefore itself to take in hand the machine, its 
characteristic instrument of production, and to 
construct machines by machines. It was not till it 
did this, that it built up for itself a fitting 
technical foundation, and stood on its own 
feet. '(168) 
With this production of machines by machines capital 
thus institutes its social power upon an altogether 
objective foundation. And this initiates an 
irreversible process of transformation of the system 
of production technologies - it is a process that, 
according to Marx, makes technology, for the first 
time in human history, an objective manifestation of 
a social power within the production process itself, 
i. e. technology as capital: 'In Manufacture, the 
organization of the social labour-process is purely 
subjective; it is a combination of detail labourers; 
in its machinery system, Modern Industry has a 
productive organism that is purely objective, in 
which the labourer becomes a mere appendage to an 
already existing material condition of 
production. '(169) 
Before the application of machinery, particularly 
before the production of machines by machines, the 
material elements of the labour process - and in 
particular, the means of labour or technologies - 
'appeared', according to Marx, 'merely as the 
essential moments of the labour process itself , 
which capital appropriates. '(170) In other words, 
originally, in the early days of capitalism, 
production technology was not as yet in itself a 
moment of capital, but simply a material element 
taken over, as it existed, by capital. Before 
machineryý as Marx puts it, technology as capital's 
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'material side - or, its character as use value... - did not at all coincide with its formal side'(171), 
i. e. technology was not capitalist technology. 
However, with the development and application of 
machinery, and particularly with the establishment 
of what Marx calls 'an automatic system of 
machinýta' , the material and the formal sides for 
the first time coincide. The materiality of 
technology, its physical form and quality, its use- 
value character itself, is now a 'determinate form' 
(as already discussed in a previous section); that 
is, it becomes transformed to fit 'capital's 
specific character as form. ' And Marx states this, 
unambiguously, as follows: 
'In the machine, and even more in machinery as an 
automatic system, the use value, i. e. the material 
quality of the means of labour, is transformed into 
an existence adequate to fixed capital and to 
capital as such; and the form in which it was 
adopted into the production process of capital, the 
direct means of labour, is superseded by a forin 
posited by capital itself and corresponding to it. 
In no way does the machine appear as the individual 
worker's means of labour. Its distinguishing 
characteristic is not in the least, as with the 
means of labour, to transmit the worker's activity 
to the object; this activity, rather, is posited in 
such a way that it merely transmits the machine's 
work, the machine's actioný on to the raw material - 
supervises it and guards against intrupptions. '(172) 
It is in the properties (the technical structure and 
functional principles) of the machine that Marx 
recognizes its technologically adequate form of 
existence as capital (and not merely because it is 
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employed or used). Its properties constitute the 
objectification of the accumulated knowledge, skill, 
experience, and strength, of generations of 
intellectual and manual labour appropriated by 
capital: 'Not as with the instrument, which the 
worker animates and makes into his organ with his 
skill and strength, and whose handling therefore 
depends on his virtuosity. Rather, it is the machine 
which possesses skill and strength in place of the 
worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its 
own in the mechanical laws acting through it.. '(173) 
It is wi th machinery that, for Marx, this 
objectification of knowledge, skill, etc., becomes 
absorbed into capital: 'The accumulation of knowledge 
and of skill, of the general productive forces of 
the social brain, is thus absorbed into capital, as 
opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attribute 
of capital, and more specifically of fixed capital, 
in so far as it enters into the production process 
as a means of production proper. Machinery appears, 
then, as the most adequate form of fixed capital, 
and fixed capital, in so far as capital's relations 
with itself are concerned, appears as the most 
adequate form of c as such. '(174) 
The form of this objectification, however, is such 
that it not only technically removes the tool from 
the hands of the labourer, it not only incorporates 
particular skills within the structure of the 
machine itself (though this aspect is far more 
gradual than the former), but it also completely 
reverses the relationship between living labour and 
means of labour. As Marx puts it: 
'The worker's 
activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, 
is determined and regulated on all sides by the 
movement of the machinery, and not the 
opposite. '(175) 
In other words, the machine - because it is the form 
of objectification of estranged (alienated) labour 
(or wage-labour, both intellectual and manual) under 
the direction and control of capital (or that of the 
capitalist as the subject) - embodies within its 
very structure the power of control over labour (the 
more fully developed the machinery systemq of 
course, the greater its range and scope of control): 
'In machinery, objectified labour confronts living 
labour within the labour process itself as the power 
which rules it. '(176) And henceg it is with 
machinery that alienation becomes technologically 
established within the production process 
itself: 'The science which compels the inanimate 
limbs of the machineryq by their constructiong to 
act purposefullyq as an automatont does not exist in 
the worker's consciousnessq but rather acts upon him 
through the machine as an alien power2 as the power 
of the machine itself. '(177) 
Now also, with machinery, according to Marx, even 
the appropriation of labour is achieved 
technolog. -ýcally: 'The appropriation of living labour 
by objectified labour - of the power or activity 
which creates value by value existing for-itself - 
which lies in the concept of capital, is posited, in 
production resting on machinery, as the character of 
the production process itself , including its 
material elements and its material motion. The 
production process has ceased to be a labour process 
in the sense of a process dominated by labour as its 
governing unity. '(178) 
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Thus for Marx, the machine (machinery, or the system 
of mechanization) is the specific form of capitalist 
technology. With machinery we have the full 
'dominion' of capital within the production process; 
with it alienation (abstraction and separation) of 
labour is realized, becomes objectively real, and we 
have the complete break up of the unity, the fusion, 
characteristic of the "art" or techne of production 
- the radical transformation of production as, 
traditionally and fundamentally, a "making" process, 
a "labour" process. And it is with the development 
of machinery that we have the transformation of 
means of labour into technology as capital, 
technology as a "master" of labour. 
Now machine technology dominates the functioning and 
organization of the production process, but, 
according to Marx, as capital, only because 
machine technology is an alteration of form posited 
by capital itself (as fixed capital). It is, I 
believe, only on the basis of this notion (of 
technology as capital) that one can both understand 
Marx's conception of the role of technology as a 
powerful determining force under capitalism and, at 
the same time, show the error in the oft-repeated 
view that he was a technological determinist. For in 
the notion of technology as capital, it is capital 
as the dominant social form (relations of 
production) that determines the physical structure 
and functional principles of production technology 
and hence as such (and only as such) conditions its 
determining role in itself (i. e. in its use-value 
character, or its specific technical, mechanical 
properties) in the process of production and in the 
domination of living labour. Machine technology is 
"deterministic it only as and because it is a 
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functional moment, the objective manifestation, of 
capital as a social power; its determinism is 
itself, therefore, conditioned (socially 
determined). 
However, before I proceed to discuss other aspects 
of Marx's views on technology and their significance 
to the notion of technology as capital, there is an 
import ant problem in Marx's view on machinery, a 
contradiction, which must be considered first. 
8. A Contradiction in Marx's Writings 
on Machinery 
It is important here to, once again, emphasise that 
for Marx the reference to the use-value character, 
or the physical aspect and materiality of the 
machine, is not, from my understanding at least, a 
reference to its physical makeup in the abstract, 
or, as it were, to the "machine" divorced from its 
relation to living labourp or to pure material 
(wood, metal, nuts & bolts) make-up of the machine. 
He is concerned with production technology as a 
functional object within the production process. 
Thus, according to my understanding, any reference 
to the machine "in itself" is not meant as an 
abstraction from its reality as a "working" or 
actually functioning machine; the notion of its 
being "in itself" is the identification of the 
properties of the machine as an actually functioning 
(applied) technology. Its properties (its structure 
and functional principles), its being "in itself", 
is only meaningful, I would suggest, precisely in 
relation to living labour - outside such a 
relationship production technology, for Marx, is not 
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a useful object; 
of production as such. 
it is not an "instrument" 
For the understanding of Marx's conception of 
technology it is therefore essential to recognize 
machinery as a (material) moment (in the sense 
already mentioned and discussed in a previous 
section) of the prevailing, capitalist, social 
relations of_production; i. e. the latter is, always 
for Marx, the essential presupposition. For Marxq 
therefore, as mentioned before, machinery, to put it 
in his own words, 'becomes capital only in certain 
relations. Torn from these relationships it is no 
more capital than gold in itself is money or sugar 
the price of sugar. '(179) 
However, having said thisq in some of his writings 
on machinery we come up against an important 
difficulty with regards to his conception of 
'machinery as such' and that of its mode of 
utilization under capitalism. For example he makes a 
comment on this very point in the Grundrisse, which 
needs closer examination at this point. There he 
writes: 
'However, while capital gives itself its adequate 
form as use value within the production process only 
in the form of machinery and other material 
manifestations of fixed capital, such as railways 
etc ... this in no way means that this use value - 
machinery as such - is capital, or that its 
existence as machinery is identical with its 
existence as capital; any more than gold would cease 
to have use value as gold if it were no longer 
mone , 
'(180) 
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To begin with, Marx's example of 'gold' in the above 
passage, and his comparison of gold's use value with 
that of machinery, is strictly speaking quite 
erroneous. Gold's use value as a metal, and when 
used as such (and not in its role as money) is 
generally as a raw material, it can hardly function, 
according to Marx's own definition(181), as an 
instrument of production. While, by contrast, 
machinery's use value, its usefulness, is precisely 
in its being a functioning instrument (technology) 
of production. What therefore makes gold a raw 
material and machinery an instrument is the 
differences, according to Marx himself as we have 
seen, between their particular properties and their 
different functions in the process of production. 
Although, therefore, one may agree with Marx's 
proposition that machinery (technology) as capital 
presupposes its relation with living labour; it is 
extremely difficult, to put it mildly, to accept 
that the use value (the properties and quality) of 
machinery is in anyway comparable with 'gold' or any 
other such materials. For the structure and 
functional principles of a machine is designed 
purposely; its use value is thus not as in 'gold', 
which is something naturally given. 
Notwithstanding this error of comparison (at least 
in my view) , it could be said that what Marx is 
attempting to convey is this that, if machinery is a 
material manifestation of capital specifically 
because of the capitalist relations of production, 
this does not mean that it ceases to have a use 
value as a means of labour - that it ceases to be a 
functioning technology for the production of goods - 
if capitalist relations were no longer dominant, 
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This view seems quite obvious; a machine as a 
functioning technology is after all a "means of 
labour" or more accurately a means of production, be 
it under capitalist relations or any other. 
However, even in this case, there seems to be a 
contradiction in Marx precisely on this very point. 
For, how can machinery be an 'adequate form' of 
capital and yet function as a means of labour under 
some other (presumably "non-capitalist" or "post- 
capitalist") social relation of production? If 
machinery is a form of capital, then must not its 
use and employment necessitate the corresponding 
social conditions (the factory system, etc. ) which 
are the organizational forms of capital's mode of 
production? 
Moreover, if 'labour', according to Marx, 'is 
organized, is divided differently according to the 
instrument it disposes over'(182), then will not the 
use of machinery, even under a different social 
system ("post-capitalist" system), require the same 
organization and division of labour as in the 
factory system? Since, after all, the instrument 
(machinery) which labour 'disposes over' is, in use- 
value terms (its properties, quality, structure and 
functional principles), according to Marx himself, 
the same as before. 
There is certainly, to say the least, an ambiguity 
in Marx on this issue. On the one hand, as we have 
already seen, there are passages in Marx which 
either implicitly or explicitly, refer to the 
physical (objective and material) characteristics of 
technology as crucial, when in relation to living 
labourg to its use-value character and to its social 
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form as capital. On the other hand, he seems to, as 
in the case mentioned above, not only abstractly 
disengage the physical aspect ('the machine as 
such', etc. ) of production technology from its 
specific social character as capital, but to even 
suggest that in reality this particular instrument, 
'the machine as such', with the same physical 
(structural and functional) characteristics can take 
on a different (and by implication oppo . site) status 
and role (e. g. as a 'Iservant", so to speak, rather 
than a "master" of direct, immediate labour). 
Thus, for example we have the following statement by 
Marx: 
'The lightening of the labourg even, becomes a sort 
of torture, since the machine does not free the 
labourer from work, but deprives the work of all 
interest. 1(183) 
But if this is the case, then how can the machine be 
employed by the labourer (as a means of labour, as 
if it were merely - in its social status though not 
technically -a craft tool) under, say, a "non- 
capitalist" social relation of production, and yet 
not deprive 'the work of all interest'? That is, 
unless the very principles of its mode of 
functioning, its designed structure specifically as 
a machine (a mechanized instrument), is radically 
transformed. 
100 This problem also appears in Marx s criticism of 
political economists. Here he is critical of the way 
these economists disregard capital as a 
'relationship' and the way they look at the 
'objective conditions of labour' in terms of use- 
value only. (184) But in this case too, his statement 
on machinery appears not only to be inconsistent 
with the main body of his writings on technology, 
but in fact quite problematic in itself. 
On the relation between the productivity of capital 
and use-value as construed by Smith, Ricardo, etc. 9 
he states his now familiar objection: 
'The objective conditions of labour do not face the 
worker [under capitalism-RR], as in the primitive 
stages, as mere natural objects (as such, they are 
never capital), but as natural objects already 
transformed by human activity. '(185) 
But, for Marx, as opposed to these political 
economists, 'the word "capital" is quite superfluous 
and meaningless' when applied to objects even in 
this sense of 'products of previous useful work' now 
serving as means of production, or as objects of 
labour, or as means of subsistence of workers. For, 
according to Marx, in this general sense of objects 
as merely products of previous labour they are 
perceived as nothing but use-values. Thusý Marx 
continues: 'Wheat is nourishing not because it is 
capital but because it is wheat. The use-value of 
wool derives from the fact that it is wool, not 
capital. ' Yet from these comments on things as 
consumption products he moves on to technology, and 
states: 'In the same way, the action of steam-powered 
machinery has nothing in common with its existence 
as capital. ' Andq more than thisq he goes on to 
claim that this technology 'would do the same work 
if it were not "capital" and if it belonged, not to 
the factory owner, but to the workerso'(186) 
Once again, as it can be seen, Marx seems to be 
contradicting his own thoughts on the process of 
objectification in his (I believe erroneous) 
comparison of the use-value of a product as 
technology with that of consumption products. It is 
certainly true that whether a steam-powered machine 
is owned by a capitalist or by the workers 'it would 
do the same work'. But then would it not also have 
the same work-related social (alienating) 
implications? Would it not 'subjugate' the workers 
because they would have to follow its movements as 
before? 
We have already seen that according to Marx, 'with 
the development of machinery the conditions of 
labour seem to dominate labour also 
technologically... '(187) And we have seen that for 
Marx: '*.. instruments of labour ... do not appear as 
subsumed to the labourer, but the labourer appears 
as subsumed to them. He does not make use of them, 
but they make use of him. And it is this that makes 
them capital. '(188) So, would we not therefore have 
the same technological and work problems which Marx 
himself constantly stresses? Namely, for instance, 
the claim that machinery oppresses labour, 'and 
makes it superfluous in its independent forms. '(189) 
Surely such "effects" have something to do with the 
'action' and 'work' of machinery and cannot simply 
be eradicated by a change of ownership! 
In other words, the difficulty lies in this: How can 
one reconcile (or, indeed, justify) what seems to be 
two opposing ideas: 
(a) The suggestion that there can be a functioning 
system of production technology designed and built 
according to the principles of mechanization ('the 
machine as such') which entails, at least according 
to Marx himself, the deprivation of 'all interest' 
at workq the degradation and displacement of labour, 
and so one 
With: 
(b) The 8uggestion that come the morrow of 
11socialist revolution" the same technological system 
(i. e. without a radical change of those designed and 
built-in principles) can then become simply a means 
of labour, a system that does not deprive work of 
all interest, does not enslave and/or displace the 
worker(s)? 
One way out of this contradiction, which some of 
Marx's followers have taken (as with Braverman, for 
example) is to emphasise the mode in which machinery 
is employed as the central factor in transforming 
technology into an 'adequate form' of capital. 
Machinery as such, according to such an 
interpretation of Marx, appears therefore as 
"neutral", it is the specific social organization of 
the labour process, being essential to the mode of 
employment of machinery, which determines the social 
role of technology. 
This is an interpretation based on the notion of 
"social determination" of technological phenomenon 
(as opposed to the notion of "technological 
determinism") in the strict sense of the 
specifically capitalist social relations in and of 
production conditioning the manner in which 
technology is used and hence determining its social 
role. 
This interpretation is, howeverg ultimately 
the significance of the ownership of the 
production to the role and status of techni 
we shall see later in this chapter). In the 
chapter (on technology and alienation) 
already looked at a number of commentators 
based on 
means of 
3logy (as 
previous 
we have 
who also 
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base their interpretation of Marx's conception of 
the role and form of technology, often almost 
exclusively, on the fact of ownership or property 
relations (and of private property in particular) 
and its significance in Marx's theoretical system. 
None of these views (whether justified in themselves 
or not), however, resolves the contradiction in 
Marx's writings on machinery; these views simply 
avoid f acing up to this difficulty which the 
following passages illustrate: 
While in one place, in connection to the Luddite 
movement, Marx writes: 'It took both time and 
experience before the workforce learnt to 
distinguish between machinery and its employment by 
capital, and to direct their attacks, not against 
the material instruments of production, but against 
the mode in which they are used. '(190) 
In another, we have this: 'The technical 
subordination of the workman to the uniform motion 
of the instruments of labour. '(191) And, 
furthermore, stressing the physical aspect (the 
structure and functional principles) even more 
clearly, we have this statement from Marx: 'the means 
of labour, as a physical thin&[my emphasis], loses 
its direct form, becomes fixed capital, and 
confronts the worker physi [my emphasis] as 
r, apital. '(192) 
As it can be seen, we have therefore two ideas which 
seem to be contradictory; and I fail to see how 
appeals to "economic ownership" (property) can in 
itself address this problem. 
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In his letter to Annenkov, Marx makes a statement 
(in criticising Proudhon) which appears to justify 
the views of those who believe Marx considered the 
mode of employment and use of machinery rather than 
the machine (or technology) as such, as essential to 
its character and social form as capital. He writes: 
'Machinery is no more an economic category than the 
ox which draws the plough. The application of 
machinery in the present day is one of the relations 
of our present economic system, but the way in which 
machinery is utilized is totally distinct from the 
machinery itself. Powder is powder whether used to 
wound a man or to dress his wounds. '(193) 
Here we have once again (as with the case of "gold" 
mentioned above) an unjustifiable comparison of 
technology with the use value of 'powder'. But what 
is important is that in the same letter, only two 
paragraphs previous to the above statement, we have 
the following remark from Marx: 'Since 1825, the 
invention and application of machinery has been 
simply the result of the war between workers and 
employers. '(194) And, what is more, in Capital 
(vol. I), Marx is quite categorical that machinery 
'is the most powerful weapon for repressing strikes, 
those periodical revolts of the working-class 
against the autocracy of capital. ' Moreover, in the 
same placeg Marx continues to assert: 'It would be 
possible to write quite a history of the inventions 
made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying 
capital with weapons against the revolts of the 
working-class. '(195) 
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Yet, can a 'weapon' purposefully invented and made 
for (and by) capital, to act as its 'adequate form', 
as its physical' and material moment or 
manifestation within the process of production, be 
"in itself", in its structural features, indifferent 
to how it is 'utilized'? This is certainly a 
problematic issue in Marx which cannot be avoided or 
simply dismissed as inessential, for it goes to the 
heart of Marx's notion of "socialism", a form of 
society in which technology is supposed to be at the 
service of humanity. But, as Alvin Gouldner has 
remarked, 'whether a technology born of the war 
between workers and owners would not have built into 
it features at variance with the liberative 
intentions of socialism is a question that Marx does 
not raise. '(196) 
To be fair to Marx, it must be remembered that the 
development of machinery, or the system of 
mechanization, was at its infancy at the time of his 
writings on the issue. And, further, it would be, in 
any case, naive to expect him (as alas some of his 
followers tend to do) to have fully developed 
"answersil, even if that were possible, to all the 
questions that such a complex issue raises. Be that 
as it may, the problem raised above cannot (and must 
not) be overlooked, or excused away. 
However, since my intention here is to evaluate 
Marx's conception of technology, it is important not 
only to mention this contradiction in Marx's ideas 
on machineryq but to also attempt to provide an 
explanation for the problem we have confronted in 
his writings on machinery - if that is possible - in 
terms of Marx's own theoretical framework. And here 
I suggest the following, explanation: 
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To begin with, it is important to note here that 
Marx always attempts to explain the particular 
phenomenon under examination from the twofold 
perspective of its historically specific social form 
of appearance and its general content common to 
"human" productive activity as such. Thus, for 
example, he writes: Nature builds no machines, no 
locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self- 
acting mules etc. These are products of human 
industry; natural materials transformed into organs 
of the human will over nature, or of human 
participation in nature. They are organs of the 
human brain, created by_the human hand; the power of 
knowledge, objectified. '(187) One could say that 
even a "half-wit" should know that nature builds no 
machines; and certainly Marx, whether one agrees 
with his theories or not, was no "half-wit". The 
reason that he therefore mentions such an obvious 
fact is simply to emphasise that while the machine 
is undoubtedly a product and a moment of capital, it 
is, of course, nothing but the product of 'human 
industry' at a historically arrived at stage of 
social development. That is, it is a product of 
'human industry' which has a specific social form. 
Capital, after all, is, for Marx, a social form of 
human relations and not a natural, or nature giveng 
eternally fixed set of relations. 
The machine, therefore, possesses a twofold nature; 
for it is both an 'organ' of 'human participation in 
nature', and a moment of capital. Its structure is 
designed in such a way that it functions 
simultaneously as a force of material production 
and as an essential element of the capitalist form 
of production (or as a 'weapon' of capital within 
the production process, if you like). The instrument 
of production, in the form of the machine as such, 
has acquired a specific social form, and therefore a 
new objectivity. And the objectivity of the machine 
is not its being a 'machine as such', but being a 
machine in relation to wage-labour; its objectivity 
is in its being fixed capital. In this sense, it can 
be said that, capital passes over into the 
technological phenomenon (the machine as suchy the 
form of production technology based on the 
principles of mechanization) as its expression* 
Therefore, one line of argument which may (perhaps) 
explain the contradiction in Marx's writings on 
machinery "in itself" is that what Marx is 
attempting to point to is that the development of 
machinery (of mechanization), the 'machine as such', 
involves a contradiction for capital (i. e. for 
capital as a relation of production, of exploitation 
of living labour), In other words, the difficulty we 
have come across in Marx's ideas on machinery 
(as 
seen from the passages mentioned above), may be 
considered as a problem related to the twofold 
nature of machine technology; a contradiction which 
manifests itself with the progressive development of 
mechanization as this advance of 
'machinery as such' 
comes into conflict with its social form as capital. 
If we take into account Marx's entire theoretical 
system (at least as I understand it), 
it can be 
argued, I would suggest, that Marx is 
(or may be) 
pointing to an inherent contradiction in the 
form of 
technology as capital. From such a perspective, the 
contradiction in the form of technology as capital 
is not, therefore, a logical contradiction, but what 
may be called a practical 
(real) contradiction 
between two incompatible aspects of production 
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technology. (198) What we have coexisting in the same 
phenomenon (i. e. in the body of production 
technology) is an antagonistic union of two distinct 
aspects: technology as a means of labour (the 
fundamental objective being its use for the 
production of goods as use-values to satisfy human 
needs); and technology as a moment of capital (the 
aim being to function as a means of enhancing the 
efficiency of the exploitation of labour for the 
expansion of value and the accumulation of capital). 
Moreover, the development of technology as a means 
of labour is dependent and conditioned by the 
development and advance of its mode of functioning 
as a moment of capital. But, according to Marx (or 
rather my reading of Marx), the more technology is 
developed, the less does it function as a means of 
labour; that is, the more it becomes independent of, 
alienated from, living labour. Yet it is only in 
relation to living labour (i. e. as a means of 
labour) that technology can function as a moment of 
capital (capital's rule, for Marx, let us recall, is 
entirely dependent on the exploitation of living 
labour). And, I would suggest, that it is perhaps 
this contradiction which is reflected in Marx's own 
writings as he attempts to, as it were, wrestle 
with it in order to explain it (though evidently 
unsuccessfully as it appears from the contradictory 
passages quoted above), 
If my suggestion is correct, then, a simplified 
explanation of this inherent contradiction (which is 
reflected in some of Marx's writings on machinery) 
is in this: that the more developed the system of 
machineryq the more difficult it becomes for capital 
to realize itself and self-expand, as machinery 
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tends tog according to Marx, increasingly devalue 
and displace living labour (the latter being, for 
Marx, the source of new value, surplus-value, 
profit, and hence the source of expansion or growth 
of capital), 
Sinceq therefore, for Marx, it is not machinery 
(technology), but living labour which is the only 
source of new value, although the machine is a 
capitalist technology and is (physically and 
materially) a moment of capital, it is at the same 
time - and precisely because of the development of 
its very quality and structural principles -a 
force of production which tends to contradict its 
social form and role as capital as technological 
development and advance of machinery makes 'direct 
labour and its quantity' increasingly 'disappear as 
the determinant principle of production'. (199)In 
other words, with the development of machinery - and 
Marx particularly stresses the development of the 
'automatic system of mac '(200) - and what he 
calls the 'technological application of natural 
sciences'9 Marx believes that capital actually 
'works towards its own dissolution as the form 
dominating production. '(201) 
This latter point is of course a highly contested 
issue and according to many commentators, arguably, 
unjustified even theoretically. But for Marx 
himselfq and within his own theoretical system 
(specifically on the basis of his theory of value) 
it is a real and crucial problematic. In wrestling 
with this (for Marx, "real") problematic, he thus 
conceptually separates the physical, material aspect 
(the machine as such) from its mode of utilization, 
not because he views the machine (or technology) as 
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a "neutral" force (as if it were a natural, nature- 
given force), but to emphasise, I would suggest, 
that precisely because machinery is a human product 
at the same time as being a capitalist product (and 
not a naturally given force) its development and 
increasing application embodies a contradiction -a 
contradiction eminent in its being at once a force 
of production as such (thus he refers to the 
'machine as such') and a force in the production and 
expansion of capital itself (production and increase 
of surplus value or profit). 
Nevertheless, even if this line of argument may help 
to explain the contradiction involved in some 
passages of Marx's writings on machinery, it is 
undoubtedly the case that Marx does not deal with 
the problematic of application and utilization of 
machinery under non-capitalist (or 11post- 
capitalist") social relations. Whether the structure 
of capitalist technology (the 'machine as such') is 
compatible with other than capitalist social 
relations, is a question which is not dealt with by 
Marx. 
Two points, howeverp should be made here in 
connection with this latter issue: 
Firstly, thatq as I have mentioned previously, for 
Marx a new social formation alwaysq and necessarily 
so, inherits the technological system (the material 
productive forces) developed under the old system - 
technology, by its very nature, takes time to 
developp and the new forms evolve, and are 
developedt on the basis of the previously existing 
and functioning forms of technology. Thus, in 
practiceg whatever the new form of social relations, 
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the prevalent system of production technology cannot 
be replaced overnight. 
But then if this is perhaps what Marx means when he 
says: 'Machinery does not lose its use value as soon 
as it ceases to be capital'(202), we have yet 
another problem. Namely the fact that the 
development of technology may (as, indeed, it is 
beginning to) completely transform the form of 
production technology as machine technology (e. g. 
with microelectronic automation). So that we may 
have a new system of technology rather than 
'machinery' (or the system of mechanization as 
distinct from automation) acting as the 'adequate 
form' of capital. Herej once again, we have the same 
problem but at a different level; that is, how is 
it possible that one technological system can act 
as the 'adequate form' of capitalv and yet a new 
system replacing it (developed from within the womb 
of the old social order) can yet again be a 
functional moment of capital at the same time as 
becoming the material conditiong a productive forceg 
for the liberation of labour and humanity? 
In effect what I am pointing to is that Marx's 
conception of technology seems to be constrained by 
his observations on machinery - his ideas on this 
subject are very much of his period. And there is no 
doubt that his statements on the future developments 
of technology and technological systems, though 
immensely interesting (often brilliantly prognostic, 
particularly in the Grundrisse), are clearly left 
undeveloped. 
Secondly, however, we know that for Marx any new 
social formation develops and establishes its own 
). 
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set of technological and material conditions of 
production. This was the case, as we have already 
seen, with capitalism; that although capital had at 
first instituted itself on the basis of the old 
forms of technologies (craft tools, etc. ) - i. e. 
inherited these and used them as they were. Yet in 
order to actually dominate the realm of production, 
and establish its own specific mode of production 
proper, it took in hand the transformation of the 
old, given, instruments of labour into a system of 
machinery. From this, thereforet one could infer 
that, for Marx, a similar process of transformation 
of the technological system of machinery would be a 
precondition for the actual establishment and 
domination of a new (future) social system. Though, 
once again, beyond some vague references and general 
statements we find little in Marx's writings on this 
issue. 
However, although Marx provides no "blue-prints" and 
no detailed explanation of the form of "future" 
technology - he was after all no prophet, though 
some have made him out to be - it would certainly be 
wholly wrong to suggest that he considered machinery 
('as such') as either "neutral" or as a "natural" 
and ultimate form of production technology, whose 
Ilemployment" and "utilization" by capital is the 
main "problem", and not also its designed structural 
and functional principles. There are, as we have 
seen, passages in his writings that do suggest such 
a notion of "neutrality", but these are both 
theoretically and textually, as it should be clearly 
evident from the discussion presented so far in 
this study, exceptions that prove the rule, as it 
were. 
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The main aspect of Marx's theoretical discourse on 
technological phenomena, and more particularly 
within his theory of capitalist production, is to 
show that machine technology is a historical and a 
specifically capitalistic (social) project. The 
thrust of Marx's argument is that the social form, 
the specific social character, of capital is 'not 
foisted upon technology'(203) by the way this or 
that capitalist employs and'uses it; its social form 
is the result of - to use one of Max Weber's 
descriptions of the machine - the 'congealed spirit' 
(Geist) (204) of capital, 
In this, we have - and this is the dominant theme in 
Marx's discourse on technological phenomena - the 
subjective act of design, conception, construction 
(i. e. objectification) becoming an essential moment 
of the objective form of the technical apparatus as 
machine technology (or more accurately, as the 
system of mechanization); thus uniting the form with 
the content. The "spirit of capitalism", in other 
words, enters the very construction (from conception 
and execution to the end product) of modern 
mechanized technology (the machine); in it is, thus, 
projected not simply what "society" (in the 
abstract) requires, but, and because that "society" 
is capitalist society, what capital requires. It is, 
in fact, because of this dominant theme in Marx that 
those passages mentioned above (on machinery as 
seemingly "neutral") can be considered as exceptions 
to the rule, hence contradictory and inconsistence. 
It is this dominant theme in Marx that enables 
anomalies and contradictions to be accounted for; 
that isq explaining the textual passages and 
particular ideas referring to the apparent 
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"neutrality" of technology, as being at variance 
with Marx's conception. 
Indeed, from his analysis of the development of 
machinery itself as the 'adequate form' of capital, 
it seems to ine that it is at least arguable that 
Marx took for granted (as something obvious) that 
under a new form of social organization of 
production, technology would inevitably be 
transformed and developed to correspond with the new 
social requirements and conditions of the system of 
production which comes into being or is in the 
process of becoming established (just as it did with 
rise and development of capitalism itself). 
Moreover, for Marx, the very conditions of 
capitalist industrial production is dynamic; he 
considers the development and transformation of 
technology as by far the most critical aspect of the 
capitalist mode of production itself. 'Modern 
Industry, ' Marx thus writes, Inever looks upon and 
treats the existing form of a process as final. The 
technical basis of that industry is therefore 
revolutionary, while all earlier modes of production 
were essentially conservative. By means of 
machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it 
is continually causing changes not only in the 
technical basis of production, but also in the 
functions of the labourer, and in the social 
combinations of the labour-process. '(205) 
Thus, finally, and without overlooking the 
problematic of "future" form of technology which 
Marx does not discuss or the contradictory passages 
mentioned above, for Marx, 'the machine', or rather, 
the system of production technology based on the 
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principles of industrialism and mechanization, "is" 
capital in the serise that it is an aspect of one 
and the same social form of the process of 
exploitation of wage-labour. What is "reflected" in 
the structure of 'the machine' (of the technological 
system) is the reality of the contradiction of 
capital itself as this social form. It is with this 
in mind, I believe, that Marx declared that there is 
an $absolute contradiction between the technical 
necessities of Modern Industryq and the social 
character inherent in its capitalistic form... '(206) 
And this inherent contradiction (and the social form 
of machinery) is by no means the invention of 
"science", nor, however, was it "created" out of the 
void. It is rather, for Marx, the consequence of the 
process of "class struggle", i. e. of capital as such 
a social process of struggle (capital as an 
antagonistic social relation of production). A 
social process which necessarily structures the 
specific processes of "invention" and technological 
development. And this historical process of social 
and technological change (i. e. the rise and 
dominance of the capitalist mode of production) was 
no mere formal transformation. For capital to 
realize itself, for its tendencies to become 
actualized, what was required was that the means of 
labour (instruments, tools, the material productive 
forces) should be transformed; their functions 
should be changed and hence their structure and 
content needed to be transformed into 'an existence 
adequate.. to capital' - technology as capital. 
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9. Technological Systems as Fixed. 
__Capital 
In this section I shall attempt to present a 
discussion of Marx's concepts of constant capital 
and fixed c, as a means of explaining the 
specific role of technology in capitalist 
production. It is through the development of these 
concepts that Marx incorporates his ideas and 
observations on machinery within his theory of 
capitalist production. With these concepts he 
establishes the interdependence of production 
techno logy as a system and the socio-economic 
framework of capital production and accumulation. 
These concepts are not, as often they are taken to 
be, "purely" economic concepts. What we get with 
these concepts, therefore, is not merely a set of 
ideas and propositions on specifically "economic" 
issues, but in fact as integral to these we have 
Marx's distinctive conception of technology -a 
conception that treats instruments, means of labour 
(means of production), and the instrumental 
conditions of production, from a systemic 
perspective, and in that sense, strictly speaking, 
treats the technological system as capital. 
Let us see why Marx uses these specific concepts 
rather than the concept of technology as such, and 
how he attempts to deal with the role and function 
of the industrial system of machine technology 
through the development and use of these concepts, 
Marx introduces the concept of "constant capital"l 
and in relation to the concept of variable ca_pitalg 
in order to explain the distinction between the 
preservation and transfer of value and its creation 
and expansion, within and by the same process of 
production. (207) 
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For Marx that part of capital-value which, in the 
production process, is represented by the means of 
production (technology, raw materials, etc. ) remains 
quantitatively unaltered; this value is preserved 
and transferred, and does not expand during the 
process (see Appendix 4). The value of production 
technology, remains constant, 'does not, in the 
process of production, undergo any quantitative 
alteration.. '(208) Looked at from this "capital- 
value" perspective, production technology is now 
located by Marx within the concept of constant 
capital; it has been given a value role. 
By this incorporation of technology in the concept 
of constant capital, I suggest Marx wanted to 
explain that production technology (and raw 
materials, etc. ) cannot be the source of new value, 
surplus value or profit (see Appendix 4). This is in 
contrast to the part of capital (called by Marx 
variable capital) which in the production process is 
represented by labour-power, which, according to 
Marx, 'does, in the process of production, undergo 
an alteration of value. '(209) For, although labour- 
power first enters the process with a constant 
value, it not only reproduces this value, but also, 
according to Marx, creates new value, more value or 
surplus value, which itself may vary in magnitude 
depending on circumstances of production. It is, 
therefore, Marx writes, 'continually being 
transformed from a constant into a variable 
magnitude. '(210) 
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Thus within his theoretical framework it was 
necessary for Marx to look at the use and employment 
of technology in capitalist production not merely as 
a useful object, a use-value moment of capital, but 
also to take into account its role in the formation 
of the value of the output. He sought to show that 
profit was not derived from the 'productive 
service'(211) of technology. For this the concept of 
of technology" as such (as "instrument" of production, 
or as 11means of labour", etc. ) would have been 
inadequate, and a broader concept had to be 
developed to express the part production technology 
plays in the augmentation and growth of capital 
(value). 
When Marx moves on from the analysis of the 
capitalist production process (i. e. the creation and 
production of value), to also take account of the 
capitalist circulation process (or the analysis of 
the circulation of value), he still maintains the 
concept of constant capital, but now looks within it 
to also specify the role of production technology in 
the process of realization of value. And now he 
sieves out technology in particular - but also the 
instrumental conditions such as buildings, railways, 
canals, or "infrastructural" factors, that were 
mentioned previously - and separates it from other 
types of means of production (such as raw materials, 
etc. ). The concept he uses here is a developed 
version of that used by the classical economists, 
e. g. Smith and Ricardo; namely, fixed capital. 
For Smith and Ricardo, for example, who were mostly 
concerned with the analysis of the circulation of 
valueg the conceptual distinction between constant 
and variable capital did not exist. For them what 
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was important was the distinction between 
circulating and fixed capital. 
The concept of fixed capital, however, is in fact 
the specific value form of Marx's concept of means 
of labour in its wider sense already discussed. 
While with the latter, as we saw, Marx is trying to 
explain the general role of technologies, systems of 
technologies, etc.; with fixed capital he is 
specifying this role in terms of value. Fixed 
capital, therefore, refers to all the various 
elements which make up the technological system, in 
operation, as it functions. And Marx uses and 
develops this concept specifically to explain some 
of the most fundamental problems and difficulties 
which, according to him at any rate, arise in the 
realization of value. It has thus a definite 
function in Marx's theory which the concept of 
"technology" as such ("instruments", etc. ) cannot 
perform adequately. 
The fundamental characteristic of means 
(instruments) of labour - i. e. that technological 
systems do not undergo, during the production 
process, a change of form, and retain their 
'definite use-form'(212) - as "fixed" means of 
production, is expressed in terms of the manner 
their value circulates. Because of their particular 
(and necessary) function, they have a certain 
peculiarity as regards the transfer of their value 
to the output. An amount of money (capital-value) is 
advanced for the establishment of a technological 
system, and the system is purchased precisely in 
order that it can be used repeatedly without losing 
its independent use-form over a certain period of 
use. Once having entered the sphere of production, 
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technologies never leave that sphere until they lose 
their use-value, or are no longer functionally 
appropriate (according to the prevailing social norm 
of productivity). For, according to Marx: 'Their 
function holds them there. '(213) This amount of 
money or capital-value advanced, therefore, 'becomes 
fixed in thi's forin determined by the function of the 
instruments of labour in the process. '(214) 
The longer the technological system is capable of 
functioning, the longer will the capital-value 
advanced for it remain fixated. So long as 
technologies, Marx writes, 'are still effective as 
instruments of labour and need not yet be replaced 
by new ones of the same kind, a certain amount of 
constant capital-value remains fixed in them, while 
the other part of the value originally fixed in them 
is transferred to the product and therefore 
circulates as a component part of the commodity- 
supply. '(215) The proportion of this fixed capital- 
value which is transferred to the commodity, and 
thus circulates, is determined by the calculated 
average rate of the system's wear and tear. That is, 
the proportion 'is measured by the average duration 
of its function.. '(216) 
In other words, since technologies are not 
completely used up or productively consumed during 
each cycle of production, and their use-form is not 
alteredq their value only circulates fractionally, 
piecemeal, as their usefulness is exhausted, over 
several cycles of production. The transfer of their 
value is based on 'a calculation of averages. '(217) 
Technology as capital has, therefore, a peculiarly 
distinct characterg in that it does not enter the 
circulation process in its use-form, that even the 
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circulation of its value is only gradual, and that 
while it is functioning a portion of its value is 
always locked in it. For Marx it is precisely this 
'peculiarity which gives to this portion of capital 
the form of fixed capital. '(218) 
I have previously mentioned that for Marx an 
essential aspect of the definition of production 
technology is an objects function in the production 
process. And, further, that this has a definite 
relation to the objectis use-form. Since, obviously, 
if technologies lose their form and physical 
structure, they lose their character and function as 
production technologies and become productively 
useless objects. While, moreover, an object may be 
technically constructed to function as a technology, 
it is a mere potential technology of production 
outside the labour-process. It is precisely this 
conception of technology that is for Marx the basis 
of the concept of "fixed capital". This is clearly 
evident from the following comment made by Marx: 'It 
is only the functioning of a product as an 
instrument of labour in the process of production 
that makes it fixed capital. But when it 
["technology"-RR] itself only just emerges from a 
process [i. e. is developed and constructed-RR], it 
is by no means fixed capital. For instance a 
machine, as a product or commodity of the machine- 
manufacturerý belongs to his commodity-capital. It 
does not become fixed capital until it is employed 
productively in the hands of its purchaser, the 
capitalist. '(219) 
An object must therefore become a functioning part 
of a capitalist productive system of technology, for 
it to become also an element of fixed capital. Here 
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it is important to re-emphasis that, as we have 
seen, on the whole - admitting certain lapses of 
rigour - Marx defines technology as fixed capital by 
the function, and not merely the "use" of an object. 
The distinction between a definition based on 
"function" and one based on "use", is not mere 
semantics, but quite fundamental. For, although the 
two terms are closely connected in relation to 
technology, the notion of "f unction" is more 
strictly relevant as regards its form as (fixed) 
capital. 
If the term "use" usually implies little more than 
mere suitability of an object to serve for a given 
purpose (for employment). The term "f unction" 
expresses, more explicitly, the operation of the 
object not merely in the sense that it is 
purposefully constructed and positioned to serve a 
definite end, but, at the same time, that the 
operation and service expected of the object, its 
role and position, is also by virtue of its 
structure, its use-value (use-form and quality). 
Thus, the tools used by an artisan reflect their 
function as means of labour in the strict sense 
already mentioned in a previous section; and when 
Marx considers the general labour-process, as we 
have seen, the notions of "use" and "function" 
coincide; there is no strict distinction made, 
since, in the reality of, for example, the artisanal 
labour-process production technology is used by, and 
serves, labour. The structure of the tool determines 
its immediate function as an instrument which the 
artisan uses to conduct his/her activity (it is a 
means of labour as such); he/she is in control of 
the tool. 
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With technology as (fixed) capital, as we have seen 
in the case of machinery, etc. , this is, at least for Marx, not the case. It is therefore quite 
erroneous (according to my reading of Marx at any 
rate) to say that the "use" of technologies defines 
their form as fixed capital. Since technologies, or 
at least certain elements of the technological 
system, particularly as regards, for example, 
instrumental conditions and infrastructural 
elements (e. g. buildings, roads, etc. ), may be, and 
often are, capable of being used for individual or 
personal consumption as well as for production. In 
this respect, Marxq for instanceg writes: 'It is not 
necessarily the case that fixed capital is capital 
which in all its aspects serves not for individual 
consumption, but only for production. A house can 
serve for production as well as for consumption; 
likewise all vehiclesq a ship and a wagon, for 
pleasure outings as well as a means of transport; a 
street as a means of communication for production 
proper, as well as for taking walks etc. '(220) But 
he immediately qualifies this aspect as not strictly 
belonging to the realm of production of 
capital: 'Fixed capital in this second aspect does 
not concern us here at all9 since we regard capital 
here only as process of realization and process of 
production. The second aspect will enter when we 
study interest. '(221) In other words the 'second 
aspect' is not strictly concerned with the system of 
production technology (technology as a "means" of 
production of capitalg surplus value). Marx is, 
thereforeq flexible (and unconcerned)9 with the 
definition of this 'second aspect' of fixed capital 
in terms of "use" or "function". 
4ýý3 
There isq however, another sense in which Marx 
defines an object as fixed capital in terms of its 
"use", which is intended, I would suggest, to 
reflect the positing of an object as a moment of 
capital - as in the sense of being used as a 
if weapon" of domination, a means of exploitation, 
etc. Thus he writes: 'The same materials, however, 
also have a use value outside production, and can 
also be consumed in another way, just as buildings, 
houses, etc. are not necessarily specified for 
production. They are fixed ca not because of 
the specific mode of their being, but rather because 
of their use. '(222) Although here he is referring 
to the notion of "use", there is a specific 
qualification attached to this "definition" of fixed 
capital by the object's "use". For he immediately 
continues: 'They become fixed capital as soon as they 
step into the production process. ' And here he does 
not mean "any" form of production process, but that 
form which produces capital (i. e. the form of value 
production or the production of surplus 
value) : 'They are fixed capital, as soon as they are 
posited as moments [my emphasis] of the production 
process of capital.. '(223) 
In this case, therefore, fixed capital is a direct 
reference to elements, objects, etc., as part of the 
technological system, which the cal2italist uses in 
order to be able to produce surplus value (without 
them the production technology, and the 
technological network, cannot function at all, or at 
least, not properly as a system)* 
What is therefore crucial is the role and function 
of an object in the production process, this 
determines its use by the capitalist - its use 
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either as a "subject" of labour (raw material) or as 
"means" of labour (technology). That such a role and 
function depends upon the object's technical 
structure and functional principles (its use-value 
characteristics as 'determinate form', or its 
properties, its qualitative characteristics, etc. ), 
has already been mentioned. But what concerns Marx 
in his definition of fixed capital is to move away 
from what he considered to be the 'fetishism' 
(whether implicit or explicit) of 'political 
economy'. The 'fetishism' which, according to Marx, 
'metamorphoses the social , economic character 
impressed on things in the process of social 
production into a natural character stemming from 
the material nature of those thingso'(224) 
Here we have come back to the issue of "the social" 
and "the material" in Marx's thought which we looked 
at in chapter one, and specifically in relation to 
Cohen's interpretation of this issue in Marx. It is 
not the case, as it was also pointed out in that 
chapter, that Marx considers the 'material nature' 
of technologies as unimportant. But that what should 
always be taken into account is that the 'material 
nature' of such objects assume certain social 
significations, or more accurately for Marx, the 
material nature as a content is already itself a 
'determinate form'. Marx is extremely concerned with 
the examination of production technology as a unity 
of "the social" and "the material" (or technical)ý 
as I have already tried to demonstrate in chapter 
one. He wants to distinguish his "materialism", 
which for him is based on and always presupposes the 
social reality of human relations, from that 
tradition which tends to, in his view (whether 
justified and valid or not), "idealizes" the purely 
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material and technical aspects of the system of 
production. Such a tradition, according to Marxi 
mystifies production technology: 'The crude 
materialism of the economists, ' he thus writes, 'who 
regard as the natural properties of things what are 
social relations of production among people, and 
qualities which things obtain because they are 
subsumed under these relations, is at the same time 
just as crude an idealism, even fetishism, since it 
imputes social relations to things as inherent 
characteristics, and thus mystifies them. '(225) 
Though here, it must be said, we have one of Marx's 
not uncommon confusing pronouncements. For while he 
talks about the 'qualities' of things 'obtained' 
because these qualities are 'subsumed' under 
capitalist relations; yet he says that we cannot 
impute' social relations to things as 'inherent 
characteristics' - i. e. presumably meaning as 
'inherent characteristics' of their 'natural' 
qualities (properties). But exactly what is meant by 
such a statement remains unexplained by Marx. 
In any case, if such a "mystification" is not and 
cannot. be for Marx (given his philosophical outlook 
and other similar statements on this subject (226)) 
a purely subjective emission - i. e. that fetishism 
does reflect a real objective condition - the 
accusation of 'crude materialism' made here has to 
be understood somewhat liberally in the following 
sense (limiting our interpretation to what this 
confusing passage may mean in terms of technology): 
Marx, if I understand him correctly, is not here 
saying that technologies (the technological system) 
can or should be viewed apart from social relations, 
or that they are in any sense independent of these. 
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On the contrary, his objection is to the 'crude 
materialism' that tends not to recognize that the 
very qualities which inform technology's role as a 
means of production (means of labour) are in fact 
socially determined. These are, thus he writes, 
'qualities which things obtain because they are 
subsumed under these relations'. We could say that 
we cannot (or, according to Marx, must not) impute 
social relations to technologies as 'inherent 
characteristics' as if the qualities they have under 
a given social system (say, technology as capitaty 
or as fixed capital, under capitalism) are -their 
'natural properties' when subsumed under any other 
social systein of production relations. 
In any event,, insofar as the technological system 
as fixed capital is concerned, Marx, for example, 
recognizes that the 'fixity' of technologies is 
dependent upon the degree of their durability, and 
"hence on a physical property'. (227) However, if one 
defines "fixed capital" solely on such a criterion 
then certain raw materials (iron, etc., for instance 
in steel production) would thus qualify as "fixed 
capital" - since, because of their material nature, 
they are extremely durable. In this case, the raw 
material (e. g. iron) is certainly used by the 
capitalist, it is certainly extremely durableg but 
is definitely not fixed capital, it is in fact part 
of circulating capital, since its role and function 
in the production process (as it is being used) 
marks it as a 'subject$ of labour. 
Thus, according to Marx, 'it is by no means solely 
on account of 
[their] physical property of 
durability that they [technologies] function as 
fixed capital. The raw material in metal factories 
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is just as durable as the machine used in 
manufacturing.. '(228) But, for Marx, it is equally 
important not to dismiss the importance of 
technology's physical and material characteristics: 
'Although it is not the durability of the material 
of which it is fabricated that makes an instrument 
of labour fixed capital, nevertheless its role as 
such an instrument requires that it should be 
composed of relatively durable material. The 
durability of its material is therefore a condition 
of its function as an instrument of labour, and 
consequently the material basis of the mode of 
circulation which renders it fixed capital. '(229) 
But there is also a further, essential, requirement 
which cannot be abstracted away and is, for Marx, 
determinant; namely the 
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aspect: 'instruments 
of labour are fixed capital, ' Marx writes, ' if 
the process of production is really a capitalist 
process of production and the means of production 
are therefore really capital and possess economic 
definiteness, the social character of capital. And 
in the second place [and this follows axiomatically 
from the former condition-RRI, they are fixed 
capital only if they transfer their value to the 
product in a particular way [see Appendix 4-RR]. If 
not, they remain instruments of labour without being 
fixed capitalo'(, 230) 
Hereq then, we have a clear distinction which Marx 
makes between production technology as an instrument 
or means of labour and as capital. The 
presupposition isq of course, capitalist production 
ý i. e. wage-labour/capital relations. 
On that basis 
we have at the level of production 
(the "labour 
process" as such) the proposition that technologies 
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(a) must be 'really capital' and (b) must 'possess 
economic definiteness, the social character of 
capital. ' What does, then, Marx mean by this? The 
following is my suggested interpretation: 
The distinction between 'instruments of labour' and 
'fixed capital' mentioned by Marx provides us, I 
would suggest, the key to what he means. There is no 
doubt that (a) and (b) are directly related. But the 
connection between the two is highly significant: 
Technologies 'are therefore really capital' refers, 
I would suggest, to their designed and developed 
technical role and function in relation to labour; 
that is technologies as specifically 'determined 
forms' that 'really', objectively (materially and 
technically), function (as means of labour) to 
produce goods (use-values) but only through the 
subsumption of living labour - i. e. the 'real 
subsumption of labour' or the technological 
alienation of labour that we have discussed in a 
previous chapter. This technical role and function 
is therefore a manifestation of a socio-economic 
function; in thisq technologies 'possess economic 
definiteness'q or a value-form as well as their 
'determinate forms' as use-value characters of 
capital. Production technology 'really' (i. e. 
objectively) and economically has the 'social 
character of capital'. 
Here we have not the separation of the material 
(technical, etc. ) from the social (as Cohen 
interprets Marx)ý but their fusion (unity or 
identity) at the point of capitalist production. And 
here, also, we have not merely the social form or 
determination of technology by the way or manner it 
is employed by capital or used (utilized) in the 
capitalist mode of organization of labour (which is, 
as we shall shortly see, Braverman's 
interpretation), but technology, in its very 
economic and technical determinatenessý as capital. 
Now, as to the notion of "fixity" in the conception 
of technological systems as fixed capital. This, for 
Marx, should not be identified, as I understand it, 
with the notion of "immobility". Within the 
technological system of production there are many 
elements which are movable and many which are 
mobile. The physical structure and technical 
principles again play an important part here, but 
only insofar as these relate to the particular 
function within the production processq and not, as 
it were, "in the abstract". 
A building is an immovable capital-asset, but only 
when in the domain of productive c (231) - 
only as, for example, a factory building - it is, 
for Marx, fixed capital. A ship, by contrast, is 
obviously highly mobile, but it may or may not be 
fixed capital depending on whether or not it is part 
of the technological system of production (e. g. for 
transportation of materials, etc. or in the fishing 
industry, and so on). Again, a machine or a device 
may be movable (for example, a personal computer), 
and yet it is fixed capital as long as it has a role 
and function within a system and involved directly 
in a particular production process (but not when it 
is used, for personal reasons). (232) 
However, modern technological systems are extremely 
complex, far more so than at the time of Marx. 
While, therefore, Marx can in principle 
(theoretically) point to the role and function of 
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production technology by the specific reference to 
the process of production as such; within the 
functioning technological networks today, this tends 
to be difficult to pin point exactly, A device's 
role and function are often quite blurred due to, 
for example, multi-faceted function and use; it is 
difficult, then, to identify at what point (in time 
or space) a technology or a piece of equipment is 
functioning within a system and in production 
(strictly speaking) or for personal use, or is as 
part of a technological system which functions in 
the process of circulation and distribution, etc. 
Marx's conception of technology as capital, it 
should therefore be noted here, does not deal. with 
or cover those fields or instances in which or when 
there is an overlapping of a technology's role and 
function (i. e. between production of goods, personal 
use, circulation, distribution and/or exchange). For 
a means of understanding this particular 
problematic, perhaps far more widespread in today's 
technological world than at any other time, we need 
a more up-to-date conception of technology than that 
of Marx's. 
In any case, from the above discussion we see that 
Marx identifies technology as capital (fixed 
capital) on the basis of the fusion of certain 
aspects and characteristics. The presupposition for 
him is the historically specific social conditions 
of production (i. e. capitalism); but given this, the 
role and function of an object in conjunction with 
its physical structure and material property must 
also be taken into account, and not merely as 
"afterthoughts". 'It is not, ' to use Marx's own 
words9 'a question here of definitions which things 
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must be made to fit. We are dealing here with 
definite functions which must be expressed in 
definite categories. '(233) 
What is also, I believeg implicitly suggested in 
Marx's writings is that the concept of "fixed 
capital", though of course incorporating a whole 
series of diverse particular technological elements9 
is strictly concerned with the prevailing and 
functioning system of technologies. It is rare to 
find (if at all possible), particularly under modern 
capitalist production, a process of production which 
operates on the basis of the functioning of a single 
individual device or machine. The capitalist process 
of production proper presupposes the '. collective 
labourer', i. e. a minimum number of wage-workers, 
and therefore also a network of technologies (from 
simple tools to complex machines). Individual tools 
or machines are fixed capital because they are 
components of such a functioning network. Moreoverg 
each network of technologies is "fixed capital" 
because each network is an "aliquot" part of a 
technological system as capital* 
0 It is in this sense of the existing and functioning 
technological system, I would suggest, that Marx 
regarded the scope of fixed capital as the most 
important indication of the level of development of 
the capitalist mode of production. As he writes: 'the 
stage of development reached by the mode of 
production based on capital - or the extent to which 
capital itself is already presupposed as the 
condition of its own production, has presupposed 
itself - is measured by the existing scope of fixed 
capital; not only by its quantity, but just as much 
9' 
(234) 
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Thus, according to my understanding of Marx, the 
level of advancement of capitalist production can be 
gauged by not only how much has been invested in, 
and how large is the scale of, the functioning 
system of production technologies, but also by how 
advanced and developed is the qualitative technical 
structure and features of the system in operation 
(e. g. the difference between manufacture and 
mechanization, or now between intensive 
mechanization and rising automation)o 
There are, however, a number of problems involved 
here both i 11 relation to the conception of 
technological systems as fixed capital and the 
twofold character of these as use-value and 
exchange-value (or as capital-value). 
To begin with, for Marx only when the use-value of 
the functioning technology is completely consumed 
will its exchange-value (or loosely, the money 
invested) be totally transferred to the output. (235) 
Yet, at the same time, Marx refers to the 'corpses' 
of technologies as being 'separate and distinct' 
from the output produced. (2236) In other words, the 
technologies used do not become physically destroyed 
even 'after their death'(237), unlike the raw 
materials which do (i. e. as they are productively 
consumed). 'The destruction of.. cotton', for 
exampleg Marx writes, 'is.. a necessary condition in 
the production of the yarn. ' And because of this, 
land no other reason, ' he continues, 'the value of 
that cotton is transferred to the product. '(238) (A 
fuller discussion is given in Appendix 4) 
a 
Now, how can7 in the case of production technology, 
thereforet the use-value be completely consumed and 
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yet the instrument retain its use-form, its physical 
structure? If use-valuey according to Marx, is 
technology's (or any product's) 'existence as a 
material thing'(239), and use-values are 'the 
material depositories of exchange-value'(240), then 
does not its complete consumption mean its complete 
destruction as such a material thing? We know that 
in reality Marx's statement that technologies retain 
their physical form, even as 'corpses', is on the 
whole correct. But then what does he mean by the 
complete consumption of the use-value of 
technologies if not a reference to their physical 
destruction as a result of productive consumption? 
Beyond the fact that Marx recognizes that there is a 
distinction between the use-value of raw materials 
and that of technologies (241), he does not, to my 
knowledge, elaborate on this specific issue of 
'complete consumption' (of technologies) without 
actual physical destruction. It is certainly true 
that, as we have seen, he refers to the wear and 
tear of technologies, i. e. their physical/technical 
deterioration, that 'the instrument is at last 
exhausted and its entire value, detached from its 
corpse, is converted into money. '(242) But then we 
are told that technologies 'retain their shape' even 
'after their death'p as 'corpses'. (243) Their 
'exhaustion' or 'wearing out' cannot therefore 
simply mean their physical destruction - for 
otherwise they could hardly be said to 'retain their 
shape' as 'corpses'l 
The Icomplete consumption' of their 'use-value' can, 
therefore, I would suggest, only mean that the 
technologies in question are no longer functionin4, r 
produqýý though they 
'retain their shape'. This 
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is, in my view, the most plausible "meaning" and 
feasible interpretation; and it is consistent with 
our previous discussions on the use-value or 
usefulness of production technologies. But if they 
still retain their shape, their physical/technical 
structure, why are they unable to function as 
production technologies? 
With a simple instrument, such as a knife, for 
example, it is easy to see that when worn out, the 
blade has almost but vanished. With a complex 
machine the matter is not so simple, the different 
parts wear out at different rates and times. These 
parts can be replaced, and this part-replacement can 
go on well beyond the so-called 'calculation of 
averages', or the average life of the machine. There 
is then in reality a problem as regards the 
determination, in advance, of the point of technical 
exhaustion of particular technologies which has 
implications for the transfer of value. 
Marx, of course, recognizes this problem and the 
difficulty of exact calculation, and he attempts to 
illustrate this by a comparison of technology's life 
with that of a human being and refers to the way 
insurance companiesý despite the inherent difficulty 
of exact calculation, draw-up life-insurance 
policies. (244) It is true that some kind of 
'average' calculation is made based on experience, 
but this is a complex matter which requires 
detailed investigation of concrete situations - 
something which Marx has not carried out. Moreover, 
when one takes into consideration the conception of 
fixed capital as technological systems, then the 
problem of replacement and transfer of value becomes 
even more complicated. For the various elements of 
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the sys tem have different life-spans, and are 
therefore replaced without having to alter or 
replace the entire system all at once. 
I am in no way suggesting that Marx was entirely 
unaware of these difficulties and complications. In 
fact when discussing the turnover of fixed capital, 
or the replacement of technologies, he does refer to 
the complexities of the physical replacement of 
elements of the technological systemt etc.: 'In any 
investment of capital, ' Marx writes, 'the separate 
elements of the fixed capital have different 
lifetimes, and therefore different turnover 
times. '(245) Marx is also well aware that while 
certain elements would require total replacement, 
other 'elements of fixed capital permit of 
periodical or partial renewal. '(246) Indeed he 
distinguishes between, what he calls, 'homogeneous 
constituents' - e. g. rails in the railway system 
'renewed piecemeal at various intervals' - and 
'heterogeneous components' - e. g. component parts of 
a machine which wear out 'in unequal periods of time 
and must so be replaced' - of fixed capital. (247) 
But his awareness is just that and no more; in his 
theoretical scheme he fails to tackle the 
complexities of the problem involved. This is, then, 
clearly a weakness that has a considerable effect on 
the usefulness of Marx's conception of technology in 
terms of its economic application, and particularly 
so given the highly advanced nature and structure of 
today's technological systems (advanced 
mechanization and automation). 
There are other complications which Marx struggles 
with but does not adequately explain or resolve. For 
; jg 
example, even if the physical lifetime of 
technologies can perhaps be reasonably calculatedy 
their economic life cannot, for this depends on 
changes in market conditions, design of products and 
technologies, the process of research and 
development, the cost factor in all these as well as 
the actual manufacture and production-time of new 
technologies, and even, it could be argued, socio- 
political factors. The life-span of technologies is 
not merely determined by their physical durability 
or on specifically technical grounds, but, in fact 
much more so, by various socio-economic factors; it 
is variable and thus not wholly predictable. 
However, although these complexities and problems 
should not be brushed aside and need to be worked 
out much more clearly than Marx has, these are 
difficulties which concern the depreciation of fixed 
capital, which though obviously very important, is 
not the major concern of Marx (though one could 
argue that in economic terms it should have been, 
but that is an issue with which we are not concerned 
in this study). It can perhaps be argued that it is 
therefore sufficient for him to stipulate a 
generalized (and certainly oversimplified) model of 
a "straight-line" or "linear" value 
depreciation. (248) 
Thus, in accordance with Marx's (certainly highly 
controversial) conception of the law of value (or 
the law of exchange of equivalence), the transfer of 
the value of the system of technologies to the 
output takes place over the total duration of the 
lifetime of the functioning of production 
technologies. Fixed capital transfers its value 
gradually with each cycle of production, up to its 
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point of exhaustion. The monetary form of the value 
transferred is part of the profit realized in the 
course of each production cycle. This becomes part 
of the amortisation fund, the amount of which is 
determined -by the value of fixed capital and its 
average turnover time as a multiple of each cycle of 
production* 
The principle issue for Marx is, however, that of 
the devalorization of 
_cal2ital, which should not 
be 
confused with the depreciation of capital. While 
with depreciation, value is transferred and becomes 
part of the amortisation fund; with devalorizationg 
value is completely lost, destroyed. It is this 
which is the major concern of Marx, as 
devalorization is (according to Marx's theory of 
capitalism at any rate) an essential aspect of the 
contradictory character of the progress of 
accumulation. The significance of it lies in the 
following basic principle: 
For Marx there are two separate processes at work 
when one considers technological systems as fixed 
capital: on the one hand, the process of realization 
of the sum of money invested in existing 
technologies (or their value); on the other hand, 
the process of physical replacement of technologies 
(as use-values). The part of capital invested in 
machineryq buildingsq etc., (the network and/or the 
system)q 'is advanced in one lump sum'(249) for the 
entire period of the functioning of the system 
and/or network of production technologies as a whole 
- no matter how long it is, or how this lifetime is 
calculatedq and so on. Yet this 'lump sum' advanced 
is only realized gradually and piecemeal through 
depreciation of fixed capital (no matter how that 
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"depreciation" is achieved or calculated, etc. ) and 
by the formation of the amortisation fund. 
What is of great significance, and particularly for 
the accumulation of social capital (total capital of 
the entire social system) is that the realization of 
the 'lump sum' advanced through complete capital 
depreciation can become impossible because of the 
devalorization of fixed capital. In other words, the 
capital-value advanced may not be fully recovered, a 
larger or smaller part of it may be lost and 
completely annihilated. This can take place when (as 
it often happens) production technology becomes 
socially obsolete before its usefulness in the 
technical sense is exhausted (i. e. it is no longer 
socially necessary due to, for example, the 
invention and application of a more productive 
technology - though technically the 
"old" technology 
can still function perfectly well)e In this case, 
the amount originally invested in the now socially 
obsolete technology cannot be fully recovered2 a 
portion of it is written off; there is thus a 
devalorization rather than depreciation of fixed 
capital. Such devalorization, which is, for Marx, 
specifically and only linked to technological 
development and change under capitalism, is a 
vitally significant potential source of capitalist 
economic instability and crises. 
It is this potential source of instability (and 
crisis) which is Marx's main concern 
(and one could 
say, precisely for that very reason). And 
for this 
specific problematic the difficulties 
involved with, 
and intricate details of, 
depreciation of fixed 
capital (the transmission of value) 
is, for Marx at 
least, of secondary importance, so 
long as the basic 
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principle is provided. It is, therefore, in order 
(partly at least) to show this fundamental problem 
of devalorization that Marx employs the concept of 
fixed capital for the technological system in 
operation - obviously for such a purpose the concept 
of "technology", as "instrument" or "means" of 
labour or production, would be quite inappropriate, 
This conceptualization of the technological system 
as fixed capital and the inherent problems of 
devalorization associated with this value-form of 
technology have, as mentioned, a direct bearing on 
the very dynamics of technological change under 
capitalism which we need to examine in the next, and 
final, chapter. But before that, and before we can 
give an evaluation of Marx's ideas and propositions 
discussed in this chapter, we need to look at some 
other views and interpretations of Marx's writings 
on the role and form of technology, particularly 
his 
writings and ideas on machinery. 
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10. Marx on Technology in Capitalism: 
Comments on Two Alternative Interpretations 
In the previous sections of this chapter I presented 
a relatively detailed discussion and examination of 
Marx's ideas on technology in the capitalist 
production process, and on the basis of the 
association of these ideas and propositions a 
conception of technology was suggested. But before an 
evaluation of this conception can be made we need to 
in this section look at two of the most influential 
alternative interpretations of Marx on technology, 
which would at the same time, and hopefully) help to 
further clarify some of the main ideas we have 
already discussed. 
In this chapter, then, we have seen how Marx 
formulates his conception of technology by moving 
from one set of concepts which signifies the general 
role and character of production technology (e. g. 
instruments or means of labour, means of production, 
etc. ) to a more socio-historically specific set of 
concepts signifying the capitalistic role, character 
and function of production technology in the specific 
technical form of machinery. That is, he constructs 
his conception of technology from the abstract, 
general notion of technology as an instrument or a 
tool in the service of labour (as a mediatory 
object)q to the socially specific notion of 
technologyý or rather more accurately as we have 
seen, of technological systemsq as capital. Or, in 
other words, the transformation of technology 
from 
"means of labour"p instruments as tools employed and 
used by labouro into an objective manifestation of 
capitalist relations at the point of production, and 
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in that sense and only as such, into a "master" of labour, 
This distinctive conception, it was suggested in this 
chapter (and on the basis of the arguments set forth 
in chapters one and two of this study), rests on the 
fusion of the technical and the social function of 
machine technology (or the system of mechanization). 
There are, it is true, what can be called anomalies, 
and certainly, as we have seen, an important 
contradiction, in Marx's writings on machinery. But 
as I have argued in this chapter (and as the 
discussions presented in chapters one and two 
hopefully confirm), Marx's basic and fundamental 
theoretical position, at least according to my 
interpretation, is that the shaping of technology as 
capital is the shaping of its physical structure and 
functional principle by the social relations of 
production in such a way that (machine) production 
technology objectively (and technically) functions at 
the point of production as a moment or manifestation 
of capital. 
It is, however, this interpretation which is at odds 
with those interpretations of Marx which we are about 
to discuss. In the General Introduction we pointed to 
two main currents of thought on the issue of 
technology in Marx. Let us begin our discussion of 
these with the one, exemplified by the works of 
G. A. Cohen, William Shaw, and others of like-mind, 
whichisq on the whole, an attempt at a technological 
(or a technological-determinist) interpretation of 
Marx. 
This particular interpretation is, howeverg less 
directly (one could say, hardly at all) concerned 
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with a reconstruction of Marx's conception of 
technology under capitalism. Its 
, claim on the "primacy" of the role and significance of 
"technology" (but more precisely and accurately, on 
the role of "productive forces") is with respect to 
Marx's general (and long-range) conception of history 
and social change. We have already discussed (in 
chapter one) a main aspect of this interpretation, 
which is more directly related to the thesis of this 
study, ' in relation to the problematic of " the 
material" v. "the social" in Marx as formulated by 
Cohen. 
However, since Cohen, Shaw, and others of similar 
persuasion, are specifically concerned with Marx's 
(general) materialist conception of history (or 
"historical materialism") and particularly as a 
philosophical exercise, there is little discussion 
and analysis of Marx's specific views on the nature, 
form, function and role of production technology 
within capitalist production in their works. 
Nonetheless, what can be observed from the various 
statements made by these writers is a view which, 
implicitly if not explicitly, denies that for Marx 
technology in itself (by its technical structure, 
character and properties - i. e. by its very 
"materiality") is social - and not merely in the 
broad, general sense of "social determination", but 
more specifically in the more strict sense of being a 
manifestation of capital as a social relation of 
production. 
This interpretation of technology in itself as merely 
a material force of production as such - that is, as 
a technically useful object which 
is, as it were, 
only embraced by this or that social 
form of 
production relations (as opposed to the coalescence 
of social form and technical characteristic and 
function) - is directly related to and based on an 
interpretation of Marx's ideas on material relations 
and the labour7process in general, which we discussed 
earlier in this chaptere 
Thus, for example, we have this statement by Shaw 
which though not directly referring to technology, 
nevertheless by implication separates the domain of 
technology from its social framework: 'Work 
relations, ' Shaw writes, 'are those involved in the 
production of material objects, relations which 
comprise the actual production process viewed apart 
from its social framework. '(250)True that what Shaw 
is here attempting to convey is a distinction between 
what he calls 'ownership' relations and 'technical 
(material) work relations'(251). But as we have 
argued in this chapter, for Marx, the labour-process, 
material relations, and production technology, are 
not (nor can be) in themselves (i. e. even as 
'content', so to speak) devoid of social form. Any 
given technical (material) relation, as also and 
therefore with technology, has (as 'content') a 
'determinate form'. 
For Marx the distinction of 'content' and 'form', 
does not at all mean that content 
(material 
relationsq technology) is in itself formless - that 
somehow a particular form merely embraces the content 
as if it were simply externally related to the 
contentq and 'form' as such can thereby 
be disposed 
of. The idea that under capitalism social 
form is 
somehow imposed upon the 
'content', upon technology 
and material relations, and that with communism we 
have (or "will" have) 'the conquest of form _hy 
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matter', as asserted by Cohen (252), for example, is 
not only dubious in itself but, I suggest, alien to 
Marx's mode of thought. It implies that 'content' 
('matter') has, in and of itself, no social form; it 
implies use-value, technology, productive forces, 
material production (as 'simply human' contentq 
according to Cohen (253)), can all have a reality 
other than a social reality. 
However, what is fundamental, for Marx, is the change 
of social f orm , and not 
'matter' conquering 'form' . 
With this change, what is 'stripped' away, cast off, 
is not social form as such, but the social form 
specific to capital/wage-labour: 'the direct, material 
production process', Marx writes with respect to the 
revolutionary transformation of capitalist society, 
, is stripped of the form of penfiry and 
antithesis. '(254) It is the capitalist form, this 
antagonistic social form which is 'stripped of'. In 
fact, to use Ellen Meiksins Wood's words, 'is it not 
the first premise of historical materialism that 
material production is a social phenomenon? '(255) 
In any case, in support of his interpretation of the 
issue raised aboveg Shaw quotes a part of a sentence 
from a very long passage from Capital, vol. III, in 
which Marx is referring to the so-called 
'trinity 
formula' and 'the complete mystification of the 
capitalist mode of production'. This is how Shaw 
invokes Marx's support and it is worth quoting him in 
full: 'Failure to distinguish society's technical 
(material) work relations from its socially specific 
ownership relations - that 
is, from the socio- 
historical integument of those work relations - leads 
to mystificationg especially 
in the analysis of 
capitalism. Thusq Marx pointedly criticizes 
those who 
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confuse "the material production relations with their 
historical and social determination. "'(256) 
Now let us see what Marx actually writes: '... in this 
economic trinity represented as the connection 
between the component parts of value and wealth in 
general and its sources, we have the complete 
mystification of the capitalist mode of production, 
the conversion of social relations into things, the 
direct coalescence of the material production 
relations with their historical and social 
determination. It is an enchanted, pervertedv topsy- 
turvy world.... '(257) 
First of all, the 'complete mystification' Marx is 
referring to is not claimed by Marx to be simply due 
to the fact that economists, social scientists, or 
anyone else for that matter, have somehow confused 
'material production relations with their historical 
and social determination'. It is quite clear from the 
passage (even if we were to disregard other 
statements of Marx relevant to this issue) that, the 
mystification (that is, if one were to accept Marx's 
argument) is in fact due to the very functioning of 
the capitalist mode of production itself; i. e. 
because of a mode of production which converts (in 
the reality of daily life itself) social relations 
into 'things'. Here, then, it is not a question of 
conceptual confusion of technical relations and 
social form; it is in fact a question of actual 
'direct coalescence' of the two in reality - that is 
why, at least according to my reading of Marx, we 
have such a mystification. 
Secondlyq Marx Is criticism is levelled, on the one 
handý at those representatives of what he calls 
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I vulgar economy' who take the economic trinity - i. e. 
capital-profit (interest), land-rent, labour-wages - 
as a formula to justify the order of things as 
'natural' and 'rational' and hence also as 'eternal'o 
And, on the other, at 'the best spokesmen of 
classical economy', but not because these latter 
'confused' material relations with their socio- 
historical determination. On the contrary, Marx in 
fact praises these (latter) economists for their work 
in revealing the different aspects of the capitalist 
mystification represented by the economic trinity 
(Marx writes: 'It is the great merit of classical 
economy to have destroyed this false appearance and 
illusion... '(258)). He censures them, howeverp on the 
grounds that despite the fact that in their analyses 
and 'their criticism' of this economic trinity they 
had conceptually 'dissolved' and 'destroyed this 
false appearance and illusion'q they had nonetheless, 
due to their class position and interests (Marx 
writes: 'as cannot be otherwise from a bourgeois 
standpoint'), 'remain[ed] more or less in the grip of 
[this] world of illusion'. (259) 
We have here, in other words, a political criticism, 
and not a charge of ignorance of the so-called 
distinction between the technical (material) and the 
social (ownership) relations, or the confusion of 
technical relations with their social determination 
(even though that may well be quite true in some 
cases). 
The upshot of the above argument is that in order to 
be able to sustain his technological 
(mis)interpretation of Marx, Shaw has not only taken 
a sentence from Marx out of context, 
but, more than 
this, he has even left out those very words and 
sentences which are quite central to its 
understanding, and which if left in by Shaw would have completely contradicted his claim (i. e. 'the 
direct coalescence of the material production 
relations with their historical and social 
determination' - which is precisely the essential 
basis of the notion of technology as capital, the 
fusion of the technical and the social), 
Shaw, therefore, I submitq completely misconceives 
the real and actual mystification of capital, and 
claims that this is how Marx viewed the problem. For 
Marx, however, the matter is quite the contrary. The 
real source of this mystification is precisely due to 
the fusion, the direct coalescence, of the 
technical/material relation, indeed of technology in 
itself, and its socio-historically specific social 
form as capital. That Marx viewed the mystification 
or illusion based on this fusion as something that 
actually takes place in the reality of everyday life 
is confirmed by a statement which he makes in the 
same passage from which Shaw has extracted his 
"abridged" sentence: '... it is just as natural, ' Marx 
remarks, 'for the actual agents of production to feel 
completely at home in these estranged and irrational 
forms of capital-interest, land-rent, labour-wages, 
since these are precisely the forms of illusion in 
which 
_they _ 
move about and find their. 
_ 
daily 
occupation. '(260) 
on this point, in his approach and interpretation, 
Shaw follows in the foot-steps of his mentor, G. A. 
Cohen2 whose views on this issue we have already 
discussed in chapter one. Cohen, of course, makes a 
large number of claims on behalf of Marx beside those 
already discussed2 not all of which can be discussed 
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or examined here for reasons of both strict relevance 
and space. One of his assertions which is relevant to 
the issue being considered here is concerned with his 
I redefinition of the proletariat' in connection with 
the 'ownership of the means of production'. 
After a couple of pages of discussing a hypothetical 
case of two would-be proletarians in relation to the 
means of production, Cohen concludes that: 'It is 
broadly true that the proletariat was formed when 
immediate producers were deprived of their means of 
production. But lack of means of production is not as 
essential to proletarian status as is traditionally 
maintained. It is better to say that a proletarian 
must sell his labour power in order to obtain his 
means of life. He may own means of production, but he 
cannot use them to support himself save by 
contracting with a capitalist. '(261) 
In other words, the separation of labour from the 
means of production (from the technological system) 
is not, according to Cohen, an essential 
presupposition of the social form of labour as wage- 
labour and hence also, by implication, of the social 
form of technology (means of production, instruments, 
or the system of machinery) as capital. The argument 
he sets forth appears quite convincing - but for a 
fundamental flaw which I shall come to shortly, 
I 
Cohen begins with two individuals: Schwartz and his 
brother-in-law Weiss. The first works as a cutter in 
a dress factory; the second as an operator 
in a coat 
factory. Schwartz is then allowed to own his own 
scissors, but he also uses a machine which 
he does 
not ('cannot') own. It 
is, therefore, 'false', Cohen 
statest 'that Schwartz owns none of 
the means of 
I Q-9 
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production he uses. '(262) Weissq however, owns the 
sewing machine - the only instrument he technically 
requires, which he operates for sewing coats - as a 
condition in fact of his employment at the factory. 
Weiss, therefore, 'constitutes', according to Cohen, 
'not only a counter-example to, but a paradox for, 
the Marxian theorem that proletarians own no means of 
production. '(263) 
The cases described by Cohen are, of course, not 
uncommon even in the most advanced capitalist 
countries today. Cohen himself mentions the early 
North American garment industry(264); there are 
however a number of other examples which can be given 
whereby the direct producer owns at least some 
instruments he uses - this is quite common in the 
building trade; among plumbers; and, perhaps most 
widespread of all, among various categories of home- 
workers (mostly women). And one may indeed go further 
than Cohen and state that in his generalization of 
the essential condition of wage-labour (of 
proletarian status), Marx may have failed to take 
adequate stock of this aspect of the reality of 
working conditions. But is this a sufficient ground 
for claiming the non-essentiality of the separation 
of the means of production to proletarian status? I 
suggest not, for there is one major flaw in Cohen's 
discussion: he has completely neglected to take 
account of Marx's concept of fixed capitalg a 
fundamental aspect of which is the distinction 
between the functioning system of production 
technology and instruments (or indeed an 'apparatus' 
in the Weberian sense) as means of labour. The 
question then is: can the system of technology 
(i. e. 
fixed capital) be owned by 
(individual) workers as 
wap, e-workers? 
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In fact from Cohen's own account of Weiss's inability 
to compete with capitalist factories it is possible 
to dismiss his 'redefinition' of a proletarian as a 
sham - and this as follows: 
Since Weiss owns the sewing machine he operates on, 
and since (it is assumed) he can obtain the materials 
he needs to make a coat quite cheaply, Cohen argues, 
he is able to perform the whole of the operation at 
home, and thus away from the 'subjection to the 
capitalist. ' In other words, he can become a self- 
employed small producer/ trader (very much in the 
guise of any traditional artisan). However, Cohen 
tells us (and rightly so) that under these 
conditions, 'he can produce domestically only on a 
paltry scale, and cannot [therefore-RR] enter trading 
connections which would enable him to compete with 
capitalist factories. '(265) 
And that is precisely the point. For we need to ask, 
as Cohen does not, why it is that Weiss is only able 
to produce 'on a paltry scale'? It is not necessary 
here to go over all the details of how and why the 
factory system of machinery enhances the productive 
power of labour (for not only is Cohen himself well 
aware of the facts of the matter, but this is 
something which is a well recognized point). To put 
the matter simply, for Marx it is the nature (scale 
and quality) of fixed capital (the technological 
system) which is the essential factor in this case. 
It is to a crucial extent the nature of fixed capital 
which determines the competency and competitive 
ability of a particular producer. 
If, howeverý Weiss can manage to survive on his own 
feet, so to speak - as evidently some small 
producers-traders-artisans 
have always done so under 
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capitalism by specializing in some craft or otherv or in a particular field of artisanall artistic, or what 
can be called "custom-made"O production - whatever his income situation he is no longer a proletarian 
(and this not only by Marx's definition but also by 
Cohen's acceptance of Marx's structural 
definition(266)), 
But if Weiss is forced to return to his old factory 
because he is unable to compete with capitalist 
factories - given his scale of production due, at 
least to an important extent, to the nature of the 
technological condition of his mode of production - 
then the fact that he even continues to own the 
machine he operates becomes irrelevant to his 
(renewed) status as a proletarian. And this for the 
simple reason that (at least by Cohen's own stated 
assumption) Weiss and his machine cannot function 
independently of the technological system and 
technical structure of his old factory (he cannot 
operate productively, efficientlyq or profitably in 
accordance to the prevailing standard or norm set 
down by capitalist factories at that time)* 
The main issue here is this: the concept of "means of 
production", as we have seen, is a broad concept 
which takes on board the factor of technology 
(instrument, tool) but as part of a collectivity of 
other instrumental and material factors directly 
involved and functioning in the production process. 
While Cohen concentrates on the fact of "ownership" 
in his 'redefinition' of a proletarian, he completely 
fails to take into account the interdependence of the 
conceptions of property and technology in Marx and 
the significance of this to Marx's definition of the 
proletariat. Marx's conception of technology - his 
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conception of the role, character and function of 
means of labour, of technological systems, as capital 
- is an integral part of his theory of capitalism and 
should not be considered as merely a side-issue. 
Insofar as our friend Weiss is concerned, the problem 
of his class status, taking into consideration Marx's 
conception of technology, can be looked at in this 
way: Weiss owns an instrument (a sewing machine), but 
not "the means of production". He may of course 
transform himself into an independent producer, if he 
is able to secure himself a niche in the market for 
making coats. In that case, he would have made his 
single instrument function as part of the domestic, 
very small scale, technical condition as his means of 
production (an artisanal technological system). 
Thus, if he worked successfully at home, in effect 
what we would then have is, for example, a 
transformation of his home into a workshop (de facto 
if not also de jure). The instrument (the sewing 
machine) he would then be using becomes socially 
(economically) useful (given his position in the 
market for coats) as a functioning moment, as a part 
of, a technological framework 
(admittedly very 
limited in scale), and it is then that we can say 
Weiss (now as a small craftsman, artisan, or 
whatever) owns his means of production, 
But since Weiss has failed 
(given Cohen's 
assumption), heý as Cohen says, 
'must sell his labour 
power'; but the sale of his 
labour power is because 
he had failed to secure a niche in the market for 
coats and this because 
(again, given Cohen's 
assumption of Weiss's paltry scale of production) 
he 
is deprived of the fixed capital socially 
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(economically) required for him to be able to compete 
with capitalist factories. (It could of course be 
argued that his failure had nothing to do with the 
limited nature of his technological conditions, but 
more to do with his inability, lack of talent and 
shrewdness, to break into the market for coats. But 
then here we are following Cohen's assumptions on the 
basis of which he 'redefines' the term proletariat. ) 
Weiss's instrument (along with his skill, ingenuity, 
and so on), in short, has proved to be socio- 
economically (in strictly capitalistic sense) useless 
independent of the given system of technology (the 
capitalist factory system of coat production of the 
time). 
Thus, on the basis of Marx's conception of technology 
discussed and presented in this chapter, his 
instrument (and the technological system he had 
managed to set up when working at home) is, 
therefore, not a means of production in the strict 
sense. That is to say, outside of the factory where 
Weiss works, his machine proved to be incapable of 
functioning as a (productive) technology to produce 
to the scale that is socially necessary. 
Weiss's machine, however, becomes a means of 
production so soon as it becomes a part of the means 
of production of Weiss's old capitalist owned factory 
- so soon as, that is, 
it becomes an element of fixed 
capital (see the discussion of Marx on this 
in 
section 9). He may, of course, take 
it home every 
night; he may even sew a 
few coats with its use to 
supplement his wages. But 
for all that he owns it 
simply as a personal 
implement (very similar to 
owning a personal computer referred 
to as an example 
when we discussed Marx 
Is conception of technological 
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systems as fixed capital), notý however, as Cohen 
claims, as his means of production. For it can only 
function as a means of production (means of labour) 
in the strict sense, when and only if it is 
incorporated within a system of technology (whether 
that system is an artisanal system, a capitalistic 
factory system, or whatever). 
With the assumption that Weiss has failed as an 
independent producer, it must be concluded that he is 
a proletarian, despite the fact that he owns his 
sewing machine - it is in this sense that Marx calls 
such forms of ownership of instruments (and not means 
of production) as 'sham property'. (267) 
Therefore, in his 'redefinition' of a proletarian, I 
submit, Cohen confuses the concepts of means of 
production and instruments; they are, of course 
related, but hardly identical. In the strict sense, 
there is a distinction between "means of production" 
and "means of labour". The former includes raw 
material, instruments, etc., or the entire 
material/objective elements used in production; while 
the latter excludes raw materials and what Marx calls 
'objects' of labour, and refers to instruments and 
instrumental conditions only. Althoughq it must be 
admitted that the two terms (instruments and means of 
production) are sometimes used interchangeably by 
many Marxists. 
However, we went furtherg and according to the 
definition we arrived at in an earlier section of 
this chapterg means of labour were designated as the 
complex of toolsq implementsq and 
instruments, as 
well as infrastructural 
factors (factory buildings, 
etc. ) or what we identified as 
technological systems 
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(or what under capitalist conditions Marx refers to 
as fixed capital). Specifically, under a strictly 
capitalist process of production, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to consider the 
ownership, or use or function, of an instrument 
independently of a network or system of technology 
(at least according to my interpretation of Marx). It 
is this systemic definition that Cohen seems to be 
completely unaware of, or at least ignores, when he 
defines (268) and uses the concepts of "means of 
production" or "means of labour" (although, it needs 
to be pointed out here that, Marx's own usage of 
these concepts is sometimes quite vague). 
A factor which is also crucial here is the system's 
socio-technical characteristic, and even the 
character of a particular technology as part of that 
system. That is, the distinction between "tools" 
(even a single machine as with a sewing machine, or a 
typewriter, or a computer) and "machinery" in its 
systemic characteristics; i. e. between technology 
which labour uses (as Weiss would have used the 
sewing machine as an independent small 
producer/artisan) and that which in its functioning 
mode uses labour (e. g. Weiss's machine as an integral 
part of a machine/industrial factory system). Cohen 
also ignores this aspect of Marx's ideas on the 
distinction between certain "non-proletarian" forms 
of labour and wage-labour (or the proletarian status 
of an individual). 
But then for Cohen there seems to exist no blending, 
or unity and fusion, of social and technical 
functions of instruments, and consequently it also 
appears that he is quite unsure of the significance 
of the technical transformation of 
instruments in the 
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process of capital's 'real subsumption' of workers 
and their intensive proletarianization (i. e. the 
impoverishment of the worker's capacities, skills, 
knowledge, etc., at the point of production - which 
is, surely, also crucial to Marx's definition of the 
proletariat). The impression one gets from Cohen's 
(scattered) remarks on Marx's writings on machinery 
is that, though he may well be fully aware of the 
distinction between industrial machine technology and 
other pre-industrial instruments of production, it 
seems he has no perception of the substantive soclial 
distinction (i. e. beyond what can be called a 
technical-engineering distinction) between these 
different kinds of technologies. We can see this, for 
example, in the following couple of passages, which 
would suffice to illustrate Cohen's lack of 
appreciation of this issue in Marx: 
In a passageg in which Cohen attempts to establish, 
through the example of geographical conditions of 
human society, the separate identity of 'material 
enviro nment' as a 'natural basis' of the given socio- 
economic structure7 and this as a non-social 
fact(269), he introduces machine technology and 
identifies a machine, in its materiality, with such 
an environment. First he starts with an apparently 
valid statement: 'That there is a river 
here, ' Cohen 
writes, 'is not, on any reckoning, a social 
fact. Yet 
it may be of great social consequence, conditioning 
trade routs, for example. It is a material 
fact of 
social importance. 
'(270) His next move is to compare 
a natural change of 
direction of the river with a 
change of direction as a result 
of 'intentional' 
human action (i. e. by design; thus the new 
direction 
is socially determined). 
He then follows this move 
with a number of questions: 
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(a) 'Does not the river's direction remain a physical 
matter? ' - that is, if I understand Cohen correctly, 
whether the change of direction is due to natural 
factors or human action, the fact remains that the 
change is a physical, material fact, and hence not a 
social one (though with certain social consequences). 
This is then confirmed by: 
(b) 'And if a canal is built, is this not merely a 
more drastic rearrangement of matter? ' - that is, the 
canal as an instrument (a technological feature like 
railways, roads, etc. ), though obviously purposely 
designed and in that sense socially determinedg is 
also considered by Cohen as 'merely' a material fact 
which is thus in essence no different from the course 
of a river. And, now, to the final questionp which 
really, as it were, gives the game away: 
(c) 'And what is a machineg but a set of moving 
pieces. of matter, an artificially contrived part of 
the environment? '(271) - that is, machine technology 
is also, according to Cohen, 'merely' a material 
fact, or perhaps one could sayp at bestp nothing but 
an even 'more drastic rearrangement of matter'p 
which as such an arrangement of matter is thus 
essentially a non-social fact and therefore despite 
this technical, 'artificially contrived', 
rearrangement of matter its social rolep character 
and function is no different from pre-machine 
instruments* 
By means of "analytical logic", Cohen thus reduces 
what is historically and socially specific to the 
capitalist production process - i. e. the machine 
industrial form of technology - to nothing more than 
a mere 'rearrangement of matter', hardly 
distinguishable from any other form of technology, or 
indeed from even a natural 'rearrangement of matter' 
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(as with the change of direction of a river, for 
example). 
Cohen's purpose in all this is to establish the 
primacy and deterministic role of material productive 
forces, of technology, in Marx's thoughts. The 
argument is intended to commit Marx to the priority 
or primacy of "matter" (of the "content") and its 
it naturally" deterministic role insofar as any given 
socio-economic structure (the "social form") is 
concerned. By means of 'easy steps'(272), Cohen 
therefore abstracts the social form of technology (as 
capital), and thereby he thus abstracts the social 
distinction between machine technology and a craft- 
tool. By 'easy steps' he makes all forms of 
technologies - indeed he makes even 'the entire 
productive plant of sophisticated economy# - appear 
as little more than 'a humanly imposed 
geography'(273). By 'easy steps' he thus makes 
technology (material productive forces) supera- 
socialg nothing more than matter rearranged2 and as 
such on a par with the natural basis of human society 
(a mere modification of 'material environment'(274)) 
- something that even if 'artificially contrived' has 
merely social consequences or is a 'material fact of 
social importance'9 but is not "in itself" social. 
From the above we can proceed to the second passage 
in which Cohen further demonstrates his lack of 
appreciation of Marx's conception of technology under 
capitalism. Following our discussion of Cohen's 
reference to a machine as a rearrangement of matter, 
we can ask the following question: With capital's 
'real subsumption', how does "dead labour" then 
dominate living labour? In order to arrive at an 
answerg Coheng in the first place, points to the 
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distinction Marx makes between capital's 'formal 
subjugation' and real subjugation'. On formal 
subjugation, Cohen states the following: 'That the 
subjugation is formal does not mean that the labourer 
is not really_ subjugated to capital: it means he is 
not subiuRated reaLly, in material fashion [my 
emphasis herel. '(275) Now, what happens with 'real 
subjugation'? According to Cohen, with real 
subjugation 'the form so develops the content that 
the worker becomes materially unable to operate 
except in subjection to capital. '(276) 
But what does it mean that the worker is 'materially' 
incapable to 'operate' unless he is subjugated by 
capital? Cohen's answer is as follows: 'His; [the 
worker's) skills are so diminished that he can 
produce only at a capitalist's machine, and he must 
follow its movements, instead of wielding tools 
subject to his control. '(277) 
Let us look at this answer more closely: 
Cohen's reference to the diminishing of skills is 
clearly important in Marx's ideas on technology. But 
we need to ask why it is that the worker's skills 
diminish (assuming that Marx's observation is in 
fact correct)? Cohen does not consider this. From 
what little he does say on this issue, it is evident 
(though merely implicitly so) that he is obviously 
well aware of the connection Marx makes between the 
reduction in skills and the development of the 
machine industrial factory system. Yet Cohen neglects 
to examine the implications of Marx's idea on what is 
(or what Marx believes is) involved in the process of 
real subjugation. He simply mentions 
(quoting Marx) 
that with real subjugationg instruments 
(means of 
production), 'subsume' and 
'employ' the 
ý10 
labourer. (278) He does not inquire how this is 
possible; or in what sense does Marx envisage such a 
subsumption; or why it is that Marx consistently 
stresses the role and significance of machinery 
insofar as real subsumption is concerned? 
The worker's skill diminishes, according to Marx, 
because of the development of machine technology; the 
more developed this particular form of technology, 
and specifically as a system of mechanization, the 
more it incorporates human productive skills. The 
incorporation of skills into machines and systems of 
machinery involves (self-evidently) the intentional 
technical/material transformation of the structural 
features and functional principles of instruments. It 
is through this transformation that what is a social 
or socio-economic requirement - i. e. according to 
Marx's theory, the reduction or replacement of skills 
in order to lower the value of labour-power - 
becomes, what Cohen calls2 a 'material fact' (i. e. is 
expressed technologically). Form and content fuse - 
machine technology becomes in its very objectivity a 
'material' moment or manifestation of capital 
(i. e. 
technology as capital). 
For this intentional 'rearrangement of matter' 
(i. e. 
the design of machinery) can only mean that the 
social purpose of such a rearrangement 
(the 
reduction of skills to cheapen 
labour-power, to 
increase productivity and efficiency, and so on) 
has 
become an inseparable part of the very physical 
structure of the machine - the social aspect cannot 
now be abstracted from the technology's objectivity. 
The content has now a 
'determinate form' (as capital) 
and it is because of 
this that the worker 'becomes 
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materially unable to operate except in subjection to 
capital'. 
In the passage quoted above, we have, moreover, what 
appears to be a hint of awareness, by Cohen, of the 
distinction between machines and tools: he says, the 
worker 'must follow its [the capitalist's machine's] 
movements, instead of wielding tools subject to his 
control'. However, on closer examination of the 
sentence, I suggest, this recognition proves to be 
merely formal. For Cohen says: 'capitalist 
- 
's 
machine', which clearly implies a machine that 
b to the capitalist; it is not a reference to a 
capitalist machine (capitalist technology, or 
technology as capital). If Cohen therefore appears to 
recognize a distinction between a tool and a machine, 
it is (or at least it seems to be) merely a 
distinction based on the fact of ownership or 
property alone. We have already examined the 
significance of the ownership of technology or means 
of production in Marx's thought. Yet we suggested 
that Marx's conception of technology as capital goes 
further, and beyond, this formal (ownership) 
relationship (see especially chapter two), 
For Cohen, therefore, the specific technical 
character of the machine as distinct from the tool 
may be socially importantt but is not 
in itself a 
social fact. The machine isq then, 
like a tool, 
merely an instrument of production; 
it is technically 
more complexq and it is more 
"productive", certainly, 
but it has no other social signification than as a 
rearrangement of matter, a product of and a means of 
labour, which belongs to the capitalist* 
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Cohen places technology (more precisely the material 
productive forces) withinp so to speak, the domain of 
of matter"; it is as such, and not as a social fact, 
that material productive forces and technology 
assume, in Cohen's interpretation of Marx, their 
primacy and indeed their deterministic role. But at 
the same time, Cohen wants to distance himself from 
criticisms of "crude materialism" and from those 
interpretations of Marx that some regard as "vulgar" 
technological--determinist. Thus, he stresses the 
significance of 'the social' in Marxp but this onl 
, 
as something that 'envelops' the material content of 
human history (e. g. of productive forces and 
technology). Insofar as machine technology is 
concerned, he does not remove it from the social 
context of capitalismp but he does separate its 
social and material aspects. This he claims is Marx's 
view, and to "prove" thisp he also like Shaw2 as we 
have seeng appeals to Marx's criticism of the 
"f etishism" and "crude materialism" of bourgeois 
economists. 
However, while it is true that Marx criticises the 
"crude materialism" of the economists of his time, he 
does so not on the basis of the separation of the 
social from the material, but, on the contrary, on 
the grounds that these economistsq according to Marx, 
fail to explain the essence of the very mystification 
of capital from the fact that in the capitalist mode 
of production the material and social aspects of 
'things', including and above all else technologies, 
are insej2arable. As I understand 
it and as I have 
attempted to show in this study, as 
far as Marx is 
concernedq these economists are 
"guilty" (if that is 
indeed the right word or true) of precisely those 
views that Cohen argues 
for: machine technology (the 
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material productive force of capitalism) is looked at 
not as a necessary aspect of capital's social 
relations of production, but only as a "factor" of 
production, or as simply "capital-asset", merely as 
an element of the labour process, and in the case of 
Cohen, simply as a material productive force; thus 
abstracting what is in fact its definite, specific 
form, as capital. 
On this very subject, in criticising Ricardo, Marx 
writes: 'the economists continually mix up the 
definite, specific form in which these things [i. e. 
the material conditions, means of production, 
technologies, etc. -RR] constitute capital with their 
nature as things and as simple elements of every 
labour process. The mystification contained in 
capital - as employ r of labour - is not explained by 
them, but it is constantly expressed by them 
unconsciously, for it is insep rable from the 
material aspect of c [my emphasisl. '(279) 
Cohen maintains that Marx wants us to 'recognize' a 
machine as an instrument (as a machine as such) 
'even if we ignore' its 'social relational, economic 
properties'(280). But as I understand Marx, the 
recognition of a machine as an instrument of 
production is precisely determined by its 
'social 
relational, economic properties', which cannot and 
must not be ignored. For 'if we ignore' them we are 
disregarding the machine's socio-historical 
specificity (as capital) and thereby reduce it to, in 
the words of Marx, 'something purely physical, only 
an element in the labour-pr-ocess(281); something, 
therefore, which is 
'common to all modes of 
01 
production and does not 
'express the specific nature 
of capital. 
'(282) 
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Whatq in my opinion, Cohen does, with his 'easy 
steps' , is to replace the "economists"' (supposed) 
confusion of the social form and the material aspect 
of 'things' as, for example, in the case of the 
instruments of production, by an abstraction which 
separates the social form from the material content 
of technology - we then have machinery, in Cohen's 
interpretation, as simply and merely a productive 
force which as such a force does not in itself 
express the specific nature of capital. These 'easy 
step' abstractions rather than helping to clarify and 
explain the mystification contained in the 
functioning of machine technology (or the industrial 
system of technology) as capital, merely expresses 
that there is such a mystification. For Cohen fails 
to recognize and examine, in his interpretation of 
Marx, the specific form in which technologies 
(instrumentsý material productive forces), for Marxq 
constitute capital (i. e. as "in themselves" 
material/technical manifestations or moments of 
capital) as distinct from the abstraction of these as 
elements (factors) of every labour process. 
It needs to be mentioned at this point, that the 
above discussion, being narrowly limited to one 
specific topic dealt with by Cohen, inevitably leaves 
out much that is valuable and of immense theoretical 
significance in his work. But while I, 
unhesitatinglyg acknowledge the limited nature and 
scope of my brief critical remarks, it is important 
to bear in mind that the points examined above are 
based on a key issue in Cohen's reconstruction (and 
'defence') of Marx's theory of history. This issue 
is, I believeg central to his arguments and is based 
on an interpretation which commits 
Marx (falsely in 
0 my viewq as well as others 
(283)) to the separation 
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of the material from the social. (284) With this 
'desocialization' of the material base (to use Wood's 
words), we not only have, with Cohen, a 
technological-determinist interpretation of Marx's 
materialist conception of history (historical 
materialism as at best a more "refined" version of 
technological determinism)q but also a purely 
technical, non-social (socially neutral) 
interpretation of Marx's conception of technology 
under capitalism. 
There are, of course, a large number of authorities 
and Marx-scholars who, despite having some wide- 
ranging differences of view on this or that aspect of 
Marx's works, seem to agree, at least in principle 
and in general, that Marx cannot be regarded as a 
"technological-determinist" (not even in Cohen's 
eloquent, refined and polished version). These 
authorities provide a broadly "social-deterministic" 
interpretation of Marx. (285) However, much of their 
discussions on and arguments against, "technological- 
determinism", has to do with the philosophical, often 
also methodological, and socio-historical (e. g. 
social change from feudalism to capitalism, etc. ) 
aspects of Marx's works. And, thus, whatever the 
merits of such views, it would not only be 
inappropriate but also impossible to examine these 
here (given both the strict limits of my thesis and 
for lack of space if no other reason)e 
Hereq then, by way of an alternative to both Cohen's 
and my own interpretation, I shall concentrate on 
only one particular strand of this, one could say, 
philosophically different, 
"social-deterministic" 
interpretation of Marx. The choice of this particular 
interpretation is not, however, arbitrary. For, on 
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the one hand, it is a view of Marx which, since the 
mid-1970s, has informed an extremely influential 
current of thought; and on the other, and perhaps 
more to the point for us, it is an interpretation 
which is not only more directly concerned with the 
issue of technology, but with its role and status 
under capitalism, 
A major issue in this interpretation, and one which 
is directly relevant to the thesis of this study, is 
the suggestion, as mentioned in my General 
Introduction, that for Marx it is not technology as 
such (i. e. the form of technology as machine 
technology in its technical structure, design and as 
it functions in the process of production) which is 
either deterministic or of fundamental significance. 
What is crucial for Marx, it is suggested, is the way 
production technology (machinery) is used, or the 
mode of its employment and utilization. 
Undoubtedly, in my opinion, the best example of this 
interpretation is found in Harry Braverman's work, 
Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974). And for this 
reason, here, therefore, I shall discuss and attempt 
a critical examination of Braverman's interpretation 
of Marx on technology. 
Braverman's work is concerned with the analysis of 
the capitalist labour process which attempts to go 
beyond Marx's analysis given in Capital, volume I. 
The arguments and discussions he produces and 
develops are rich in historical examples and factual 
details, and eloquent in form. He begins with a 
discussion of the distinction between 'human labour' 
and that of other animal species. Like Marx, he 
concludes that: 
'Human work is conscious and 
ff 
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purposive, while the work of other animals is 
instinctual. '(286) And, according to Braverman, what 
is fundamental about human labour is what he calls, Ithe power of conceptual thought'. (287) For 
Braverman, this basic distinction between human and 
animal 'work' serves to establish a theoretical 
point: While with all other animals, 'the directing 
force -and the resulting activity, instinct and 
execution, are indivisible', with humans this 'unity 
between the motive force of labor and the labor 
itself is not inviolable. '(288) In short, with 
humans: 'The unity of conce tion and execution may be 
dissolved. '(289) 
Following in the foot-steps of Marx, he then 
identifies what is a fundamental feature of 
capitalism: the commodification of labour-power. With 
labour-power 'alienated', the workers, Braverman goes 
on, 'also surrender their interest in the labor 
process. .. ' What he means by this is that: ', The labor 
process has become the responsibility of the 
capitalist. '(290) The labour process, thus, according 
to Braverman (and Marx, also) becomes the 'setting of 
antagonistic relations of production'. Under such 
conditions a basic problem involved in the capitalist 
labour process is the realization of the 'full 
usefulness' of labour power. The realization of 
labour power is a problem of the translation of that 
power into labour, and as efficiently and effectively 
as possible. And this is, what Braverman calls, 'the 
problem of management' , or of managerial coIntrol, 
which 'presents itself in history as the progressive 
alienation of the process of production from the 
worker*oo'(291) 
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We are here concerned only with Braverman's 
interpretation of Marx on how this problem of 
management becomes a technological issue. How does 
Bravermanv basing himself unflinchingly and squarely 
on Matx's works on this subject, explain the role, 
status, and function of technology in this historical 
process of 'the progressive alienation of the process 
of production from the workers'? How does he come to 
explain the exercise of control at the point of 
production in relation to the technological 
phenomenon of industrial machine technology? 
To discuss these questions we need to examine 
Braverman's writings on "machinery". But by way of an 
introduction let us first look at his ideas on and 
his interpretation of Marx's view of the relation 
between technology and society as a general 
problematic. 
Like all (or almost all) Marxists, Braverman accepts 
that Marx gave 'a position of primacy to the "means 
of production" [actually as we have seen this should 
read "productive forces" -RRII in social 
evolution. '(292) But in his view this proposition was 
'never conceived' by Marx as 'a simple and unilateral 
determinism'(293). Braverman, however, provides no 
substantive explanation for the repeated occurrence 
of "deterministic" statements in Marx's writings on 
technology and productive forces. For example, he 
quotes a passage from Marx's The Povert 
Phil2j2phy in which Marx makes one of his now most 
famous (or, by some accounts, infamous) 
"deterministic" statements; that is, 'The hand-mill 
gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam- 
, nill, society with the industrial capitalist. 
' But 
rather than attempting to explain this statement 
(as 
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we tried to do in the first chapter of this study) or 
even reject it as simply false, what Braverman does 
is to, firstly, praise its 'striking quality and 
broad historical fidelity characteristic of Marx's 
best aphorisms', and then, without further 
explanation, to reject any application and use of 
this statement as 'a ready-made formula' for a 
"deterministic" interpretation of Marx's views. (294) 
In other words, Braverman, in my opinion, fails to 
reconcile the two notions of "social determination" 
and "technological determinism" in Marx's works 
(which in fact lies at the heart of the notion of 
technology as capital). Failing this and failing to 
explain Marx's view on the "determinism" of 
technology, yet wishing to remain faithful to Marx 
and knowing full-well that Marx does appear to 
repeatedly express such a view (and particularly 
insofar as capitalism is concerned), what Braverman 
does is to merely reject the label of "technological 
00 it determinism with regards to Marx's views, and even 
this, it seems to me, only in a half-hearted manner. 
Thus, for example, we have the above quoted sentence 
qualifying "determinism" as not being conceived 
by 
Marx in a 'simple and unilateral' manner - but with 
no explanation as to what he means 
by a 'unilateral' 
determinismg or what is, one is forced to ask, the 
distinction between a 'unilateral' and a supposedly 
"non-unilateral" determinism. Or, again, the 
qualification that Marx's aphorism on 
the "mills" 
should not be taken as a 
'ready-made formula'. 
From this mere rejection of a 
"label"q Braverman 
moves on to state 
his interpretation of what is 
really at stake behind 
Marx's aphorism. On the basis 
of Marx's idea that 
the development of productive 
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forces takes place 'within a system of social 
relations'(295)9 Braverman concludes: 'Thus if steam 
power "gives Usti the industrial capitalist, 
industrial capitalism "gives us", in turn, electric 
power, the power of the internal combustion engine, 
and atomic power. '(296) In shortp while apparently 
accepting the technological-deterministic idea that 
'steam power "gives us" the industrial capitalist' - 
without explaining how it is possible that the 
harnessing of such a natural force can lead to a 
social transformation of the agency (or controller) 
of production - Braverman wants to also establish the 
determinism of "social relations" (i. e. now 
'industrial capitalism "gives us" electric power, ' 
etc. ). 
It is far from clear as to why we have in the case of 
'steam power' a force that determines the social 
character and nature of the "master" of production, 
while in the case of 'electric power' (etc. ) we have, 
what one may call, a reverse conditioning or 
determinism. What is at stake here is not whether 
Braverman is factually and historically correct in 
this example. The point is that although he appears 
to want the best of both worlds, so to speak, or, in 
other words, appears to want to reconcile the notions 
of technological and social determinism in Marx's 
thoughtsq he fails to provide a reasoned argument for 
this - and an important, critical, reason for this 
failureq as we shall see later on, has to do with 
his, in my view, mistaken interpretation of Marx's 
conception of technology. Thusq rather than giving an 
explanation of Marx's notion of 
"determinism", he 
merely resorts to a kind of superficial justification 
of Marx: 
'If Marxq' Braverman writesý 'was not in the least 
3ý, l 
embarrassed by this interchange of roles between 
social forms on the one side and material production 
processes on the other, but on the contrary moved 
comfortably among them, it was because - apart from 
'his genius at dialectic - he never took a formulistic 
view of history, never played with bare and hapless 
correlatives, "one-to-one relationships", and other 
foolish attempts to master history by means of 
violent simplifications. Social determinacy does not 
have the fixity of a chemical reaction, but is a 
historical process. The concrete and determinate 
forms of society are indeed "determined" rather than 
accidental, but this is the determinacy of the 
thread -by- thread weaving of the fabric of history, 
not the imposition of external formulas. '(297) 
Though eloquently expressed, this passage fails to 
give any reasons for or explanation of Marx's notion 
of the primacy or determinism of productive forces, 
or, more specifically, that of technology under 
capitalism. I am sure many of Marx's critics (and 
orthodox supporters, too) may well agree that for 
Marx 'social determinacy does not have the fixity of 
a chemical reaction'. But a major point of contention 
is Marx's view on the primacy of productive forces, 
and, ofteng the determinism of technology, and how 
this is (or can be, if at all) reconciled with his 
view on 'social determinacy' (the primacy of 
'social 
being'f in its strict early-Marxian sense) as 'a 
historical process'. Braverman, it seems to me, fails 
in his attempt to come to terms with this problematic 
in Marx's works, and in fact he seems to actually 
avoid 
- facing up to it; instead he appeals to Marx's 
'genius at dialectic'9 his avoidance of 'violent 
simplifications' 
(note the qualification of 'violent' 
here! )9 and Marx's non-formulistic view of historY9 
3ýý- 
and so on. Whether true or not, such words, alas, do 
not help us understand Marx's view on the relation 
between technology and society. 
At any rate, Braverman's fundamental concern is to 
state his case for a "social deterministic" reading 
of Marx. And in support of this he appeals to Marx's 
C"ital. Thus he writes: 'Those who know Marx's 
historical method only from a few scattered aphorisms 
would do well to study Capital in order to see how 
the relationship between capital as a social form and 
the capitalist mode of production as a technical 
organization is treated. ' And it is after this advise 
that Braverman gives a general interpretation of Marx 
on technology under capitalism: 'Within the historical 
and analytical limits of capitalismg according to 
Marx's analysis, technology, instead of simply 
producing social relations, is produced by the social 
relation represented by capital. '(298) 
With respect to this last passageg one point of 
interest, by way of a general critical observation, 
needs to be made here: The passage appears to imply 
that it is only under capitalism that, for Marx, 
technology 'is produced by' social relations 
(Braverman says: 'Within the historical and analytical 
limits of capitalism'). If such a reading of this 
passage is correct (it may not be, of course), then, 
in Braverman's viewý for Marx, technology was a 
"deterministic" force only up to the establishment of 
capitalism. In this connection 
it is interesting to 
recall Braverman's previously mentioned statement 
that 'steam power "gives Usti the 
industrial 
capitalist'. 
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Whatever is meant by it, I find the reference to the 'limits of capitalism' somewhat confusing andy 
indeed, unacceptable in terms of my interpretation 
of Marx. Thus, for example, one may in fact ask: was 
not 'steam power', or rather the steam engine, also 
'produced by' social relations? Under what social 
relations, under what form of society, was it, then, 
'produced' if not the capitalist form? And what of 
other productive forces and technologies, were they 
not also 'produced' by particular past social 
relations (i. e. were not previous forms of 
technologies 'produced', though not 'within the 
historical.. limits of capitalism', but within the 
historical 'limits' of some other form of social 
relations)? All technologies of whatever kind or 
characterg according to my view of Marxq are 
'produced by' (if I may use Braverman's own words) 
social relations (i. e. such social determination of 
technology is not specific only to the historical 
limits of capitalism). 
In any event, what does Braverman mean by the 
statement that 'technology ... - 
is produced by the 
social relation represented by capital'? To find out 
we need to leave his general observations aside and 
go to his chapter on "Machinery". It is here, in this 
chapter, that Braverman sets down the essence of his 
interpretation of Marx's conception of technology. An 
interpretation whichq I believe, prevents him from 
locating technology (the industrial machine 
technological system) as a central, and by far the 
most fundamentalq issue in what he calls 
'the 
progressive alienation of the process of production 
from the worker'; or technology as by far the most 
essential means of control of labour. 
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Let us see what Braverman has to say about "machinery". In the first place, what is interesting 
is that, if with Cohen (and Shaw) the separation of 
the material or technical from the social is a key 
argument in the technological interpretation of 
Marx's theories; in Braverman, ironically, there is a 
similar assumption which is, however, used to assert 
the opposite. This assumption is clearly observable 
in the very first paragraph of his chapter on 
machinery. it is made in the following 
terms: 'Machines may be defined, classified, and 
studied in their evolution according to any criteria 
one wishes to select: their motive power, their 
complexity, their use of physical principles, etc. 
But one is forced at the outset to choose between two 
essentially dif erent modes of thought. '(299) 
Here in the last sentence, then, we have the 
assumption that technology (machines) can be 
conceptualized in two essentially different ways. The 
use of the word 'essentially' is of course crucial 
here; for it indicates that in Braverman's mind the 
two approaches are completely distinct and separate. 
And these distinct approaches are: 'The first is the 
engineering approach, which views technology 
primarily in its internal connections and tends to 
define the machine in relation to itself, as a 
technical fact. The other is the social approach, 
which views technology in its connections with 
humanity and defines the machine in relation to human 
labor, and as a social artifact. '(300) 
Braverman illustrates the first approach with the 
definitions of a machine given by Robert Willis and 
Franz Reuleaux, quoted by A. P. Usher in his book, A 
History of Mechanical Inventions. And by way of a 
a 
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contrast he then quotes a passage from Marx stressing 
the social aspect of technology. 'Marx'9 Braverman 
then goes on to state, 'selects from among a host of 
technical characteristics the specific feature which 
forms the juncture between humanity and the machine: 
its effect upon the labor process. '(301) 
That there is a difference of approach between Marx 
and many nineteenth-century (and later) authorities 
on machinery is quite obvious. That Marx viewed 
technology in relation to labour is, also, in my 
view, incontestable. So, one is forced to ask, what 
is Braverman really getting at here7 Why is he making 
such a comparison of approaches7 The reason for 
stating this, obvious, contrast of approach is made 
clear in the following passage: 'The analysis of the 
machine by means of purely technical characteristics, 
such as its power source, the scientific principles 
it employs, etc., may yield much information of value 
to engineers, but this study of the machine "in 
itself" has little direct value for a comprehension 
of its social role. '(302) 
In o ther words, the machine " in itself "p its 
technical and functional principles, cannot provide 
us with an understanding of its social role. The 
assumption here is that there is not merely an 
'essentially different' mode of conceptualization of 
technology, but in fact a fundamental distinction 
between machinery "in itself" and its social form and 
role. If the social role of technology cannot be, 
according to Braverman, comprehended on the basis of 
its technical features (i. e. from the technical 
character and principles of the machine "in itself"), 
it is, at least by implication, because these are, as 
it were, "asocial". Thus, for Braverman, 'technical 
3ý, 6 
features 4, pe are utiliz_ed by capital as the basis for 
the organization and control of labor. '(303) The 
technical features are notq in other words, 1produced 
by' the social relations of capital as its technical 
manifestation at the point of production - they are 
merely used and employed by it. The machine "in 
itself" does not function as a moment of capital, or 
as capital. Technology, then, in Braverman's 
interpretation, is only a social artifact in the very 
general sense and technology's social role is simply 
contingent upon the particular mode of its 
utilization and this as a result of the social form 
of its ownership. 
Thus, for example, we have the following statement: 
'Machinery comes into the world not as the servant of 
"humanity", but as the instrument of those to whom 
the accumulation of capital gives the ownership 
[emphasis in the original -RRI of the machines. The 
capacity of humans to control the labor process 
through machinery is seized [my emphasis -RR] upon by 
management... '(304) Rather than 'machinery' being 
designed from commencement to function as a moment of 
capital, which then signifies that its 'technical 
features', or the machine "in itself", incorporates 
the exigencies of capital production and accumulation 
(the requirements of productivity, efficiencyg and so 
on) - which according to my reading is essential to 
Marx's conception of technology - we in fact have, 
with Bravermang a human 'capacity'9 a productive 
force, which is simply 'seized upon by management'. 
It is true that Braverman acknowledges that machinery 
is not 'the servant' of humanity, but in the service 
of capital. For him, however, this social role 
is 
simply conditioned by the ownership of machinery by 
ýZ 
the capit-Aist, In this case, Braverman's 
interpretation (like some other writers we discussed 
in chapter two) takes into account only the ownership 
aspect of Marx's conception. And this idea is more 
fully explained as follows: 'Before the human capacity 
to control machinery can be transformed into its 
opposite, a series of special conditions must be met 
which have nothing to do with the physical character 
of the macfiine. The machine must be the property not 
of the producer, nor of the associated producers, but 
of an alien power. '(305) 
Three comments should be. made here: 
First comment: Braverman seems to assume an abstract, 
ahistorical, notion of 'the human capacity to control 
machinery'. It is as if, at least by implication, we 
have, on the one side, the development of technology, 
and on the other, as distinct from this process, the 
human capacity to control technology and its 
development and transformation. 
Second comment: The emphasis is placed by Braverman 
not on the transformation of the 'physical character' 
(i. e. "internal" functional principles etc. ) of 
technology as a means of control, but on that of the 
transformation of 'the human capacity to control 
machinery'. For Braverman, the transformation of 
technology (which he describes in other pages (306)) 
certainly takes place within the social system, but 
there is, to say the least, a certain ambiguity on 
his part towards the interrelationship between social 
and technical development as a process that 
conditions the specific form of control. The 
technical function of the machineq it seems, has 
nothing to do with the 
'special' social conditions 
(i. e. capitalistic conditions) thatq according to 
3Aýg 
Braverman himself, frame and shape the mode of 
utilization of the machine. Thus he says, the 'series 
of special conditions' - i. e. the social conditions 
of commodification of labour power, of the 
antagonistic relations, of the specific social form 
of productive organization and of property, etc. - 
'have nothing to do with the physical character of 
the machine. ' 
But it is precisely on this point that Braverman, in 
my opinion, misconceives what is essential to Marx's 
conception of technology. For the 'physical 
character' of the machine has, at least according to 
my reading of Marx, a lot to do with these so-called 
Iseries of special conditions'. And although I have 
already discussed, at length, Marx's view on this, 
but just to illustrate my point let me quote a 
sentence froin Marx's chapter on machinery: 'Along with 
the tool, ' Marx writes, 'the skill of the workman in 
handling it passesover to the machine. '(307) 
Now, as Braverman himself demonstrates (308), the 
tool is removed from the hand of the worker and 
fitted 'into a mechanism'(309). This fitting of the 
tool into a mechanism, this transformation of 
technology, cannot be anything else but a change of 
'physical character' of the technology! For how is it 
possible to remove the tool from the hands of the 
worker, and fit this into a mechanism without a 
change (development, design, transformation) of 
physical structure and functional principles of 
technology? So that it is a mistake to say that the 
'special condition' of the removal of the tool from 
the worker - which is, for Marx and for Braverman, a 
decidedly social fact - has 'nothing to do with the 
physical character of the machine'. Not only 
is this 
ýý-q 
contrary to Marx's view (which is our concern here), 
but it is also, I believe, historically inaccurate. 
But Marx goes eveti further than this, for in his 
view, along with the tool, 'the skill of the workman 
in handling it' also 'passes over to the machine'. In 
short, the 'physical character' of the machine comes 
to incorporate (by design and development) certain 
skills and productive knowledge once possessed only 
by the worker. 
Indeed, Braverman's own account of the development 
of, for example, numerical-control machine-tools 
contradicts his statement that the 'physical 
character' of technology has 'nothing to do' with the 
'special conditions' of capitalism. (310) With 
numerical-control, do we not have a change of 
'physical character' as a result of the development 
and design of the technical features specific to such 
a system? And does not this design of the technical 
features of numerical-control machines reflect the 
transference (Marx says, passing over) of skill to 
the technology; that is, as a functioning aspect of 
its specific 'physical character'? 
Third comment: By separating the 'physical character' 
of technology from its social character, all that 
Braverman has left to signify the definitive social 
role of technology is the notion of "property", of 
ownership. The machine is, thus, conceptualized not 
as a technical manifestation of an alien power 
(of 
capital), and by virtue of that as 
'in itself' an 
alienating power at the point of production 
(as I 
believe Marx does), but merely as 'the property... of 
an alien power* I 
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Braverman does, of course, recognize that for Marx 
technology (means of production) as 'dead labor takes 
the form of capital. '(311) And, moreover, that, for 
Marx, the 'domination of living by dead labor' is not 
'just an allegorical expression, not just as the 
domination of wealth over poverty, of employer over 
employee, or of capital over labor in the sense of 
financial or power relationships, but as a physical 
fact. '(312) And he goes on to quote a passage from 
Marx's Capital, vol. I, that states this idea of the 
physical domination in no uncertain terms. Although 
we have referred to this passage on a number of 
previous occas 
, 
ions, it is worth repeating parts of it 
so that we, can examine Braverman's subsequent 
response to it. 
The main parts that concern our argument with 
Braverman's interpretation are as follows: (a) 'By 
means of its conversion into an automaton, the 
instrument of labour confronts the labourer, during 
the labour process, in the shape of capital, of dead 
labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour- 
power. '(b) 'The separation of the intellectual powers 
of production from the manual labour, and the 
conversion of those powers into the might of capital 
over labour, is, as we have already shown, finally 
completed by modern industry erected on the 
foundation of machinery. ' And (c) 'the gigantic 
physical forcesq and the mass of labour that are 
embodied in the factory mechanism and, together with 
that mechanismg constitute the power of the 
"master". '(313) 
Before we look at Braverman's response let me comment 
on the underlined words in this passage. The 
'conversion' of instruments of labour, in my 
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estimation, signifies the intentional change from one 
state to another of technology as a result of a 
transformation (by design, development, construction, 
etc,. ) of the 'physical character' of technology into 
'the shape of capital'. For it is a social conversion 
of the intellectual powers of labour into 
material/technical and physical structure of the 
system of technology ('modern industry') based on 
machinery which as such (i. e. in its very physical 
and technical characteristics - or as the machine "in 
itself", if you like) 'confronts the labourer'. There 
is, in other words, a transposition; a rearrangement 
of the state and terms of the labour process without 
altering its capitalistic character (or without 
altering, in Braverman's words, its 'series of 
special conditions'). We have, theng the 'separation 
of intellectual powers' and the conversion of these 
in the sense of the appropriation of powers but by 
means of their transposition into a technological 
force as the 'might of capital'. And it is now, with 
the factory mechanismy that this machine 
technological system constitutes 'the power of the 
"master"'. 
It constitutes such a power precisely in the sense 
that capital has united (fused) its social 
characteristics with technology, and thereby 
established its adequate form in terms of the 
#physical character' and technical functioning of the 
industrial system in operation (i. e. technology as 
capital). Technology (or rather the technological 
system) cannot be said to 'constitute' the power of 
capital unless it is intentionally converted, in its 
'physical character', from a 'servant' of labour (as 
in craft tools) into a master of labour. Thus, we are 
told by Marx - and Braverman - that the tool and the 
ý; 3ý- 
skill of workers are removed from them. That is, a 
social act of dispossession (appropriation) thatý 
with the development of machinery, as Marx puts it, 
'for the first time acquires technical and palpable 
reality'(314) - i. e. it becomes, in the words of 
Braverman himself, 'a physical fact'. Machine 
technology (or the system of machinery), therefore, 
in its constitution (in. its physical qualities, 
structure and composition) comes to function as that 
alien power which is capital or, if you will, is the 
power of the "mast ". 
That at least is my interpretation of the passage 
from Marx. Now let us see what is Braverman's 
response: 'It is of course, ' he tells us, 'this 
"master", standing behind the machine, who dominatest 
pumps dry, the living labor power'. (315) Although I 
have no quarrel with Braverman on this point; capital 
is after all, according to Marx, a social relation of 
production - the concept of capital by definition (at 
least by Marx's definition) necessarily includes the 
capitalist (the "master"). Yet, in terms of a 
response to the passage Braverman quoted from Marx, 
this statement is actually, and one would have to 
say, deliberately, evasive by its very deceptive 
simplicity. And this for the following two reasons: 
Firstly, while Marx is (rightly or wrongly) talking 
about what in his view constitutes the power of the 
master and the inversion of the social role of 
technology (instruments of labour employing and 
confronting the labourer; dead labour dominating and 
pumping dry living labour power) by means of its 
conversion into 'an automaton'. Braverman, as it 
were, skilfully, shifts the emphasis from the 
constitution of that power 
(the technological 
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condition, the 'factory mechanism', etc. ) to the 
"master" himself , thus reversing the inversion of 
technology's social role. With Braverman, the 
"master" stands behind the machine, employs and uses 
it to dominate, etc.; the machine's role is simply as 
an instrument, means of labour; the instrument does 
not employ labour, the "master" employs the machine 
and the labour. And hence by means of such a shift of 
emphasis, he thereby avoids having to either explain 
or reject the technological-deterministic 
implications of Marx's view expressed in the passage 
quoted, 
Secondly, by pointing the finger at the master, 
Braverman avoids dealing with the fundamental issue 
of the passage: the machine's role and function as 
such. The issue which Marx is attempting to convey 
in the passage in question (whether one agrees with 
him or not) is not who stands 'behind the machine' , 
who 'dominates' and 'pumps dry, the living labor 
power'; but how the power of the "master" comes to be 
exercised at the point of production, how is that 
power translated from its subjective orientation into 
an objective force, how the power of the "master's"- 
domination is actualized, and how it is manifested 
within the labour process. 
It is on this issue that we part company with 
Braverman. For according to his interpretation, 'it 
is not the productive strength of machinery that 
weakens the human race, but the manner in which it is 
employed in capitalist social relations. 
'(316) 
According to this view, the power of the "master" 
becomes translatedq becomes actualized, becomes an 
objective forceg not in the shape and function of 
machineryq not even in the form and functioning of 
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the technological systemq but only, and I repeat 
, in the manner machines (and systems) are 
employed by the master. How, or the way, a machine is 
used or employed, is thus the only issue of concern 
for the 'human race', according to Braverman; but not 
also how the technology functions. The function of 
the machine (its 'productive strength') is separated 
by Braverman from the method(s) (the 'manner') of its 
utilization and employment. 
By separating use and function, Braverman forces one 
to see the machine as nothing more than a mere 
instrument or means of labour (however complex it may 
be). If it is the manner of employment which is 
essential, and not also the machine "in itself". then 
what requires transformation is the way machines are 
(mis)used and not also the technology "in itself". 
The logical extension of this naive proposition is 
that the historical process of the removal of the 
tool from the hands of the worker (and his/her skill, 
too) can be reversed on the basis of machinery 
itself; that is, on the basis of that very technology 
which actually incorporates (at least according to 
Marx) within its very designed structure the 
dispossession of the tool, skill, etc. Change the 
manner of its employment and the machine can then 
become a "servant" of humanity, it can be used as if 
it were a mere craf t-tool. But is such a reversal of 
usage possible without a radical change of 
technology? 
To be fair to Braverman it needs to be repeated here 
that Marx is tiimself guilty of regarding machine- 
technology in such innocent terms in some of his 
writings (as we have already mentioned in previous 
sections); but at least in the passage quoted by 
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Braverman this is not the case. In that passage, as 
well as in principle (as I have tried to show in this 
study), Marx is quite categorical and adamant that 
the technological system, is not simply employed and 
used, but actually functions as, and constitutes, the 
power of capital at the point of production. 
For Braverman, moreover, there seems to be no 
relationship between the technical characteristics of 
technology arid the way that technology is employed by 
capital: 'in the factory it is not the machines that 
are at fault, ' he tells us, 'but the conditions of 
the capitalist mode of production under which they 
are used.,, '(317) This is in his view the Marxian 
perspective. But is riot machinery, for Marx, an 
essential element of the 'conditions of the 
capitalist mode of production'? Indeed, does he not 
refer to machinery as the material foundation of the 
capitalist mode of production proper? 
Braverman would, I am sure, give an affirmative 
answer to these question. But then he would qualify 
his answer by separating the physical/technical 
aspects of technology as a productive force, from its 
social aspect as a force in the service of capital. 
By this separation he makes technology appear as 
untainted, as innocent, as neutral, and it is only 
from such a perspective that he argues against 
technological determinism and attempts to commit Marx 
to his own strand of social determinism. 
Thus: 'Considered only in their physical aspect, ' he 
writes, 'machines are nothing but developed 
instruments of production whereby humankind increases 
the effectiveness of its labor. '(318) And again, but 
somewhat ambivalently: 'Acting for the master in a way 
which he plans with inexhaustible care and precision, 
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they [machinery) seem in human eyes to act for 
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themselves and out of their own inner necessities. 
These necessities are called "technical needs, " 
11machine characteristics, " 11 the requirements of 
efficiency, " but by and large they are the exigencies 
of capital and not of technique [my emphasis here - 
RR]. '(319) And finally: 'In reality, machinery 
embraces a host of possibilities, many of which are 
systematically thwarted, rather than developed, by 
capital. '(320) 
The point of quoting these passages is not to argue 
that Braverman's account is wrong. The point is that 
he fails to recognize the intertwinement of the 
social and the technical, the fusion of the 
$exigencies of capital and ... of technique'. He 
stresses the employment of machinery by capital, but 
fails to explain the form of technology as capital 
and how the two are not only linked but inseparable. 
The notion of technology as capital, by contrast, 
takes such a fusion as essential to the reality of 
the functioning of technology in relation to labour 
at the point of production. It necessarily therefore 
takes into account the contradictions and antagonisms 
which are inseparable from the capitalistic use and 
employment of machinery; that is, the contradictions 
and antagonisms involved in technology functioning 
not only as a means of production (increasing the 
'effectiveness' and 'productivity' of labour), but 
also, at the same time, as a means of domination and 
exploitation of labour, 
However, when, as with Braverman, the emphasis is 
placed solely on the employment of technology, on the 
'forms of utilization of machinery - the manner in 
which labor is organized and deployed around 
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itoeo'(321), and the machine "in itself", viewed 
abstractly and only from the perspective of 'a 
material process' of production (322), is divorced 
from the specific social form of its employment, then 
the contradictions of, for example, increase of 
productivity coupled with technological unemployment, 
of lightening the burden of labour coupled with an 
increase of the intensity of labour, of the power of 
'humankind' over the forces of nature coupled with 
the 'degradation' of skills, and so on - these and 
other contradictions tend to be, at best, obscured. 
Let us be clear that on the basis of Marx's writings, 
few would disagree that he thought, 'Machinery is put 
to a wrong use, with the object of transforming the 
workman, from his very childhood, into a part of a 
detail-machine. '(323) Few would disagree that, in his 
view, workers may indeed have to employ machinery as 
an acquired force (if or when they are in control of 
production); that history does not end with capital's 
employment of machinery, and that, for him, 
therefore, it is neither an 'impossibility' to have 
workers controlling the system of machinery, nor that 
'the exploitation of the machine by the workman' 
is 
'identical' with the 'Exploitation of the workman by 
the machine'. (324) And, furthermore, 
few would 
disagree that, for Marx, 'machinery embraces a host 
of possibilities'(Braverman); that, 
for him, 
machinery increases the productive power of 
labour 
(in the very general and historical sense), 
'But, ' as Marx puts it, 'where is the medal without 
its reverse! '(325) In his view, neither the 
"good" 
side nor the "bad" side can 
be separated; nor can one 
divorce the form of employment and use of machinery 
from 'its function "in itself" 
(except, perhaps, 
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purely analytically and in the abstract); nor the 
technical/material from the social. In factt what is 
essential in Marx is that he conceptualizes 
technology (according to my interpretation, at any 
rate) not from 'two essentially different'(Braverman) 
perspectives - that is, in the sense that technology 
has, as it were, two sides to it, two aspects that 
are #essentially different' and separate not only in 
thought but also in reality. But that the two aspects 
or sides of technology (i. e its technical/physical 
and it's social character) are two sides of the same 
coin, are two aspects that are inseparables 
It is on the basis of such a conception that he sees 
the contradictions, and the antagonisms, inherent in 
the capitalist form and hence employment of 
technology. The notion of technology as capital 
conveys these contradictions and antagonisms with 
respect to the use and function of the industrial 
system of technology as contingent upon the fusion of 
the technical/physical and the social aspects. For it 
denotes the two aspects of production technology as 
two sides of the same coin, as inseparable. But 
Braverman, I believe, misinterprets Marx by taking 
the two inseparable aspects of machinery, which Marx 
examines, as signifying an actual separation of these 
aspects in the reality of functioning production 
technology. The machine "in itself" thus becomes, in 
Braverman's thought, innocent, neutral; as such, it 
is then assumed to be not essentially as important a 
problematic as the forms of its capitalist 
employment. Thereby, a crucial aspect of the 
realization of the alienation, control and domination 
of labour is either by-passed altogether or made to 
appear as merely derivative or, at best, as of 
secondary importanceo 
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Marx, in his discussions on machinery and its 
technical aspects, then we are told by Braverman 
(326), is concerned to point out not how and why (at 
least in part) with machinery, as Marx puts it 
himself, an 'inversion for the first time acquires 
technical and palpable reality'(327), not how and why 
with the industrial system 'reification' achieves an 
objective manifestation, but simply to point to the 
"fetishistic" or the "reif ied" manner in which 
technology tends to be perceived by active 
individuals in modern society (i. e. merely 
subjectively) - thus Braverman says: 'they [machines] 
seem in human eyes to act for themselves'(328). 
In Braverman's discussion on machinery, therefore, we 
find, in my opinion, not a critique of technology as 
such (though he has produced an admirable critique of 
methods of organization of labour, "scientific 
managemento', etc.; yet even in this case he has been 
criticised on a number of issues of both theoretical 
and empirical nature (329)), but its exoneration; 
there we find not a critique of technological 
determinism, but merely a statement of its obverse, 
But the machine can neither be exonerated (as in 
Braverman) nor blamed (as in, for example, Jacques 
Ellul's work). (330) 
On balance, that is not, as I have tried to show, 
Marx's basic view (though there are certain 
inconsistencies, contradictions and ambiguities which 
cannot, and should not, be brushed aside). On this 
point, my understanding of Marx is that while the 
machine in itself cannot be 
"blamed" for what is 
inherent to the social system of production 
relations; nor can it, however, be regarded 
in the 
abstract as "neutral", because it is, after all, a 
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specific product of, and, in concrete historical 
terms, a necessary (material) technological condition 
of that system of social relations. It is not, then, 
I suggest, a question of taking sides, so to speak, 
for or against the machine. It is a question of 
understanding a particular technological force as it 
functions and as it is utilized under specific 
historical circumstances. 
There is a passage in Capital, volume I, which, I 
believe, gives Marx's position on this point. In this 
passage Marx is criticising, and with some irony, the 
views of 'bourgeois' economists (i. e. J. Milly 
MacCulloch, Torrens, Senior, J. S. Millq etc. ) 
specifically with respect to machinery, its 
employment and its effects on unemployment and the 
"setting free" of capital and the labourers' means of 
subsistence. And it is perhaps, I would suggest, also 
interesting in relation to Braverman's interpretation 
(though from a different perspective). The long 
passage, which is necessary to give here in full, 
starts as follows: 
'It is an undoubted fact that machinery, as such, is 
not responsible for "setting free" the workman from 
the means of subsistence. It cheapens and increases 
production in that branch which it seizes on, and at 
first makes no change in the mass of the means of 
subsistence produced in other branches. Hence, after 
its introduction, the society possesses as much, if 
not more, of the necessaries of life than before, for 
the labourers thrown out of work, and that quite 
apart from the enormous share of the annual produce 
wasted by the non-workers. And this is the point 
relied on by our apologists! The contradictions and 
antagonisms inseparable from the capitalist 
employment of machineryg do not exist, they say, 
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since they do not arise out of machinery, as such, 
but out of its capitalist employment! Since therefore 
machinery, considered alone shortens the hours of 
labour, but, when in the service of capital, 
lengthens them; since in itself it lightens labour, 
but when employed by capital, heightens the intensity 
of labour; since in itself it is a victory of man 
over the forces of Nature, but in the hands of 
capital, makes man the slave of those forces; since 
in itself it increases the wealth of the producers, 
but in the hands of capital, makes them paupers - for 
all these reasons and others besides, says the 
bourgeois economist without more ado, it is clear as 
noon-day that all these contradictions are a mere 
semblance of the reality, and that, as a matter of 
fact, they have neither an actual nor a theoretical 
existence. Thus he saves himself from all further 
puzzling of the brain, and what is more, implicitly 
declares his opponent to be stupid enough to contend 
against, not the capitalist employment of machinery, 
but machinery itself. 
'No doubt he is far from denying that temporary 
inconvenience may result from the capitalist use of 
machin. ery. But where is the medal without its 
reverse! '(331) 
The question, then, is to grasp the two sides of the 
'medal', as it were. And only in that way, if I 
understand Ma rx correctly, is it then possible to see 
the 'contradi ctions' as not 'a mere semblance of the 
reality' of modern industrial technology as it is 
employed, but as having 'an actual -, P* existen ce' as 
it functions in relation to living labour, 
Braverman is of course, in my view, absolutely right 
to criticise and attack those who 
'attribute to 
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machinery the powers over humanity which arise in 
fact from social relations. '(332) But, then, it seems 
to me that he has himself lost sight of the fact that 
because machinery is 'produced by' these social 
relations its technical functioning ('physical 
character', etc. ) cannot be impervious to both the 
demands placed upon it by these relations and the 
contradictior-is inherent 4'. these relations. It has 
somehow escaped his attention that though Marx 
repeatedly states that the machine in itself is not 
'responsible' - or, as Braverman puts it, 'at fault' 
- and that one should take account of the capitalist 
employment of machineryp this is not intended to 
exonerate technology) to declare it as innocent and 
neutralv but to stress the social specification of 
the technological functionv to stress that machinery 
(as suchl as a productive force) cannot have a. social 
signification apart from its integration in a system 
of social relations. And it is the particular 
historical form of that system (i. e. capitalism) 
which, to use Marx's own wordsp makes a 'cotton- 
spinning machine' not merely 'a machine for spinning 
cotton' (a machine "in itself")ý but, and as such a 
productive force and in relation to wage-labour, 
'capital'. (333) 
From this understanding of Marx, the 'powers' of 
which Braverman speaks of are the 'powers' of capital 
incorporated in the design of machines (e. g. with 
respect to the requirements of productivity, 
efficiency, control, and so on, or as Braverman 
himself has pointed out, with respect to what is 
called the Babbage principle, reflected in the 
machine's technical and functional principles) which 
become effective wheng and only wheng machines are 
employed or utilized, and henceg self-evidently, as 
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they function at the point of production in relation 
with labour. In this sense, therefore, the 'powers' 
are the 'powers' of technology as capital, and not 
technology in the abstract - since technology only 
becomes "capital" when it functions within the 
capitalist form of production process (i. e. only in 
relation to wage-labour). And it is at the point of 
production that it is an essential objective aspect 
of capital's mode of domination, control, and 
efficient exploitation of labour, it is at that point 
and as it functions that it constitutes the power of 
the capitalist by assuming the role of the master of 
labour (even though that may be, as they say, "by 
appointment only"). 
Earlier we enquired as to how Braverman, deriving his 
ideas from Marx, explains the role, status and 
function of technology in the historical process of 
'the progressive alienation of the process of 
production from the workers'. From the discussion 
presented, it seems to me, and if I have understood 
him correctly, Braverman tends to concentrate on the 
significance of the role of methods of organization 
of labour, particularly with respect to the notion of 
the 'separation of conception from execution', with 
technology merely appearing in the shadow of the 
development and changes of the organizational forms 
to control labouro Scientific managementg Taylorism, 
etc., in other words, tend to over-shadow not only 
the development of technology, but also its technical 
features and function. He not only underestimates the 
role and function of production technology insofar as 
the historical process of alienation is concerned, 
but also misjudges Marx's considerations on the 
status and function of production technology in the 
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process of 'real subordination of labour' (at least 
according to my interpretation of Marx)e 
Despite his important efforts to elevate the role and 
significance of social relations of production, 
Braverman's conception of, and hence also his 
interpretation of Marx on, technology seem to me 
therefore to be flawed. By disregarding the 
conditioning effect of the 'physical character' 
(internal technical features and principles) of 
mechanized technology on the manner or mode of its 
utilization and employmentp Braverman, I suggest, 
fails to come -to terms with a crucial aspect of what 
he calls the managerial control over the production 
process. (334) 
If, therefore, according to Braverman, machines in 
themselves are not at fault, if it is the mode of 
their utilization which is alone regarded as to be 
faulty, then it follows that, the 'degradation of 
work' through expropriation of skill and knowledge, 
through alienation and the separation of conception 
from execution, comes to be conditioned and 
determined, almost one-sidedly it could be said, by 
the varieties of organizational methods of work, that 
is, merely by the manner in which technology is 
employed, rather than by the combination of 
production technologies (the technological system in 
particular) and these methods -a combination, it 
should be addedq in which the system of machinery and 
its functioning mechanism (according to Marx at 
least, as we have seen) is the governing 
principle. (335) 
Let me say that I am not in any way disputing the 
fact that methods of labour organization are of 
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crucial importance to Marx, nor am I disputing the 
fact that Braverman covers and analyses the 
development and role of the 'scientific-technical 
revolution', of mechanization and its interplay with 
the management of labour. What I am pointing to is 
that Braverman fails to recognize that what the 
machine is in itself - how its technical features are 
developed and designed, and how therefore it 
functions - is not only determined by the fact of its 
immersion in the nexus of social relations, but that 
precisely because of this it incorporates what 
Braverman calls managerial control or capitalist 
control within its form as a functioning productive 
force. 
In Braverman technology appears to trail after 
"capital" - that is, in the sense that it is owned 
and employed by the capitalist and behind it lies the 
power of that "master" - rather than as being in 
itself an integral aspect or moment of capital as a 
relation of production. Machine technology is 
conceptualized as a productive force, period. It is 
this aspect of Marx's conception that Braverman 
stresses, and Marx's reference to technology as 
capital is only mentioned in passing. The problematic 
of the deterministic characterization of technology, 
and also the issue of the machine in itself, or the 
significance or otherwise of the technical features 
of machinery - these are assumed to be, by Braverman 
(even if only implicitly)ý as merely incidental to 
Marx's theory of capitalist production process. Thus 
alsog technology's role and function in the 
extraction of surplus-labour as surplus-value, and 
how important is the development of the form of 
technology as machine technology to this process and 
to the social (value) form of this process, 
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specifically in relation to the objective obscuring 
of exploitation, is hardly touched on by Braverman. 
In effect, and finally, from Braverman's 
interpretation of Marx on machinery, we get an 
understanding of machinery which does not go beyond 
its characterization as "instrument of labour" (means 
of labour); the understanding of its social role is 
merely derived from its form of ownership (from 
capitalist property relations) and thus its social 
form as capital is hardly taken into account. In 
short, it appears that after all that Marx has 
written on various aspects of machinery, of the 
technological system as fixed capital, on the social 
form and use-value character of machinery, as well as 
the contradictions that are inseparable from its use 
and as it functions within the capitalist process of 
production, he has, apparently, no distinctive 
conception of technology that "naturally" fits into 
his theory of capitalism. 
However, as I have tried to show in this study, 
inconsistencies and ambiguities granted, there is a 
distinctive conception of technology to be found in 
Marx's works which is specifically related to his 
theory of capitalist production. What we need to do 
now is to give an evaluation of this conception based 
on the main points raised in this chaptere 
Summary and Evaluation: 
In this chapter I have tried to present an analysis 
of Marx's writings on "technology" in order to show 
how and why Marx uses various concepts to explain the 
role and function of technology 
in capitalism. Since 
he has a particular aim in mind, namely the analysis 
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of the capitalist mode of production, he moves from a 
general definition of technology (as instruments and 
means of labour), to broader yet more specific 
concepts that emphasise the social form of 
technology as a productive force (as a means of 
labour). And, furthermore, since (rightly or wrongly) 
he is deeply concerned with, and committed to, the 
notion of value, he uses the concepts such as 
"constant capital" and "fixed capital", as powerful 
tools to establish certain principle propositions. 
Whether or not one is convinced by his arguments as 
regards value theory or indeed other aspects of his 
theory of capitalism, all of which are in any case 
highly controversial, Marx has, in my opinion, a 
distinctive conception of technology which deserves 
our attention. As with all of his other concepts 
(e. g. commodity, labour, productiong etc. ), whereby 
Marx is concerned with the interplay of "essence", 
"appearance", "content", and "form", so also with 
production technologyq he takes into account not 
merely its content as a material/technical artifact 
and its essence as a means of labour, but also its 
appearance as independent alienating power 
(or as 
"master" of labour) and its form as capital. In this 
way he is thus able to unravel the particular 
characteristic of technology in capitalist 
production, its deterministic and alienating role in 
relation to labour and how the latter is organized, 
controlled and disciplined, as well as its peculiar 
part in the process of realization of value. 
In this latter context, as well as certain other 
aspects of his conception of technology, there are a 
number of problems with Marx's analysis of the role 
and function of technology. I have attempted not only 
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to air these problems as best I can, but to also 
provide som e explanations for them in terms of Marx's 
own frame of reference and aims, It goes without 
saying that I am of course in no way claiming that my 
explanation of these problems (or indeed my 
examination of Marx's conception of technology 
itself) is flawless* 
At any rate, there are a number of critical 
observations that need to be mentioned here: 
In section (2) on the value-form of technology we are 
not only faced with the contentious issue of the 
validity or otherwise of Marx's value theory, but 
also with a further problem of the very 
conceptualization of technology from a "value-form" 
perspective - that is, even if one could grant the 
validity of Marx's value theory. For the problem with 
Marx's concept of value-form is that it is a 
conception that invites us to consider the form of 
technology in relational terms, almost, one could 
say, to the exclusion of looking at technology as a 
particular 'thing'. In other words, with Marx's 
value-form applied to technology, though we may have, 
I would suggest, a better understanding of the 
specific social character, role and function of 
production technology, we have, however, hardly any 
understanding of technologjes as particular 
functioning objects or systems in terms of their 
different operational modes. 
Thus, - although the value-form of 
technology is a 
proposition that attempts to overcome the 
conventional generalization of technology as simply 
(or even, only) a means (instrument) of labour (a 
productive force as such) - i. e. overcoming the kind 
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of generalization that tends to, even if only by 
implication, admit no socio-historical specificity. 
Nonetheless, as it stands and without further 
modification, it seems to me to go to the other 
extreme of excluding the practical implications of 
particular types (and kinds) of technologies involved 
in qualitatively different production processes (e. g. 
it does not, if taken very strictly, permit a 
distinction between, say, the technologies of the 
chemical industries, nuclear powerg car 
manufacturing, etc. 9 which may, and often dog have 
different implications for those who work in these 
industries). 
But having said this, in my opiniont it is, 
nevertheless, an important approach and perspective 
precisely because it gives us, at the very least, a 
sense of the socially and historically specific form 
of production technology (technology as capital; 
technology as a functioning moment of the capitalist 
relations of production). It can therefore, I 
suggest, provide and inform a sociological 
understanding of technology that goes beyond the 
conventional economic approach of looking at 
technology purely as a "factor" of production, 
However, even in this respect what should not be 
overlooked is the limits of Marx's conception of 
technology. It seems quite clear from the discussions 
presented in section (3) that Marx is specifically 
concerned with a "definition" of "technology" as 
production technologyo He is interested In objects, 
devices, implements9 etc. t that are used and function 
as means of production; and more often than not, even 
more narrowly, as means of production of material 
"goods" as such. It is from this basis, that is, from 
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the perspective of the labour process, as it was 
pointed out, that he first defines "technology" as an 
instrument of labour or means of labour. But although 
one may be able to stretch the definition of an 
"instrument of labour" given by him to cover any and 
all types of "activity" (as "labour"), and hence 
provide a wider, more general conception of 
technology, that however, I believe, will not reflect 
Marx's intention, Technology as a general concept is 
strictly limited, for Marx, to such "artifacts" which 
serve as the conductors of labouring activity in the 
production of materials of life. This limitation, I 
would suggest, restricts the usefulness and 
applicability of Marx's conception of technology. 
Although, it should be clear from the discussions 
presented in this chapter, that this is a limitation 
which is not groundless - not at least in terms of 
Marx's world-view (historical materialism) and his 
socio-economic theory (theory of valueg capital 
productiong etc. ). 
At any rate, modern technological systems are, to 
state the obvious, extremely complex, far more so 
than at the time of Marx. While therefore Marx can in 
principle (according to his own theoretical frame of 
reference) define technology and take account of its 
role and function by the specific reference to the 
process of production as such, from the operational 
reality of technological networks and systems, such a 
strictly narrow and limited definition is hard to 
justify. For example, due to multi-faceted function 
and use of a particular device (e. g. a computer, or 
many other similar equipments)2 it is sometimes quite 
difficult to pinpoint its "productive" role and 
function ("productive" in the strict sense of being a 
means of production). When we look at the socio- 
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economic system as a complex of interdependent 
activities and relationshipsg in certain cases it 
becomes even more difficult, it seems to me, to 
clearly identify at what point (in space or time) a 
particular technology or a piece of equipment is 
actually functioning in production (strictly 
speaking) or, for example, in the processes of 
circulation, distribution, and so on. There is, 
perhaps quite often, a blurring and overlapping of 
not only networks and systems, but even particular 
technologies. 
Marx's conception of technology as capital, I submit, 
does not deal with or cover those fields or instances 
in which or when there is such an overlapping of 
technology's role and function, at least according to 
my understanding of his conception. As it was shown, 
Marx is of course aware of this (and other related) 
problems. But, in my opinion, his writings on 
technology is too narrowly confined to production; he 
thus fails to elaborate on the role and function of 
technology in relation to its practical implications 
for the control or management of labour in other 
fields of socio-economic activity. When he does deal 
with technology in relation to "non-productive" 
fields (circulation, exchange, distribution 
processes), Marx's basic concern is with its value 
implications (transfer of value, depreciation, 
devalorization, etc. ). In shortv from a social 
(sociological) perspective his conception of 
technology as capitalv I maintain, is quite valuable, 
but it needs updating in order to provide us with a 
better understanding of the complexity of the reality 
of modern-day technological phenomena both in 
strictly operational and practical terms and also in 
relation to society at large. 
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With regard- fri the shaping of technology, again, 
Marx's conception has its strength and weaknesses. 
For Marx, as ý, 7e saw in section (4), the production of 
surplus val. ue ( if profit"), its increase and 
accumulation, is the fundamental social purpose of 
capitalist production. It is this purpose (the 
motivation foc profit, its maximization and growth) 
that, accorcling to my understanding of Marx, has a 
basic conditi. oning effect on both the development and 
design of lie technical features of production 
technology, well as also on the social choices of 
technology. IJAIS proposition I would suggest is on 
the whole ind in fundamental terms far from 
groundless. Pýllt it would be an error to assume that 
in having e,. posed the basic aim of production as 
crucial to the shaping of technology, Marx has 
thereby also exposed the reality of how in concrete 
terms technology is actually shaped; that he has also 
exposed the reality that informs the process of 
technological development. 
Here, as also to a greater or lesser extent with some 
of his other ideas, Marx's intensity of concentration 
on exploring the fundamentals tends to result in a 
degree (and often a high degree) of overemphasis and 
sometimes oversimplification of issues he is dealing 
with. Thus, in the case of the shaping of technology, 
for example, there appears to be a basic assumption 
in Marx that the social purpose of surplus-value 
production, accumulation, and so on, is somehow quite 
overpowering and almost completely decisive. In 
practice, howevert the matter is far more complex. In 
the real world of design, development and production 
of technologies not only many other factors come to 
influence the making of a particular production 
technology, butq and perhaps even more importantly, 
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the dominant social purpose ("profit", etc. ) is often 
compromised, often challengedq often also limits come 
to be imposed on the processes of design, 
development, etc., by the existing levels of 
scientific and technical knowledge, and so one 
In other words, what we need to be aware of is that 
Marx's notion of technology as capital, which is in 
part based on and derived from the fundamental social 
purpose of capitalist production, is an idea that 
rests on the stringency of Marx's assumptionsq it is 
contingent on a number of his theoretical constructs, 
which are, needless to say, highly controversial. My 
own verdict is that there is a definite link between 
the shaping of technology and the exigencies of 
capital production and accumulation. The forming of 
technology, in my view, is certainly not free of 
socio-economic constraints, though in practice it is 
indeed far richer and more complex than that depicted 
by the flat generalization and abstraction of a 
theoretical model (2. n j theoretical model, and not 
merely Marx's). 
The issue in terms of my interpretation of Marx can 
be stated briefly as follows: From within Marx's own 
theoretical framework it is quite clear that the 
basic socio-economic purpose of capitalist production 
comes to be reflected in the form of technology and 
as such it becomes expressed at the point of 
production technologically; that is, not simply 
according to the manner production technology is 
utilized and employed, but as it functions "in 
itself". And for Marx it is only in the design of 
technology as machine technology that capital's 
fundamental socio-economic purpose and requirements 
come to be technically realized. Machine technology 
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cannot, then, be regarded as having powers 
independent of capital, nor as in itself untainted by 
the social relations of capital. 
However, from my understanding of Marx, the form of 
technology as capital involves a contradiction. For 
what we have coexisting in the same phenomenon (i. e. 
in the body of production technology) is an 
antagonistic union of two distinct aspects: 
technology as a productive force, a means of labour 
(the fundamental objective being its use for the 
production of goods as use-values for the 
satisfaction of human needs and wants); and 
technology as a moment of capital (the aim being its 
specific function as a means of enhancing the 
efficiency of exploitation of labour for the 
expansion of value and the accumulation of capital). 
The contradiction in the form of technology as 
capital manifests itself with the further development 
and advance of the system of machinery (with the 
advance of the process of mechanization). The more 
the technological system of machinery is developed, 
the less does it function, even nominally, as a 
"means of labour"; that is, the more it becomes 
independent of living labour. Yet it is only in 
relation to labour (i. e. precisely as a "means" that 
employs living labour) that technology or the 
technological system can, at least according to Marx, 
functi on as a moment of capital (capital's rule as a 
social system of production, for Marx, let us recall, 
is entirely dependent on the exploitation of living 
labour)o 
In other words, with 
0 technological development and 
the advance of the system of machinery 
(the 
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development of what Marx called the 'automatic system 
of machinery'(336)), Marx envisaged and proposed that 
the contradiction inherent in the form of technology 
as capital comes not only to plague capitalism (in 
the form of ever-deepening crises), but to actually 
work towards the 'dissolution' of capital itself as 
the social form dominating production. (337) 
This latter point is of course a highly contested 
issue and according to many commentators, arguably, 
unjustifiable even theoretically. But for Marx 
himself, and from within his own theoretical system, 
this is (wrongly or rightly) a basic issue of crucial 
significance, which he attempts to theoretically 
develop on the basis of his conception of fixed 
capital. For according to my understanding, the 
overriding aim of Marx's analysis of capitalist 
production (including of course also that of 
technology) is to point to the historical limits of 
capitalism by exploring, examining and attempting to 
explain the contradictions inherent in that social 
system of production. Marx, in my view, is 
fundamentally concerned with the sources of 
instability, crisisq and contradictions. And the 
conception of the technological systems as fixed 
capital is central to his thoughts on these issues - 
though his theoretical propositions on these issues 
are in many respects unsatisfactorily and certainly 
remain undeveloped. 
In any case, with respect to his concept of fixed 
capital, as already mentionedg Marx tends to give a 
less than adequate recognition to the difficulties 
involved in the process of transfer of the value of 
the technological system, and, I 
believe, he 
presents an altogether oversimplified 
"model" of the 
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ocess of depreciation of fixed capital. 
vertheless, I have also attempted to provide an 
planation for why this is so. This, as I have 
gg'ested, is to do with his concern to put a greater 
phasis on the problem of devalorization of (fixed) 
pital. Since Marx came to identify this problem in 
rticular as a crucial source of instability and 
ntradiction as it is directly related to the 
namics of technological change. 
w does the conception of technology as capital, or 
e technological system as fixed capital, then, 
late to Marx's understanding and discussions of 
e process of technological development and change 
der capitalism? It is this issue that I shall 
nsider in the next and final chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Marx on the Development of Productive Forces 
and Technological Change under Capitalism 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters we worked through the 
different aspects of Marx's thoughts, extracting and 
examining his ideas and propositions on technology. 
On that basis, an understanding of Marx's conception 
of technology was presented in chapter three. The 
task of this chapter is to investigate Marx's ideas 
on the development of productive forces and on 
technological development and change specifically as 
they are related to this suggested conception, and 
hence with respect to the thesis proposed in this 
study. 
We have suggested, and attempted to show, that in 
principle Marx is committed to a conception of 
technology which is grounded on the notion of 
"technology as capital". We have argued that this 
conception is decidedly concerned with production 
technology alone, and, what is more, with industrial- 
mechanized production technology - with machinery as 
such. Thus, the issue we are concerned with here is 
not an investigation of Marx's ideas on technological 
change and the development of productive forces in a 
general senseq or as an aspect of the history of 
human social development, but with an examination of 
these ideas in relation to capitalism and to the 
notion of technology as capital. 
Moreover, as I have previously remarked in relation 
to his conception of technology, Marx devoted his 
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main theoretical works to the study of the nature and 
character of the capitalist social system of 
production. Technology and technological change 
therefore are never examined and analysed by him 
independent of the processes and relations of capital 
production and reproduction. So that what we find is 
that Marx's conception of technological development 
and change, and of the development of productive 
forces, is enmeshed in his theory of capital 
accumulation - the process of accumulation being, for 
Marx, the historically specific form of social 
reproduction under capitalism. 
In the different sections of this chapter, I shall 
therefore need to take account of Marx's ideas on the 
process of accumulation. However, the discussion to 
be presented will be limited to what is strictly 
relevant to the thesis of this study: That is, 
concentrating on the examination of the relationship 
between Marx's conception of technology and his ideas 
and propositions on productive-force/technological 
development and change as an essential aspect of the 
process of accumulation of capital. In other words, 
this chapter is not concerned with either an 
explanation or a critical evaluation of Marx's theory 
of accumulation as such - that task is well beyond 
the scope of this study. The thesis is concerned with 
Marx's conception of technology based on the notion 
of technology as capital, and what we need to examine 
is whether or not this conception has any relevance 
to Marx's views of the development of productive 
forces and technological change. Can one understand 
the latter views without taking into account the 
conception of technology as capital? 
And in what way 
are the two linked 
(if at all)? It is only after such 
an examination 
(strictly limited though it may be), 
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as well as a discussion of some alternative views on 
Marx's ideas on this subject, that we can then give a 
final evaluation of Marx's conception of technology 
under capitalism. 
However, before we proceed, it needs to be mentioned 
here that this limitation, imposed by the strict 
adherence to the thesis, is not without its adverse 
consequences and problems, at least in terms of a 
critical examination and an understanding of Marx's 
writings on accumulation and social reproduction. For 
we are restricted to a discussion of one aspect 
(however essential it may be) of a socio-economic 
process which involves and engulfs a number of other 
aspects and relationships. We are also obliged, given 
the limited scope and nature of this study, to take 
many of Marx's controversial "economic" propositions 
and assumptions as they stand, uncritically (though 
references to works critical of these will of course 
be given), 
There is, therefore, a great deal of other issues 
beside "technology" (particularly in terms of the 
economic and social/class aspects of Marx's theory of 
accumulation), which will remain unexamined, or at 
best barely touched upon, in this chapter. For this 
reason (if no other) I do not, and cannot, claim 
that 
my understanding of Marx on this subject 
is flawless, 
and I am only too conscious of the 
fact that my 
interpretation of Marx on this issue, based as it is 
on the notion of technology as capital, 
is just that, 
one interpretation among many, and 
is certainly not 
intended as a conclusive statement on this subject 
in 
Marx. 
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1. A Preliminary Observation 
It is of course well known that Marx's socio-economic 
works and his critique of political economy remain 
unfinished. This has left many loose ends, problems 
and difficulties, besides those which some critics 
regard as inherent in his system. Nonetheless, 
despite this and also that of the existence of 
certain ambiguities, which have for long dogged the 
Marxian tradition, one of the most influential 
aspects of Marx's works is his analysis of the 
phenomenon of technological change under capitalism. 
As, for example, Professor Heertje rightly 
remarks: 'Marx was the first economist to realize 
fully the significance of technical change for 
economics and society. '(1) 
In what follows I shall give a brief, and simplified, 
exposition of the essential condition and basis of 
accumulation according to Marx (or at least according 
to my interpretation of Marx). This would then enable 
us to concentrate, in later sections, on Marx's ideas 
on technological change in relation to his conception 
of technology as capital as a crucial aspect of his 
analysis of the process of production and therefore 
reproduction (accumulation) of capital. 
We start with what, in my understanding, is essential 
to Marx's theoretical model: 
In every form of society a division of labour exists 
so that the goods that are produced conform 
in 
variety and quantity to the needs of 
life and the 
reproduction of that society. In pre- and non- 
capitalist societies, this was achieved through a 
conscious process of decision-making and regulation 
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prior to the acts of production and distribution. But 
with the alienation of labour and separation of 
labour from the means of production, the acts of 
production become socially isolated, with each 
producer (capitalist) taking decisions concerned with 
production autonomously, formally independent of 
others. This is in fact the central peculiarity of 
the capitalist system - that is, its fragmentation 
into more or less autonomous competing units. The 
social system of production, according to Marx, is 
therefore anarchic. 
Yet it is a system nevertheless, which functions with 
a certain regularity. It does so because the anarchic 
condition is regulated through exchange (or through 
what is often referred to as "the market", or "market 
relations") which is in fact also a reflection of 
such a condition. This establishes an objectively 
imposed condition upon every producing unit (every 
capitalist firm). Each individual unit must make sure 
that the labour-power and the means of production 
under its command are employed at the prevailing 
standard of efficiency and productivity. This 
efficiency in production is defined according to the 
criterion of monetary costs. And it is this objective 
social norm which every capital unit is compelled to 
emulatet or risk bankruptcy. This norm is established 
through the interaction of many capitals - i. e. 
through competition. 
The social norm - Marx's 'socially necessary labour- 
time' - is contingent upon the level of the material 
productive forces 
(upon technologies and'techniques), 
which are not however evenly distributed among all 
capitals (all firms). Thus some capitals are more 
efficient than others, and can therefore take 
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Avantage of the divergence between "individual" (or 
'particular") and "average" (or "normal") 
oroductivity, extending it by means of technological 
and organizational) improvements, which enables the 
ýaining of above average profits. But, according to 
larx, with the generalization of the new improved 
, echnological. (and/or organizational) conditions, 
, hrough competition, a new social norm becomes 
ýstablished. And the whole process of attempting to 
, ain above average profits by means of technological 
mprovements is thereby constantly renewed. This 
, rocess is in fact the process of capital 
ccumulatione 
t is, for Marx, through this process that the law of. 
alue, by determining the division of total labour- 
ime and the exchange relation between the commodity 
abour-power and other commodities, also determines 
he division of the working-day into necessary 
abour-time - the time taken to reproduce the value 
f labour-power - and surplus labour-time - the time 
aken by workers to produce surplus-value (profit, 
nd hence capital)* 
oreover, in the accumulation process, the decision 
s regards the actual division of the surplus-value 
r the mass of profit into revenue and investment is 
ade by the individual capitalist alone. But although 
t is, Marx admits, a 'deliberate act'(2), it is not 
apricious: 'the development of capitalist production 
akes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the 
mount of the capital laid out in a given industrial 
ndertaking, and competition makes the immanent laws 
f capitalist production to be felt by each 
ndividual capitalist, as external coercive laws. It 
Dmpels him to keep constantly extending his capital, 
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in order to preserve it, but extend he cannot, except 
by means of progressive accumulation. '(3) In other 
words, reproduction under capitalism is not simple 
reproduction; i. e. 'a mere repetition of the process 
of production on the old scale'. (4) But in fact it is 
the 'repetition' of capital production (self- 
expansion of value) on a progressively increasing and 
expanding scale. 
Remembering that for Marx "value" is a social 
phenomenon - the socio-economic expression and 
manifestation of the separation (alienation) of 
labour from means of production - self-expansion of 
value on a progressively increasing and expanding 
scale, or the process of accumulation, is essentially 
therefore the social reproduction of this separation 
(alienation) of labour on a progressively expanding 
scale. Accumulation is therefore a process of 
"expanding reproduction" of the social and 
technological conditions of capital production: 
'Capitalist production, ' Marx writes, 'under its 
aspect of a continuous connected process, of a 
process of reproduction, produces not only 
commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also 
produces and reproduces the capitalist relation; on 
the one side the capitalist2 on the other the wage- 
labourer. '(5) 
For Marx , moreover I the compulsive pas s 
ion for 
accumulation is inherent in the very nature of 
capital as a relation of production, a relationship 
between two classes - between the working class and 
the capitalist class or labour and capital (in 
_g_e_neral) . 
In explaining the dynamics of the 
capitalist system, and hence the systemic compulsion 
for technological change, as a process of 
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accumulation of capital, Marx begins at a level of 
abstraction which takes into account what is for him 
the essential and fundamental relationship - that 
between labour and capital - and moves on from this 
basis to take account of the much more complex 
interaction between individual capitals; i. e. taking 
account of competition (far from adequately it must 
'be said). 
Two basic relationships are therefore important for 
an understanding of Marx's ideas on the development 
of productive forces and technological change under 
capitalism: Firstly, the relationship between labour 
and capital; and, secondly, the relationship between 
the many different capital units (firms). However, 
according to my understanding, for Marx, the role and 
functioning of the second - i. e. the significance of 
the mechanism of competition to the process of 
technological change - is based on and derived from 
the first relationship - i. e. based on and derived 
from capital-labour relations as the precondition of 
self-expansion and accumulation. 
This, then, is a basic account of Marx's model as I 
understand it. There are, as I have already noted, 
many aspects of Marx's theory which are at the very 
least controversial; some are, it is claimed, 
questionable or in fact inaccurate; a number of 
propositions are certainly difficult and problematic; 
and, perhaps more damaging of all, the basic premise 
(i. e. Marx's theory of value) is regarded by some 
writers as an outdated tool of economic analysis or, 
indeed , as plainly 
false. (6) These are, however, 
questions that we cannot deal with here. But however 
problematic and questionable are aspects of Marx's 
theory, it is important to bear in mind that like 
365 
Marx himself, his critics also have their own set of 
assumptions, which may or may not be justified or 
valid, and are, according to some writers, in 
themselves quite suspect at any rate. (7) 
In any case, what concerns us here is one essential 
aspect of Marx's theory: namely, the development of 
productive forces and technological change. And we 
need to see how Marx's conception of technology as 
capital helps us to better understand his ideas on 
this issue. This requires an examination of Marx's 
ideas on the matrix of social relations that compel 
the technological dynamism of capitalism. 
2. The Extraction of Surplus Labour 
and Technological Change 
As we saw in the previous chapters on Marx's 
conception of technology, how Marx interprets and 
explains the role and status of technology under 
capitalism is directly related to its function in 
relation to the production of surplus-value and the 
exploitation of labour - this being, I have 
suggested, an essential aspect of the notion of of 
technology as capital. For Marx the same principle 
applies equally to the dynamics of technological 
development and changes 
Let us see how this dynamics is linked to the notion 
of technology as capital: 
Since for Marx surplus-value is merely a specific 
historical form of surplus labour, the production of 
surplus-value (and its magnitude) is determined by 
the mode and conditions of the extraction of surplus 
labour - which is a function of the 
direct process of 
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production. While the form of labour as wage-labour 
(i. e. the separation of labour from the means of 
production, etc. ) establishes a systematic socio. 
. e_conomic compulsion to labour (at least in principle 
and according to Marx); within the production 
process, however, this "socio-economic" compulsion on 
individual workers does not automatically guarantee 
that their actual, immediate performance of labour is 
in line or above the prevailing social norm of 
productive activity (or productivity). 
This, as we have already seen in chapter three, is a 
problem that Marx makes the responsibility of the 
capitalist; it is what Braverman, for example, 
identifies as a "managerial problem". It is, in other 
words, a function of the capitalist (or management) 
to ensure that the performance of labour meets the 
prevailing standard of productivity, and in so doing 
ensure that surplus labour is sufficiently extracted. 
"Free" labour, as we saw, according to Marx (and 
others, for example, Braverman and Pollard, just to 
name two), requires the act and agency of direct 
control of production, of labour. The "socio- 
economic" compulsion (due in principle to social 
dispossession and alienation), therefore, needs to be 
buttressed by a different kind of compulsion at the 
point of production. 
The mode of extraction of surplus labour, in Marx's 
though tj if I understand him correctly, ref ers to 
this latter power of compulsion, which is actualized 
as a coercive force, through the particular manner in 
which the technical relations of production operate 
and function. It refers to the actual manner in which 
the material forces of production (technologies and 
techniques) are utilized and function in order to 
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ensure the "adequate" performance of labour, and 
hence surplus labour. Thus we have seen that an 
essential aspect of Marx's conception of technology 
as capital is machine technology's role in 
actualizing, what Marx referred to asq labour's 'real 
subsumption'. The technological (and organizational) 
conditions of the production process thus `become 
essential to the mode of control and exploitation of 
labour, and inseparable from it. That is, the 
domination of capital within the production process 
through the mastery of machinery, or the 
technological system (technology as capital). 
However, the mode of extraction is not established 
arbitrarily by particular capitalists. It is well to 
remember that, for Marx at any rate, just as 
individual labourers are forced to labour, so 
individual capitalists are also compelled to make 
sure that labour is properly performed. We have 
already come across this latter idea in relation to 
the capitalist as the "subject" of the capitalist 
process of objectification. Each individual capital 
unit (or firm) is compelled to ensure that its 
consumption of labour-time (living and dead, i. e. 
labour-power, technologies, materials2 etc. ) is no 
more than the prevailing social norm (or Marx's 
'socially necessary labour-time'). For Marx, the 
manner in which exploitation is concretely effected - 
hence the choice of techniques and technologies used 
to translate the desire for surplus-value into actual 
production of it, and the gaining of profits - is in 
the first instance determined by the prevailing 
social (general) rate of surplus-value, or, what is 
the sameg the rate of exploitation. 
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In capitalism, with its complex division of labour 
and formally isolated production units, the 
productive activity of each producer becomes 
socialized (that is, dependent upon other producers), 
through the act and process of exchange (through the 
market and in competition). This interaction of units 
(capitals) generates a social norm of necessary 
labour-time and a criterion on the basis of which the 
efficiency of the particular, concrete modes of 
extraction (particular to each concrete production 
processes) can be measured - it establishes an 
objective and systemic social (society- or system- 
wide) rate of exploitation. (8) 
The rate of surplus-value W) exists for total 
social capital; it is, in value terms, the ratio of 
the total mass of surplus-value produced (SV), within 
the system as a whole, to the total value invested in 
the employment of labour-power (V, or total variable 
capital): i. e. s'=SV/V. This rate, for Marx, 
expresses the ratio of paid to unpaid labour, or that 
of necessary to surplus labour. If, therefore, it is 
in the interest of capital to increase this, rate 
(thus extracting greater unpaid or surplus labour), 
it is just as much in the interest of collective 
labour to resist any such increase. For an increase 
of this rate has a direct effect upon the very 
conditions of labour. It is on the basis of this 
proposition that, according to Marx, the conflict of 
interests between labour and capital is constantly 
and systemically reinforced, and class struggle 
firmly located within the production process. And it 
is, according to my understanding of Marx, this 
struggle over the rate of surplus-value (the rate of 
exploitation) which is a fundamental leverage in the 
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transformation of the technological conditions of 
production. 
But what is important here, at least in terms of my 
thesis, is, I suggest, the way the struggle of labour 
and capital over the rate of surplus-value, or the 
rate of exploitation (i. e. the struggle over 
conditions of work, wages, hours, etc., or over the 
manner of extraction of surplus labour), influences 
the decisions taken with respect to the development 
and change of the technical features of production 
technology - i. e. the way this so-called inherent 
conflict of interest (if we accept Marx's reasoning), 
as well as of course actual industrial conflictsp 
influences the direction of the development, design 
and application of new or improved production 
technologies, or the direction of technological 
change. In this connection, a key example that Marx 
gives, following Ure, is the development of the 
I automatic spinning mule'. (9) 
That capitalism is a technologically dynamic social 
system of production seems to be generally accepted 
and historically unquestionable. That there is a 
definite link between the particular form of 
capitalist economic structure (the labour-capital 
relations, the market, exchange and competition, 
etc. ) and the dynamics of technological development 
and change seems also to be generally agreed upon 
(though there are, of course, disagreements on the 
significance of the different aspects of this 
structure with regards to the impetus to 
technological change). What isq however, of 
fundamental importance in Marx's thoughts on this 
issue is not simply to show how and why this is so, 
but what is the direction of the process of 
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technological change and what are its implications 
for the social system of capital production. It is 
with this in mind, I would suggestq that Marx's 
conception of technology as capital has a direct 
relevance to the process of the development of 
productive forces and technological change. 
Here, then, we can propose the following 
interpretation: The direction of technological change 
is "progressively" towards the enhancement of the 
efficiency of the extraction of surplus by means of a 
"progressive" increase of the mastery of technology 
over labour. At every stage of the development of the 
technological conditions of production, according to 
my reading of Marx, efficiency is achieved by both a 
qualitative and quantitative advance of fixed capital 
formation: 'Hence, ' so Marx writes, 'the dimension 
already possessed by fixed capital, which its 
production occupies within total production, is the 
measuring rod of the development of wealth founded on 
the mode of production of capital. '(10) For Marx, the 
labour-capital struggle over the extraction of 
surplus labour has in essence a uni-dimensional 
influence on the direction and also the character of 
technological development and change* 
In principle, according to Marx's very logic and 
definition of capital and capitalism (however 
controversial and questionable these may be), the 
dynamics of technological change must at all time 
respect the axiom of the domination of living by dead 
labour. Given the social purpose of production 
(already discussed in chapter three) as the making of 
profits and its maximization, or as the self- 
expansion of capital (growth and accumulation), no 
invention even if developed will become a technology 
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of production, or be maintained as such for long, 
unless it can raise the rate of surplus-value. On the 
basis of Marx's conception of technology already 
discussed, the direction and character of 
technological change can only be ascertained from the 
relation between the newly instituted and functioning 
technology or system of technology (in itself) and 
labour. It is this relation at the point of 
production which is the basic premise, and not any 
abstract notion of technical and human "progress". 
And the fundamental criterion is the increase of 
surplus value (of profits), which is achieved by 
means of the technological intensification of the 
performance of labour - i. e. the greater subjection 
of labour's effort to a progressively improving 
rhythm and movement of the machinery system which 
technically expresses the social requirement of the 
quantitative maximization of profits and the 
reduction of socially necessary labour-time (often 
referred to in terms of the growth of output and 
minimization of production costs). (11) 
In other words, for Marx, according to my 
understanding, the process of technological change is 
not only based on the mastery of technology at the 
point of production, but in fact on the progressive 
enhancement of that mastery. In this connection, let 
us see what is the significance of Marx's statement 
(mentioned earlier) that with the self-acting mule 
(taken as a key example), a 'new epoch' was opened up: 
The first point of significance here is the notion of 
"technology shapes technology"(12); that is, the 
conditioning of the process of development of 
(potential) technology (i. e. of invention) by what is 
already developed and applied, and specifically 
if it 
371 
has proved to be successful in terms of its desired 
effects. Existing technology has a direct and 
definite influence on the shape and direction of 
technological change. The second point of 
significance, which is related to the former, is that 
the self-acting mule (again as only a key example) 
opened up a new epoch of technical/technological 
problem-solving approach to the process of design and 
development of production technologies. What is at 
stake here is that a matrix of shared attitudes and 
assumptions is formed from which technological change 
is initiated and instituted. (13) The new epoch Marx 
refers to can thus be seen in terms of the 
establishment of a "paradigm" and a "working" 
(actually functioning) technology which set the 
agenda for technological change on the basis of a 
definition of "efficiency" and a conception of 
"rationality" that are in conformity with the very 
logic of capital as the domination of living by dead 
labour - i. e. the premise and the assumption in and 
of production and of productivity (in technical as 
well as socio-economic terms) is the mastery of 
technology as capital. 
In connection with this, let us take an example from 
Howard Rosenbrock's study of the development of; two 
quite different kinds of machines in the early ppriod 
of the industrial revolution, which is both 
interesting in itself and useful as an illustration 
of Marx's point on the opening up of this 'new 
epoch'. He writes: 'Looking back at the early stages 
of the industrial revolution we tend to see the early 
machines as part of one single evolutiQn 41 
'(14) 
However, perhaps in general, but certainly in the 
case of technologies of spinning, according to 
Rosenbrockq the development of machinery was 
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initially guided by two distinct perspectives: 'there 
were in fact, ' Rosenbrock writes, 'two quite 
different kinds of machine ... with opposed 
relationships to human abilities. One of them can be 
typified by Hargreaves's spinning-jenny, which he 
invented for his own or his family's use. It is a 
hand-operated machine, deriving from the spinning 
wheel, but allowing many threads to be spun at the 
same time. To use it demands a skill, which is a 
natural development from the skill needed to use the 
spinning wheel. This skill in the user is rewarded by 
a great increase in his productivity. Samuel 
Crompton's spinning-mule was a similar kind of 
machine, and even when it was driven mechanically it 
needed the skilled cooperation of the spinner. '(15) 
Yet there was a development of a different kind of 
technology which 'proved' to be 'more profitable for 
the inventor and the manufacturer'* And it was this 
that was epoch making. -'The other type of machine, ' 
Rosenbrock continues, 'can be typified by the self- 
acting mule which was invented by Richard Roberts in 
1830. What Roberts set out to do was not, like 
Hargreaves or Crompton, to make skill more 
productive. Rather he set out to eliminate skill so 
that the spinner was no longer needed except to 
supervise a set of machines. Fragments of his job 
remained, such as mending broken threads, or removing 
thread which had been spun. These jobs were given 
largely to children ... 
'(16) 
It is with the principle of "self-acting mule" that 
Marx identifies the direction of technological change 
under capitalism. The principle does not guarantee 
greater general productivity as compared with other 
alternativesý but greater productivity based on and 
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derived from an enhancement of the technological 
alienation of labour. The greater the alienation of 
labour, the less is production depend ent on the input 
of labour-power (in terms of skill and/or numbers), 
and the greater will be the rise in the rate of 
surplus-value. The principle fuses together what is 
technically required in the activity of spinning 
(technology as a "factor" of production of use- 
values) with what is socio-economically required 
within the context of capital-labour relations 
(technology as capital). It is this principle, we 
suggest, that, for Marx, sets the agenda for the 
process of the development of productive forces and 
technological change. 
Marx's conception of technological change, therefore, 
takes account of the influences of the technical 
innovations and developments in themselves upon the 
process of change. As regards the changing of 
individual technologies, for example, he writes: 'To 
what extent the old forms of the instruments of 
production influenced their new forms at first 
starting, is shown by, amongst other things, the most 
superficial comparison of the present power-loom with 
the old one, of the modern blowing apparatus of a 
blast-furnace with the first inefficient mechanical 
reproduction of the ordinary bellows... '(17) 
Moreover, a technological change in one branch of 
production has spill-over and multiplier effects, and 
begins to influence and shape the direction of 
change; it becomes a technological requirement in 
itself. (18) Thus, according to Marx, the mechanical 
'revolution in the modes of production of industry 
and agriculture made necessary a revolution in the 
general conditions of the social process of 
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production, i. e., in the means of communication and 
of transport.. '(19) And this in turn provided the 
technical impetus for other technological changes and 
improvements. (20) 
It is evident from his writings on machinery that, 
this diffusion of the "mechanical" revolution, or the 
advance of the process of mechanization, is 
conceptualized by Marx as having a high degree of its 
own technologically perpetuating "inner" dynamics 
because machine technology is in itself and as such a 
necessary manifestation of capital relations. Once 
the technological change from Manufacture to Modern 
Industry has been initiated, in fact once we have the 
"paradigm" and the "working", actually functioning, 
technology of "mechanization" (based on the principle 
of "automatic/self-acting" system), technological 
change and the spread of mechanization, according to 
my reading of Marx, become themselves a technical 
necessity given its specific social role, form and 
function as capital. 
However, what is also crucial in Marx is the role of 
competition in this process. To overcome the 
subjective limitations (labout's skill, resistance, 
etc. ) of raising the rate and increasing the 
production of surplus-value, it becomes necessary, as 
mentioned in chapter three, to objectively 
improve 
the efficiency and productivity of the workforce - 
and by far the most important means of achieving this 
is, for Marx, as we have seen, through the 
development of technology: 'the capitalist', writes 
Marx, 'who applies the improved method of production, 
appropriates to surplus-labour a greater portion of 
the working-day, than the other capitalists 
in the 
same trade. He does individually, what 
the whole body 
37b 
of capitalists engaged in producing relative surplus- 
value, do collectively. '(21) The technological change 
introduced 'individually' becomes in fact 
compulsively systematic through competition. 
For Marx comr)etition is essentially concerned with 
the distribution of the total quantity of surplus- 
value (the mass of profits) produced within the 
system - i. e. it is concerned with the sharing of 
what he calls the mass of surplus-value. It is, for 
him, the mechanism that ensures the behaviour of each 
individual capital as self-expanding value. The inner 
necessary tendency of capital for self-expansion, for 
growth, becomes, through the mechanism of 
competition, a compulsion exercised over each and 
every individual capital. The sharing of the mass of 
surplus-value (the gaining of profit as such by 
individual firms) depends on the competitive strength 
of each individual capital. While, at the same timet 
each capital's competitive strength (indeed often its 
very survival) depends on the scale and scope of its 
operation and its size. But the latter, in turn, 
depends on how much and how fast it can grow through 
its participation in the sharing process of the mass 
of surplus-value produced. 
The process therefore appears static though circular, 
it is in fact, however, a spiralling, dynamic process 
of progressive growth and accumulation. And the key 
to its dynamism is located at the core of production, 
with the relative efficiency of the technological 
conditions of each concrete production process. Thus, 
if competitive strength depends on growth, then 
growth depends on a deliberate act of 
investment in 
the extensive and/or intensive improvements of the 
technical composition of production. For2 according 
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to Marx, only through the raising of productivity - 
i. e. the increasing of surplus labour-time, or the 
reduction of labour-time embodied in commodities 
produced - can any individual capital increase its 
share of surplus-value, gain greater profits and grow 
larger and faster than its rivals. Technology and 
technological change cannot therefore be simply 
attached to this process as some kind of 
afterthought; the dynamics of technology, its 
development and change, is essential to and 
inseparable from the dynamics of capital 
accumulation. The two are aspects of a single 
process. 
This process, however, involves an inherent 
contradiction which is, I submit, of the highest 
importance in Marx's conception of technological 
development and change under capitalism. And in this 
respect also the notion of technology as capital is 
in fact quite significant, as we shall shortly see. 
Let us, then, go on to look at the following 
question: how does this inherent contradiction 
in the 
process of accumulation and of technological 
development and change manifests itself , and with 
what implications for the capitalist system of 
production? 
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3. Technological Development and 0 -Change. Contradiction and Crisis 
Perhaps the shortest expression Marx uses with 
respect to the nature of "capital" is: capital as a 
'living contradiction'. This expression points to 
what Marx regards as a systemic contradiction that 
although as the root cause of capitalism's dynamics 
is nonetheless, and paradoxically, supposed to ensure 
its eventual breakdown and demise. This is a 
fundamental issue that lies at the very core of 
Marx's theoretical project. As Elster has rightly 
pointed out: 'No problem is more central to Marxism 
than the mechanism whereby capitalism destroys 
itself. '(22) What is an essential aspect of this 
'mechanism' and central to Marx's expression of 
capital as a 'living contradiction', according to my 
understandingg is the progressive development of 
machine-technology's role, function and form as 
capital, the advance and progress of the specific 
socio-technical character of production technology as 
the master of labour. This conception of 
technological change based on the notion of 
technology as capital is, I would suggest7 crucial to 
understanding that central problem referred to by 
Elstero 
However, the question of capitalism destroying itself 
is generally discussed2 interpreted and criticised, 
from within Marx's "economic" writings concerned with 
capitalist crisis. The conventional argument is based 
on Marx's proposition on the falling profit 
rate/rising organic composition of capital. This is 
then connected in one way or another to his more 
general proposition on the revolutionary social 
transformation associated with the contradiction 
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between the productive forces and the relation of 
production. The link between "crisis" of accumulation 
and "systemic contradiction" is argued to be the 
of tendency of the fall in the rate of profit". The 
connection between this to tendency" and the 
it contradiction between productive forces and 
production relations" appears in most commentaries to 
be simply stated at a general level of Marx's "theory 
of history", or "historical materialism". Here we 
propose, however, that Marx's conception of 
technology as capital is vital to an explanation of 
this connection and hence to an understanding of his 
thoughts on what is called the "fettering" of the 
productive forces and the breakdown of capitalism. 
In the previous section we argued that in Marx's view 
the process of technological development and change, 
its direction, and its particular objective, are 
essentially conditioned by the relationship between 
capital and labour (in the way surplus labour is 
extracted), and that through the mechanism of 
competition the process becomes dynamic and 
technologies come to be diffused. 
This process under capitalism, we pointed out, is 
initiated and instituted, according to Marx, in order 
to raise the rate of surplus-value; in order to 
decrease, in Marx's own words, 'the portion of 
living labour'(23); or, what is the same, in order to 
reduce necessary labour and hence increase surplus 
labour-time (the substance of surplus value). 
It is this that, for Marx at least, defines the 
meaning of "productivity" under capitalism. What is 
crucial to this definition of "productivity", we can 
therefore suggestq is the technical characteristic of 
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production technology, its qualitative progress based 
on what Marx identifies as the principle of "self- 
acting" or what is now referred to as the principles 
of "mechanization". This is a principle which, for 
Marx, expresses the progress of the mastery of 
technology as capital over labour, and it is a 
principle that therefore reflects the technical 
"efficiency" of productive processes. (24) 
Technological change under capitalism, then, is based 
on the continuous improvement of this form of 
it productivity" which is achievable by the enhancement 
of the qualitative features of production technology 
whereby the mastery of technology over labour can be 
continuously reinforced and expanded, which becomes 
itself, given Marx's view of "efficiency" under 
capitalism, a technical necessity (as mentioned in 
the previous section). In this sense, the capitalist 
process of technological development and change tends 
towards greater mechanization of production and hence 
greater diminishing of necessary labour. And 
precisely for that very reason, Marx regarded this 
process as a dynamic process involving periodic 
crises, or cycles of booms and slumps, and a process 
that, on the basis of Marx's theory of value, is 
inherently contradictory and ultimately devastating 
for the system of capital itself. 
Here, however, we cannot go into the details of 
Marx's theory of accumulation and crisis - Marx's 
view on capitalist crisis is a controversial issue, 
which we cannot even attempt to resolve here. 
(25) 
What we would like to point out is that the 
conventional interpretations of Marx on this issue, 
and associated with this, of Marx's ideas on the 
breakdown of capitalism(26), do not devote attention 
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to the signif icance of the qualitative aspects of the 
development of technology. We suggest that for a more 
accurate interpretation these aspects need to be 
taken into account - even though by doXng so we may 
not resolve many of the problems involved in Marx's 
theory, 
In wha t follows, therefore, we begin with an 
schematic account of Marx's ideas on this issue and 
move on to presenting some suggestions which take 
account of Marx's conception of technology., 
The development of technology, its application and 
diffusion brings about a change in the composition of 
capital (i. e. changing the relation between the 
inputs of labour-power and means of production, or 
between investment in labour relative to that in 
technologies and materials - in Marx's language 
between variable and constant capital). Although this 
subject is I-ess than adequately clarified by Marx, 
and has in any case been a major source of 
contention, what is important in our case is the 
correlation 'between what Marx calls the "technical" 
and the "value" composition which he expresses by the 
use of the concept of "organic composition". (27) 
As a result of the process of technological 
development and change, the structure of the social 
process of production becomes transformed, thus 
altering the ratio of the physical or material 
elements (technologiest etc. ) to workers. This then 
effects a change in the ratio of constant to variable 
capital - i. e. changes the organic composition of 
capital. The change in the organic composition, 
thereforeý 'can only' take place 
'as a result of a 
change in the mode of production which alters 
the 
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technological relationship between the two parts of 
capital [i. e. constant and variable-RR]. '(28) Ift 
for Marx, the growth of productivity is conditioned 
by the development and the growing extent of 
technologies relative to the input of living labour, 
then, so he proposes (as a "law" of capitalist 
accumulation), there must be an 'increase of the 
constant constituent of capital at the expense of its 
variable constituent. '(29) In other words, the 
progress and advance of accumulation - which involves 
technological changes and progressive increase in 
productivity because of the constant pressure of 
competition - results in a progressive rise in the 
organic composition of total social capital. (30) 
The main economic implication of the progressive rise 
in the organic composition is, according to Marx, the 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall. While, 
therefore, as a general rule, higher productivity and 
technological change increase the mass of profits, 
they tend to, however, lower the amount of profit per 
unit of investment, i. e. they tend to lower the. rate 
of profit. Since, in terms of Marx's theory, the 
source of profit is the mass of surplus value created 
by living labour, and since for Marx higher 
productivity means 'the diminution of the mass of 
labour in proportion to the mass of means of 
production moved by it'(31) - or the increase of 
constant relative to variable capital - this 
necessarily means, so it is claimed by Marx, that the 
mass of surplus value produced becomes smaller 
relative to -total capital investments. Thus, the 
profit rate (profit per unit of investment) has a 
tendency to fall, which when translated into an 
actual shortage of profit in relation to the capital 
already accumulated results in the 
(temporary) 
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cessation of further investment and we have economic 
crisis. 
According to this model, economic crisis is a 
necessary feature of the process of accumulation, and 
the key concept here is the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall linked to technological development 
and change. The model has been criticised heavily and 
for many of Marx's critics, and some of his 
followers, the very idea of the fall in the profit 
rate as a result not of a decrease but in fact of an 
increase 
, 
in the productive force of technology, is, 
to use Elster's words, 'contrary not only to 
intuition, but to truth as well. '(32) 
Though we cannot discuss the many objections raised, 
there is one major and important criticism made by 
many writers which concerns us directly and needs to 
be mentioned here (we shall come back to some 
aspects of this issue in the next section). This 
objection is concerned with Marx's claim on the rise 
in the organic composition of capital. It has been 
argued that both on theoretical and empirical grounds 
this proposition of Marx is unjustifiable and 
invalid. The effect of technological change and 
progress may not result in a progressive increase in 
the value of technologies and hence a rise in the 
average organic composition. Indeed, it has been 
argued, technological development can bring the 
value of constant capital. In other words, research 
and development can (and indeed often do) result in 
the invention of technologies which are not only more 
"productive", but also cheaper than the "old" forms, 
It is, in other words, argued that increases in 
productivity are very often the result of 
innovations 
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that are actually "capital-saving". The fundamental 
objective of firms is the reduction Of costs, and it 
makes no difference to them whether this is achieved 
by savings on investments in technology or on 
labour. (33) But if technological change is "capital- 
saving" then there is no reason to assume that there 
must be a rise in the organic composition of capital, 
and hence a fall in the profit rate. Marx seems to 
have also recognized this point that it is not always 
the case that increased productivity results in a 
rise in the organic composition. But beyond referring 
to 'a few cases' whereby this does not occur(34), he 
provides no explanation as to why such an effect 
should be confined to only a few cases. 
And, it is of course true that Marx does take account 
of certain "counteracting influences" - increasing 
intensity of exploitation, lowering of wages below 
the value of labour-power, relative over-population, 
foreig n trade, the increase of stock capital, and 
indeed cheapening of elements of constant 
capital. (35) Such counteracting influences, Marx 
argues, work to 'cross and annul the effect of the 
general law [of fall in the profit rate -RR], 
and.. give it merely the characteristic of a 
tendency., '(36) Nonetheless, it is also the case 
that, he insists that such influences 'do not do away 
with the law, but impair its effect. ' And that 
'it is 
only under certain circumstances and only after long 
periods that its [the law's] effects become 
strikingly pronounced. '(37) 
Beside the mere "assertion" of Marx's "law" as a 
"fact" (as some Marxist tend to do (38)) - which in 
fact does little justice to Marx's argumentation - is 
there anything in Marxis writings that can perhaps 
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provide some explanation for his main contention 
stated so far? In our view, there are certain ideas 
in Marx, specifically concerning the development of 
technologies, that can help to explain the thrust of 
his argument, and can give a degree of consistency to 
his stance, even if these may not provide an 
"absolute" validation of his proposition (for that is 
ultimately an empirical problematic)* 
In this connection, we like to make three suggestions 
which if taken into account, may provide, at least 
in principle, some form of basic explanation for why 
Marx envisaged that technological change - "capital- 
saving" innovations included - could not in the 
term counteract a rise in the organic composition. 
That in fact technical progress - even though it may 
indeed result in an increase in the rate of profit 
temporarily - increases (periodically) the pressure 
on the general rate of profit to fall and thereby 
plunges the system into periodic economic crises. But 
that, moreover, at a "certain stage" in the 
development of capitalist production there can appear 
a progressively declining mass of profit, 
These three suggestions are as follows: 
First suggestion: Technological change can indeed be 
in the direction of "capi tal- saving", but this does 
not mean that the value of total investment within 
the social system necessarily declines absolutely. 
Further, that the value of investment does not 
increase in the same proportion as its material mass 
- e. g. technologies may have become cheaper, 
but the 
scale of production increasesq more of the new 
technologies and more materials may be used. (39) 
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As technologies of production become cheaper and more 
efficient there is greater incentive for individual 
capitals to increase the scale of production; an 
individual capital must make the maximum advantage of 
the new technology before a cheaper technology is 
developed, produced, and applied by a competitor. 
This therefore increases the pressure within the 
economy to buy and employ more of them. Total 
investment in production technologies (and materials) 
increases, and it is such a long term increase which 
tends to raise the organic composition of capital 
precisely as a result of the progressive advances in 
the quality of technology - i. e. its progressively 
increasing efficiency, lower cost of production and 
use, a nd hence its greater productive power. 
Second suggestion: This point has to do with the 
devalorization of fixed capital (as briefly discussed 
in the previous chapter - and not to be confused with 
the "depreciation", or transfer, of the value of 
fixed capital, on this latter see Appendix 4). 
Because of the development of productivity - due to 
technological development and change - the initial 
value of constant capital already invested (i. e. the 
value of technologies, etc., already functioning) 
will not necessarily be the same as that of its 
reproduction and replacement. If we assume new 
cheaper inventions and growth of productivity, then 
fixed capital is devalued. 
We have already noted in the previous chapter (but 
for more detail see Appendix 4) that in accordance 
with Marx's theoryq the transfer of the value of 
fixed capital (technologies, etc. ) into the value of 
produced commodities takes place over the whole 
period that technologies function 
in the process of 
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production. During this period the value of fixed 
capital depreciates, and is gradually transformed and 
accumulated, in the monetary form, with each cycle of 
production. However, as a result of technological 
development and change, technologies that are already 
functioning can become socially obsolete. This social 
obsolescence can occur before a technology's actual 
physical and functional obsolescence. 
The intention of individual capitalist firms in 
introducing technological changes and innovations is 
to reduce the unit cost of production and thereby 
raise their rate of profit. For Marx, technological 
change is initially introduced only by certain firms; 
at any one time (and in this sense the process of 
innovation takes place continuously but unevenly) 
there are always capital units which seek to increase 
their profits, to gain above average profit, through 
innovations (both organizational and technological) - 
innovation is not somethingg thereforeq that a whole 
economy or a whole branch (sector) introduces 
suddenly or evenly. 
If an individual capital, or a new capital formation, 
introduces a new, more productive technology, then 
its rivals, under the pressure of competition, would 
be forced, on the pain of bankruptcy (or take-over), 
to transform their technological structure and 
introduce the new technology - despite the fact that 
their "old" technologies are not as yet functionally 
exhausted. If the depreciation of the capital 
invested in the "old" technologies is calculated on 
the basis of, say, a ten year life-span, but an 
individual capital is forced to replace the 
"old" 
with the new technologies after only 
five years, 
then, a portion of the value of the 
"old" 
-399, 
technologies cannot be recovered through normal 
depreciation. In short, a part of the value of fixed 
capital originally invested is lost, it is destroyede 
For Marx, the devalorization of fixed capital becomes 
increasingly more important, with decisive economic 
consequences. It is 'accompanied', according to Marx, 
'by sudden stoppages and crises in the production 
process. '(40) 
The introduction of new technologies, by making the 
"old" technologies obsolete, results in the loss of 
part of the value of previous investments made as 
fixed capital. However, since technological change 
does not occur evenly, while there is an increase of 
profit for the innovative capitals - which more than 
compensates them for the devaluation of their 
previous investments - it falls for the less 
effici ent capitals. Within the same branch those 
capitals which have not yet introduced the new 
technologies (and/or techniques) will have higher 
cost prices for their commodities than the innovative 
capitals. But the pressure of competition compels 
other capitals to emulate these latter; some are able 
to do so, others are not and go out of business or 
are absorbed by the more efficient/larger capitals. 
Whatever the case, as old technologies are gradually 
replaced by the new, as technological change spreads, 
and the use of new technologies becomes generalized, 
there occurs a general devaluation of fixed capital 
and forces down the value realized by all capitals - 
i. e. it generates a general decline in the (average) 
rate of profit, there is an interruption of 
accumulation, and we have the beginnings of an 
s, (41) economic crisi 
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However, what is absolutely crucial for Marx in all 
this, according to my understanding, is the 
contradiction associated with the process of 
technological development and change (or as a result 
of the development of the material productive 
forces). As he writes: 
'The contradiction, to put it in a very general way, 
consists in that the capitalist mode of production 
involves a tendency towards absolute development of 
the productive forces, regardless of the value and 
surplus-value it contains, and regardless of the 
social conditions under which capitalist production 
takes place; while, on the other handq its aim is to 
preserve the value of the existing capital and 
promote its self-expansion to the highest limit 
(i. e., to promote an ever more rapid growth of this 
value). The specific feature about it is that it uses 
the existing value of capital as a means of 
increasing this value to the utmost. The methods by 
which it accomplishes this include the fall of the 
rate of profit, depreciation of existing capital, and 
the development of the productive forces of labour at 
the expense of already created productive 
forces. '(42) 
At the heart of the process of accumulation is the 
development of technologies (and techniques). 
Technological development and change, however, 
involve not merely quantitative adjustments of the 
scale of production, but also qualitative advance and 
change. It is in this respect that Marx's conception 
of technology is of crucial significance for an 
understanding of his views on the connection between 
the periodic crises of accumulation and the 
contradiction inherent in the process of development 
of the material productive forces, 
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And thus we come to our third 
-suggestion: 
The 
_qualitative character of new technologies developed 
and being introduced affects the ratio of constant to 
variable capital. Composition of capital refers to 
the ratio of constant to variable (or dead to living 
labour). Even when, as a result of innovations and 
increased productivity, elements of constant capital 
(and indeed fixed capital - the technological system) 
are cheapened, thus lowering the value of constant 
capital, this cannot rule out a rise in the organic 
composition. For the whole notion of high or low 
organic composition depends not on the "absolute" 
change of the value of constant capital, but on a 
change relative to variable capital. For the rate of 
profit, as against the mass of profit, according to 
Marx, it is the ratio which is crucial: 'The drop in 
the rate of profit is not due to an absolute, but 
only to a relative decrease of the variable part of 
the total capital, i. e., to its decrease in relation 
to the constant part. '(43) 
From their initial application up to the point of 
their generalization as the established system of 
technology within the social system, the use of new 
technologies will provide the firms utilizing them 
with a great deal of advantage in terms of 
competitive strength and hence profitability. It is 
during this period that accumulation accelerates, the 
rate of surplus value rises, and, therefore, 
according to Marx's proposition, the tendency of the 
profit rate to fall is checked. 
These technologies may indeed be so-called "capital- 
saving" in the fullest sense, for example, as in the 
case of computers, microelectronics, etc., or even 
before these as with certain machinery and mechanical 
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inventions. Thus there will be a lowering of the 
value of constant capital. But if we take their 
qualitative character (in the terms we have already 
discussed in chapter three) into account, they are 
also so-called " labour- saving", which onlY becomes 
increasingly more apparent gradually as the s_ystem of 
technology begins to change. As far as the organic 
composition is concerned, once new technologies 
diffuse and spread, in spite of a considerable 
lowering ot the value of means of production 
(constant capital), the variable capital will 
decrease relatively more, simply because the input of 
labour (or rather necessary labour) in proportion to 
that of technologies (and materials) is lower than 
previously - that is precisely why, according to Marx 
at any rate, it can be said that there is an increase 
of productivity from the previous level. Once the 
system of technology has become transformed within 
the social system of production, then, the net result 
is that the ratio of constant to variable capital 
will rise, and, if Marx's assumptions are justified, 
the profit rate declines - the rate of accumulation 
of social capital slows down, and when the process of 
accumulation becomes interrupted the system enters a 
period of crisis. 
When exactly this occurs depends on the rate of 
diffusion of the new technological system. For the 
organic composition to rise, it is not merely the 
rate of diffusion of individual technologies 
(e. g. 
machines, computers, robots, etc., individually) 
which is important, but in fact the diffusion of the 
new system as such (the established networks of these 
and the articulation of the latter). This 
is why Marx 
constantly emphasises the role and significance of 
fixed Sýýta19 which, as we have already seen 
in 
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chapter three, is the concept he uses for the system 
of machinery, etc., and not simply for individual 
technologies. This conceptualization of the system of 
technology as fixed capital is also significant in 
the case of devalorization mentioned above. For, as 
new technologies become generalized and established 
as the new technological system of production it is 
then that there occurs a general devaluation of fixed 
capital. 
Thus, and finally, what is an important point in all 
this, and one which 1 is often ignored, is that it is 
the progressive advance of the quality and technical 
characteristics of the system of technology (of fixed 
capital) which is a critical factor not only for the 
increasing severity of periodic crises, but also for 
the eventual demise of capitalism. For in terms of 
Marx's theory of capital production, the more the 
technological system is developed on the basis of the 
princi'ples of mechanization (or what he called the 
'automatic system'), the greater is the reduction of 
necessary labour involved in the production process. 
And since according to Marx living labour is the only 
source of value and hence essential for the expansion 
of capital, when the qualitative level of the 
development of the system of technology reaches a 
certain point whereby the input of labour becomes a 
negligible factor of production, then the systematic 
expansýon of capital (total social capital, and not 
necessarily individual capital) becomes impossible. 
Thus, beyond a certain point in the qualitative 
advance of the technological system, the latter can 
no longer function as a manifestation of capital 
because of the immense reduction of living labour. At 
that point, there appears an incompatibility between 
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forces and rdlations of productiont and we have what 
Marx called "fettering" and the beginnings of social 
instability and chronic crisis. It is in this respect 
that Marx's ideas on crisis can be linked to his 
proposition on the contradiction between the 
productive forces and relations of production. (44) 
However, as previously mentioned, most critics, and 
even many of Marx's followers, fail to take account 
of this qualitative transformation of the 
technological system. Let us then look at a few of 
the most influential (and recent) alternative 
interpretations of Marx on this subject. This would 
allow us not only to clarify certain points briefly 
raised here, but also the later evaluation of Marx's 
main propositions on the process of technological 
development and change and its implications for 
capitalism. 
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4. Alternative Interpretations of Marx on 
Technological Development, Crisis and Contradiction 
By contrast to the discussion presented in the 
previous sections of this chapter, most critics9 and 
even many of Marx's supporters, tend to discuss his 
ideas on crises, the rate of profit, etc., as if 
these f orm a "theory" independent of Marx's 
conception of technology. So that what we are 
presented with is a scenario of what is in fact the 
"business cycle" of crisis and recovery (of slumps 
and booms). And on the basis of this scenario what is 
then merely stated to be Marx's position (either 
"faithfully" or in criticism) is that as capitalism 
develops each economic crisis it undergoes tends to 
become more and more severe than its predecessorv 
eventually leading to a particularly sever 
contradiction between forces and relations of 
production as the capacity for investment is 
critically undermined. As a consequence of this we 
have Marx's so-called "fettering" of productive 
forces, thus social instability becomes rife and 
there begins an epoch of social revolutionary 
transformation. 
Thus, for example, in discussing Marx's ideas on this 
issue, Wright, Levine and Sober write: 'In the long 
term, therefore, economic recoveries will be less 
robust, with weaker booms and more prolonged 
busts. '(45) This scenario, if correct, it is further 
stated, would then eventually lead to capitalism 
becoming 'an unreproducible social system. In time, 
the average rate of profit would be so low that 
capitalism would collapse. 
'(46) This is meant as a 
synopsis of Marx's position. 
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But if one were to ask why did Marx think economic 
crises should get more severe 'in the long term' , leading 'eventually' to capitalism's collapse. The 
answer invariably provided is nothing short of a 
presentation of a circular argument based on the rise 
in the organic composition, the fall of the rate of 
profit, and so on - the same elements of the scenario 
of cyclic bust and boom, in other words, comes to be 
restated. 
It is obvious then that given this scenario, Marx's 
ideas on this issue cannot be taken seriously as they 
stand even on the basis of his own theoretical 
assumptions (that is, even if one were to accept as 
valid his theory of value and accumulation). Thus, 
even many Marxists have come to argue on the basis of 
Marx's theory itself that 'from the process of 
accumulation itself, ' as for example Weeks remarks, 
'there is no reason to predict or expect a final 
crisis that because of its severity will for economic 
reasons, alone result in the collapse of the 
capitalist system... '(47) And since we are told that 
the collapse can-not come about for 'economic reasons 
alone' ,a 
"social" connection is then introduced, in 
most cases almost faithfully, to rescue Marx from the 
apparent inconsistencies (and circularity) of his own 
arguments, 
Thus, with Weeks, we have the following assertion 
(without further explanation or substantive 
argumentation): 'Marx wrote that, in each mode of 
production, the development of the productive forces 
reaches a point where the social relations governing 
production and distribution come in conflict with the 
further development of those productive forces. The 
advanced capitalist countries 
have reached that 
3q 
point. The social relations that two hundred years 
ago liberated the productive forces for a great burst 
of development now serve to restrict that 
development, ushering in an era in which the tensions 
accompanying accumulation lay the basis for the 
possibility of a revolutionary transformation of 
capitalist society... '(48) 
On what grounds, theoretical and/or empirical, could 
it be said that there is now a 'conflict' between 
social relations and productive forces? What does 
this supposed 'conflict' entail and what does it 
signify? How could it be claimed that the social 
relations 'now serve to restrict' the development of 
productive forces? Is it not simply preposterous to 
state that the development of productive forces is 
now being restricted, at precisely the very time of 
the 'great burst of development' of electronics, 
computers, automation, and a host of other 
technological advances? And, in any case, how and in 
what way does such a 'restriction' (even if we assume 
that there is such a restriction) usher 'in an era' 
of 'tensions accompanying accumulation'? 
To simply state that 'Marx wrote' therefore it is, 
will not do. Either Marx's theoryq observations and 
insightsý can provide some grounds for explaining, as 
a general principle (and however tentatively), the 
connection between the development of productive 
forces, the so-called 'tensions accompanying 
accumulation', and the 'restriction' (or Marx's 
'fettering') of further development of these forces, 
or it cannot and therefore it should be rejected and 
replaced or at least updated and corrected. Weeks in 
fact fails to establish such a connection, and he 
fails, at least in part, because, I would suggest, 
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he, like so many of Marx's followers and critics, 
does not take into account Marx's conception of 
technology (as capital). 
The interpretation of Marx's theory of accumulation 
and crises almost exclusively from an "economic" 
perspective with the notion of technical change 
thrown in merely for good measure leads to little 
more than a more sophisticated version of a general 
theory of "business cycles". It fails to come to 
terms with Marx's notion of "development" as a 
dynamic process involving quantitative changes into 
qualitative changes. If, according to Marx's formula, 
constant capital increases relative to variable 
capital (i. e. the rise in the organic composition), 
this does not mean that we have only a quantitative 
growth in value, but that there is also a qualitative 
change in the very technological conditions 
(recalling that the concept of constant capital, as 
we saw in chapter three, is a broad concept that 
includes the network of machinery, instrumental 
conditions, etc. ). And, thus, as it was suggested in 
the previous section, we need to take into account 
the qualitative aspect of the development of 
technology (particularly the qualitative change of 
technological systems, or of fixed capital) in order 
to be able to make some sense of Marx's connection 
between accumulation2 crises2 and the systemic 
contradiction that is supposedly meant to 
(at least 
in theory) result in the breakdown of the socio- 
economic bonds that hold the capitalist system 
together as a social system. 
However2 it should be noted here that this 
does not 
necessarily make the scenario 
"correct" in the real, 
empirical sense, but 
it does, at the very least, I 
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would suggfý-st, make it more consistent in terms of 
Marx's owri theoretical system. For in the absence of 
what is a key element in Marx's thoughts (i. e. 
technology, Its role, form, technical characteristics 
and functiou), one cannot even begin to take Marx's 
theoretical proposals on this issue seriously, and 
thus evaluate it or examine its explanatory 
relevance. 
The failure to take Marx's conception of technology 
into account can, for example, lead to statements 
such as the following by Wright, Levine and Sober, 
that: 
'Marx 
... did not believe that capitalism would, in 
fact, last long enough for this final collapse to 
occur. The popular masses would topple the system 
before it reached that point. The declining rate of 
profit - or, more strictly, the deteriorating 
economic prospects it produces - helps explain why 
masses of people come to oppose capitalism and to 
favor socialism - before capitalism becomes unable to 
reproduce itself for strictly economic reasons'. (49) 
In other %vords, in practice the 'demise of actual 
capitalism', for Marx, according to such a view, 
boils down, at least by implication, to little more 
than a faith in, what Gorz in his criticism of Marx 
calls, the so-called messianic 'class mission' of the 
proletariat. (50) But leaving aside the contentious 
issue of Marx's faith in the proletariat, what has 
not been established in terms of Marx's theory, nor 
indeed even explained or argued for, is, on the one 
hand, the reason(s) for the 'declining rate of 
profit', and on the otherg the connection 
between 
such a decline and the rising of 
'popular masses' to 
'topple the system' before it reaches the point of 
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collapse. An important aspect of this problem, in my 
view, as I have mentioned, is that Marx's 
propositions on the issue of crisisp etc., is 
considered in purely economic terms. On that basis, 
the scenario presented is perceived to be in need of 
some exogenous contingent factor(s) if it is to make 
any sense-. 
And, thus, we have the following conclusion from 
Wright, Levine and Sober: In theory (Marx's theory) 
'capitalism is a social system with a built-in self- 
destruction mechanism. ' In practice, so it is claimed 
in the name of Marx, 'the explanation for the demise 
of actual capitalism depends more on contingent 
political and cultural factors. '(51) Or, in short, 
what we are really being told is that the supposedly 
'built-in self-destructive mechanism' does not really 
in the practice of 'actual capitalism' bring about 
the latter's destruction - what needs to be taken 
into account are exogenous contingent factors. That, 
of course, may well prove to be the case. But that is 
not the issue here. What is at stake here, 
particularly insofar as this study is concerned, is 
the theoretical status of this alleged 'mechanism' in 
terms of Marx's thoughts on the development and 
change of technology within capitalism and as the 
central feature of the process of accumulation of 
capital. Is this 'mechanism', or the scenario often 
presented, theoretically consistent and viable in 
terms of Marx's system; and on what grounds? Its 
ltesting'f its 'truth't its concrete, empirical 
investigation (if at all possible), becomes an 
irrelevant matter if one reaches the conclusion that 
Marx's theoretical proposal is suspect and 
inconsistent even in its own terms, or even in terms 
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of Marx's own wider intellectual framework (e. g. 
historical materialism). 
For Elster, for example, the scenario, the mechanism, 
Marx's theoretical prediction of the downfall of 
capitalism based on the tendency of the falling rate 
of profit, is highly suspect theoretically, or, as he 
puts it, 'this is treacherous language that does not 
survive a more rigorous statement'(52), and, further, 
that Marx's arguments on this score are, at the very 
least, 'confused'. (53) According to Elster, even if 
one were to accept as valid, 'for the sake of 
simplification', Marx's fundamental though "false" 
assumption of living labour being the ultimate source 
of profit(54), there are still three basic objections 
to Marx's proposition of the falling profit rate. (55) 
Here we are only concerned with Elster's first 
objection, and this for the following reasons: 
firstly that it is directly concerned with the issue 
we are discussing and the subject of this study; and 
secondly that it is the most basic point that carries 
the weight of Elster's main criticism (including key 
aspects of his other two objections); and thirdly 
that it is crucial in terms of Marx's own ideas. 
Elster's first objection, as he says, 'turns 
crucially on the assumption that innovations as a 
rule are labour-saving in the ex ante sense. '(56) He 
claims that Marx simply assumed this to be the case 
'more or less unthin , without realizing that an 
argument was needed. '(57) What is at issue here for 
us is, therefore, on the one hand to see what Elster 
has to offer by way of an argument refuting this 
assumptiong and on the other, to see 
how he justifies 
his quite serious charge against Marx of 
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I unthinkingly' assuming such a tendency or direction 
in the progress of technological change. 
However, on this second point, and despite his own 
accusation against Marx that van argument was 
needed', look as one may, Elster fails to provide an 
argument in support of or to back up his claim of 
I unthinking' assumption. From the discussion 
presented in this study this allegation of 
I unthinking' assumption seems quite unwarranted. We 
have, I believe quite adequately, demonstrated that 
Marx has a distinctive conception of technology, that 
he thoughtfully proposed a set of ideas on the role 
and form of technology,. on the way it is socio- 
historically shaped and developed, and hence on the 
direction of technological development and change. 
True that his ideas and propositions (or his 
conception as such) are far from adequately 
developed. And, one may of course be critical of, 
disagree with, and reject his ideas; one may also 
find inconsistencies, weaknesses and contradictions 
involved in his arguments on this subject. But none 
of these, I would suggestq can justify Elster's 
accusation that Marx 'unthinkingly' assumes a 
"labour-saving" bias in the direction of 
technological development and changeg and that he has 
no argument on the shaping and form of technology and 
its 'direction'. 
If Elster had examined the subject of technology in 
Marx, he would have realized that despite his 
weaknesses Marx did actually think about this matter 
and quite carefully and seriously 
(for this is an 
issue which is in fact an essential pillar that 
supports his entire theoretical structure concerning 
capital production and accumulation). 
And, indeed, 
40ý 
as Nathan Rosenberg has remarked: 'His (Marx's-RRI 
argument suggests a great deal, not only about the 
process through which a capitalist economy generates 
new techniques, but also about the speed with which 
new techniques will be spread throughout the 
economy. '(58) 
Even when Elster comes to the discussion of the 
direction of technological changev we have no more 
than an almost fleeting presentation - if that word 
is not too strong - of Marx's views(59), a part of 
which is actually not strictly concerned with Marx 
himself but with the Hicksian view of "labour- 
saving" innovation (60) and with Sweezy's assertion 
that for Marx 'labour-saving machinery [is] a more or 
less direct response on the part of capitalists to 
rising tendency of wages. o. '(61) Elster in fact cites 
only three passages from Marx's Grundrisse, and gives 
an unquoted exposition of an statement by Marx from 
C, volume III. It is therefore only on this 
basis that we can try and assess the validity or 
otherwise of his first objection mentioned above. Let 
us then examine these citations in relation to 
Elster's criticism: 
The first two passages given by Elster deal with the 
notion of the introduction 
(or 'employment') of 
machinery not as a result of the scarcity 
but of the 
abundance of labour - one is actually a passage 
from 
Ravenstone quoted by Marx, the other an adapted 
version of Ravenstone's idea 
by Marx himself. (62) 
The second passage by Marx is actually part of a 
critical discussion of Lauderdale's assertion 
that 
'fixed capital' is an 'independent source of value, 
independent of labour-time' (we have already referred 
to this issue in the previous chapter - see also 
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Appendix 4). In examining this passage, therefore, 
one needs to take account of Marx's concept of 'fixed 
capital' and specifically in the terms we discussed 
in chapter three - i. e. Marx is unambiguously 
referring to, and I quote, 'fixed capital, in its 
character as means of production, whose most adequate 
form is machinery., o'(63) Marx is here, in other 
words, dealing with an important aspect of the notion 
of technology as capital. 
Now, with this in mind, we can look at the essential 
aspect of the passage quoted by Elster: Marx 
maintains (adapting Ravenstone's idea) that machinery 
'enters not in order to replace labour power where 
this is lacking, but rather in order to reduce 
massively available labour power to its necessary 
measure. '(64) 
In the first place I would like to point to what is, 
in my view, a difference of understanding, 
specif ically on the idea of " labour- saving". This 
notion of "labour-saving" (or its counterpart 
licapital-saving"), its meaning and understanding, are 
crucial to Elster's entire discussion of Marx on 
technical change. it is also a notion, it should be 
added, that is quite foreign to Marx's conceptual 
framework. It is a conception, insofar as I am aware, 
that is based on a developed (or "revisionist") 
understanding of the neo-classical concept of 
"marginal product" of labour and/or capital, itself 
based on the concepts of "production functions" 
(particularly the Schumpeterian understanding of it) 
and "factors" of production. 
In economic literature, overwhelmingly dominated by 
the neo-classical tradition (revisionist or 
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otherwise), technical change is related to a shift in 
the production function, and also such a shift is 
interpreted as a sign of technical change. The notion 
of labour or capital "saving" achieved its prominence 
with the works of Piguo, Hicks and Harrod (65), and 
was also taken up by some Marxists economists (e. g. 
Sweezy). As Heertje explains: 
'Piguo and Hicks distinguish between capital-saving, 
labour-saving and neutral inventions, according to 
the effects these inventions have on the marginal 
product of labour and capital; if they raise the 
marginal product of labour more than they raise the 
margin I al product of capitalq they are labour-saving, 
and if they raise the marginal product of capital 
more than they raise the marginal product of labour, 
they are capital-saving. "Neutral" technical change 
takes placeg according to Hicksq when the marginal 
products of labour and capital are affected to the 
same extent. '(66) 
So much then for the neo-classical notion of "labour- 
saving" technical change. Now, the underlined words 
in the above passage quoted from Marx are quite 
crucial to Marx's notion of technological change. For 
what they signify is not that machinery is "labour" 
saving as such - i. e. in the sense of either the 
classical economists' assumption of reduction of 
effort and toil or of the mass of labour as such, or 
the neo-classical assumption of reduction of factor- 
costs. Marx2 it should be mentioned, does not deny 
that labour costs can be reduced with the use of 
advanced machinery, but what is essential 
for such a 
reductiong if I understand him correctly, 
is that 
machinery is a form of technology that saves the 
Daid portion of labour; it reduces available 
labour 
power to its necessary measure 
in terms of the 
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production of value, in terms of what Marx calls the 
established norm of socially necessary labour-timee 
One may of course disagree with Marx on this issuel 
but this does not alter the fact that there is a 
clear and, it could be said, fundamental difference 
of understanding between the neo-classical and Marx's 
notion of technical change, which needs to be taken 
into account when interpreting and evaluating Marx 
(this is something which Elster in fact does not do), 
What is therefore to begin with important is that for 
Marx the crucial aspect of technological development 
and change is the increase in the productivity of 
labour (in the specific sense we mentioned in the 
previous section and not simply in terms of a 
"savingif of labour, or cost of labour, as a "factor" 
of production) which comes about, according to him, 
as a result of the introduction of new or improved 
technology (and of course techniques) which thereby 
reduces the value of labour-power (or reduces 
necessary labour) which may or may not necessarily 
mean a reduction in wages (the of labour- 
power), and indeed it could (and often does) mean a 
greater degree of intensity of effort and toil. 
Here, in other wordsý we have an understanding of the 
technological change which is not at all the same as 
what is commonly implied by the term " labour- saving" 
used in (classical or neo-classical) economic studies 
(a termý as already mentioned, that as far as I am 
aware Marx never uses). 
For example, what [licks means by "labour-saving" is 
'inventions' that are 'directed to economising the 
use of' labour as 'a factor which has become 
relatively more expensive. 
'(67) This is meant only in 
terms of wages and the "saving" of labour as a factor 
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of production as such, and not in the sense of a 
reduction of necessary labour so as to increase 
surplus labour even if wages or the mass of labour 
employed increases. There is thus a basic conceptual 
distinction involved here which one needs to point 
out even if one disagrees with Marx on this issue. It 
is surely important to any meaningful critical 
evaluation of Marx's ideas on technology and 
technological development and change. 
But this conceptual distinction in itself does not, 
of course, explain why technological progress should 
(or must) be by its very nature "labour-saving", even 
if one were to, as it were, adopt such a notion, and 
accept the neo-classical definition of it. (68) In 
this case, I believe, Elster is quite right to refute 
such an assumption. But then, as I shall try and 
show, Elster's criticism of this assumption is not, 
strictly speaking, justified insofar as Marx's view 
of technological change is concerned. In a sense, it 
could be said that, Elster has transported the 
assumption and concept of "labour-saving" (and 
indeed, "capita 1- saving") from one theoretical model 
(neo-classical) to another (Marx's) where these do 
not apply - and this quite simply because he has 
failed to even examine Marx's views on technology. 
What is important in terms of Marx's thoughts on the 
direction of technological development and change 
under capitalism is, in my opinion, the social 
dimension (or what may be called the sociological 
perspective) of "technology" that I have attempted to 
explain in the previous chapters of this study. That 
is, in brief and simple terms, the social distinction 
which Marx (as well as Weber, for example) came to 
make between machinery and tools. 
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Without repeating the discussion presented 
previously, with the separation of labour from the 
means of production a socio-technical framework and 
paradigm comes to be established that conditions the 
development and change of technology so that the 
increase of productive power comes to be expressed 
through the increasing alienation of labour by means 
of the enhancement of the role and function of 
machine technology (or its mastery); or the increase 
of productive power manifests itself as the increase 
of capital's power in relation (or relative) to 
labour. Marx's argument on this issue of 
technological alienation, domination and 
dispossession of labour (which is wrongly, in my 
view, referred to as " labour- saving" bias) is thus 
based not on purely economic reasons, but in fact on 
much wider social (sociological) grounds and 
technical observations - something which Elster 
completely ignores in his fleeting discussion of Marx 
on technical change. 
Indeed, Marx gives a brief explanation of his view on 
this point in the very next paragraph from the 
passage Elster quotes from him. It is a passage that 
in summary terms explains Marx's conception of 
technology as capital, which, even as it stands, 
shows that Marx could not have, as Elster maýntains, 
'unthinkingly' assumed that technological change is 
'as a rule ... labour-saving', and that, on the 
contrary, he has a reasoned argument why 
technological progress under capitalism has a 
definite tendency towards greater 
alienation/domination of labour through the progress 
of mechanizationý and hence cumulative reduction in 
necessary labour in the twofold sense of 
dispossession/degradation of the labourer and the 
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decrease of the value of labour-power (in this 
passage there is also a clear hint of what Marx has 
in mind with respect to the introduction of machine 
technology): 
'Lauderdale, ' Marx writes, 'believes himself to have 
made the great discovery that machinery does not 
increase the productive power of labour, because it 
rather replaces the latter, or does what labour 
cannot do with its own power. ' However, Marx goes 
on: 'It belongs to the concept of capital [i. e. as a 
relation of production -RR] that the increased 
productive force of labour is posited rather as the 
increase of a force [Kraft] outside itself, and as 
labour's own debilitation [Entkraftung]. ' And he then 
follows with what is essential to his argument: 'The 
hand tool makes the worker independent - posits him 
as proprietor. Machinery - as fixed capital - posits 
him as dependent, posits him as appropriated. This 
effect of machinery holds only in so far as it is 
cast into the role of fixed capital, and this it is 
only because the worker relates to it as wage-worker 
[recalling here our discussion of Marx on the 
separation and alienation of labour -RR], and the 
active individual generallyq as mere worker. '(69) 
This is, at least as I understand Marx and insofar as 
this study is concerned, an essential point 
underlying the critical aspect of Marx's view of the 
direction of technological change under capitalism. 
It is, at one levelq concerned with, if we may use 
Abbott Payson Usher's wordsq a socio-technical 
#setting of the stage' that as such suggests 
'the 
solution of the perceived problem'(70) of the process 
of inventiong development and change of technology. 
In technical terms, therefore, this 'setting of the 
stage' is based, for Marx, on the productive 
force of 
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machinery, on the principles of machine/industrial or 
"mechanical" engineering and design that condition 
and set limits to the direction of technological 
change. And, at another level, in socio-economic 
terms, this 'setting of the stage' is based, for 
Marx, on the abundance of labour as wage-labour and 
not its scarcity. 
Thus, in the very passage Elster quotes from Marx 
(given above) we have the following remarks (which 
are not given by Elster): 'It [machinery -RR] can be 
effective only with masses of workers, whose 
concentration relative to capital is one of its [i. e. 
machinery's -RR] historic presupposition' . (71) And 
with respect to the direction of technological change 
we have the following from Capital I: 'It is only 
after considerable development of the science of 
mechanics, and accumulated practical experience, that 
the form of a machine becomes settled entirely in 
accordance with mechanical principles, and 
emancipated from the traditional form of the tool 
that gave rise to it. '(72) 
The point here is that in examining Marx's views on 
technical change, one cannot simply take up 
(critically or otherwise) his so-called "economic" 
model, one cannot simply focus on his views on 
"economic growth" leading to technical change and 
increased productivity without at the same time 
taking into account his conception of technology. For 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, Marx's 
concepts of constant capital and fixed capital 
(two 
concepts which are essential to his model of 
"economic growth" and crisis) are , for him, 
expressions of the technological structure 
(or 
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system) of production based on mach (that is, 
based on the principles of mechanization). 
So that, for example, accumulation of capital does 
not simply mean the augmentation of capital as money, 
commodities, or even of means of production as such 
(as "factors"). But in fact, at the same time, and 
crucially for Marx, the progressive investment in the 
development of the system of machinery (i. e. a 
techno logical structure of production that, according 
to Marx's view, axiomatically entails the 
'debilitation' of labour). This understanding of 
technology is thus inherent in the concept of capital 
(Marx's concept, of course) - as he says in the above 
quoted passage - and hence it is from this given 
technical premise that the process of accumulation 
("economic growth") entails the progress of a 
technological system that augments the socio-economic 
power of capital relative to labour (in "pure" 
economic terms, increases constant capital relative 
to variable capital). 
Without this conception, I would suggest, Marx's 
arguments on accumulation, crisis, and technical 
change, lack internal coherence. This does not, 
however, mean that by taking inýo account his 
conception of technology, we are then faced with no 
more problems, or that thereby his theory can be said 
to be adequate, valid and a mirror of reality. But it 
does mean that we can at least begin to evaluate 
Marx's views from, what is in my opinion, a more 
accurate interpretation. 
Now let us look at Elster's exposition of what he 
calls an 'obscure statement' of Marx on this 
issue in 
Capital, vol. III. This is how Elster breaks down 
*11 
Marx's statement: '(i) Economic growth implies or is 
synonymous with more output per worker. (ii) If more 
is produced per worker, each worker must be able to 
handle more raw material. (iii) In order to be able 
to handle more raw materialq the worker needs more 
machinery. (iv) Since constant capital mainly consists 
of raw material and machinery, it follows that the 
amount of capital per worker must rise - that is that 
technical progress is inherently labour-saving. '(73) 
Then Elster goes on to refute this 
statement: 'Premises (ii) and (iii) may appear 
compelling, ' he writes, 'but in fact are not. ' And 
why not? Because, we are told: 'They embody a narrow 
vision of technical change, that excludes among 
others such dramatic capital-saving innovations as 
explosives or the wireless. ' And thus he 
concludes: 'Marx's argument for the preponderance of 
labour-saving inventions is invalid, and the 
conclusion quite possibly wrong. '(74) 
Notice, firstly, that Elster contradicts his earlier- 
mentioned comment that Marx has no 'argument', that 
Marx 'unthinkingly' assumed the "labour-saving" 
direction of technical progress. In the above quote, 
as it can be seen, he states that 'Marx's argument' 
is invalid; so that valid or not Marx certainly has 
an argument! But let this pass. What is actually 
important here is Elster's basic reason for the 
refutation of Marx on this issue; namely, that Marx 
has a 'narrow vision of technical change, that 
excludes ... capital-saving 
innovations. **' Even if we 
leave aside the conceptual distinction 
(mentioned 
above) between Marx's notion of technical change and 
that of neo-classical economics 
(which Elster seems 
to adhere to) - even if, that is, we accept the terms 
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of "labour-" or "capita I- saving" notion of technical 
change - Elster's accusation of a 'narrow vision' is, 
I suggestq false. That his allegation is plainly 
wrong is quite evident from even a cursory look at 
Marx's writings on technology. Elster seems to rely 
on Blaug's view (to whom he refers his readers at the 
end of his exposition and refutation of Marx's 
statement). 
Blaug for his part well recognizes thatq as he puts 
it, 'Marx ... was not only aware of capital-saving 
change s but spoke of them as the product of automatic 
market forces. '(75) But then Blaug goes on to claim 
that actually the comments of Marx (and Engels) in 
this respect 'were confined to innovations which save 
workin& capital' - that is, saving of circulating as 
against fixed capital - and that 'neither Marx nor 
Engels considered the effects of technological 
progress concentrated in the capital goods 
industries. ' And, thus, he asserts: 'In the final 
analysis, Marx too remained a victim of the myth of a 
labour-saving bias in technical change. '(76) C-) 
But, once again this is quite untrue. To demonstrate 
the fallacy of this claim that Marx (and Engels) only 
considered such 'innovations which save working 
capital' and not fixed capital (capital-goods 
development) we shall here point to only two 
statements on this issue: 
(a) With respect to the development and improvement 
of, for example, the transmission equipment for large 
factories, we have the following comment: 'In a large 
factory with one or two central motors the cost of 
these motors does not increase in the same ratio as 
their horse-power ... The cost of the transmission 
equipment does not grow in the same ratio as the 
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total number of working machines which it sets in 
motion... ' etc. (77) 
(b) With respect to technical development and 
improvement of machinery we have the following: 'At 
this point we shall deal with the savings yielded by 
the continuous improvements of machinery, namely 1) 
of its material, e. g., the substitution of iron for 
wood; 2) the cheapening of machinery due to the 
general improvement of machine-building [i. e. 
improvements in the capital-goods industries - 
RR) ... 3) special improvements enabling existing 
machinery to work more cheaply and effectively; for 
instance, improvements of steam-boilers, etc.; 4) 
reduction of waste through better machinery. '(78) 
We hope that this suffices to show, at the very 
least, that Marx is quite aware of "savings" in fixed 
capital as a result of the progress of technical 
improvements in "capital-goods" (machine-building, 
etc. ) industries. (79) This, however, certainly does 
not mean that Marx has a fully developed conception 
of the implications as well as complexities of what 
are called "capital-saving" technological 
developments. Nonetheless, it does at least show that 
Marx did not have such a 'narrow vision' after all, 
and certainly not one that, according to Elster, 
'excludes ... capital-saving 
innovations'. 
Thus, to return to Elster's comments, let us firstly 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Elster's 
allegation that Marx's 
'narrow vision' Of 
technological change excludes 'such dramatic capital- 
saving innovations' as, for example, 
'the wireless', 
is quite unfounded. For in volume 
III, Chapt. IV on 
"The Effects of the Turnover on the Rate of Profit", 
just to give one example, Marx 
deals with the effect 
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of so-called to capital-saving" innovation, and 
specifically, indeedv referring to the communication 
revolution. Marx writes: 
'The chief means of reducing the time of circulation 
is improved communication. The last fifty years have 
brought about a revolution in this field, comparable 
only with the industrial revolution of the latter 
half of the 18th century. On land the macadamised 
road has been displaced by the railway, on sea the 
slow and irregular sailing vessel has been pushed 
into the background by the rapid and dependable 
steamboat line, and the entire globe is being girdled 
by telegraph wires .... the efficacy of the capital 
involved in it [world commerce -RR] has been more 
than doubled or trebled. It goes without saying that 
this has not been without effect on the rate of 
profit. '(80) 
As Rosenberg comments, after quoting the same 
passage: 'All this from someone who is often described 
as treating the process of technological innovation 
as if it were purely a labour-saving phenomenon! '(81) 
To be sure, Marx does not consider or refer to 'the 
wireless' or 'explosives'. But, nonetheless, here we 
have Marx on "capital-saving" innovations, on 
revolution in communications. Let us also note here, 
as merely an aside, that it was, at least partly but 
very significantlyg on the basis of the development 
and application of the telegraph, that Guglielmo 
Marconi was able to subsequently develop the wireless 
(or the radio)(82) - indeed, achieving primitive 
wireless transmission over short distance only by 
around 1895 (by which time, of course, Marx had been 
dead for a while! ). 
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Be that as it may, let us now take up Elster's 
refutation of Marx's argument based on dismissing 
'premises (ii) and (iii)' (quoted above). Here 
Elster's critical remarks seem quite compelling, and 
given his specific narrow understanding (and 
interpretation) of Marx on technical change, one 
cannot but agree with his rejection of Marx's 
assumption that the increase in productivity 
necessarily ineans 'more machinery' (physicallyý or2 
in use-value terms) or a growth of the technological 
structure of production - that is to say in 
quantitative sense. One could say that such a 
quantitative2 material (or use-value) growth can take 
place with respect to raw materials; but then as 
Elster correctly points out this growth of raw 
materials does not necessarily mean that there would 
be a need for more machinery (i. e. physically more) 
per worker in order to transform the raw materials 
into products. Improvements in the technical 
efficiency of machinery can indeed offset the need 
for more machinery, and in fact innovations (e. g. in 
the methods of organization of labour, handling 
operations, and so on) as well as new inventions can 
even lead to a reduction of the quantitative growth 
of the technological structure of production (e. g. 
use of the same or less machinery, etc*)* 
But then from this it does not follow that such so- 
called "capital-saving" innovations have no impact on 
the relative position of labour, or, that is, on 
either the value of labour-power and/or the 
employment of labour in relation to the mass of means 
of production set into motion (whatever the physical 
quantity of that mass). There is no logical reason, 
according to my understanding of Marx's argument, why 
the relative change (of machine per worker, or, of 
1+1 
relative increase of constant to variable capital) 
cannot take place as a result of "capi tal- saving" 
innovations; or to put it in another way, there is no 
reason why technological progress must necessarily be 
'inherently labour-saving' for this relative change 
to occur. (see previous section)(83) 
For example, improvements in communication (as in 
Elster's example of the wireless, or, even more 
importantly, the more recent computerization of 
information transmission, satellites, etc. ), and 
advances in machine building (both mentioned by Marx) 
- orin fact, the recent automation/microelectronics 
revolution, and so on - are, according to 
economistic reasoning, all "capital-saving" technical 
changes. But do they not also "save" a great deal 
more of "labour"?, So that what we have are, in 
effect, innovations intended to save "costs" (whether 
labour or capital or preferably both). But what 
concerns Marx's argument, which Elster has not, in my 
opinion, managed to deal with, is how technological 
change ("labour-saving", "capital-saving", or 
whatever) alters the relations between labour and 
capital both in its social terms (i. e. in terms of 
the alienation, domination and dispossession of 
labour, etc. ) and in its capitalistic or economic 
expression (the relative increase of constant as 
against variable capital). 
Marx's conception of technological change, I would 
suggest, cannot be classified in terms of either 
" labour- saving" or "capi tal- saving" notions. As we 
have pointed out, Elster errs in his judgment that 
Marx has a 'narrow vision of technical change, that 
excludes ... capital-saving innovations'. Yet there 
is 
no denying that Marx's vision, if not 'narrow' in 
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Elster's sense, is certainly one-dimensional (or uni- 
directional), in that he views technological change 
("capital-saving" or "labour-saving") almost 
consistently and exclusively in terms of the mastery 
of capital. In his own terms, and according to his 
own categories, Marx could be justified 
theoretically. Although, it should be mentioned that, 
according to his critics, his terms and categories 
were perhaps (and at best) useful in his own time; 
but are said to be irrelevant today. That is, 
however, a debatable issue. In the case of 
technology, I suggest that Marx's conception still 
has a good deal of potential usefulness. Although it 
is certainly true that in the wider context of the 
real processes of technological change Marx's 
conception is at the very least in need of further 
development - in fact, in my opiniong it is a 
conception that is in desperate need of empirical 
backing. 
At any event, what is also important to bear in mind 
is that, we need to look at Marx's argument on this 
issue by taking into account the significance he 
attaches to the qualitative development of 
technology. We have already suggested (in the 
previous sections and chapters) that, for Marx, the 
quality and technical characteristics of technology 
(or rather, of technological systems) are essential 
considerations. What is, therefore, clearly important 
to his argument is the alteration of the ratio of 
constant to variable capital as a result of the 
qualitative advance of the technological system 
(of 
fixed capital). This is a crucial point that Elster 
has completely failed to take into account 
in his 
interpretation and examination of Marx on 
technological change. Again there is no need to go 
q! 
over old grounds which we covered on this issue in 
the previous chapter, but let us just give one 
passage which demonstrates the importance of this 
point of qualitative change (and not simply 
quantitative growth) in Marx's view: 
'A necessary condition, ' Marx writes, 'to the growth 
of the number of factory hands, is a proportionally 
much more rapid growth of the amount of capital 
invested in mills. ["mills" is given here as an 
example -RR] This growth, however, is conditioned by 
the ebb and flow of the industrial cycle. It is, 
besides, constantly interrupted by the technical 
progress that at one time virtually supplies the 
place of new workmen, at another, actually displaces 
old ones. This qualitative in mechanical 
industry continually discharges hands from the 
factory, or shuts its doors against the fresh stream 
of recruits, while the purely quantitative extension 
of the factories absorbs not only the men thrown out 
of work, but also fresh contingents. '(84) 
Accumulation and technical progress, in other words, 
involves both a quantitative and a qualitative change 
in the technological structure of capitalist 
production - i. e. 'more machinery' and more efficient 
machinery. But what is inherent in the concept of 
capital and inherent in Marx's conception of 
technology as capital, is that at some point in time 
both the quantitative extension (growth of the 
conditions of production) and the qualitative change 
of mechanical industry (the advance of mechanization) 
reach such a level that they begin to contradict each 
other. (85) This contradiction, it should be stressed, 
has nothing to do with production in general; 
it is a 
contradiction specific to the capitalist 
form of 
production (at least as I understand 
Marx). What is 
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at stake here is not that such a contradiction would 
result in the collapse of production as such, but 
that it results in the de facto (though not de jour) 
socio-technical transformation of capitalist form of 
production. And it is, I would suggest, this 
qualitative/quantitative contradiction which is 
central to the link between Marx's ideas on 
crisis/fall in the profit rate and his ideas on the 
"end of capitalism" because of the contradiction 
between the productive forces and the relations of 
-production. 
At this point, by way of clarifying the suggestion 
made above, we need to look at a different 
interpretation of Marx on this problematic of the 
connection (in short) between crisis and the thesis 
of the contradiction between the productive forces 
and capitalist relations. The interpretation we have 
selected is that of G. A. Cohen's, which is now 
generally accepted to be by far the most thorough and 
influential in recent times. 
tf, 
We have already discussed (in chapter one) Cohen'E 
interpretation of the so-called 'primacy' of thE 
productive forces, particularly in relation to his 
views on the apparent separation of the social frou 
the material in Marx. Connected to this notion of 
'primacy', and indeed crucial to Cohen's argument, 
are two important subsidiary theses of the 
'development' of the productive forces and their 
'restriction' or 'fettering'. 
First let us look at the question of 'development'. 
According to Cohen's interpretation of Marx: 'The 
productive forces tend to develop throughout 
history. '(86) This he calls 'The Development Thesis'. 
And the thesis is concerned with a developmental 
tendency on a continuous basis and as a 'universal 
tendency'. (87) That is, as Wright, Levine, and Sober 
point -out: 'The claim is that there is a tendency for 
forces of production to develop continuously, not 
that forces of production invariably do develop 
continuously. '(88) In terms of general social/human 
evolution, this is certainly a controversial issue. 
Hobsbawm thinks, for example, that there is 'an 
inevitable evolutionary trend for the material 
productive forces to develop... '(89) While, by 
contrast, Giddens rejects such a thesis on both 
methodological and empirical grounds; he opposes all 
forms of 'evolutionary' claims in social theory. (90) 
At any rate, while the debate on this issue is both 
interesting and important, in my opinion the issue is 
not simply a theoretical problem, but very much an 
empirical one. And what is more, there is certainly 
no doubto in my view, that the substantiation of the 
thesis requires a far greater historical research and 
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empirical evidence than either Cohen or in fact Mar 
himself have provided. 
Cohen's own argument in support of this thesi; 
depends on a number of assertions, broai 
generalizations, and assumptions. A broa( 
generalization made is, as Cohen writes, that 'it i. - 
a fact ... that societies rarely replace a given set ol 
productive forces by an inferior one. '(91) In thi., 
respect, the thesis is not falsified, it is claimed, 
either by a decline of productive force, for example, 
as a result of 'Natural disasters' (e. g. earthquakes, 
etc. (92)) - these are, in any case, considered aý 
exceptions that 'are of no theoretical 
consequence. '(93) Thus we have the followiný 
assertion that 'a theory of history is not answerablE 
to abnormal occurances.. '(94) Nor is the development 
thesis (amazingly enough) falsified even b) 
historical examples of stagnation and regression, for 
example, as in the case of the decline of the Romar 
Empire. (95) 
Cohen's substantive support for the thesis is based 
on an argument that links human nature wi tf 
rationality, intelligence, and scarcity. Humar 
beings, he maintains, are 'somewhat rational'; thE 
'historical situation of men is one of scarcity'; and 
human beings 'possess intelligence of a kind and 
degree which enables them to improve their. 
situation. '(96) Here the argument is based on certair 
underlying assumptions which are not only ir 
themselves questionable and treacherously difficult 
to explain and justify, but are also, in my opinion, 
dubious in terms of Marx's thoughts. On the basis of 
arguing these claims (with some appeals to thE 
science of biology(97)), Cohen then concludes that 
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there is a permanent, human 
advance human capacities and 
nature in order to realize 
Consequently, there is tf 
productive forces to develop 
history. 
impulse to attempt to 
abilities to transform 
human needs or wants. 
lis tendency for the 
continuously throughout 
The point of giving this (admittedly brief and 
perhaps oversimplified) "review" of Cohen on the 
development of the productive forces is not to enter 
into a debate on the correctness or otherwise of his 
claims with respect to the general history of 
humanity - that is well beyond the scope of this 
study. (98) What we would like to question here is 
its application to capitalism. For despite claims and 
counter-claims made about Marx's so-called theory of 
history, one thing is quite unquestionable in Marx's 
thoughts, namely, the uniqueness of capitalism, 
particularly centred on the compulsive drive to 
accumulate and revolutionize the material productive 
forces (technology and techniques of production). The 
connection between the development of the productive 
forces and rationality/scarcity as some permanent 
characteristics of humanity seems to clash strongly 
with Marx's views (already mentioned in this chapter) 
on the specific nature of the impulse for the 
development of productive forces and the peculiarity 
of the very form of the productive forces under 
capitalism. 
There are basically two interrelated objections that 
can be raised: Firstly, there is a broad or general 
objection, which as Levine and Wright remark, is as 
follows: Cohen's development thesis 'presupposes a 
transhistorical meaning for "rationality" and 
"scarcity" 9 and thus a transhistorical 
notion of 
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human beings' interests that likely cannot be 
sustained. '(99) In this case what is important to 
Cohen's argument is to isolate the process of the 
development of productive forces from any particular 
social form of society, thereby giving it a permanent 
"human" or even more to the point "natural" premise, 
and hence for that reason giving it a priority, 
primacy and determinism which it may otherwise lack. 
The appeal to "nature" - to the combination of human 
nature and Nature itself (e. g. as in assuming 'an 
historically invariant human nature' as 'rational' 
and the natural characteristic condition of 
'scarcity') - also provides a degree of generality 
which would be hard to empirically falsify. This is a 
familiar argument and tactic we have already seen in 
relation to Cohen's separation of the material from 
the social, and his dubious argument that productive 
forces belong to the material substratum as such 
alone (see chapter one). 
This perspective based on a premise of "naturalism" 
or similar kind of interpretation of history is 
neither new nor confined to Cohen's brand of 
technological interpretation of history. Nor is it, 
it needs to be said here, completely or strictly "un- 
Marxian". To be sure Marx can himself be reproached 
for, in the words of Sahlins, 'rendering the cultural 
relations of production natural in order to posit the 
natural logic of production as the primary cultural 
(historical) fact. '(100) 
In other wordsq there is certainly no denying that 
Marx also has his "moments" of 
"naturalism" and, 
despite orthodox Marxian disclaimerg even of 
"utilitarian" thought. (101) Thus we have, just to 
give one exampleg Marx's notion of 
"human nature" 
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contained in his 
. 
1844 Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscr . There we find the notion of 'man' as 
'directlY a natural 1, as 'an active natural 
being', and 'endowed with natural 2owers of life 
, 
'. 
And there we also find the idea of 'labour' as 
I. productive life itself', and 'life-activ I as 
'purposive' and 'conscious', as well as 'Hunger' as 
'a natural need', as 'an acknowledged need of my body 
for an existing outside it, indispensable to 
its integration and to the expression of its 
essential being. '(102) 
Here we have therefore some of the necessary 
ingredients for an apparently "naturalist", as well 
as, it could be said, a "utilitarian", frame of 
reference; the notion of work or activity as 
naturally purposive hence in some sense a naturally 
"rational" activity; the natural inclination to be 
acquisitive, use "reason" to satisfy natural "needs" 
and overcome the nature imposed "scarcity" with a 
minimum of "effort" and a maximum of "cunning" or 
"intelligence" - thus we have what Cohen calls, 
'an 
historically invariant human nature'(103) coupled 
with the historical situation of "men" as one of 
'scarcity. ' What is at issue here, let us be clear 
however, is not the validity or otherwise of such 
notions or theories. The question is whether Marx 
intended this "logic" (if that it may be called) as 
one that guides the entire course of human history, 
as something to be taken for granted, or as one that 
requir es an explanation in terms of the different, 
historically specific forms of human society? We 
believe the latter to be the case. 
Thus our second, more specific, objection 
follows 
from this, and it is concerned with Cohen's 
4ý6 
projection of what is, according to my understanding 
of Marx, specific to capitalism to cover the whole of 
human history. It is here (at least in part) that 
there is a disagreement and a difference of 
interpretation. In his early and later works, Marx, 
in my view, is riot strictly concerned with framing or 
formulating a "general theory" of history, but of 
looking into the past as a means of explaining the 
present (i. e. capitalism). We have no systematic 
theory of history from Marx; we have numerous 
propositions, statements, and brief discussions and 
analyses, and whatever their merits, all in one way 
or another are related to an attempt on his part to 
explain or clarify some or other aspects of 
capitalism and their historical specificity. (104) 
Indeed, from early on he warns US9 quite 
unambiguously - in the 1844 Manuscripts itself, for 
example - that: 'We proceed from an economic fact of 
the present. '(Marx's emphasis)(105) 
Taking 'the present' or capitalism as his point of 
departure, for Marx the questions of "rationality", 
of developing technology in order to "economize 
effort", of the very nature and characteristic of 
"scarcity", of productivity and rise of productive 
power, of the character and form of technology, all 
these have their own specific meaning. If in Cohen's 
interpretation technological development is at 
bottom simply a "rational" way to "economize effort", 
a means of increasing "the productive power" of 
production as such; for Marxq as I have attempted to 
show in this study, the development of technology 
under capitalism is concerned, essentially, with the 
decrease of the "paid portion" of working time (or 
increase of "surplus labour-time" - surplus-value); 
for Marx it concerns not the increase of the 
Lýý 
productive power of humanity's labour or of 
production in general and as such, or the increase of 
output (use-values) in itself, but the increase of 
the power of capital, the increase of surplus-value, 
and the greater augmentation of capital-value* 
Cohen, of course, recognizes that according to Marx) 
I the capitalist economic structure, and, among class 
structures, the capitalist alone, stimulates a 
continuous development of productive power. '(106) But 
his whole discussion of this is aimed at 
demonstrating that the capitalist relations are 
merely the most fitting or compatible among past 
relations for the systematic development of 
productive forces. While Marx himself is actually, in 
my view, attempting to demonstrate not only the 
uniqueness of capitalism's developmental drive, but 
also the specifically distinct social character of 
the productive forces and the implications of this 
specific socio-technical characteristic for the 
process of socio-economic development. Neither the 
compulsion nor the socio-technical character of the 
productive forces (technologyý labour-power, 
knowledge, techniques, etc. ) under capitalism can in 
any way be simply reducible to some general 
('universal') continuous tendency of development 
throughout history. The argument thený from my 
understanding of Marx, is not simply that capi talist 
relations areq as compared to past social relationst 
far better suited for the systematic development of 
productive forces. The fundamental problematic for 
Marx is how and in what way one could understand and 
explain the specificq distinguishing characteristics 
of, for example, the development of productive forces 
under capitalism, rather than to smudge and blur 
4ýri 
these with abstract generalities as Cohen tends to 
do. 
With capitalism proper (= for Marx industrial 
capitalism) we not only have a gigantic leap in some 
general quantitative sense - that is, growth of 
productive power to produce greater output of goods 
than ever before, or, as Cohen says, 'more use- 
values, and more capacity to produce use-values, than 
any other class society' (107) - but also, and this 
is the fundamental point of Marx's argument (at least 
as I understand it), we have an irreversible 
qualitative transformation of productive forces (i. e. 
in the case of technology, we have the system of 
machinery and the whole industrial system, according 
to Marx, as fixed capital; or, in short, machine 
technology as capital), and hence a radical break 
with the whole pattern of the pre-capitalist forms of 
the development of the productive forces. 
At this point, we like to take up a couple of 
examples produced by Cohen in support of his 'broad 
generalization' asserting that 'good productive 
forces do not yield to less good ones, in the normal 
run of things. '(108) The problem here has to do with 
the kind of examples Cohen gives in order to support 
that 'reversion to more primitive' or 'less good' 
productive forces is 'often technically unfeasible' 
over and above taking into account the so-called 
"rationality" factor or 'the preponderance of reason 
against it'. (109) 
Now what is interesting here is that Cohen has moved, 
or apparently moved, from generality to something 
more concrete and specific; namely, technical 
characteristics* On that basis, 
Cohen argues that, 
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for example, once we have a linkage between 
agricultural production and 'town industry, which 
supplies machinery, fertilizers' and so on to 'the 
farmer', then a return to 'pre-industrial' forms of 
agriculture would make 'impossible, or virtually 
imposs ible, to sustain human life'. (110) Similarly, 
as he goes on to give another example, once we have 
trailways 
... it is hard to go back to horse-drawn 
modes of transportq partly because after a time the 
population of horses dwindles and the craft of 
coachmaking, grooming, etc., disappear, but also 
because it is hard to renounce the increased mobility 
the railways bring. '(111) 
Though, we think, there are some questionable points 
in aspects of his reasoning - such as the point that 
'it is hard to renounce the increased mobility the 
railways bring' which requires an explanation as to 
why it would be 'hard', i. e. on what grounds (e. g. 
physical, social, economic, personalg etc. 0 or what? 
) 
- let us here assume for the sake of simplification 
that Cohen's reasons are valid. That said, on the 
basis of these two examples what is actually 
demonstrated is not, or not necessarily, that 
I reversion' to 'more primitive' or 'less developed' 
productive forces is generally 'unfeasible' 
(i. e. 
throughout the movement of history); but only that 
such a 'reversion' is technically unfeasible given 
the characteristics of the development of technology 
(or of "productive forces") under capitalism - which 
is precisely Marx's point had Cohen taken the trouble 
of examining his conception of technology. 
The technical unfeasiblity of reversion does not 
necessarily apply 
(at least on the whole and in most 
cases) to pre-capitalist 
forms of technology or 
42( 
i; 
productive forces. A peasant farmer using pre- 
capitalist tools, the plough (cattle or horse-drawn, 
carruca or heavy plough, or whatever)2 etc., could, 
if for one reason or other was deprived of such 
implementsp technically revert to more primitive 
tools (even stone tools) and 'less good' earlier 
versions ofq say, the wooden plough (e. g. as used in 
the ancient Near East) or even the hoe, and still 
manage perfectly well to 'sustain human life'. To be 
sure it may not be a very happy occasion for such a 
farmer, and there will indeed be a loss of productive 
power in terms of output, and the farmer would need 
to spend more effort and time. But given the 
character of the system of technology (more to the 
point, of the productive forces as a whole) this is 
something that is technic feasible. And the main 
reason that this is perfectly feasible, we would 
suggest, has to do with the characteristics of pre- 
capitalist (as against capitalist) productive forces 
as in the sense of techne, and the character of 
technology itself as "tool". 
The fundamental productive force in this (pre- 
capitalist) case is the immediate, direct producer, 
whether a craftsman and/or a peasant farmer (or 
household). With machine or the industrial system of 
technology, that pre-capitalist productive force (the 
farmer's, craftsman's, etc., capacity, knowledge, 
activity, which presupposes a more or less cohesive 
social unity with the implements, tools, and other 
material conditions - e. g. land, etc. 
) is 
transferred to technology, it has become separated 
from i'ts social bond and objectified in the form of 
"dead labour" , as Marx would put 
it. It is, of 
course, not lost to humanityp 
but has become, 
according to Marx 
(as we have discussed in the 
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previous chapters), alienated and externalized into a 
power over the "f armer" (the direct producers, 
etc. ). The "farmer", in other words, has become 
separated from his/her "productive forces" not only 
socio-economically (transfer of property in means of 
production) but also technologically (transfer of 
capacity and knowledge). And particularly important 
here is the necessary existence of the material 
productive forces as a technological system; i. e. the 
unavoidable and technically irreversible 
interdependence of the various and different items, 
devices, and networks of technologies (e. g. a 
capitalist farmer needs to rely for the use of 
his/her tractor on the technology of oil productiong 
and so on all along the expanse of production - 
vertically and horizontally). 
What we have then is a development of a form of 
productive forces which makes 'reversion' (i. e. to 
'more primitive' forms) 'technically unfeasible' 
because it has specific, distinguishing 
characteristics which no previous set of forces had 
had. For it involves, from my interpretation of Marx, 
a radical transposition and transference of 
productive power to machinery and industrial 
technological networks, or the system as such, as an 
indispensable 'moinent' of a technologically and 
impersonally structured system of relations of 
production based on more or less autonomous competing 
units. Here, by contrast to Cohen's simplistic 
generalization, we have the specificity of the social 
system (capitalism), of its technology 
(machine/industrial technology as capital), and of 
its developmental dynamics, 
LL21 M-vj 
Cohen's examples, we suggestp cannot therefore serve 
to demonstrate or justify his "non-reversion" 
proposition in the general sense; that in historical 
termsv either normally or as a rule, 'productive 
forces ... do not ... actually go into reverse. '(112) The 
examples do not permit such a generalized conclusion; 
if they show anything at all it is that, given the 
form of capitalist development of productive forces 
such a 'reversion' is 'technically unfeasible', and 
no more. In terms of pre-capitalist history, and 
specifically in terms of technology and techniques, 
this claim (Cohen's 'generalization'), remains to be 
demonstrated and justified in concrete empirical 
terms - as it stands it is vacuous. 
It is in this respect that Marx's conception of 
technology as capital is important to the 
understanding of the nature and character of 
technological development and change, and the 
distinction between the capitalist and the pre- 
capitalist forms of development. For with machinery 
and the industrial technological system as fixed 
capital we have a radical transformation of the art 
of production (of techne); whatever the character and 
extent of the development of technology throughout 
pre-capitalist history, the art of direct production 
was one based on labour; labour, human productive 
activity, was the impulse. What we have, however, 
with industrial capitalism is a method of direct 
production that is based on and derives its basic 
impulse from objectified labour (from "dead labour"), 
and specificallyq at least for Marx (and particularly 
given -the times he lived in) q in the form of machine 
or mechanized technology. In this case, and because 
of this technical character of the productive force 
of technology (as distinct from tools, apparatus in 
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the Weberian sense, etc. ), according to Marx, this 
material productive force in its very 'use ývalue 
corresponds to its economic role' as fixed 
capital(113) and socially, at the point of 
production, it is, as capital, a 'power over living 
labour'. (114) 
This is something that Cohen has completely failed to 
grasp. For him, and in his interpretation of Marx) 
even with respect to the connection between 
accumulation and technological development and change 
(or, as he puts it, the development of productive 
forces) what we get from him is the following type of 
understanding: 'whatever may be the source of profit 
on capital, exchange-value is what the capitalist 
firm must seek, on pain of ruin in competition. But 
exchange-value will not be accumulated unless use- 
value is produced efficiently. Opportunities to 
improve productivity must be found and seized, and so 
the productive forces move forward 
systematically. '(115) 
And to support this understanding and interpretation 
he quotes a statement from Marx's Grundrisse on the 
importance of 'exchange-valUe' to the above 
porcess. (116) In passingv let us note but leave aside 
two related points: (a) that the 'source of profit' 
(as living, active labour) is essential (and not 
incidental) to Marx's argument and explanation of 
accumulation, as well as to his concept of exchange- 
value; and (b) that, according to Marxv 
'Capitalist 
production is not merely the production of 
commodities [or exchange-value -RR]j 
it is 
essentially the production of surplus-value. 
'(117) 
But, of course, Cohen is well aware of this, and the 
reason for ignoring it is that he 
does not (as with, 
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for exampleý Elsterf among others) accept Marx's 
theory of value. Given the scope and limitation of 
this study, we cannot nor do we intend to defend that 
theory here (118), we would simply note here that 
ignoring Marx's theory of value cannot but effect the 
interpretation of his ideas on the process of 
accumulation of capital and his conception of 
technical change associated with, inherent in, that 
process. 
However, be that as it may, what we in fact like to 
point out here is that Cohen's interpretation of the 
imperative to accumulate and what is implied by it or 
is its consequence (i. e. the increase of productivity 
or productive power) differs significantly from 
Marx's own version: 'It is important to call attention 
to the point, ' Marx writes, 'that this law [of 
accumulation -RR] deals not si with the 
development of productive power. 99, but at the same 
time with the scope in which this productive power 
acts as capital, and is realized as fixed capital 
above all in one respect, and as population in the 
other. '(119) 
Here, by contrast to Cohen's 'forward' march of the 
productive forces and the continuous growth of 
productive power, Marx is quite specific. Productive 
power acts as capital ('as power over living 
labour'(120)), and it is a power that, though 
appropriated from labour (in Marx's view), 
is 
actually realized above all in machinery and machine 
systems as fixed capital. We have a 
form of 
technological development which is based not simply 
on some general tendency to curtail toil, economize 
on effort, and produce more goods, 
but rather based 
on a historically specific tendency 
to augment and 
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expand capital as 'value' (in Marx's sense, for what 
is worth) and hence as a socio-economic and 
technological power (a class relation of production). 
'The productivity of capital as capital, ' according 
to Marx, 'is not the productive force which increases 
use values; but rather its capacity to create value; 
the degree to which it produces value. '(121) 
This brings us now to the question of 'restriction' 
or 'fetterinia' of the development of productive 
forces, which, I suggest, has a specifically 
distinct meaning insofar as capitalism is concerned 
and is directly concerned with Marx's understanding 
of capital (value) production and accumulation, 
rather than with the production of use-value (goods) 
and the expansion of output as such (in general)* 
But let us first, and briefly, see what Cohen has in 
mind on this issue. For Cohen, and according to him 
for Marx, there is a correspondence or compatibility 
between productive forces and production relations. 
More than this, Cohen claims that, the 'nature of the 
production relations of a society is explained by the 
level of development of its productive forces. '(122) 
Very simply put, with slavery we cannot have 
computers, and with computers we cannot have slavery 
(this is an example of Cohen (123)). But according to 
Cohen the 1constraint' is not 'mutual' or 
'symmetrical'; in fact productive forces have primacy 
given his development thesis that productive 
forces 
'are disposed to develop'. (124) It is then further 
argued that: 'Given the constraints, with sufficient 
development of the forces the old relations are no 
longer compatible with them. Either they will 
have 
changed without lag along with productive 
development, or - the theoretically prescribed 
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alternative - there will now be 'contradiction' 
between forces and relations. '(125) 
At this point it is appropriate to introduce the 
essential part of Marx's schematic proposition on 
social transformation (given in the 1859 Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy), 
which is the subject of Cohen's interpretation and 
argument. This part is, stated as follows: 
'At a certain stage of their development, the 
material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of production 
... From forms of development of the productive 
forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then 
begins an epoch of social revolution. ' 
And: 
'No social formation ever perishes before all the 
productive forces for which there is room in it have 
developed; and new, higher relations of production 
never . appear before the material conditions of their 
existence have matured in the womb of the old 
society. ' 
The forces-relations contradiction hypothesis' 
central problematic involves the following two sets 
of claims made by Marx (at least according to my 
interpretation): (a) The conflict that ensues can 
only take place at a certain stage of the development 
of the productive forces; the conflict 
(contradiction) is both conditioned by (or is the 
result of) and a sign of the maturity of the material 
conditions that have hitherto been necessary for the 
systematic reproduction of the dominance of the given 
set of relations of production - i. e. that at that 
stage the productive forces have reached such a 
level 
or degree of development that 
in their very 
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functioning they begin to undermine the systematic 
reproduction of the relations that have hitherto 
determined the' limits of their productive function 
and defined their essential social purpose. And (b) 
given that level or degree of maturity there is an 
incompatibility between forces and relations of 
produc-tion, and precisely for that reason the 
relations become fetters, restricting the "use" 
and/or the further "development" of forces (Marx does 
not explain which kind of "fettering" is meant to 
occur), at which time society enters an epoch of 
revolutionary social transformation. 
Firstly let us note here at least one major ambiguity 
in Marx's statement which Cohen appears to have by- 
passed. It can be observed that Marx says, 'No social 
formation ever perishes before all the productive 
forces for which there is room in it have 
developed.. ' Here Marx uses 'productive forces' 
rather than 'material productive forces' or 'material 
conditions'. If we stick to a strict definition, the 
latter refers to things like technologies, while the 
former is, or could be, far more generalt certainly 
including labour-power, knowledge, etc., and indeed, 
arguably, the class of direct producers or 
in fact 
the proletariat which Marx sometimes refers to as a 
productive force (there are other candidates that can 
be included, particularly in the case of pre- 
capitalist modes). 
We have therefore a problem of interpretationg andý 
hence, also of explaining what Marx means 
by the 
"full" development (i. e. Marx's reference to 
'for 
which there is room in it' 
has this connotation of 
"fullness") of 'all' the productive forces. It must 
certainly include the 
'material conditions', but does 
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it also, and necessarily sog mean that, for example, 
labour-power (which by all reckoning, including 
Cohen's, is a productive force) must also become 
fully developed before a social formation 'perishes'? 
Besides the fact that Marx is clearly ambiguous on 
this issueg the reference to development of 'all' the 
productive forces poses a potentially more 
devastating problem in terms of Marx's ideas on the 
development of material conditions, and technology in 
particular, under capitalism. For he is certainly 
quite unambiguous that under capitalism the 
development of technology (machinery, etc. ) is based 
on a progressive devaluation of labour-power in 
social and economic senses - in fact, as we have 
seen, the degradation, alienationg etc-9 of the 
labourer. So that by implication capitalism cannot 
'perish' until the prespmed social devaluation, 
degradation, etc-9 of the labourers are not only 
reversed but indeed labour-power has become fully 
developed along with the other components of the 
productive forces* 
But then such a development of living-labour's power 
and capacity (which by definition involves the 
development of the subject, of a degree of 
consciousness in socio-cultural and economic terms, 
not to mention class and political consciousness) 
appears to contradict Marx's own statements on the 
advance of machinery and its socio-economic 
(even 
cultural and political) alienating implications. 
Moreover, it is not, arguably, even permitted by his 
earlier proposition contained in the Preface 
(given 
above) that once the 
'material' conditions and forces 
are m ature then social relations turn 
into their 
'fetters'; since, if at that 'certain stage' 
capitalist relations 
impede the development of 
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labour-power also, thený consequently, not 'all the 
productive forces' have actually developedg as Marx 
insists that they should before capitalism (or any 'social formation') can 'perish'. 
Thus, over and above perhaps other problems, here we 
have not merely a point of tension or difficulty in 
Marx's proposition, but in fact what appears to be a 
principal problem that, if left unresolved, can 
render his formulation internally inconsistent and 
place serious doubts upon its usefulness or its 
explanatory force. (126) Cohen, of course, avoids 
facing this problem quite simply by identifying 
"productive forces" as nothing but "material": 'all 
productive forces, ' he claims, and in the name of 
Marx, 'are material. '(127) Furthermore, according to 
Cohen, 'Marx often speaks of ". material productive 
forces", ' but he goes on to claim that, "'productive 
forces" is just his [Marx's] abbreviation of that 
expression' - i. e. of the "material" productive 
forces. (128) This reading and interpretation of Marx 
not only neatly avoids the problem stated above, but 
at the same time helps Cohen with his technological 
interpretation of the development of productive 
forces throughout historyg by-passing the various 
non-materialg non-technological factors which Marx in 
fact includes as essential to such a development. 
Given the limits of this studyp we cannot adequately 
deal with this issue here. But we would simply give 
one example from Marx which discredits Cohen's 
interpretation of Marx's concept of productive forces 
and their development, certainly in the case of pre- 
and non-capitalist history. In his writing on the 
development of ancient forms of production, Marx 
singles out not merely the 
"material" or the 
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technological conditions or factors, but in fact a 
social factor as a productive force* In ancient 
historic times, Marx writes: 'The community itself 
appears as the first great force of production'. (129) 
The community is by any reckoning not simply a 
"material" force; it is, certainly, for Marx, a unity 
of objective and subjective conditions. But it is 
above all else 'a specific mode of working (which is 
always family labour, often communal labour)' and as 
such it defines 'a relation between the individuals, 
and as their specific active relation to inorganic 
nature. ' (Here we note, in passing, the close 
connection between this and the notion of techne we 
referred to in chapter one. ) The development of the 
community as a productive force therefore is not 
simply a material or technological development, but 
rather one that includes 'subjective, appearing as 
qualities of individuals, as well as objective 
(ones). '(130) 
Claims of 'abbreviation' and the label of "material" 
cannot therefore be a substitute for an explanation 
of the problem contained in the , 
Preface. A further 
problem that needs to be mentioned is with respect to 
the interpretation of the connection between the 
development and maturity of the material productive 
forces and Marx's notion of "fettering" itself. 
Assuming, as with Cohen and others, that the notion 
of "fettering" is itself a valid theoretical 
proposition (certainly a controversial matter in 
itself), we still have a problem in that Marx did not 
really address himself to explaining the meaning or 
terms of "fettering". What does Marx mean by the 
statement that production relations turn 
into the 
'fetters' of productive forces? Does this mean a 
restriction of further development of 
forces, or of 
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their functioning and use, or of both? Though the 
Preface is certainly ambiguous on this matter (as 
with some others), it is nonetheless an important 
issue which is, of course, related to the crux of 
Marx's concern - the demise of capitalism. It is 
invariably taken to be (by most Marxists) a 
problematic which concerns socio-economic deprivation 
(due to loss of productive power, etc. ) leading to 
social instability and epochal social change. 
Since, however, the issue of "fettering" is directly 
related to the questions of the "maturity" of 
material conditions and of the "level" of development 
of productive forces, we need to first look at these. 
Marx is clearly vague on these questions also. How 
does one judge the level of development and the stage 
of maturity of these forces and conditions? Marx 
merely statesq 'at a certain stage of their 
development'. But, at the very least, what needs to 
be explained is the grounds or the criterion for the 
recognition of that 'certain stage'. Moreoverg how 
does one "measure" the degree of development of 
forces, and since we are concerned with technology, 
the degree or level of advancement of the 
technological system? And thus in what sense and on 
what basis can one label a particular technological 
system and material conditions as "mature"? 
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The answers to these questions, I suggest, are 
important to the notion of "fettering"t since 
without explaining what is meant by "maturity", or 
how the degree of development of forces (or 
technology) is measured, and so on, we have no way of 
knowing the terms of fettering. For Marx, as with 
Cohen also, the measure of the degree of development 
is the growth of productive power, which is something 
quantifiable in terms of productivity. For Cohen, 
'insofar as quantity of productive power is what 
matters, the key quantity is how much time it takes 
to (re)produce the producers... ' And this is meant in 
the sense of 'what is required to satisfy the 
inescapable physical needs of the immediate 
producers. '(131) 
In terms of my understanding of Marx's position on 
this issue, this latter point is not strictly 
correct. For one thing, in Cohen's definition we have 
a problem of extreme reductionism to what is almost 
nothing more than physiological "needs". Once again, 
in this way Cohen is attempting to establish a 
of general" definition of the measure of productive 
power or productivity which he could then claim 
applies to the history of humanity in general. Marx, 
in contrast, is specific; he is concerned with an 
understanding of productivity in terms of the 
capitalist aim of production. He refers to the 
reduction of the amount of labour-time which is 
soci necessary to produce a definite quantity of 
output, and he is concerned with what he calls 
'relative productivity'. (132) In other words, what 
is for him essential is not the growth of output as 
such, but that of (a) surplus-value and the expansion 
of capital - or in terms of labour, the measure of 
the growth of productive power is how much surplus 
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labour-time increases relative to necessary labour- 
time - and (b) on the basis of (a) the rise in the 
rate of profit and the relative growth of individual 
capitals (firms). 
But this quantitative measure on its own (however one 
defines it) cannot, I would suggest, be an adequate 
grounds for the labelling of a particular 
technological system or material conditions as being 
11mature". What is also required - on the basis of 
Marx's conception of technology, and particularly in 
connection with the concept of fixed capital - is a 
qualitative criterion -a criterion that reflects the 
quantitative growth of power (of productivity) in 
terms of both the social and technical aspects of 
the function and use of productive forces. This 
qualitative criterion is based on the extent to which 
human labour-power (mental and physical) has been 
taxed, drained and channelled into the objectified 
form of a technological system as fixed capital. 
Cohen, of course, ignores all this, and nowhere does 
he examine Marx's concept of fixed capital in 
relation to the level of development of productive 
forces, or to the notion of "fettering", or to the 
notion of productivity. By contrast, for Marx himself 
this concept is highly pertinent to the 
aforementioned issues: 'in fixed capital, ' Marx 
writes, 'the social productivity of labour is posited 
as a property inherent in capital; including the 
scientific 2ower as well as the combination of social 
powers within the production process, and final 
the skill transposed from direct labour into the 
machine, into the dead productive force. 
'(emphasis by 
Marx himself)(133) In other words, if I understand 
Marx's ideas on the role and significance of fixed 
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capital correctly, the more advanced a technological 
system, the more simplified, narrowly specialized, 
and alienated will be the existing form of individual 
labour-power in use, as well as therefore the lower 
will be the quantity of capital-value invested in 
living labour-power relative to the overall 
investment in the material conditions of productiony 
and more specifically in fixed capital. 
Thus, with respect to the question of "fettering", as 
I understand Marx, what actually matters is both the 
qualitative and qualitative determinants of fixed 
capital or the technological system actually in 
operation. Marx mentions this, and precisely with 
respect to the development of capitalism: Hence the 
stage of development reached by the mode of 
production based on capital ... is measured by the 
existing scope of fixed capital; not only by its 
quantity, but just as much by its quality. '(134) And 
the reason why the 'scope of fixed capital' - i. e. 
that of the technological system - is considered to 
be important in terms of understanding the questions 
of 'the stage of development' and of "fettering" is 
that it has a direct bearing on the production of 
value and surplus-valueg and hence it has definite 
consequences for the increase of profit and the 
growth or accumulation of capital. 
In terms of Marx's theory of capitalism, a 
technological system is deemed to be more developed 
or advanced than another not on the grounds of the 
growth of the quantity of output 
in itself, but on 
the basis of the extent to which it aids the 
increase 
of surplus value and therefore the systematic 
expansion of capital - or what 
is the same, aids the 
process of accumulation. It 
is capital, its expansion 
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and accumulation, which is the critical factor, 
rather than the expansion of output. For, according 
to Marx, the systematic and continuous reproduction 
of capitalist relations of production (the 
reproduction of what Cohen calls 'the producers' as 
wage-workers on the one side and capital or the 
capitalist on the other) is dependent on the 
production of surplus value (or the mass of profit) 
and its systematic investment on an expanding scale. 
Investments in production, hence the hiring of 
labour, and investments in the development of new 
technology, in its application and its diffusion, all 
depend on both the expectation for the gaining of an 
"adequate" return (of profit) as well as, of course, 
on the actual amount of profit gained* 
Therefore, from my understanding of Marx's theory, I 
would suggest the following interpretation; only if 
it can be shown that the technological system in 
operation (i. e. 'the existing scope of fixed 
capital'), because of its quantitative and 
qualitative features, can disturb, or rather 
negatively affect, the mechanism of surplus value 
production, and therefore impede the systematic 
expansion of capital (or of accumulation), is it then 
possible to propose that the development of the 
productive forces has reached that 'certain stage' 
which designates the material conditions as being 
"mature" and that on that basis and from that point 
on capitalism's specific compulsion to revolutionize 
the forces of production is no longer operative - 
i. e. capitalist relations have turned 
from forms of 
development of the productive forces into their 
fetters. 
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Cohen's initial response to this problematic, 
however, is to smudge the issue by stating that, 
I production relations are capable of fettering, that 
is, restricting the use and development of the 
productive forces. '(135) Yet in Marx's 
, 
Preface we can 
observe no mention of the meaning and the terms of 
"fettering, be it "use" or "development" fettering. 
Aware of this, Cohen seems to be confused, in some of 
his discussion of this issue (particularly in his 
book), he tends to stress the 'fettering' of further 
development of forces (called "development 
fettering"). In some others (and particularly in his 
later works), however, his position changes to 
arguing for the 'fettering' of the use of productive 
forces (called "use fettering"). (136) 
With respect to capitalism, Cohen's basic argument on 
the "fettering" question is as follows: under 
capitalism the aim of production is not use-value but 
exchange value - i. e. production for exchange rather 
than use. Given this, capitalism has an inherent 
tendency to use advances in productive forces 
(technology) to expand output rather than 'reduce 
toil and extend leisure. (137) In other words: 'As 
long as production remains subject to the capitalist 
principle, the output-increasing option will tend to 
be selected, and implemented in one way or 
another. '[[ibid. p. 30411 Since, 
'toil reduction2 
threatens a sacrifice of the profit associated with 
increased outpu and sales2 -_ 
and hence a loss of 
competitive strength. '(Cohen's emphasis)(138) 
The consequence of this principle of output-expansion 
is, paradoxically, the increase of consumption. 
'Hence, ' Cohen writes, Ithe boundless pursuit of 
consumption goods is a result of a productive process 
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oriented to exchange-values rather than consumption- 
values. It is the Rockefellers who ensure that the 
Smiths need to keep up with the Jones's. '(139) This 
generates what Cohen calls the 'distinctive 
contradiction' of capitalism: 'The productive 
technology of advanced capitalism begets an 
unparalleled opportunity of lifting the curse of Adam 
and liberating men from toil, but the production 
relations of capitalist economic organization prevent 
the opportunity from being seized, see It brings 
society to the threshold of abundance and locks the 
door. For the promise of abundance is not an endless 
flow of goods but a sufficiency produced with a 
minimum of unpleasant exertion. '(140) 
0 The 'contradiction' therefore ensues, accor Ing to 
Cohen, not because the development of the productive 
forces, and hence productive power, is impeded or 
halted, but because these are irrationally used and 
deployed in terms of 'a balanced human 
existence' . 
(141) The notion of "fettering", then, is 
concerned with what is possible, rather than actual, 
and defined in terms of rational human action. 
In. his later works, Cohen becomes somewhat more 
precise, though still promoting the same 
basic 
interpretation based on the principle of general 
human rationality. In these works, the main 
issue for 
Cohen seems to be that, 
'capitalist relations of 
production impede optimally productive use 
of the 
high technology' ofq for exampleg computers and 
electronics. (142) He proposes - 
in connection with 
the "fettering" principle - that we should recognize 
'the irrationality of, the existing use of 
contemporary technological marvels' 
which could 
'result' in 'socialist social changele He goes on 
to 
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assert that: 'If that happened, the change would occur 
not at all because capitalism does not replace a 
given generation of computers quickly enough, but 
because it does not make good use of any generation 
of computers. '(143) 
The issues of "maturity" of material conditions, of 
the "level" of productive forces, of "fettering" and 
social change, for Cohen, seems to revolve around the 
question of 'irrationality' of use, of capital's 
inability to make I good use' of the given 
technological systemsq or as he puts it, of 'what is 
done and what could be done'(144) with these systems. 
Cohen's proposition on this so-called "use- 
fettering", though perhaps true, is, however, of no 
use whatsoever for an understanding of the dynamics 
of change under capitalism, given its generality. In 
an abstract and general senseq one could quite easily 
show that capitalism has never made 'good use' of any 
of its systems of technologies - if by 'good use' we 
mean what could be but is not done; the "possible" 
rather than the actual, this is particularly the case 
in terms of human needs9 but alsoý arguablyg even in 
capitalism's own terms of reference. (145) 
The proposition of the "irrationality" of use of 
'high technology' of computers (etc. ) is vacuous, 
since one could claim, and demonstrate, for example, 
that capitalism has not made 'good use' of its early 
systems of machinery, or of the later system of 
intensive mechanizationg or so-called Fordism - by 
showing the waste in human and material resources 
during the operation of those early systems, And yet, 
it cannot be denied that we have had an unprecedented 
expansion of capitalism since those times, 
further 
development of the productive forces 
(e. g. 
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microelectronic automation) and growth of productive 
power, but no "fettering" and, obviously, no social 
revolutionary transformation. If it is, as Cohen 
seems to advocate, the "irrationality" of use in the 
general sense which should be recognized as the 
crucial issue for the 'dynamics of social 
change'(146), if, according to Cohen's claim, 'forms 
of society ris e and fall according as they enable or 
discourage use of the productive capacity'(147), then 
by all accounts capitalism should have "fallen" a 
long time ago. 
At this point it should be mentioned that Cohen is 
not, however, alone in opting for the "use 
fettering" interpretation. In their criticism of 
Cohen, Wrightq Levine, and Sober, also argue for the 
idea of use-fettering as not only the more likely 
situation for capitalism, but in fact one that 
applies in general. As they write: 'We argue... that in 
all stages of the historical materialist trajectory, 
it is use-fettering that destabilizes social 
relations; and that development-fettering, if it 
occurs, is only a by-product of use-fettering. '(148) 
For them too, it seems, what is crucial is the 
'effective' or 'ineffective' use of 'existing 
productive resources'(149). The word 
'effective' 
might sound somewhat more exacting than Cohen's use 
of the words 'good use'q but it takes us no further 
than the latter. For the same basic objection of 
generality applies to it: What does 
'effective' or 
'ineffective' use mean? How and on what grounds is 
any use of resources judged to 
be 'effective' or 
'ineffective'? Neither Cohen nor Wrightq Levine, and 
Soberg tackle this problem in specific terms. 
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A further objection has to do with the connotation of "use" itself. The concept of "use-fettering" based on 
the idea of ineffective use of technologies 
disregards the significance of the socio-technical 
function of technological systems. By asserting that 
relations fetter the good or effective use of 
technologies it is simply assumed that (a) 
technologies are or have been used effectively prior 
to that certain stage of development; and (b) that 
they can actually be "used" effectively (however one 
defines the terms "effective" or "good"). But this 
cannot simply be assumed, it is something that needs 
to be established, and to do so one needs to take 
account of the inbuilt technical characteristics of 
particular technological systems, that is, their 
designed features and how they actually function. In 
other words, with the concept of use-fettering a 
crucial aspect of the actuality of technology is 
either merely taken for granted or in fact 
disregarded, rather than examined and explained. 
In fact, if we look at Cohen's statement (given 
above) on the 'liberating' power of 'productive 
technology of advanced capitalism, it can be seen 
that he simply assumes that this 'technology' can be 
used to deliver an 'abundance' of goods 'with a 
minimum of unpleasant exertion'(150). Yet if we look 
at the technical characteristics of the systems in 
operation in advanced capitalism it is at least 
arguable whether or not these are in their technical 
functioning capable of accommodating a 'liberating' 
principle of work. 
Indeed, according to some writers the opposite is the 
case. For example, Andre Gorz argues 
that, in 
reality, the 'development of the productive 
forces is 
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functional exclusively to the logic and needs of 
capital'. And, insofar as he (like Cohen, among 
others) identifies the basic principles of 
11socialism" with the "liberation" from toil and 
exploitation (etc. ), Gorz goes on to assert that 
even the further development and maturity of these 
forces 'will not only fail to establish the material 
preconditions of socialism, but are an obstacle to 
its realization'. (151) Thus, the 'productive 
technology of capitalism'(Cohen), is in fact, 
according to Gorz, 'so profoundly tainted by their 
origins that they are incapable of accommodation to a 
socialist rationality'. (152) 
Whatever the case, the point that we like to make - 
and this is derived from the examination of Marx's 
conception of technology we have presented - is that 
for an understanding of the notion of "fettering", or 
the contradiction between forces and relations of 
production, one needs to take into account not merely 
whether and to what extent the 'productive capacity' 
of technolog'Les 'is being effectively used'(153), but 
rather whether and to what extent the designed 
technical and functional principles of technologies 
have built-in contradictory features - i. e. they are 
designed to function as means of production and as 
means of exploitation and domination of labour (as 
capital). It is here that in examining the 
development (maturity) of technological systems one 
needs to take account of the qualitative side. Since, 
it is, at least to a large extent, on that basis that 
one could recognize whether or not these systems are 
compatible with, say, capitalist principles and aims, 
or because of their specific technical features they 
tend to undermine such principles and aims. If the 
latter proves to be the case, then it can be said 
451 
that there is a contradiction, and the capitalist 
relations have become fetters, 
Moreover, for Marx, as we have argued in previous 
chapters, the fundamental point is that with 
capitalism the use and function of technological 
systems (in fact, of productive forces as such) are 
socially determined; technology functions as a 
'moment' of capital's relation of production. Their 
'good use' or 'effective use' (if one wishes to use 
these terms) has a specific meaning in terms not of 
some general, abstract conceptions of rationality, or 
human needs, or reduction of toil, or even increase 
of output as such, but in terms of the expansion of 
capital (expressed "economically" it is the growth of 
capital-value,, and its associates, profit, money, 
etc.; expressed "socio-technically" it is the 
expansion of the domain of the power of domination of 
capital personified, or the capitalist, over labour 
technologically and organizationally). 
Finally, Marx, we suggest, has a specific social 
understanding of the efficiency, or effectiveness, or 
good use, of technologies (or productive forces 
in 
general), and for him, under capitalism, these are 
defined in terms of capital's own logic and 
rationality. According to such logic and rationality, 
the notions of 'good use' and 
'effective use' refer 
to the actual (and not the potential or possible) 
efficient function of given technological systems 
in 
the extraction of surplus-value, which 
in the 
actuality of the existence of capital as 
"many 
capitals" (i. e. in the world of numerous 
firms) it is 
translated atid' expressed as the efficient use of such 
systems by individual capitals 
(firms) in the battles 
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of competition to gain the greatest amount of profits 
and hence achieve relative growth. 
Having discussed these alternative views and 
interpretations of Marx on the development of 
productive forces and technological change we are now 
in a position to give an evaluation of Marx's ideas 
on these issues. 
An Evaluation and Summing_Up: 
The task of this chapter, as stated in the 
introduction, was to examine the relevance of Marx's 
conception of technology (as capital) to his ideas 
and propositions on the development of productive 
forces and technological change under capitalism. If 
my interpretation of these latter, presented in this 
chapter, is deemed to be at least reasonably 
accurate, then what can be called the conventional 
interpretations advanced by many of Marx's critics 
and also followers (a few of which we have examined) 
are in at least one but significant respect flawed. 
In that, as we have tried to demonstratev such 
interpretations invariablyg if not in fact 
completelyý tend to ignore Marx's ideasq observations 
and insights with respect to the socially and 
historically specific formg technical characteristics 
and qualitative features of capitalist technologyg 
which areq in part at leastq for Marx, of critical 
importance to the direction of technological 
development and change7 and hence have definite 
implications for the process of production and 
accumulation of capital. 
We can sum up the basic discussion presented as 
follows: For Marx, in our opinion, what 
is a vital 
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factor for the explanation of the historical limits 
of capitalism and hence its eventual demise, at least 
in , is the dynamic process of development of 
the technical characteristics and quality of the 
system of technology. A process of development which 
necessarily (at least according to the discussions 
presented in the previous chapters, and for reasons 
suggested in the previous sections of this chapter) 
takes place in such a way that it constantly 
heightens the mastery of technology as capital in 
relation to labour. This entails a progressive 
technological debasement of the role of living labour 
at the point of production; and hence the debasement 
of, what Marx considers to be, the very source of 
expansion, growth and accumulation. 
Thus, according to this reading of Marx, the 
fundamental significance of the tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall, as the so-called immanent law of 
accumulation, is that it expresses the development of 
the material productive forces, by actually 
necess. itating, through crisis, a complete 
modification and modernization of the technological 
conditions of capital production. A fall in the 
general profit rate is concomitant with the 
generalization of a certain system of techniques and 
technologies. Its actual fall is a direct consequence 
of the inability to raise the prevailing rate of 
surplus value under the existing technological 
conditions. The compulsion for technological change 
is thus a built-in feature of the capitalist mode of 
production. It is a dynamic process that 
involves 
structural changes through, as Marx puts 
it, 'bitter 
contradictionsg crises2 spasms. 
'(154) This is the way 
the social system of capital production, according 
to 
Marx, comes to grips with the 
limitations of the 
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prevailing technical relations of production and of 
the extraction of surplus labour. 
It is, therefore, not the fall in the profit rate 
which 'at a certain point' brings down the capitalist 
system, at least as T understand Marx (which is often 
the way conventional interpretations present his 
views). The fall brings about a rupture in the 
process of accumulation, a crisis. And this is 
crucial, for it compels individual capitals (firms), 
as with the force of a natural law, according to 
Marx, to increase their productivity and efficiency 
by the application of improved or new technological 
systems, which are fundamentally achieved by 
revolutions in technology (e. g. the development of 
mechanization, and now we have electronics and 
automationg and so on) made possible, as a rule, 
during the expansionary upswing of the business 
cycle. 
The long-term effect of the law of falling profit 
rate and of periodic crises, according to my 
interpretation of Marx, is therefore to transform 
growth (quantitative expansion) into development 
(qualitative change). The progressive advance of 
accumulation by facilitating and compelling (i. e. in 
order to gain above average profits during the 
upswing, and to avoid bankruptcy or take-over during 
crisis or the downswing) the development and 
application of forms of technological systems that 
tend to progressively reduce necessary labour would 
in principle reach a certain point whereby the 
technological mastery of labour becomes almost 
absolute, thereby negating the systematic production 
of surplus-value. Such a negation, howevert is not a 
crisis situation in the traditional economic sense, 
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but in fact it isq for Marx, the essential factor for 
the breakdown of the social system of production 
based on value. 
Given Marx's conception of technology, the 
"fettering", and hence the epoch of social 
revolutionary transformation, can only occur, 
according to my interpretation, when the qualitative 
development of the system of production technology 
reaches such a level that the input of necessary 
labour within the productive processes of material 
production (or rather, more accurately, within the 
productive value creating sectors) is reduced to such 
an extent that the extraction of surplus labour, and 
hence the appropriation of it as surplus value, 
becomes objectively impossible on a systematic basis. 
This, then, in sum, is an interpretation of Marx's 
views, which, in contrast to the conventional 
interpretations, takes account of and incorporates 
what we have suggested to be his conception of 
technology. Though it is not by any means a 
definitive and exhaustive account of his views on the 
subject of the development of productive forces and 
technological change, it is, nonetheless, we suggest, 
a more responsible reflection of Marx's position than 
those interpretations which tend to disregard his 
conception of technology. Foro as we have suggested, 
this neglect cannot but lead to, at best, a 
constricted and limited interpretation of Marx, thus 
resulting in only a hazy understanding of his ideas 
and arguments on technical changeq development of 
productive forcesp and so on (however controversial 
and problematic these are considered to be), and, at 
worst, a virtual misunderstanding and often false 
view of his position. Moreover, failing to take 
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account of Marx's conception of technology also tends 
to render Marx's views on these issuesp and indeed 
his model of the dynamics of capitalist development, 
simplistically "economistic" in focus. 
Again, we do notp however, claim (as repeatedly 
mentioned before) that by taking account of Marx's 
conception of technology we thereby render his 
theoretical modelq his propositions on technological 
change and the development of productive forces, 
etc., unproblematic, flawless, or entirely valid. In 
fact, in addition to certain problems we have already 
mentioned (which do not need to be repeated here), 
there are many gaps and loose ends in Marx's 
writings(155), and, what is more, there are certain 
issues and questions which are either not covered at 
all by Marx, or at best in some cases simply referred 
to in passing. 
Thus, in evaluating Marx's views, and specifically on 
the subject of technological development and change 
under capitalism, we can propose the following: 
Though we think that Marx's observations and 
propositions, particularly on the intertwinement of 
the socio-economic and the strictly technical aspects 
of the process of development and change, are 
extremely valuable, and certainly far ahead of his 
contemporaries, they are, nonetheless, not only 
incomplete, but also in some sense somewhat one- 
sided.. Let me explain the nature of this one- 
sidedness. 
In a similar way to his conception of technology 
which stresses the inextricable relation 
between 
production technology and capital, 
Marx's view of 
technological change tends to, on the one 
hand, 
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concentrate on the objective aspects of this process 
(almost exclusively), and, on the otherg stress what 
he regards as the essential productive relations 
(value creation and expansion, and surplus-value 
extraction and production). The main weakness of this 
approach, i ti my opinion, is that it tends t0 
disregard the many modified forms in which technology 
is developed and technological structure of 
production is changed in the actual market-oriented 
societye 
Besides, with this almost exclusive concentration on 
technological development and change specifically 
concerning the production process, Marx fails to 
consider certain factors which are also important to 
the process of technical change. In fact, let us note 
here, that although we, like most other commentators, 
have referred to the concept of "innovation" in our 
discussion of Marx on technological development and 
change, that concept is not strictly speaking 
applicable to Marx's thoughts. For one thing, the 
concept of innovation, and particularly in its 
Schumpeterian definition, places a far greater stress 
on the subjective aspects of the process of technical 
change than Marx's ideas allow (though to be sure his 
work on this aspect of the complexity of market 
phenomena remained unfinished). For another, the so- 
called marketing aspects of innovation, among other 
things, for example, are far from adequately covered 
by Marx. 
Since Schumpeter, "innovation" has been regarded as a 
function of the entrepreneur, of his/her special 
quality of leadership and will., 
(156) It is considered 
as the introduction of 
"new combination", covering 
new products, new methods, new 
forms of organization 
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of management of firms (e. g. mergers)q and opening up 
of new markets. (157) It covers any aspect of 'Putting 
productive resources to uses hitherto untried in 
practice... '(158) 
The nearest conception we have in Marx to such a 
notion of "innovation" (though perhaps even that is 
pushing it too far) is his discussions on the 
"development of capitalism" in general - but with 
the si gnificant qualification of the capitalist as a 
personification of capital, as a subject of a 
determinant social relation of production. However, 
in specific terms, Marx's "technological change" is 
concerned with what is often called "invention" as 
distinct from "innovation". Even in this case, this 
is not strictly correctq since for Marx technological 
change is decidedly concerned with the application 
and diffusion of "inventions" of production 
technologies. (159) 
Marx's observations and propositions are, therefore, 
very weak (and that is perhaps putting it too mildly) 
on what he calls the phenomenal aspects of 
capitalism; market and price competition, new 
"production function", the behaviour of firms and 
above all of entrepreneurs (individually). Similarly, 
Marx is less than concerned with the erosion of the 
psychology of entrepreneurship in the 
(presumed) 
demise of capitalism. This ist in my opinion, an 
important weakness which needs to be remedied. For 
even if one accepts Marx's ideas, and his emphasis on 
"essential relations"g it would be quite wrong to 
disregard what Schumpeter, for exampleg calls 
'The 
Obsolescence of the Entrepreneurial Function' as a 
problem of the 'mechanization of progress'(160). 
That 
is that with greater mechanization and the 
increase 
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of rationalization and specialization accompanying it 
(or as Marx would put it, as a result of the progress 
of accumulation and hence of technological 
development and change) there could well be 
(Schumpeter says 'will' be) an eventual blotting out 
of entrepreneurial 'personality, the calculable 
result, the "vision". '(161) Thus, even if one does 
not consider this decreasing role of entrepreneurship 
as a "fundamental" causal factor of what Marx calls 
the "fettering" principle and hence of the demise of 
capitalism, it would be extremely hardý in my view, 
to go along with Marx and disregard it altogether. It 
should certainly be considered asq at the very least, 
a contributing factor of some importance to the 
withering of capitalism's vitality and vigour, and 
this even if one disagrees with both Schumpeter's and 
Marx's "prediction" of the eventual breakdown of 
capitalism. 
The case of "product" innovation is yet another 
important issue which Marx fails to take account of 
in his treatment of technical change. But here we 
need to be cautious, for this would be only justified 
if one were to look at product innovation in the very 
narrow sense of innovations in marketable end- 
products (consumer goods as such). Thus, what is 
clearly important with this case is what is exactly 
meant by "product" innovation. As, for example, 
Kuznets (162) has argued, if innovation involves the 
development and application of new machinery, then 
one could say that from the perspective of the 
manufacturer of machinery this would 
be a case of 
"product" innovation, while from a general economic 
perspective it is a case of what 
is often referred to 
as "process" innovation 
(or technological development 
and change). (163) Thereforeq while 
Marx clearly fails 
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to examine the question of end-product, or consumer- 
goodsl innovations, one could not say that he ignores 
technological-product development. Nonetheless, what 
he in fact does not take account of is that the two 
types of innovations are actually quite closely 
interrelated. (164) 
Finally, then, we can conclude our evaluation of 
Marx's view of technological development and change 
as follows: Its strength is in emphasising the 
structural (objective) relations involved in the 
process of development and change of technological 
systems. But its strength is also, it can be said, a 
main source of its weakness, for it fails to take an 
adequate account of the particularities of 
competition and market conditions, the practice and 
conduct of individual capitals (firms)l the diversity 
of forces and pressures and the subjective aspects 
involved in this process - all of which tend to 
modify the determining force of those structural 
relations Marx emphasises. 
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General Conclusion 
In the review section we pointed to the problem of definition of the concept of "technology". There we surveyed the views of a fairly large number of 
scholars, from within different academic disciplines, 
and what we saw was not only a wide discrepancy between definitions and meanings given, but also 
quite a large inconsistency in the usage and 
application of the concept of technology. Yet there 
is, of course, what can be called a conceptual orbit 
within which the different schools and traditions of 
thought place varying emphases on specific aspects of 
technological phenomenon. We tentatively identified 
the range of this orbit by the vacillation of the 
definition and usage of the term technology between 
some form of activity and process (generally 
productive in character)9 knowledge to do with the 
latter or of how to make and apply artifactsq the 
physical o-bj ec ts or artifacts themselves, or a 
combination of these. Moreoverg we also identified a 
major division within that orbit between two 
predominantly influential broad perspectives on the 
relationship between technology and society: namelyg 
technological determinism and what can be described 
as the social determinism of technology. 
It is no exaggeration to state that in one way or 
another Marx' s thoughts cast their shadow over the 
very subject of technology and the perspectives 
mentioned. How does Marx's thoughts on technology, 
then, fit into this conceptual orbit we have 
identified? And how do we evaluate his contributions 
towards an understanding of the concept of 
technology, its def inition and meaning, the role of 
technology and its social "impact" and/or 
"implications"? To expound the analysis of Marx's 
thoughts, and to investigate his perspective with 
respect to the issue of technology, was thus the task 
of this study. We therefore set out to examine Marx's 
writings on or relevant to technologyq but limiting 
this study to his views on "technology in 
capitalism". The main justification for the nature 
and limits of this study lies in its dealing with an 
aspect of Marx's views on technology that 
has 
received the least serious attention: namely, the 
notion of "technology as capital". 
In fact, given the importance of the role of 
technology, as evident from our survey of views, and 
given the evident importance of technology 
in Marx's 
works, as well as his 
(either direct or at least 
shadowy) influence, it is strange, 
to say the least, 
that despite the large 
(and growingg) literature on 
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Marx, despite the many references to his views on technology, and machinery in particularg and despite the range of interpretations that have been put forward to capture the meaning of this or that idea or statement of Marx on technology and its role in society, there has been no thorough, detailed and systematic examination of Marx's writings on technology. 
Even when technology is taken as a significant aspect of a study of Marx (as we have seen in the cases of Braverman, Colien, and others, for example) J we have interpretations and commentaries on Marx on technology", but no coherent conceptual 
reconstruction which combines his early and "mature" ideas on this issue. His ideas on machinery, on technology as instruments, on technical change, on development of technology and productive forces, 
etc., are interpreted, praised or criticised, and on 
that basis, questionable notions of technolo, cyy are 
proposed on behalf of Marx. In this latter respect, 
as we have seen, two notions are prominent: the idea 
that technology "in itself" is, for Marx, something "neutral"; and the notion that technology as a 
material force of production is, as a part of the 
material substratumý "determinant". Statements and 
passages are quoted as textual evidence in support of 
one claim or anotherý but as if there is in Marx 
himself no systematic agenda on technologyq and 
insofar as his theory of capitalism is concerned, as 
if his views on technology though not marginal to his 
critique of capitalismý are nonetheless somehow 
either artificially linked or secondary to his 
analysis of the economics and the social organization 
of capitalism. In shortg it appears that Marx has a 
great deal to say about technology and machineryg and 
as much on productive forces, but hardly a formulated 
and st . ructured. set of ideas which one can identify as 
a conception of technology. 
This we believe, and as we have attempted to show in 
this study, is not true. What is, however, true, in 
our opinion at least, is that Marx is conception of 
technology (insofar as capitalism is concerned, of 
course) is incorporated in and predicated upon the 
notion of technology as capital - this being the 
thesis of our study. Thus, the conception needs to be 
reconstructed in the course of investigation, 
exposition, and interpretation, of Marx's writings 
which are directly or indirectly concerned with his 
development of a theory of capitalism, and hence from 
following his own stated a5enda (however doubtful and 
controversial these may be . 
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This bond between technology and capital in Marx, 
moreover, has, it seems to us, made the task of identifying (and reconstructing) his ideas and propositions on technology as a distinctive 
conception difficult. For Marx's conception of technology needs to be, as it were, disentangled from his conception of capital and capitalism - but this in such a way that the former is not artificially divorced from the latter. With the notion of technology as capital, as we have argued and 
attempted to demonstrate, Marx's conception of technology emerges, so to speak, quite naturally from 
within his theoretical critique of capitalism. 
Let uSP then , give a summary statement of our findings and propositions: 
1. In chapter one, we argued that Marx's concept of 
the productive forces is far broader in meaning than 
the purely technological meaning often attributed to 
it. We suggested a close affinity between this 
concept and Aristotle's conception of techne as a 
"making" process - the socio-technical fusion of the 
art and instruments of production, of activity, 
knowledge and tools. On that basis we questioned the 
artificial distinction and separation of the material 
from the social. It was suggested that a careful 
reading of Marx shows that in fact what for Marx has 
"primacy" is "social being". This concept for Marx 
presupposes, by definition, the socio-historical 
realization of human life, which is necessarily the 
result of human activity in the social processes of 
the production of materials of life and that of 
social relations simultaneously. And we, therefore, 
proposed an interpretation ot Marx's notion of 
"primacy" in the historical sense - in tha t 
productive forces are not simply freely chosen but 
acquired. 
But , we f ound that 
for Marx, with the rise and 
development of capitalism, the socio-technical unit 
and fusion characteristic of past forms of 
"making 
processes breaks down due to the social and later 
technological separation of labour from the material 
conditions of production. With this , the various 
elements of the productive forces acquired, begin to 
be socially and technically transformed and shaped to 
function according to the needs of the new 
(capitalist) conditions and aims of production. The 
different elements thus take on socially specific 
forms, roles and functions. It 
is with this 
transformation, we suggested, that technology, 
"freed" from its previous social bonds9 takes on the 
appearance of an independent, alien, and 
hostile 
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power; a power, however, that comes to confront the labourer, according to Marx, as a power of capital within the production process. 
2. In chapter two, we argued that, for Marx, the social phenomenon of alienation (the self-alienation 
of the direct producer) under capitalism both 
reflects as it aLso conditions the role and function 
of production technolo, gy as an 'autonomous' alien power within the process of production. Just as money becomes the most abstract universal expression of capital in society at large, so production technology becomes the most concrete manifestation of capital in the act of production. Thus, we have Marx's now famous dictum that capital relation essentially 
signifies the domination of dead labour over living labour. A view which, however, should be interpreted 9 in our opinion, as referring to not only the social 
role of money (value, exchange-value) as the ultimate 
manifestation in soýiety of what Marx calls the lunfettered dominion oIf the estranged thinf' (i. e. of 
LI accumulated, pastv -ibour or dead labour) over man , but also to t1he 'unfettered dominion' of -p-r-o7uction 
technology as objectifiedg past, accumulated labour 
or dead labourg over living labour in production. 
Technology, in other words, takes on its own specific 
social role in the mode of production. It is no 
longer simply a technical mediatory object, merely a 
if means of production", a mere "tool' 
I; 
and it is 
certainly not, therefore, a "neutral" object being 
used or misused; it has now over and above its 
technical role a specific social function. The 'power 
to command labour' - whi-, h belongs to the capitalist 
not simply as the individual owner of the means of 
production, but as the personification of capital as 
a social power - achieves a technical manifestation 
through the design and functioning of production 
technology. Virough its development, production 
technology becomes itself , and in itself , an 
essential element in the exercise of social power at 
the point of production. And, thus, as such an 
element, the 'alien power' it has in relation to the 
worker(s) is not simply the result of its ownership 
by the capitalist as a proprietor as such. What 
signifies its alienating role is that the specific 
socio-economic requirements ("needs") of 
it the 
capitalist" (not in the sense of a personal 
proprietor, bu t in that of a social status in 
production), org of the social production relations 
- i. e. capital - are built 
into its technical 
structure and functional principles by 
design. 
4b5 
3. In chapter three we presented an analysis of the different and various specific concepts which the so- called "mature" Marx uses to explain the role and function of technology in capitalism. It was shown that Marx moves from a general "definition" of technology as instruments and means of labour, to broader yet more specific concepts that emphasise the social form as against the essence of technology. His use of these concepts in place of the term "technology", it was suggested, is related to his analysis of the different aspects of the capitalist mode of production. Thus, for example, because of his concern to explain the notion of "value" he uses such concepýs as , constant capital" and "fixed capital" (the latter, we suggested, specifically with regard to the system of technology) as powerful tools to establish certain principle propositions on the peculiar part technology plays in the processes of production, circulation and realization of value. 
For Marx, the alienation of labour, as it was 
suggested in chapter two, needs to be realized in 
production itself; formal subordination needs to become real subsumption. And, we argued and tried to 
show in chapter three, that the development of 
machine technology is, for Marx, an essential part of 
this process of the realization of alienation; it is 
directly linked to the process of social struggle for 
the shaping and control, or management, of labour. We 
found that, according to Marx, with manufacture we 
have formal subordination - i. e. that capital has 
control over production2 but has not as yet achieved 
its domination within the production process itself. 
Since it is still fettered by the subjective factor - 
by the skill and knowledge that belong to labour and 
by the character of technologies as tools or as means 
of labour. This however changes with the development 
of machinery. The designed framework of the machine 
negates the socio-technical characteristics of the 
tool. Social appropriation of means of production 
becomes a technical reality; instruments are no 
longer simply means of labour as such, but means 
which are now technologically separated from labour. 
It isq for Marx, it was suggested, this 
transformation of technology, the development of 
machinery, that is vital to the social form of 
technology as capital and hence to its functioning in 
relation to labour as a moment of the capitalist 
relations of production. Before machinery, according 
to Marx, technology appears merelY as an essential 
moment of the labour process itself 
(i. e. as part of 
a "making" process) which capital 
(or the capitalist) 
appropriates; before machineryp technology was not 
in 
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itself a moment of capital - it was not, that is, 
ca]2italist technology strictly speakingg though it 
may have belonged to the capitalist as his/her 
property. With machinery, capital achieves its 
technologically adequate form. With it capital 
achieves the real subsumption of labour, it achieves its dominion within the production process itself. 
And with machinery, technology becomes transformed 
from a "servant" into a "master" of labour, as the 
objectification of labouring activity, skill, knowledge, etc., becomes absorbed into the technical 
structure and functional principles of machinery (and 
more specifically for Marx, absorbed into the 
industrial-mechanized system of production 
technology), and hence the alienation of labour 
becomes objectively real. It was mentioned that on 
this point, Weber's acute and illuminating 
observation agrees with Marx's, that 'the lifeless 
machine is congealed spirit (Giest)', and that 'only 
by being 
I 
this has it the power to force men into its 
service. (Gesammelte politischen Schriften, 
1921, p. 152T- 
With this transformation of means of labour into the 
machine system of technology as capital, what we 
have, then, is the complete break 
of 
up of the unity, 
the fusion, characteristic of the art" or techne of 
production - the radical transformation of p-ro'd-uction 
as, traditionally and fundamentally, a making 
process, a labour process. Within capitalism, 
therefore, at least according to my understanding of 
Marx, the technological system possesses a twofold 
nature; for it is both an organ of human 
participation in nature (a productive force) and a 
moment of capital (as fixed capital). Its structuret 
in the form of machinery or mechanized networks of 
various technologies, is designed in such a way that 
it functions simultaneously as a factor of production 
(a "capital asset") and as an essential force 
for the 
exploitation, discip=lne and management 
(control) of 
"free" wage-labour* 
For Marx, it was further suggestedg the recognition 
of a machine as an instrument of capitalist 
production is determined by its 
function within the 
technological system as fixed capital and as such 
by 
its social relational properties. 
And to ignore the 
industrial technological system's relational 
properties and its social 
form would be tantamount 
to disregarding its very historical specificity and 
thereby making it appear as something quite abstract 
and general, which, in that case, would 
not, in the 
words of Marx himself, 
'express the specific nature 
of capital'. 
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It was therefore suggested that, it is only on the basis of the notion of technology as capital that one can both understand Marx's conception of the role of the technological system as a powerful determining force under capitalism and, at the same time, show the error in the oft-repeated view that he was a technological determinist. For in the notion of technology as capital, it is capital as the dominant social form (relations of production) that determines the phy-sli-cal structure and functional principles of machine technology and the system of such technologiesq and hence as such (and only as such) conditions machinery's or the system's determining 
role "in itself" within the process of production; its mastery over labour. The spirit of capitalism" ' in other words, enters the very construction (from 
conception and execution to the end-product) of 
machine technological system; in it is, thus, 
projected not simply what "society" or "humanity" (in 
the abstract) requires, but, and because that "society" is capitalist society, what capital 
requires. Machinery, or the mechanized industrial 
system, is "deterministic", therefore, only as and because it is a functional moment, objective 
manifestation, of capital as a social power; only because it constitutes the power of capital in 
relation to labour. Its determinism is itself, 
therefore, conditioned (socially determined). 
4. In chapter four, we suggested, that, for Marx, the 
technological development and change that came to be 
instituted with the industrial revolution was based 
on technical features and principles that translated 
the desire for the quantitative maximization of 
output and hence of profits into a technologically 
induced reduction of socially necessary labour-time. 
And this was achieved by the development and 
introduction of machinery based on the principle of 
"self-acting mule" (as an example mentioned by Marx), 
The increase of the rate of surplus-value (or the 
degree of exploitation), in other words, was, with 
machinery and its further improvements9 translateq 
into the technical efficiency of production as such. 
Thus, the development of productive forces comes to 
be expressed by the scope of fixed capital 
(the 
development of the technological system) as such - 
i. e. by the quality and quantity of fixed capital in 
relation to the input of living labour. And since the 
technological system is, as fixed capital, a moment 
or aspect of capitalist relations of production it 
is, on the basis of that notion, axiomatic that 
production technology's development and change serves 
to enhance the power of capital in the process of 
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extraction of surplus labour. If the fundamental 
social purpose of production under capitalism is for Marx, as we have seen, the production of surplus value (hence growth, expansion and accumulation of surplus as capital), then the process of technological development and change cannot by (Marx's) definition be "independent" of the 
exigencies of surplus extraction and appropriation. 
Moreover, we argued that, Marx's conception of technology, and particularly his conception of the technological system as fixed capital, is directly 
relevant to the understanding of his views on the development of productive forces and technological 
change under capitalism. Thus, it was suggested that, it is, for Marx, precisely because production 
technology (the technolo ical system) is in itself an 
essential aspect (moment5 of the capitalist relations 
of production, and not merely a factor of production, 
that the process of technological development and 
change can then be seen to be a necessary function of 
those ver relatOns. If, however2 the technological yI 
system is looked at as merely a factor of production, 
then the change (development) of technology and 
productive forces cannot be necessarily attributed to 
the specificity of the relations of capitalist 
production as such (i. e. to the historically specific 
form of wage-labour/capital relations). The process 
of technological development and change then becomes 
either something which is natural to "human" 
rationality in some very abstract and general sense 
(which is essentially Cohen's position on this issue, 
as we have seen), or inherent in "technology" itself 
independently of anX form of society ("crude" 
technological determinist position). 
In both cases, technological change appears to be an 
extraneous fact, independent of capitalist social 
relations. In both cases what is, for Marx, according 
to my understanding, uniquely specific to capitalism 
- the very dynamics of technological change 
based as 
it is on the historically unprecedented systematic 
drive to accumulate - is either denied or obscured. 
And in both cases, therefore, what is overlooked, 
obscured or denied is the particular systemic 
contradiction of technological development and change 
based on the mastery of technology 
(as capital) - 
i. e. the contradiction involved in the 
drive to 
develop the material productive forces to devalue and 
alienate the capacity and status of 
labour relative 
to that of capital, as well as to technologically 
displace/replace living labour, and this on the basis 
and within the limits of a social 
form of capital 
(value) production and reproduction that 
is in fact, 
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according to Marx at leastq utterly dependent on the exploitation of living labour. 
Indeed, from my understanding of Marx, the very form of technology as capital itself involves a contradiction. For what we have coexisting in the same phenomenon is an antagonistic union of two distinct aspects: technology as a productive force, a means of labour (the fundamental objective being its use for the production of goods as use-values for the satisfaction of human needs and wants); and technology as a moment of capital (the aim being its specific function as a means of enhancing the 
efficiency of exploitation of labour for the 
expansion of value and the accumulation of capital). And this contradiction in the form of technology as capital manifests itself with the further development 
and advance of the system of machinery (with the 
advance of the process of mechanization). The more the technological system of machinery is developed, 
the less does it function, even nominally, as a "means of labour"; that is, the more it becomes independent of living labour. Yet it is only in 
relation to labour (i. e. precisely as a "means" that 
employs living labour) that technology or the 
technological system can, at least according to Marx, 
function as a moment of capital (capital's rule as a 
social system of production, for Marx, let us recall, 
is entirely dependent on the exploitation of living 
labour). 
In other words, with technological development and 
the advance of the system of machinery (the 
development of what Marx called the 'automatic system 
of machinery'), Marx envisages and proposes that the 
contradiction inherent in the form of technology as 
capital comes not only to plague capitalism (in the 
form of ever-deepening crises), but to actually work 
towards the 'dissolution' of capital itself as the 
social form dominating production* Thus we have 
Marx's 'so-called "fettering" principle, social 
instability and revolutionary transformation, linked 
to an inherent contradiction in the very dynamics of 
technological development and change based on the 
principle of the progressive enhancement of the 
mastery of technology as capital* 
This was, then, a summary statement of the principal 
findings and propositions of my interpretation of 
Marx's writings on technology in capitalism, which we 
believe (and. hope) shows and explicates his 
distinctive conception of technology as capital. 
However, as it was pointed out in the General 
Introduction, among a host of other interpretations 
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of Marx, two types of interpretation haveg in recent times, come to gain an influential standingg far 
above almost all others, and the works of two authors have come to exemplify the best of these - namely, the work of Braverman and that of Cohen. And though 
we have looked at and examined other writers in this 
study, here we shall give a brief assessment of the interpretations offered by these two writers only, 
and this specifically with respect to their claims 
concerning the role, form and character of technology 
under capitalism. 
Critical scrutiny of Braverman's claims has led us to 
view his interpretation of Marx as quite one-sided 
and deficient. With him machine technology appears, in Marx, as a 'neutral' productive force simply (mis)appropriated by capital. Certainly, elements for 
such an interpretation exist in Marx's works; 
elements which indeed seem to contradict the main 
thrust of Marx's theoretical discourse on technology 
and machinery. And precisely for that reason we 
suggested them to be "anomalies" - anomalies that 
cannot be simply dismissed, avoided, or uncritically 
justified, but which could perhaps be explained, even 
if only tentatively, if a balanced and rigorous 
examination of Marx s writings (early and "mature") 
is carried out. Braverman, however, in our opinion, 
has failed to do exactly that - at least insofar as 
Marx's thoughts on technology and machinery are 
concerned. His interpretation, we have suggested, is 
based on an understanding of technology which 
neglects the interdependence of the mode of use and 
employment of machinery and the machine's 'physical 
character' and its mode of functioning in itself - 
these, we have tried to show, are, for Marx, two 
sides of the same coin, and cannot be separated in 
the reality of 'working' technology. 
By separating the 'physical character' of the machine 
from its employment and use (thatq according to 
Braverman, one has 'nothing to do' with the other) a 
picture of technology emerges that only allows an 
understanding of its social role as something merely 
extraneously imposed, through its ownership, its 
appropriation, its control, by the capitalist. In 
this sense, the machine is in effect only considered 
as a "factor" of production. This interpretation 
cannot allow a conception of machine technology that 
grounds its function as a factor of production as 
being conditioned by its social form as capital. 
From 
such an interpretation, and paradoxically 
despite 
Braverman's own descriptions of the technical aspects 
of machinery and mechanizationg there 
is (nor can 
there be) a substantive social distinction 
between 
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the function of an industrial machine and that of a tool as such; the distinction tends to appear, in Braverman, as nothing more than technical in essence. 
Thus, Braverman's statements concerning the rejection 
of the mastery of machines over labour appear rather 
superficial. And this is, in our view, because of his failure to come to terms with the manner in which the 
machine "in itself" (in its technical features) has 
come, by design and development, to constitute the 
power of capital at the point of production. It is 
also a failure on the part of Braverman to understand 
the notion of the machine "in itself" which Marx, we 
believe, derived from the Hegelian notion of 'being- 
in-itself' (see Appendix 2). It is therefore for that 
reason (at least according to our interpretation of 
Marx) that its mastery is not a mere illusion but an 
actual objective inversion of technology's 
traditional role and function as a mediatory object, 
an artifact, a servant of labour. And it is on that 
basis that machine technology asserts the mastery of 
capital over labour (i. e. the latter's 'real 
subsumption') and not merely and simply, as Braverman 
seems to think, because of the manner of its 
employment and utilization by the capitalist. It can 
be suggested, therefore, that in his desire to avoid 
technological determinism and to reject a 
technological-determinist reading of Marx, Braverman 
has not only contradicted his own insights into the 
process of mechanization of the labour process, but 
that he has also failed to come to grips with Marx's 
notion of technology as capital. 
With Cohen, also, we have an understanding of Marx on 
technology that, in our view, ignores not only the 
notion of technology as capital, but also that of the 
social signification of the form and function of an 
instrument or technology as machine technology. 
Cohen's purpose is, of course, to establish the 
primacy and determinism of the material productive 
forces in Marx. His arguments are intended to commit 
Marx to a priority or primacy of "matter" 
(of the 
"content" as a material fact) and its 
"naturally" 
deterministic role insofar as any given socio- 
economic structure (the "social form") is concerned. 
Cohen therefore places technology within the domain 
of "matter", and it is as such, and not as a 
"social 
fact", that technology assumesq in his interpretation 
of Marx, its primacy and deterministic role@ 
But of course (as with Braverman and 
indeed most 
Marxists), Cohen wants to distance 
himself from 
criticisms of "crude materialism" and 
from those 
interpretations of Marx that some would regard as 
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"vulgar" technological-determinist. Soy what we have with Cohen is an acknowledgement of the importance of "the social" in Marx's ideas on productive forces and technology. Yet what is important and interesting is that in Cohen's interpretation "the social" appears as something which attaches itself to and envelops technology - it appears as if it were a packaging that can be discarded, and not as something which is an integral aspect of technology. 
Thus it is that Cohen maintains that Marx wants us to 
recognize the non-social character of a machine as an instrument, a productive force, even if one were to ignore its social relational properties and its 
social form as capital. With this, and other dubious 
claims, he, like Braverman, has failed to take 
account of Marx's concept of fixed capital, and its 
specific understanding as the socio-economic 
expression of the technological system. And, 
moreover, if Cohen, rightly, concentrates on 
ownership of "means of production" as a crucial 
determining factor of the exercise of control over 
technology and productiong he, nonethelessq seems to 
neglect the interdependence of the conception of 
property and technology in Marx. In factq he 
confuses, in our opinion, the concepts of "means of 
labour", "instruments" and "means of production" in 
his interpretation of Marx. This confusiong and his 
failure to examine the significance of the system of 
technology (as fixed capital) in Marxq results in 
vacuous claimsq grand generalizationsq and dubious 
arguments with respect to "history in general" based 
actually on examples of the implications of 
technology and the development of technology underg 
and specific only tog capitalism. 
Indeed, it is, we believe, not unreasonable to 
suggest, finally, that we are being seduced, by both 
Cohen and Braverman (though for different reasons) 
,,, 
a false dualism, between technology or into accepting 
the machine "in itself" (or the material) and its 
social role, employment and use (or the social). By 
contrast, we have suggested that, the thrust of 
Marx's arguments are! opposed to such a dualism, and 
this opposition is captured by the notion of 
technology as capital. 
Consideration must now be given to a final critical 
evaluation of Marx's conception of technology. 
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A major problem in Marx is that we find no clear-cut definitions of either technology (thoufý he does give, as we have seen, a definition of instruments of labour") or, even more surprisingly, productive forces. And over and above other features of Marx's methodý this is in itself one important source of interpretational difficulties one encounters in a survey of Marx's views. With respect to his concept of productive forces, this problem of the lack of a definition is compounded by the way Marx himself is 
often inconsistent in the way he uses and applies the 
concept; while he sometimes tends to use it in a broad, indeed very broad sense, on many other 
occasions, by contrast, he tends to use it in fact 
very narrowly, often qualifying it by the word "material". This has certainly been a major source of 
confusion as to his position with respect to the role 
and function of technology as a productive force. 
Even if we were to agree with Marx's method of 
analysis, which invariably means omitting definition 
of concepts, what we would suggest is less than 
satisfactory in Marx is his tendency to extend some of 
his basic propositions on the role and status of the 
productive forces (though not so much in the case of 
technology as such) well beyond the historical limits 
of capitalism without providing the detailed empirical 
support that such a generalization surely requires. 
Indeed, Marx often appears to use this particular 
concept as a kind of short-hand substitute for an 
explanation of historical change, and though this may 
be partly due to the unfinsihed nature of his works, 
it has lend itself to easy adoption by many of his 
followers (past and present) in whose hands the 
concept has become a disarmingly simple solvent, a 
panacea for any historical problematic that is 
difficult to deal with or, in fact, to reconcile with 
Marx's materialist conception. 
Thus, for example, although neither Marx nor indeed 
Cohen, for instance, provide any detailed historical 
analysis (beyond a few perhaps valuable, but certainly 
sketchy, insights on certain aspects of 
"feudalism", 
slavery, oriental despotism, and so on), we have a 
repeated assertions on the development of the 
productive forces as being something akin to a 
"law" 
of human social evolution and history as a whole. 
There are two problems involved here; one 
is 
theoretical, the other empirical and historical. 
We 
have suggested that on both counts 
Marx fails to give 
a substantiated argument and concrete evidence 
that 
such a development of productive 
forces is actually 
applicable to and is the basis of 
the whole of human 
historical development. He may well be justified, 
but 
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that needs to be shown by a case by case historical investigation of different societies and at different times. Yet the only case study provided by Marx, in which one could say he actually tested his proposition on the development of productive forces, is his analysis of capitalism (which was itself never completed and what exists is itself, according to some accounts, subject to many reservations). 
Moreover, it was also suggested that in much of Marx's writings the concept of productive forces is used often quite indiscriminately. In fact, if one were to be strict and rigorous in examining the internal 
coherence of his application of this concept, one would have to conclude that the so-called "determinations" suggested by Marx appear to 
constitute a circle. And, more than this, on many occasions, the conaept appears to be used in such a way that it gives one the impression of being teleological (though that 
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may not have been, according to some authorities, Marx s intention). 
Our final evaluation of Marx's concept of productive forces is that we cannot generalize his propositions 
and insights as if these are anything more than a set 
of hypotheses. In the case of capitalism, Marx, we 
suggest, is certaiply on much firmer grounds. We would 
suggest that there is a strong case for Marx's 
proposition on the relation between capitalism's 
dominant social purpose and its specific structure of 
production and the historically distinctive, in fact, 
unique, features and form of the productive forces. 
We, further, find Marx's ideas on the continuous drive 
to revolutionize the productive forces as not only far 
ahead of his time, but even by today's standards quite 
appealing and justified. We think, however, that it is 
specifically with respect to capitalism that Marx's 
theory explicitly singles out the dynamic impulse of 
productive forces as a primary mechanism of social 
change - though even here, we need to be wary of his 
particular method and of his abstraction of relations 
and aspects involved in the process of socio-economic 
change, that is, certain factors that he did not - 
whether intentionally or not - incorporate into his 
theoretical structure. 
With respect to the question of the connection between 
the alienation of labour and the characterization of 
production technology as an 'autonomous' and 'alien' 
power, we have pointed to at least one major problem 
in Marx's early views. In his writings on alienation, 
Marx gives two basic conditions for production 
technolo5y (the 'product' as means of labour's 
activity assuming 'alien' and 
'independent' power: 
475 
property/ownership and the influence or determining 
role of 'external needs'. But it seems to us, these 
conditions are not in themselves wholly convincing. For it can be argued that in all class societies labour has been 'a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself'(Marx) - this is certainly not something unique 
to capitalism. Nor is the ownership of the means of 
production (including technology) by someone other 
than the direct producer something exclusive to 
capitalism - which is the other condition given by Marx in his early writings. 
Thereforeý even if we take into account Marx's 
references to the important role of exchangel without 
further qualification and explanation one cannot 
simply accept that on the basis of these conditions 
alone and as they are iven in Marx's early writings, 
production technology 
eOIr 
even the 'product' as such) 
confronts the labourer as an independent, alien power 
only under capitalism. For this proposition to have 
any relevance at all, it must be shown that there is 
something specific to the needs of capital, and only 
peculiar to its mode of production, which brings about 
such a transformation of instruments of production. 
With respect to this latter point, we have already 
made some suggestions. Yet despite the suggestions 
made, there are still, it must be admitted, some 
nagging reservations on our part concerning Marx's 
early views on this question of the link between the 
legal, juridical aspect of ownership (property) and 
technology or the product as "alien" power. 
The verdict, then, on Marx's early writings on 
alienation of labour, etc. - specifically with respect 
to the issue of technology - is that they can only 
provide guide-line principles, as it were, which, 
although undoubtedly important for the understanding 
of his conception of technology, cannot as they stand 
be taken as unproblematic. There are clearly, in our 
opinion, very important insights and propositions; 
there are also clear indications of the 
direction of 
Marx's thoughts on the role and form of technology 
with respect to the ali. enation of 
labour under the 
rule of capital. In other words, 
in his early 
discussions of alienation (etc. 
) Marx, as it was 
mentioned, has seen - i. e. glimpsed 
but never analysed 
- the significance of the character 
and form of 
technology, specifically pointing to the 
technical 
function of instruments " in 
itself" within the 
capitalist process of production 
(to the 'work done 
by the material properties of the object'), 
as well as 
to its social function 
(this is something that most 
commentators fail to take 
into account)* Thus2 even in 
his early writings, there 
is ample evidence against 
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the idea that Marx regarded technolop as "neutral", or that he viewed it as a phenomenon 'governed" by its own "laws" - despite the vagueness of some of his statements, 
But this said, his conception of technology is merely embryonic at this stage; the ideas, insights and propositions on or related to technology often too philosophical and general; there is hardly any substantive and concrete socio-economic analysis of the relationship between technology, the alienation of labour, and capitalist processes of production. Yet, it would be a great mistake to dismiss Marx's early writings as unimportant to the understanding of his (later, developed) conception of technology. Nor is it, in our opinion, possible to come to grips with his later, developed conception, without an understanding 
of his views on alienation. For, as we have argued and tried to show, it is his ideas on alienation which hold the key to the understanding of the notion of technology as capital, 
In examining Marx's later works on or relevant to 
technology and technological development and change, 
we believe we have clearly demonstrated the two 
fundamental questions raised in our General Introduction: namely, we have shown that Marx's 
conception of technology under capitalism is without a doubt based on the notion of technology as capital; 
and that this conception (and notion) is directly and 
solely concerned with machinery, or, more specifically 
and strictly, with the system of machinery (the 
industrial mechanized system of technologies). Yet we 
found a number of difficulties which went beyond the 
mere problem of his language, his vocabulary, and his 
lack of communicative skills, referred to by many 
writers. The difficulties we encountered (some of 
which we attempted to provide tentative explanation 
for) ranged from ambiguities, inconsistencies, to at 
least one major contradiction specifically concerning 
his view on machinery "in itself" or "as such". These 
problems, however, need not be repeated here, for we 
have already aired them and here we are only concerned 
with a general assessment of Marx's conception. For 
this purpose we should mention three basic 
limitations: Firstly, that Marx's conception is almost 
exclusively concerned with production technology; 
secondly, insofar as capitalism is concerned, only 
with machinery; and thirdly, with value or capital 
production as such. 
The first limitation, therefore, effectively excludes 
an application of his conception to other than the 
investigation of production processes - unless it is 
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considerably modified. But even if it is so modified, its usefulness would still, we believe, be handicapped 
by its second and third limitations. Marx's conception 
of technology is severely constrained by his 
observations on machinery. True that at points he 
refers to, for example, chemical processes, and other 
aspects of the technological structure and system; 
true also that he talks about 'the automatic system' 
often wrongly taken to be an early insight to the 
technologies of automation. Yet these are all confined 
within the limits of early processes of mechanization. 
This limitation should not, of course, be surprising: 
for despite all the claims and counter-claims 
concerning his so-called "utopianism", his predictions 
and "prophecies", Marx's ideas, his philosophical and 
socio-economic views, were shaped by and a product of 
his contemporary world, in which the domain of 
technology itself was still extremely limited in 
scope. And precisely for this very reason one should 
be cautious in working from Marx's conception and 
applying it to the infinitely more complex world of 
technology today -a world that has moved on beyond 
Marx's fundamental domain, "production", into the home 
and all other aspects and fields of life. Thus also we 
would encounter problems with his notion of technology 
as capital, if we were to apply this, perhaps even 
with modifications and updating, to the role, 
character, and implications of technology in fields 
which are not directly concerned with the production 
and creation of value and surplus-value (this 
dependence of Marx's conception on his value theory 
would of course, be a particularly contentious 
issueý. 
On the subject of technological development and 
change under capitalism, though we think that Marx's 
observations and propositions are still not only quite 
valuable and interesting, but also extremely useful, 
and potentially fruitful, for research purposes 
particularly because of his emphasis on the 
intertwinement of the socio-economic and the strictly 
technical aspects of the process of development and 
change, - they are, nonetheless, not only 
incomplete, 
but also in some sense somewhat one-sided. 
Let me 
explain the nature of this one-sidedness. 
In a similar way to his conception of technology which 
stresses the inextricable relation 
between production 
technology and capitalg Marx's view of technological 
change tends to, on the one handq concentrate 
on the 
objective aspects of this process 
(almost 
exclusively), and, on the otherg stress 
what he 
regards as the essential productive 
relations (value 
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creation and expansion, and surplus-value extraction and production). In other wordsp and this is the fundamental feature of his theoretical analysis of capitalism, Marx's view of technological development 
and change is basically abstract, not so much, however, in the usual sense of it being a mere conceptual working hypothesis (though that too 
perhaps), but more in the literal sense, in that it is formed by abstracting away what are, at least 
according to Marx, the less essential and derivative 
surface appearances and phenomena of the market 
economy. The main weakness of this approach, in our 
opinion, is that it tends to disregard the many 
modified forms in which technology is developed and technological structure of production is changed in 
the actual market-oriented society. 
Besides, with this almost exclusive concentration on 
technological development and change specifically 
concerning the production process, Marx fails to 
consider certain factors which are also important to 
the process of technical change. In fact, as it was 
mentioned, the concept of "innovation" is not strictly 
speaking applicable to Marx's thoughts. For one thing, 
this concept, and particularly in its Schumpeterian 
definition, places a far greater stress on the 
subjective aspects of the process of technical change 
than Marx's ideas allow. For another2 the so-called 
marketing aspects of innovation2 among other things2 
for example, are far from adequately covered by Marx. 
In specific terms2 we have suggested thatý Marx's 
"technological change" is concerned with what is often 
called "invention" as distinct from "innovation". Even 
in this case, it was noted2 this is not strictly 
correct, since for Marx technological change is 
decidedly concerned with the lication and diffusion 
of "inventions" of production technologies. o 
Marx's observations and propositions are, therefore, 
very weak on what he calls the phenomenal aspects of 
capitalism; market and price competition, new 
to production function"q the behaviour of firms and 
above all of entrepreneurs (individually). Similarly, 
we also found that, Marx is less 
Ehan concerned with 
the erosion of the role of entrepreneurship in the 
(presumed) demise of capitalism; it was for him, as we 
have seen, the advance of technology and its objective 
implications for the relations of production that are 
of fundamental significance in this case. 
This, in our 
view, is also an important weakness which needs 
to be 
remedied. For even if one were to accept 
Marx's ideas, 
and his emphasis on "essential relations", 
it would be 
quite wrong to disregard the possible or 
likely 
impact of greater mechanization and the 
increase of 
47q 
rationalization and specialization accompanying it (or 
as Marx would put it, the progress of accumulation and hence of technological development and change) on the behaviour of firms and on, what Schumpeter called, the 
entrepreneurial personality and vision. Thus, even if 
one does not consider, for instance, the decreasing 
role of entrepreneurship as a "fundamental" causal factor of what Marx calls the "fettering" principle 
and hence of the demise of capitalism, it would be 
extremely hardq in our view, to go along with Marx and disregard it altogether. It should certainly be 
considered as7 at the very least, a contributing factor of some importance to the withering of 
capitalism's vitality and vigour, and this even if one disagrees with or rejects both Schumpeter's and Marx's 
reasoning on the eventual breakdown of capitalism. 
We also found that "product" innovation is yet another 
important issue which Marx fails to take account of in 
his treatment of technical change. But here, as it was 
suggested, we need to be cautious, for this would be 
only justified if one were to look at product 
innovation in the very narrow sense of innovations in 
marketable end-products (consumer goods as such). 
Since, while Marx clearly fails to examine the 
question of end-product, or consumer-goods, 
innovations, one could not say that he ignores 
technological-product development. And the crucial 
question, at least in terms of Marx's view, is which 
kind of innovation is regarded and singled out as 
having a more central role for the dynamics of 
capitalist economic development and change? We noted 
that in this case Marx stresses, with some 
justification, technological or "process" innovations. 
But we went on to suggest that, though he my be, 
arguably, justified from a socio-historical I ong- 
term) standpoint, in our opinion, in practice and in 
economic terms, it would be difficult to dismiss the 
significance of end-product innovation for economic 
development and capital expansion. Indeed, although 
Marx's identification of the character and nature of 
it products" according to their particular function in 
the production process (as, for example, technologiesq 
raw materials, etc-9 which we have already referred to 
in chapter three)9 could perhaps be of use in clearing 
up certain ambiguities involved in the complex reality 
of the process of innovation, we believe, nonetheless, 
that what he in fact ignores is that the two types of 
innovations are actually quite closely interrelated. 
However, in our examination of his writings on 
technological change, we found that Marx 
does not in 
fact ignore what are called 
It capital-saving" 
innovations and inventions. We thus countered 
the 
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claim made by some commentators (notablyq Elster) that Marx has a "narrow" vision of technological change, demonstrating the fallacy of such a claimq and suggested that it would be wrong to transport the assumption of " labour-saving"/"capital-saving" 
technical change from the neo-classical theoretical model to Marx's where they do not, strictly speaking, apply. Althoughq we also pointed out that Marx does 9 indeed, tend towards a uni-directional vision of the development and change in technological systems under capitalism. This vision, we submit, is certainly justified in terms of Marx's own frame of reference. But whether or not it is valid insofar as the reality of the process of technological development and change is concerned can only be ascertained on the basis of concrete historical and empirical investigation of the 
actuality of that process. In this connection we would 
venture to su C, "' est that, the historical process of 
mechanization from the self-acting machines, intensive mechanization/Fordism, and now to 
microelectronic automation), appears to perhaps 
vindicate Marx's vision. 
Finally, then, we can conclude our evaluation of 
Marx's view of technological development and change as 
follows: Its strength is in emphasising the structural (objective) relations involved in the process of 
development and change of technological systems. But 
its strength is also, it can be said, a main source of 
its weakness, for it fails to take an adequate account 
of the particularities of competition and market 
conditions, ýhe practice and conduct of individual 
capitals (firms), the diversity of forces and 
pressures and the subjective aspects involved in this 
process - all of which tend to modify the determining 
force of those structural relations Marx emphasises. 
If, in Marx, actions and behaviours involved in the 
process of technological development and change are 
compulsively systemic; if Marx attempts to point to 
the relation between the behaviour of capitalists 
(entrepreneurs, management, etc. ) and the social 
mechanism which ensures and underpins that behaviour; 
if, in other words, he stresses (or perhaps over- 
emphasises), as it were, the game and its rules, what 
he tends to grossly underestimate, however, is the 
players themselves. 
Nevertheless, with Marxq we suggestq we have, at the 
very least, a basic framework for the understanding of 
the essentials of the structural features of the 
process of technological development and change under 
capitalism, and of particular significance, an 
understanding of change and development 
in terms of 
networks and systems of technologies 
(as fixed 
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capital). We have an understanding of how the process is structured according to a socio-economically as well as a technologically conditioned set of relations (anJ-'i-t is in this respect that, we suggest, Marx's 
conception of technology is highly relevant - i. e. the connection between capital and technology, or technology as capital, as with that between the development of capitalism and that of the material 
productive forces). What is needed, however, is to 
enhance that understanding by taking account of 
particular elements9 forces and relations involved in 
such a process. I. e. Marx's ideas, his conception of technology and technological changeg need to be 
underpinned as well as improved by much more detailed 
empirical studies of how technology is used and functions in particular processesq in what concrete 
ways and to what extent in the real world of R&D its 
technical and qualitative characteristics9 its designq 
development and constructiong are socio-economically 
influenced and shapedg and the way technoloýical 
systems are changed in the actual world of many 
capitals'. 
Though limited in its scope, and despite its problems, 
we would suggest, however, that Marx's conception of 
technology as ca2ital offers a positive, but perhaps 
no more than a basic theoretical, starting-point for 
social research. It can in fact be a particularly 
useful aid for a sociological study of those issues 
mentioned above. For it provides, in our view, a 
necessary corrective to the purely economic and the 
purely engineering perspectives, as it actually goes 
beyond these and combines them with a specifically 
social and historical understanding of the problematic 
of the role and function of industrial technological 
networks and systems in the process of production 
structured on the basis of "free" wage-labour. 
What therefore this study of Marx on technology, with 
its emphasis on a conception of machine technology as 
capital, has to offer is an alternative way of looking 
at and understanding of the technological phenomenon 
in twentieth century industrial society. According to 
this alternative perspective, technology takes on 
its 
own specific social role in the mode of production. 
We 
cannot, we have suggested following Marx, view 
industrial machine technology as a mere 
"tool" or a 
"neutral" object. That is, Marx's insights help us to 
see machine or mechanized technology not as a 
monstrous creation, a Frankenstein's monster, out 
of 
control, grotesquely animated by 
its own "inner laws" 
and as such determining social relations and 
society, 
nor indeed as simply a 
"neutral" instrument used (or 
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"misused") as a means of domination and control by the economically dominant class. 
With the development of machinery, with industrial 
mechanized system of technologyq technology becomes 
transformed as a "servant" into a", master" of labour, but this because it becomes itself, and in itself, an essential functional moment, and objective 
manifestation, of the social power of capital to 
command labour. It is with this perspective in mind that we can then begin to examine the complex world of technology both in itself and in relation to socio- 
economic processes from a sociological standpoint 
which does not exclude the designed functional and 
operational characteristics and principles of 
technologies and which therefore does not treat 
technological development and change as some "extraneous fact", independent of social relations. 
This, we would suggest, is clearly a valuable and 
lasting contribution that Marx s insights on 
technology has to offer any student of technology 
today - and this in spite of certain problems and 
inadequacies that exist in Marx's social theory, and, 
indeed, even despite the scale of crisis now clearly 
apparent within Marxism as both an intellectual and 
political/ideological tradition. For whatever the 
scale and depth of the "crisis of Marxism", 
particularly in the wake of the collapse of 
totalitarian states in Russia and Eastern Europe, 
there is still much in Marx's own works which, in our 
opinion, is not only of great interest, but, more than 
this, has lasting significance in terms of its 
contribution to our understanding of modern industrial 
society. 
At any event, what our study of Marx on technology, we 
hope, has shown is that Marx's conception of 
technology as capital - though for the most part 
completely neglected by Marxists of different shades 
and colours - deserves to be taken seriously as a 
challenging way of looking at the role of technology 
in the socio-economic organization of the modern 
industrial form of production rocesses. And that his 
contributions on this issue 
Fand 
in fact on other 
issues) needs to be treated, as we hope we have, with 
the same seriousness and critical attention as those 
of any other great social theorist . 
This completes our evaluation of Marx 
Is conception of 
technology and technological change under capitalism. 
But we would like to end with a 
final word of caution, 
that the interpretation and critical reconstruction of 
this conception is not by any means a 
definitive and 
exhaustive account of Marx's writings on the subject, 
And therefore although we think (and hope) that it is, 
at least, a responsible and reasonably accurate 
reflection of his views and thoughts, further research 
and studies on Marx and on technology may show up 
certain deficiencies and shortcomings in our 
interpretationg findings and evaluation. 
Appendix 1 
Aristotle and Techne 
In this appendix I shall attempt to give an outline 
of some of the main observations of Aristotle which 
are relevant to the subject matter of this study. 
Aristotle is one of the two most important 
philosophical sources (the other being Hegelq which I 
shall look at in Appendix 2), which, in my view, has 
had a great influence on the formation of Marx's 
conception of technology. Beside this, he is, of 
course, an important source influencing the general 
notion of technology, also. 
However, it should be noted here that it is beyond 
both the scope of this very brief outline and of my 
competence to ponder upon the philosophical and 
metaphysical complexities involved in the works of 
Aristotle. I shall try and concentrate on only those 
aspects of the Aristotelian corpus which have a 
bearing on the concept of technology. This is, also, 
not meant to be a discussion on the "philosophy", or 
the historico-philosophical problems, of 
technology. (l) 
And what is also important to mention is that, in 
singling out the views of Aristotle (and Hegel - see 
Appendix 2), 1 am not in any way implicitly (by the 
fact of omission) denying the relevance, 
significance, or influence, of other philosophical 
traditions upon the issue of technology. Perhaps the 
main justification I can provide for selecting this 
great philosopher can be stated as follows: 
Firstly, 
that almost all modern conceptions of 
"technology", 
despite all the variations of 
"definition" that we 
have already seen in the Review section of 
this 
Vý 
study, have a linkage (extremely close in some cases, 
less so in others) to the Aristotelian notion of the 
"arts" or "knowledge of the arts". Secondly, that the 
works of Aristotle (and, even more so, of Hegel) have 
had a great measure of influence upon Marx's 
conception of technology certainly, I maintain, far 
more than any other philosophical views. 
Aristotle's observations are therefore important for 
the general understanding of the term "technology", 
as they are also for the illumination of both Hegel's 
and Marx's observations on issues related to 
technology. Although we cannot go into the 
comple xities of Aristotelian development of 
Platonism, it is worth mentioning, by way of an 
introduction, the distinction Plato makes between two 
forms of "knowledge" which is clearly crucial also 
for Aristotle. For Plato the highest form of 
knowledge is episteme, which he distinguishes from 
techne; the latter is considered by him as the more, 
as it were, down to earth form of knowledge. As Alvin 
Gouldner explains: "rhe dualism expressed in 
counterposing episteme and techne reflects an 
interest i ri two forms of knowing with two 
corresponding, larger styles of existence'. (2) 
And Gouldner explains Plato's distinction as 
follows: episteme is the form of 
'Knowing' in the 
sense of 'being aware, having understanding, 
insight'; it is the form of knowing 'not acquirable 
from but manifested by: "theorists", philosophers, 
wise men'; it is, in shortg 
'introspective'. Techne, 
by contrast, is the form of 
knowing 'as being 
informed, having facts and skills'; that is, the form 
of knowing 'acquirable from and 
held by: experts and 
technicians'; it is, therefore, 
'extrospective'. (3) 
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In this Platonic distinctiong what is clearly evident is the emphasis upon a particular aspect of the 
social division of labour at its relative infancy 
that between the "men" of of science" 
phi losophy/knowledge) and those of "technology" 
arts/crafts). Broadly, this distinction is also 
important in Aristotle. (4) But I believe Aristotle's 
observations, especially on the knowledge of the 
"arts", are far more profound than those of Plato's. 
What we have in Aristotle is a further classification 
of "sciences", of "knowledge": (a) theoria for him is 
the form of science dealing with the process of 
to understanding" in its deepest sense; i. e. based on 
philosophy, mathematics, and physics. (b) Praxis is 
the form of science or knowledge which enables the 
translation of behaviour into conduct; i. e. based on 
ethics and politics. And, finally, (c) poiesis is the 
science of the activity of production; the knowledge 
which enables the making process. It is this last 
category within the Aristotelian classification of 
to sciences" which is relevant to our subject. 
In Aristotle, of course, poiesis includes the 
knowledge of productive activity as (how to 
make arguments), as Rhetorics (how to make speeches), 
and as Poetics (how to make poems). Poetics, however, 
seems sometimes to be regarded as more especial than 
the aforementioned forms; thus, Aristotle often 
refers to Nature as the supreme "poet". 
Here it is crucial not to confuse poiesis with the 
act of making; it is rather specifically a reference 
to the knowledge of the activity of making, or the 
"science" as "knowing" how to make something. If 9 
however, Aristotle makes a reasonably clear-cut 
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identification of poiesis as the knowledge of the how 
of the making process, the same cannot be said, at least in any categorical sense, about his notion of 
techne. There seems to be a certain "ambiguity" 
involved in this notion, which like poiesis, and 
decidedly linked to that notion, is one of the most 
crucially fundamental concepts in Aristotle's 
philosophy, particularly as regards his observations 
on Nature* 
Techne, from my reading of Aristotle, is a notion 
involving the combination of a specific form of 
knowledge and a particular activity as a single unity 
direct ed towards the transformation of matter, the 
making of something out of matter. Techne is, thus, 
not "knowledge" in the abstract, but particular 
knowledge of the kind often referred to as "skill". 
Yet it is not "skill" as technique in its modern 
sense of "know-how", but skill as "habit"q as that 
form of knowledge which is inseparable from activity. 
For while in the modern sense of "technique" (or as 
with some scholars even "technology" as "knowledge")2 
it is implicitg if not explicitý that this "know-how" 
can be (and is) separable from activity; in 
Aristotle, however, skill and activity are fused. 
Thus , 
"habi t" means, according to Aristotle's 
conception: 'a kind of activity of the haver and the 
thing had, something like an operation or movement. 
When one thing does and another is done, the act of 
doing is a link between the two. '(5) For Aristotle, 
therefore, techne refers to the dynamis, the power or 
cap , in human 
beings for transforming matter. It 
is this "meaning" of techne which, I would suggest, 
is in fact extremely close to "early" Marx's notion 
of life activityq or productive 
life. (6) And although 
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this meaning of techne also bears a close resemblance 
to Marx's notion of "Iabour_pawer", its more precise 
equivalent within Marx's conceptual framework is in 
fact the concept of produktivekraf_t or "productive 
power/force". 
Techne is the human capacity for the realization of 
some particular "form" in the mind through and out of 
matter existing outside and external to "man"; it is 
the power of making the objective world. As Aristotle 
says, 'it is by art [techne] that those products 
[artifacts] come whose form dwells in the mind'. And 
by "form" he means 'what it is to be that product, 
its first or primary being. '(7) Once again we can 
trace Marx's conceptualization of the principal 
distinguishing feature of human labour (in general) 
to this observation of Aristotle. In Marx this 
appears as follows: 'At the end of every labour- 
process, we get a result that already existed in the 
imagination of the labourer at its comencement. '(8) 
But techne is not the ability to grasp or understand 
the form of the idea, eidos, in the mind. It is the 
capacity which enables the objectification of the 
formed idea. In Aristotle, as Charlton rightly 
comments: 'We speak of art [techne], not when 
something could be made into a bed or the like, 
but 
when it actually is a bed, has the form of a 
bed. '(9) 
And techne as the capacity to make artifacts 
(products) is only that when it is being actualized. 
In other words, techne is not a reference to a 
"potentiality" I or rather, 
the possibility of 
something to be made, i. e. the mere 
knowledge of (or 
idea of) the form in the mind. 
As Aristotle himself 
puts it: 'We would not say... that a 
thing is at all in 
accordance with techne7 or that 
it is techne, if it 
i 
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is a bed only in possibility, and has not yet the 
form of a bed.. . 
'(10) 
And, although there is some ambiguity involved here, 
it seems to me that, it would be wrong to interpret 
this passage as if it is only a reference to techne 
as the formation of the idea, the 'coming-to-bel of 
the form in the mind, or the mere grasping and 
knowledge, or knowing, of the form not yet realized - 
i. e. "pure" knowledge of 'what is to be' , or even 
the mere know-how of 'that which is to be'. For only 
when the form is realized in a concrete 'thing-' can 
one speak of 
-techne 
according to my interpretation of 
the Aristotelian notion. Since only then does 
Aristotle, as he puts it, calls 'a thing something' so 
that is, only 'when it is that thing in actuality2 
rather than just in possibility. '(11) 
The actualization of techne involves, according to 
Aristotle, four 'causes' - each and all as necessary 
to that notion as the making of a 'thing'. (12) The 
two obvious ones are: the "idea", or, in modern 
terms, the conceptiong which is the 'form' causation, 
or the 'formal cause'; and, external matter which 
is 
'that out of which' the form is to be made, and hence 
is the material causation. But Aristotle gives two 
further (and necessary) causes: effectual causation, 
or 'what makes of what is made' and 
'what causes 
change of what is changed', that 
is, not merely the 
idea as realized form ("conception") and the external 
material, but also the activity and 
the instrument 
(organon) necessary for that activity - and, 
for 
Aristotle, this includes above all other 
instruments, 
the hand as 'the instrument of 
instruments'. 
Translated into modern terms - that 
is if I am right 
in my interpretation - effectual 
causation is the 
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unity of all operational activities/motion and 
instrumental aspects involved in the actualization of 
techne, or the making of 'things'. 
And, finally, we have the purposive causation, or the 
telos, which is 'that for the sake of which' the 
realization of the form in the mind is taking place; 
that is, not only the purpose realized in the form of 
an object produced (the "want" of a bed, or the 
purpose of making the bed for lying on, etc. ), but 
also the purpose which governs the modus operandi of 
what is being made, i. e. particular 'things' made for 
use. This is for Aristotle techne's "causa finalis", 
which is, as he mentions in the case of the 
- 
techne of 
house building, 'the use to which the house is 
put'. (13) 
In the Aristotelian notion of techne, therefore, 
though there is an analytical distinction, there is, 
however, no constitutional separation, between the 
four causations mentioned. Thus, when we talk about 
techne as the "capacity" to make artifacts 
('things'), this capacity already includes, as a 
presupposition, matter and form, as well as purpose 
and motion. And even as regards the 
'processes by 
techne', or kineseis apo techne, there is no 
constitutional separation (e. g. separation of 
conception from execution), but there is, for 
Aristotle, a procedural distinction: 'One phase of the 
productive process ... is called 
"thinking", and 
another, "making": that which proceeds 
from the 
starting-point and from the form is 
"thinking"; that 
which proceeds from the end-point of the thinking 
is 
11making". '(14) 
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But in this process, if form is the 'first or primary 
being' of the product(15) - that is, it As the 
primary aspect of techne., and in fact Aristotle 
sometimes says that, 'the techne is the form'(16) - 
it is not the 'starting-point' of the processq which 
is "matter". Matter, for Aristotle, 'is the starting- 
point of the process of the production and coming 
into existence of the artificial beings, and in which 
some part of the final product is already existent 
can initiate its own motion. '(17) Or as Aristotle 
says in his example of the techne of building a 
house, 'its material is earth and stone', while the 
form, again in the case of building a house, is 'its 
plan or definition'. (18) But although the 'plan' may 
be present, 'it would be impossible for anything to 
come to be if nothing were [materially] present 
previously. ' According to Aristotle, then, 'It is 
evident ... that some part of the production 
necessarily be present: thus, the material part is 
essential, since it is in processt and it is this 
material that comes to be somthing. '(19) 
Matter, as is well known, occupies a fundamental 
place in Aristotle. By matter, Aristotle writes, 'I 
mean that primary underlying thing in each case, out 
of which as a constituent and not by virtue of 
concurrence something comes to be. (20) And the 
making of something is the form given to matter; it 
is techne. 'Whatever is produced, ' Aristotle writes, 
'is produced not only by some agency 
(I mean, that by 
which the production is begun) but also out of 
something (not out of its privation, but out of a 
material.. ).. '(21) Now, we have also seen that 
Aristotle says that techne is the form, but what is 
important to stress is that this is not conceived by 
him in the sense that techne is the form in 
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abstraction. For as Aristotle says, 'if one were to 
make a form, one would make it out of something other 
than itself; for this is what "making" means. '(22) 
Moreover, what is also important to Aristotle's 
notion of techne is that it is concerned with the 
"making" of something particular. As Charlton 
comments, I art [techne] ... is always the art of 
something definite, the art of making a table... '(23) 
And as Aristotle himself says: 'For to make an 
individual thing is to make a "this -something" out of 
an indefinite substance or subject. ' rhat is, 'it 
is.. a product, something brought into being (a 
sphere, a ring,... ). '(24) Techne for Aristotle is, 
therefore, not concerned with "abstract" production 
of 'things'; it is concerned with the production of 
artifacts which are particular, and have specific 
flutility". As Mitcham points out: 'Techne in the 
classical understanding ... is thus fundamentally 
oriented toward particulars instead of toward the 
efficient production of many things of the same kind 
in order to make money. '(25) 
Andq therefore, I would suggest, that it is the 
particular 'thing', a specific artifact, which is as 
"fo rm" a necessary aspect of techne. For the 
particular object to be produced concretely is the 
form, by which, as we have seen, Aristotle means 
I what it is to be that product'(26); it is the 
objectification of techne as the capacity, the 
'habit' realized, but not abstracted* 
There is also perhaps a hint of this in Aristotle's 
distinction between the techne of making an artifact 
and that of using the latter. Whatever the case, 
it 
is interesting that in his Oeconomica, as mentioned 
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in Oresme's commented translation, Aristotle 
illustrates the distinction just mentioned with 
reference to music and the use of musical 
instruments: 'Now, among the arts [technes] a 
distinction must be made between the fashioning of an 
object and the employment or use of it, as for 
instance a harp or a flute. For it requires one kind 
of skill [technel to construct the harp and a very 
different skill [techne] to use it and make music on 
it. '(27) 
In his fhysics also the same distinction is explained 
as follows: 'There are two technes which control the 
matter and involve knowledge, the techne of using, 
and the techne which directs the making. Hence the 
techne of using too is directive in a way, but is 
different in that it involves knowledge of the form, 
whilst the techne which is directive in that it is 
the techne of making involves knowledge of the 
matter. The steersman knows and prescribes what the 
form for a rudder is, and the carpenter knows out of 
what sort of wood and by what changes it will be 
made. '(28) 
However, although he makes such a distinction between 
the 'two technes', Aristotle says that ltechne 
imitates nature ( )'. (29) If this 'imitation' is 
applied to both the 'use' and the 'making', it is 
perhaps meant as the capacity to overcome the 
difficulties involved in dealing with 'matter'. 
Since, according to Aristotle, 'matter is something 
relative to something, for the matter varies with the 
form. '(30) In any case, it seems certain that for 
Aristotle, techne is a mimesis: 'In general, techne 
either imitates the work of nature or completes that 
which nature is unable to bring to complition. 
'(31) 
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This way of thinking about techne reflects the still 
extremely close tie between 'nature' and crafts in 
ancient Greece. But what is, however, important to 
point out, as Randall has argued, is that by 
'imitation' of nature, 'Aristotle does not mean that 
art "mimics" nature' . In other words, techne, as 
Randall explains, 'does not imitate nature's 
products'; it does, however, 'imitate nature's 
productive ac *'(32) For, again as Randall has 
shown, for Aristotle nature is a process, 'is a way 
of acting'(33), and techne is the imitation of 'that 
way'. (34) 
But for Aristotle 
_techne 
imitates nature's 'way of 
acting' not as an instinctive mimesis, not because 
instinct is the prior cause, but, on the contrary, 
consciously with knowledge and deliberation. Thusý 
Aristotle distinguishes between, for example, the 
techne of house building, and the instinctive 
movements of swallows and spiders in making their 
nests and webs, which he regards as acts that do not 
begin from knowledge or deliberation. (35) By 
contrast, he says: 'a man builds because he is a 
builder, and a builder builds in accordance with the 
techne of building; the techne of building, then, is 
the prior cause, and similarly in all cases. '(36) 
Techne is therefore the human power, capacity, of 
"intelligent creativity"; and it is in this sense 
that Aristotle calls music the most "imitative" of 
the technes. 
To sum up: The Aristotelian notion of techne, I 
submit, reflects the social conditions of production 
of its time. To equate this notion with modern 
Iltechnology" is quite erroneous. There is also no 
justification for the definition of the concept of 
/I 
"technology" as "knowledge" (or as knowledge of of techniques", of processes of productiony of systems 
and/or equipments, etc), even if on etymological 
grounds the two terms are connected. For it is not 
the terminological connection in itself which is 
important but the Sýoncept, which as such needs to 
reflect the prevalent historically specific socio- 
technical conditions of production. In other words, 
whatever its roots and origins etymologically, if the 
"terminology" appears not to have changed, the 
concept has changed with the changing socio-economic 
reality of the times. 
The concept of techne, for Aristotle, did not mean, 
as I have attempted to show, merely "knowledge", nor 
did it simply mean knowledge which informs and guides 
human action. Techne for Aristotle was the power of 
initiating,, as well as the capacity of knowing the 
how and the why of, the transformation of matter, of 
natural materials. As he says, fall the technes, or 
capacities of knowing how to make things, are powers, 
since they are capacities of initiating change in 
something else or in another aspect of the agent 
himself. '(37) Techne as dynamis, or the power in 
human beings to make 'things', is distinguished from 
episteme precisely because while the latter is 
knowledge ("introspective", 11 theoretical", 
it systematic", or of whatever description), it is not 
like techne a power and capacity to initiate actual 
change of matter concretely - i. e. realize the form 
in matter, or the "natural" human power of 
objectification. 
Therefore, from my interpretation of the Aristotelian 
notion of techne - although I do not in any way claim 
it to be infallible - it seems to me that there is a 
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reasonably good ground for explaining this concept in 
the following manner: Techne is the power which of 
necessity (e. g. because of the four causations 
mentioned above) involves a fusion of knowledge as 
"skill" 
, motion as purposive activity, and the 
instrumental-material conditions, which only as such 
can facilitate the actualization of the form, its 
realization as a product. It is, in other words, a 
conception which is identical to Marx's concept of 
"productive forces" ("productive power"), or 
produktivkraf te . 
(38) For the concepts of "productive 
forces" in Marx, as we have seen in chapter one, like 
Aristotle's techne, signifies this type of fusion 
mentioned above. 
By contrast, the concept of "technology", at least 
since the industrial revolution, does not in any way 
signify such a fusion. Why such a change had taken 
place, what are its significant features and its 
implications for society and social development, are 
extremely complex issues; issues which are still the 
subject of much debate. One of the earliest 
systematic analysis of these issues is found in Marx. 
Marx's discussions of the labour-process, machinery, 
and his conception of technology under capitalism, 
are an attempt to come to terms with the significance 
of the transformation of the "productive 
forces"q and 
explain this change in the technological phenomenon. 
And I believe that Aristotle's observations on techne 
helps us to better understand Marx on the 
issue of 
technology. 
/q 
Appendix 2 
Hegel's Observations and Techn 
The influence of classical German philosophy, and 
more specifically of Hegel's philosophy, on the 
formation of Marx's thoughts was certainly as 
important, if not perhaps more so, as was that of 
classical Greek philosophy and classical political 
economy. It was through Marx's criticism of these 
classical traditions (particularly that of the 
"idealist" philosophy of Hegel and the theories of 
Smith and Ricardo) that he forged and developed his 
distinctive views on the nature, form and processes 
of the capitalist system of production. 
Insofar as the influence of Hegel is concerned, what 
has been repeatedly stressed by most commentators is 
the dialectical method, which Marx "inherited" from 
Hegel, and which became the most important basis of 
Marx's system - although 'only after its mystical 
form [had] been cast off. '(1) What is, however, also 
of great interest, both in general and insofar as 
Marx is concerned, are Hegel's reflections on 
economic issues and "labour". But in addition, and of 
particular interest to us here, is that there are 
propositions and reflections in Hegel concerning 
the 
conceptualization of " obj ec ts" and the objective 
world, and the relationship between that world and 
the process of labour which can provide us with a 
certain understanding of Hegel's view 
on 
"technology it , as well as 
throw some light on the 
genesis of Marx's view on this subject. 
What I shall, therefore, attempt to 
do in this 
appendix is to look into some of 
these ideas with 
the aim of trying to unravelq at 
least in outline, an 
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understanding of them. It is, however, important to 
state here that the discussion to be presented in no 
way attempts to deal with the many complex 
(philosophical, epistemological, etc. ) questions 
involved in Hegel. And because of this, my 
interpretation of Hegel's ideas should be regarded as 
merely tentative. (2) 
There is no doubt, as Lukacs has showng that Hegel 
was well acquainted with the works of Adam Smith, and 
was greatly influenced in terms of economic issues by 
the latter's ideas. (3) However, what concerns Hegel 
is not Smith-'s formulation of concrete economic 
"laws" of capitalist society as such, but rather a 
philosophical exploration of the motive forces of 
"economics"; a grand project that links economic 
issues and categories with those of philosophy and 
dialectics. What Hegel provides us is an abstract 
reflection of the general principles of economics 
within a broad philosophical system which attempts 
'to elaborate the notion of reason'(4) and the 
dialectical movement of its realization in "Freedomil. 
It is therefore pointless to look for strictly 
"scientific" analyses and "definitions" of technology 
and technical change in Hegel's works. But what he 
does produce are some exceptionally important 
insights on the cognition of the objective world, of 
"things", and hence also of technologyg its character 
and form, and its relation to labour. 
In his Lectures of 1805-6, Hegel attempts to explain 
the distinction between the "tool" as means of 
labour, and what he calls the #self-activatingi tool, 
the "machine"; and he does this by relating 
technology to human activity. Technology is regarded 
as an lobjecti, which as means of 
labour it is 
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something general: 'In toolsy' Hegel writesq 'or in 
the cultivated, fertilized field I possess a 
possibility, content, as something general. For this 
reason tools, the means, are to be preferred to the 
end or purpose of desire, which is more individual; 
tools comprehend all the individualities. '(5) 
In the above passage, Hegel brings out the 
significance of technology as something "universal". 
The tool as instrument of production, as technology 
as such,, is something which in its content includes 
the possibility of the satisfaction of all individual 
desires. Technology (the tool) is a force of 
production, and as such a force, and because it is 
such a force, it should be 'preferred to the end or 
purpose of desire'; that is, 'preferred' in the sense 
of being chosen to be promoted. The significance of 
this passage lies in this that Hegel appears to 
elevate technology as a force of production as 
against individual desires or wants: 'the end or 
purpose of desire', in other wordsq cannot be 
achieved without 'the means', without ob ectiv 
mpr1i qt--i on. 
However, as a tool, or a mediatory objectp technology 
is passive or "dead'Y But a tool' , writes 
Hegel, 
'does not yet have activity in itself. It 
is inert 
matter, it does not turn back in itself. 
I must still 
work with it. ' What it requires to 
become "active" is 
therefore human activity and skill, In this sense, 
the use of a tool needs a further 
"mediation", namely 
that of skill. Thus in working with a 
tool, writes 
Hegel: 'I have interposed cunning between myself and 
external objects, so as to spare myself 
and to shield 
my determinacy and let 
it wear itself out. 
'(6) 
Iq 
Here the use of the concept of "cunning" (which has 
complicated philosophical connotations in Hegel that 
does not concern us) is, I would suggest, a reference 
both to the artfulness, or the skil 
, 
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a tool, and to the tool itself as a craft instrument 
designed in order to be a mediating force between the 
subjective and the objective world. The important 
point here is that there is a necessary unity between 
craft technology and skill -a unity that Hegel 
captures by the reference to the interposition of 
'cunning'. 
The character of technology as a tool is here, 
therefore, defined by Hegel in terms of the subject- 
object relationship. A craft tool, as against a 
machine for example, is a mediatory object both 
because 'it does not turn back in itself' (i. e. this 
is its given objective quality, its objectivity)9 and 
also because 'I must still work with it' (i. e. it 
must be subjectively qualified). Thus, as Hegel 
remarks in this connection: 'The Ego remains the soul 
of this syllogising in reference to it9 to 
activity ... tlip activity of the 
impulse is not yet in 
the thing. '(7) 
Now, from this characterization of craft tools as 
passive objects, Hegel moves on to describe his 
conception of "machines": 'It is important also' , 
he 
writes, 'to make the tool generate its own activity, 
to make it self-activating. 
'(8) This is achieved, 
according to Hegel, in a twofold way: 
'(a) by 
contriving it so that its line, 
its thread, its 
double edge or whatever, is used to reverse 
its 
direction, to turn it in upon itself. Its passivity 
must be transformed into activity, 
into a cohesive 
movement. (b) In general nature's own activity, 
the 
/F 
elasticity of a 
employed to do 
lef t to themse 
made purposive, 
behaviour of 
existence. '(9) 
watch-spring, water, wind, etc., are 
things that would not have done if 
Lves , so that their blind action is 
the opposite of itself: the rational 
nature, 9 in its external 
What is interesting in the above passage is not the 
accuracy or otherwise of Hegel's description of the 
distinction between a craft tool and a 'self- 
activating' tool, but rather the reference to the 
transformation of the tool's passivity into activity. 
This transformation is purposive and contrived 
(designed) to harness the forces of nature. And the 
crucial point in this form of transformation iso in 
the words of Hegel, that: 'Here impulse departs 
ent from labour. '(10) 
While, therefore, with craft tools Hegel recognizes 
that 'the impulse is not yet in the thing'; that is, 
it still resides with labour. With the 'self- 
activating' tool, or the machine, the essential 
characteristic is that 'the impulse' is transferred 
by design (Hegel says, 'by contriving') from labour 
to the instrument. What is more, this is recognized 
as itself the result of the power of human skill, 
ingenuity and creativity, which makes it possible to 
use the forces of nature (even though human power is 
unable to change or transcend nature's laws). And 
this is what Hegel calls 'cunning': 
'Nothing happens to nature itself'q in the act of 
harnessing its forces, Hegel writes, 'the individual 
purposesof natural existence become universal ... 
It 
allows nature to act on itself, simply 
looks on and 
controls it with a light touch: cunning. 
The 
broadside of force is assailed by the 
fine point of 
Iq 
cunning. The point d'honneur of cunning in its 
struggle with force is to seize it on its blind side 
so that it is directed against itself or to turn 
it as movement back on itself... '(11) 
As we have seen in the main text, Marx's view on 
technology has an extremely close affinity to Hegel's 
basic insights on the relationship between 
technology, labour, skill and nature. Moreover, on 
the question of Marx's view on the status of 
technology (and technique, skill, etc), or the 
productive forces, we can trace definite elements 
existing in embryo in Ilegel's discussions of the 
relationship between human "ends" and "means". (12) 
Hegel, - by contrast to some previous philosophical 
traditions (and in particular the Romantics)q places 
a greater emphasis upon "the means" as against "the 
ends". The forces that mediate - "cunning" 
objectified in tools and as an essential human power 
(13) - have higher value for him than the ends. 
Hegel, of course, does not dispute the fact that 
human labour and the use of technology are meant to 
achieve the satisfaction of needs, desires, etc. But 
because 'the end or purpose of desire', according to 
Hegel, is 'more individual' it tends to be immediate, 
which, as lie puts it, 'must always start again from 
the beginning'. (14) 
In other words, 'the end'q as the immediate 
satisfaction of needs, passes awayp 
it varies and 
changes, it therefore cannot be, 
in its immediacy, 
preserved and promoted into an objectively universal, 
and a social, principle of progress: 
'In the immediate 
relation to the object 
[i. e. 'the external object' to 
be worked upon, or 
"raw materials"-RRI, ' Hegel 
£0 
writes, 'it ['the end'] would itself ... be subject to 
contingency and the loss of its determination... '(15) 
By contrast, 'the means', as in skilIq knowledge, 
tools, etc. , --an become (are) such a social principle 
of progress because they can be preservedý passed 
on, promoted beyond the immediate; that iS9 
technology as such (and technique, skill, etc. ) is 
the means that enables the satisfaction of all 
immediate (individual) ends, or as Hegel says, 'the 
tools comprehend all the individualities. '(16) For 
Marx also, as we have seen, the forces of production 
(technology, skill, knowledge, techniquesq etc) have 
a higher more universal position than has the 
immediate satisfaction of needs, and are the very 
basis of social progress. 
Thus, for example, we can see the influence of Hegel 
on Marx in this respect even more clearly from the 
following passage: 
'Further, since the end is finite it has a finite 
content; accordingly it is not an absolute, nor 
simply something that in its own nature is rational. 
But the means is external middle term of the 
syllogism which is the realization of the end; in the 
means, therefore, the rationality in it manifests 
itself as such by maintaining itself in this external 
other, and precisely through this externality. To 
this extent the means is superior to the finite ends 
of external purposiveness: the plough is more 
honourable than are immediately the enjoyments 
procured by it and which are ends. The tool 
lasts, 
while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are 
forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over 
external natureq even though 
in respect of his ends 
he isq- on the contraryq subject to 
it. '(17) 
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This "honorific" Position which Hegel confers on 
technologyý howeverg should not be mistaken for a 
supposition of it technological determinism". For 
Hegel, as indeed for Marx (though from a totally 
opposing basis)q technology's "superiority" is itself 
conditioned. In the first instance, and in the 
general sense, both for Hegel and Marx, it is human 
act which is the absolute mediation that 
conditions technology's status, role, etc. 
In Hegel the concept of activity is the key to the 
human essence and the self -development of "man" in 
general. In other words, in Hegel, human activity, or 
labour in the general sense, achieves a universal 
character: 'labour is the universal interaction and 
education (Bildung) of man ... a recognition which is 
mutual 2 or the highest individuality'. (18) 
Everything, including human needs and the means of 
their satisfaction (whether technological, 
organizational, or intellectual, etc. ) are 
conditioned by work or general human activity as 
labour: 'Needs and means2 as things existent realiter 
become something which has being for others by whose 
needs and work satisfaction for all alike is 
conditioned... '(19) And again, for Hegel: 'The means 
of acquiring and preparing the particularized means 
appropriate to our similarly particularized needs is 
work. Through work the raw material directly supplied 
by nature is specifically adapted to these numerous 
ends by all sorts of different processes... 
'(20) 
However, while Marx goes beyond this merely positive, 
general conception of labour (productive activity as 
such), and takes into account the socio-historically 
specific form of alienated labour and stresses the 
essential significance of this social 
form (of 
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alienated labour) in the determination of the 
character, role, and status of technology. Hegel, by 
contrastq remains tied to his philosophical 
conception of the abstract form of mental labour as 
universal. That is, as Avineri has pointed out, 
although 'Hegel did realize that labour entails 
alienation. '(21) Nonetheless the element of 
alienation for Hegel - though he recognizes its 
intensification in modern society - is in fact 
'fundamental and immanent to the structure of human 
society' as such. (22) This is, in other words, a 
general (abstract) conception of alienation - the 
'absoluteness and universality', as Meszaros has 
argued, of alienation in the form objectification 
(23) - and not Marx's specific conception as wage- 
labour, or alienation, as we have seen in chapter 
two, as the result of the separation of labour from 
the technological conditions of labour. 
Therefore, while with Marx, as I have suggested, 
technology's "superior" status is conditioned by 
capital as a historically real social process of 
human relationships (alienated labour posited as 
capital, or wage-labour/capital relations). In Hegel, 
it is the logical process of thought, the 
determinateness of Notion that 'exists in and for 
itself', which conditions such a status. Thus: 
'the 
determinateness is in its truth the totality of the 
negative, the concrete Notion that posits externality 
within itself. '(24) In fact, for Hegel, not only the 
"superior" status of , but the tool as such 
(or indeed 
any object or material) 
'as it appears apart from and 
prior to the notion has no truth; this 
it has solely 
in its ideality or its identity with the Notion'. 
(25) 
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The question of the relationship between technology 
and alienation, which Marx came to recognize as 
central to the historically specific social form of 
modern society as capitalistý has its roots in 
Hegel's concepts of it object if icat ion", 
"externalization", and it abstraction". In the 
discussion of the master/servant relation (Lordship 
and Bondage), given in his Thenomenology of Mind, for 
example, Hegel provides some extremely important 
insights on this very question, and also more 
generally on the problematic of "objectification" 
which I believe has a direct bearing on technology's 
characteristics (or at least on the cognition of 
these latter). 
The basic premise of the master/servant relationship 
is the appropriation of another "man's" labour. But 
what is, I think, crucial is that Hegel recognizes 
the servant's bondage to labour not essentially in 
terms of the superficial (in the strict sense) aspect 
of appropriation (i. e. as due to, for example, mere 
legal title to another's labour)q or that of personal 
(e. g. slavery as such), or naturally enforced (e. g. 
due to physical, mentalý etc. weakness), dependence. 
It is in fact the realization of appropriation which 
is, I believe, for Hegel the essence of the bondage 
of the servant, and indeed that of lordship 
(the 
being of the master). This realization of 
appropriation is achievedq in part, through 
objectification. The servant's bondage and the 
master's lordship is for Hegel mediated 
by objects. 
The objects formed by the servant's labour 
becomeq 
according to Hegelq the chain from which 
he cannot 
get away: 'The master relates himself to the 
bondsman 
mediately through independent existence 
[i. e. 
'thinghood'-RR]q for that is precisely what keeps the 
ZLf 
bondsman in thrull; it is his chain, from which he 
could not in the struggle get awayý and for that 
reason he proves himself dependent, shows that his 
independence consists in being a thing. ' And the 
master's lordship is based on his command over 
objects produced by the servant's labour. (26) 
But Hegel digs deeper into this objective mediation, 
and discloses a further dimension of the 
master/servant relation. The command of the master 
over the labour of the servant which is mediated 
through the objects produced by the latter, is at the 
same time the command over the servant's 
'consciousness'. The servant's very being as a 
servant is thus entirely at the mercy of the master 
who appropriates the objects. The being of the 
servant is a 'being-for-another' because of the 
externalization of his/her consciousness through the 
process of labour. 
For Hegel, it is the objectification of consciousness 
which is of crucial significance; it is the fact that 
the servant's consciousness becomes externalized 'in 
the form and shape of thinghood. '(27) Hegel 
recognizes that the objects produced by the servant 
is the objectification of the servant as a subject. 
But this objectification is perceived as nothing 
'other than the consciousness moulding the thing 
through work; for just that form is his pure self- 
existence, which therein becomes truly realized. 
'(28) 
The objectification of the subject is 
in Hegel 
essentially nothing but the externalization of 
the 
subject's consciousness: 
'Since in the notion of 
independent consciousness the inherent reality 
is 
consciousnessq the phase of 
inherent existence 
2.5 
(Ansichsein) or thinghoodp which received its shape 
and form through labour, is no other substance than 
consciousness. '(29) This externalization as 
objectification, of the realization of activity or 
labour, means, in iny interpretation of Hegel, that 
the object (in the sense of 'thinghood' or the 
objective world) is not simply (or rather 
essentially) the embodiment of the externalized 
individual consciousness, but that of alienated 
Spirit as social consciousness, or, for example, in 
modern society as the "spirit of the age of capital". 
The 'shape and form' of the object (the particular as 
part of the whole) reflects the social consciousness 
of this age, the consciousness of the alienated 
subject. This is because: 
'The work produced is the reality which consciousness 
gives itself. It is there that the individual becomes 
consciously what he is implicitly, and in such wise 
that the consciousness which becomes aware of the 
individual in the work performed is not the 
particular consciousness but the universal 
consciousness. '(30) 
If we can translate and apply this to the issue of 
technology, then the reality of technology as an 
object is, in the general sense, based on and 
confirmed only in relation to something subjective. 
The tool's objectivity - its 'shape and form', its 
quality, its characteristics - is 
'real', however, 
because the consciousness that has been externalized 
and thus objectified is that of the alienated 
(abstract) subject - objectified activity of 
"man" as 
alienated being. It is, if I am correct 
in my 
interpretation, the embodiment of the consciousness 
of its maker as an alienated 
labourer 
(mental/manual), not merely as an 
"immediate" 
individual producer, but also as an "abstract" 
universal subject. Technology's characteristic is 
determined through the process of objectification 
which involves riot simply the externalization of the 
producer's ideas, knowledge, and activity (i. e. that 
of the labour involved in both conception and 
manufacture), but the abstraction of consciousness 
and the alienation of Subjectivity. Under capitalism, 
as Hegel writes: 
'The work is.. in general something transitory, which 
is extinguished by the counter-action of other powers 
and interests, and displays the reality of 
individuality in a transitory form rather than as 
fulfilled and accomplished. 
'Consciousness) then, by doing work becomes aware of 
that contrast between being and acting, which in the 
earlier forms of consciousness was at the same time 
the beginning of actiong and is here merely a 
result. '(31) 
It is only in this way that, for Hegelý ideas, or 
consciousness, can be passed into the condition of 
permanence: '.. labour shapes and fashions the thing. 
The negative relation to the object passes 
into the 
form of the object, into something that is permanent 
and remains... This negative mediating agency, 
this 
activity giving shape and form, 
is at the same time 
the individual existence, the pure self-existence of 
that consciousness, which now in the work 
it does is 
externalized and passes 
into the condition of 
permanence. '(32) And what 
is individual and 
particular can become abstract and 
universal (or 
social) - in other words, 
there is for Hegel an 
identification of "objectification" with 
"alienation". And it is only in this way that 
ideas - 
as for example in the cases 
of science, art, and 
4ýq 
technology - can thus be-appropriated as property, or 
be alienated: 'the purpose of a product of mind', 
Hegel writes, 'is that people other than its author 
should understand it and make it the possession of 
their ideas ... Their mode of expression, whereby in 
turn they make what they have learnt ... into a 
"thing" which they can alienate, very likely has some 
special form of its own in every case. '(33) 
In the process of objectification, therefore, there 
is both externalization of particular or individual 
consciousness, and the abstraction of this 
externalization, i. e. alienation. Thus in the case of 
technology, not only is a tool the objectified form 
of specific knowledge and ideas, but, at the same 
time, an objective form of consciousness of the 
'alienated subject'. Hegel expresses this in 
relation to 'property' as follows: 
Firstly as regards externalization: 'By alienating the 
whole of my time, as crystallized in my work, and 
everything I produced, I would be making into 
another's property the substance of my being, my 
universal activity and actuality, my 
personality. '(34) In this general sense, a product 
(be it a work of art or a technology, etc. ) bears the 
definite imprint of its producer. 
But secondly as regards abstraction: 
'What is 
peculiarly mine in a product of my mind may, owing to 
the method whereby it is expressed, turn at once 
into 
something external like a 
"thing" which eo ipso may 
then be produced by other people. The result 
is that 
by taking possession of a thing of this 
kind, its 
owner may make his own the thoughts communicated 
in 
it or the mechanical invention which 
it contains,... 
the new owner at the same time comes 
into possession 
of the universal methods of so expressing 
himself and 
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producing numerous other things of the same 
sort. ' 
* 
(35) In this sense, the ideas are abstracted 
(separated) from the producer, and as objectified 
I things' (or in our case, technologies), are 
alienatedy becoming the property of another, and 
through this alienation can become the 'universal 
methods' of expressing the consciousness of the 'new 
ownerl. (36) 
Now, although there are certain elements within 
Hegel's conception of objectification which bear a 
close resemblance to Marx's conception, there is a 
major difference between the two on the question of 
alienation, as Lukacs, Avineri, and others have 
pointed out. For Hegel objectification necessarily 
entails alienation; for Marx alienation is socio- 
historically specific to capitalism and not a 
necessary aspect of objectification in general. But 
having said this, there is a striking parallel 
between the two, as Avineri has shown, with respect 
to the effects of modern division of labour and 
machine technology on the labourer. 
Technology (the tool), as we mentioned above, was 
originally regarded by Hegel in the general sense of 
a mediatory object, or as the objective mediation 
between the subject and the external world - i. e. as 
merely a passive object. Howeverv again as we saw 
earlier, Hegel also attempted to point out the basic 
distinction between the tool and the machine (or the 
'self-activating' tool) - i. e. the transfer of the 
'impulse' from labour to technology. And it is in 
this distinction that he recognized a process of 
intensification of alienation: 
'In the same way, [the worker] becomes through 
the 
work of the machine more and more machine-like, 
dull, 
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spiritless. The spiritual element, the self-conscious 
plenitude of life, becomes an empty activity. The 
power of the self resides in rich comprehension: this 
is being lost. He can leave some work to the machine; 
his own doing thus becomes even more formal. His dull 
work limits him to one point, and labour is the more 
perfect, the more one-sided it is... In the machine 
man abolishes his own formal activity and makes it 
work for him. But this deception, which he 
perpetrates upon nature takes vengeance on 
him. '(37) 
If we analyse the above statement in conjunction with 
Hegel's view on "objectification" and the distinction 
he made between the "tool" and the "self -activating" 
tool, we can then see some of the basic elements 
which were later synthesized by Marx into his 
distinctive conception of machine technology. What 
comes across in Hegel is that there is something in 
the character of machine technology that helps to 
intensify the alienation of the labourer. With 
machine technology labour as self-conscious activity, 
'becomes an empty activity'. Why? Because it is 
'contrived'. Hegel says, but not simply to transform 
the passivity of the tool into activity; nor is the 
significance of its designed character merely the 
fact that in machine technology the 'blind action' of 
'nature's own activity ... is made purposivel. 
(38) 
What is essential and it is this that shows Hegel's 
remarkable insight is that with machine technology 
'impulse ts entirely rom labour'. (39) 
Now if we take Hegel's conception of 
"objectification" into account, this transfer of 
'impulse' does not simply mean the transfer of motive 
power of labour in the sense of 
the mere 
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physical/manual actuation, but essentially that of 
consciousness as the powerful driving force. We can 
then translate Hegel's philosophical understanding of 
the social significance of machine technology in this 
sense that: the transfer of 'impulse' from labour to 
technology is at once the objective alienation 
(separation, abstraction) of the tool from the hands 
of the labourer and the alienation of intell 
(consciousness, skillq 'cunning') from the labourer. 
The "departure" or removal of 'impulse' from labour 
is the transfer of what Aristotle called intel 
action (i. e. his definition of human labour) to the 
machine. The fusion which I mentioned with regards to 
Aristotle's notion of techne (see Appendix 1), is 
lost with the development of machine technology. If 
I am correct in my interpretation of Hegelq this is 
the essential meaning of the following passage: 
'The gratified impulse is the annulled labour of the 
self; this is the object that labours in its stead. 
Labour means to make oneself immanently into a0 
The division of the impulsive self is this very 
process of making oneself into an object ... The 
impulseq howeverg is the unity of the self as made 
into a thing. '(40) 
Thus, the worker 'becomes through the work of the 
machine... spiritless. ' 
But why does the 'work of the machine' makes human 
labour empty of spirit? And is this so-called 
spiritlessness "caused" by the machine, or 
has it got 
some other "origin"? According to 
Hegel's dialectics, 
if I have understood him correctly, the machine as 
the "cause" of spiritlessness is 
itself, as that 
cause, conditioned. 
(41) And precisely because it is 
as such (in itself) conditioned, 
the machine is a 
conditionjR& factor of spiritlessness 
of labour. (42) 
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That which conditions the machine, that which 
transforms the means (technology), into a 
conditioning factor is 'social conditions [which] 
tend to multiply and subdivide needs, meansp and 
enjoyments indefinitely***'(43); or what Hegel calls 
'the abstracting process': 
'The universal and objective element in work ... lies 
in the abstracting process which effects the 
subdivision of needs and means and thereby eo ipso 
subdivides production and brings about the division 
of labour. By this division, the work of the 
individual becomes less complex, and consequently his 
skill at his section of the job increases, like his 
output. At the same time, this abstraction of one 
man's skill and means of production from another's 
completes and makes necessary everywhere the 
dependence of men on one another and their reciprocal 
relation in the satisfaction of their needs. Further, 
the abstraction of one man's production from 
another's makes work more and more mechanical, until 
finally man is able to step aside and install 
machines in his place. '(44) 
Thus, what seems to be an essential presupposition 
for the division of labour and the introduction of 
machine is the 'abstracting process'. And it is this 
abstracting process which brings forth a 
'system of 
universal reciprocal' dependence as 
'an alien power 
(eine fremede Macht), over which he ["man"] has no 
control... '(45) It is this 
'system' of universal 
dependence which thus conditions the means of 
production (technology, etc. 
), which then in turn, 
according to Regel's dialectics, 
become themselves 
conditioning factors. 
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Consequently, given this 'system'P with the division 
of labour human labouring activity becomes abstract. 
It is in fact this abstraction of labour that leads 
(". directly") to the introduction of machine 
technology: This is explained by Hegel as follows: 
'His [i. e. man's] labour itself becomes quite 
mechanical or belongs to a quite simple order of 
things. But the more abstract it is, the more he 
becomes pure abstract activity, and this enables him 
to withdraw from the work-process altogether and to 
replace his own labour with the activity of external 
nature. He requires only movement and this he finds 
in external nature, or in other words, pure movement 
is just a relationship of the abstract forms of space 
and time - abstract external activity, machines. '(46) 
However, we have seen that for Hegel this abstraction 
is inherent in labour in general; that is, though for 
him the (capitalist) division of labour certainly 
intensifies the abstraction of labour, the fact of 
abstraction actually belongs to the process of 
objectification as such. Although as with his 
"teacher" on economic issues, Adam Smith, Hegel also 
takes the capitalist division of labour as something 
universal and does not regard abstract labour as 
socio-historically specific but as something 
universal which progressively becomes intensified, 
nevertheless, there is no doubt that in his 
philosophical discussions of this issue Hegel 
provides a radically new point of departure -a new 
dimension to the problematic of labour. Granting his 
philosophical idealism, there is no question that 
for 
Hegel machine technology is the result of the 
abstraction of labour. 
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Therefore, if with the advent of machine technology 
'man abolishes his own formal activityl(47), it is 
because the machine "in itself" is made Ccontrived', 
designed, and produced), or conditioned, to function 
as the expression of the I generality' of 
I abstract self-existing need'(48); that iS9 
conditioned by the system' of universal 
interdependence, the material manifestation of which 
is realized, for Hegel, in money: 
'These manifold exertions of needs as things must 
realize their concept, their abstraction. Their 
general concept must be a thing like them, but one 
which as an abstraction can represent them all. Money 
is that materially existing concept, the unitary form 
or the possibility of all objects of need. By 
elevating need and work to this level of generality a 
vast system of common interest and mutual dependence 
is formed among a great people, a self-propelling 
life of the dead [my emphasis-RRI9 which moves hither 
and thither, blind and elemental and2 like a wild 
animal, it stands in constant need of being tamed and 
kept under control. '(49) 
In other words, the machine in its 'being-in-itself' 
is a determinate technology which in relation to 
labour (i. e. 'through the work of the machine' or in 
production) , as labour's 
'otherness' , is posited as a 
moment of the totality of abstract self-existing 
needs which is represented in the form of money 
relations (or in the form of what Marx came to call 
capital relations). As such a moment, machine 
technology is conditioned by and a conditioning 
factor of a 'system' based on the 
'self-propelling 
life of the dead' (or in Marx's terms, it 
is based on 
the 'self-propelling life' of dead labour, of capital 
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(value) - 'material relations between persons and 
social relations 'between things'(50)). 
It is important to note here that Hegel's conceptual 
elements of 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-other' 
have a great significance in Marx's works, and 
particularly in his conception of technology 
(machinery). For Hegel, 'Being-for-other and being- 
in-itself constitute the two moments of the 
something ... their truth is their relation;... [theyl 
are theref ore .... posited as moments of one and the 
same something, as determinations Which are relations 
and which remain in their unity, in the unity of 
determinate being. Each, therefore, at the same time, 
also contains within itself its other moment which is 
distinguished from it. '(51) To understand Marx's 
notion of the machine 'in-itself', which we have 
already come across in chapter three of this study, 
it is crucial to have this Hegelian notion of 'being- 
in-itself' in mind. This is essential to the 
conception of "technology as ca to; technology 
being a 'moment' of capital relation. Thus, Hegel 
writes: 'Something is in itself in so far as it has 
returned into itself out of the being-for-other. But 
something also has in itself (here the accent falls 
on in) or within it, a determination or circumstance 
in so far as this circumstance is outwardly 
is 
a being-for-other. '(52) 
The machine's characteristic, or quality, 
its 'being- 
in-itself' is determined only in relation to capital 
relation (y2Ze: Labour relation), or 
'out of the 
being-for-other' . But this 
does not mean its role and 
effects are only conditioned 
by the social mode of 
its utilization and employment; that 
is, it does not 
mean that the machine 
is "innocent", "neutral", and 
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"untainted" in itself. For the machine has 'within 
it', in its designed characteristic, a determination, 
and it is precisely because 'this circumstance is 
outwardly in it' that it can be employed in the 
manner that it is, or as Hegel puts it, it 'is a 
being-for-otherl -a moment of capital, 
However, while for Marx this dialectics is an 
essential consideration in the understanding of 
machine technology, for many of his followers - as 
for example with Braverman, as we have seen - the 
machine 'in itself' has merely a "technical" 
significance, and what is essential is the 
'ownership', 'control', and the social mode of 
employment of it. (53) 
Thus, to sum up: What we have in Hegel is a 
philosophical understanding of the "coming- to-be" of 
modern machine technology from within a general 
notion of objectification. In work, and through 
'activity' or labour, human beings realize themselves 
as humans. This realization is achieved only through 
the process of objectification, which is nothing but 
the externalization of human consciousness and will - 
the first expression of which is technology: 'Man 
makes tools because he is rational and this is the 
first expression of his will. This will is still 
abstract will - the pride people take in their 
tools. '(54) 
Technology (in general) is a form of the 
objectification of the subject. Machine technology, 
however, is the form of the objectification of the 
subject at a "higher" level of abstraction and 
alienation. It is, on that 
basis, conditioned by a 
'system' governed (determined) by 
'the unconscious 
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blind totality of needs and methods of their 
satisfaction. '(55) Machine technology is thus a 
moment of , what Hegel called, 'a self-propelling life 
of the dead' - or as Marx later came to propose, a 
moment of capital (technology as capital). 
There are, thereforep definite indications that 
Marx's conception of technology involves certain 
elements which are directly connected to some of 
Hegel's observations on objectification, 
externalization, abstraction, etc. What Hegel 
observes, accurately, is that objectification (or in 
Aristotelian terms, the 'making' process) involves 
the externalization of consciousness, or the 
transformation of what is specifically human - the 
formed idea, conception, or ##will" into 
1thinghood'. But, for example, while for Aristotle 
this objectification, being based on techne, does not 
involve a separation or "abstraction" of 
consciousness, for Hegel it does - as alienation. 
In Marx's view, if objectification necessarily 
involves externalization, it does not necessarily 
involve abstraction and alienation the 
$universality' of alienation is not in 
objectification as a general principle - or according 
to Hegel immanent to the very structure of "human 
society" as such, Alienation, for Marx, is directly 
related to the 'universality' of what Hegel observes 
as the 'abstracting process'p but which, contrary to 
Hegel, Marx identifies as historically specific in 
the separation of labour from the technological 
conditions of labour - the break up of the fusion 
which Aristotle's notion of techne expressese 
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Hegel, of courseq pointed towards this form of 
understanding, as I have argued, in his consideration 
of machinery. A presupposition for the introduction 
of machine technology (as also of the detailed 
division of labour) is, for Hegel, the 'abstracting 
process' and the abstraction of labour. Moreover, the 
machine form of technology, for Hegel, is conditioned 
to function as the expression of the 'generality' of 
'abstract self-existing need' - i. e. capital (as 
self-expanding value). Here, therefore, I submit, we 
can identify a source for Marx's distinctive 
understanding of modern machine technology as 
capital. 
Finally, although it is clearly important, as 
Colletti has pointed out, not to interpolate a 
"hidden materialism" in Hegel's thoughts. (56) It is, 
nonetheless, I believe, beyond any doubt that the 
content of Hegel's system, and his dialectic, though 
obviously not "historical materialist", is 
impregnated with the ideas of the reality of 
developing capitalist society. (57) And that it is 
precisely because of this that Marx could say 
that: 'Hegel's dialectic is the basis of any dialectic 
[i. e. including Marx's own version -RR19 
but only 
after its mystical form has been cast off. 
'(58) 
I would also like to stress that in the 
discussion 
presented above I have concentrated on only 
those 
ideas of Hegel which are directly rele vant 
to my 
thesis. Thus, it goes wi thout saying that what 
I have 
presented is limited both 
in scope and depth 
(philosophically). 
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Appendix 3 
Marx 1s Notions of "Separation" and Division of 
Labour: An Interpretation of Early Views on Technology 
It is in The German Ideology that we find a first 
(though still half-baked) "historical-materialist" 
account of the development and social significance 
of the division of labour. Moreover, what is already 
apparent from this work, is that Marx is clearly more 
than interested in the interplay between the division 
of labour, technology, and forms of social 
interaction. And in fact even at this stage in his 
intellectual development he tends to greatly stress 
the enormous importance of the role of the 
instruments of production, techniques and methods, as 
well as the specific character and form of production 
techno logy, particularly with regard to the 
development of the capitalist mode of production. 
This is, however, not a work dedicated to a detailed 
explanation of the role of technology. We have in a 
sense merely a series of statements, at least in the 
first part of the text, specifically concerned 
(in a 
very general and incomplete manner) with the 
development of European history. It is a crude 
attempt to give some general theoretical 
(and 
materialist) foundation for the rise of capitalism. 
In other words, to provide a basic materialist 
framework for the understanding of the historical 
process of the separation of labour 
from the material 
conditions of production. This 
is what was clearly 
essential for Marx. As he later points out 
in the 
Grundrisse : 'It is not the unity of 
living and 
active humanity with the natural, 
inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange 
with nature, 
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and hence their appropriation of natureg which 
requires explanation or is the result of a historic 
process, but rather the separation between 
these.. '(1) 
This separation is important to Marx for it generated 
the social conditions which objectively necessitate 
the rapid advancement of the productive forces - the 
advance of the instruments and methods of production, 
of technology and techniques - and hence the progress 
of the productive power of labour. This does not 
however mean that Marx saw no development of 
technology prior to such a separation. Nor that such 
a development and advancement was merely confined to 
the Western forms of civilization. But that, for 
Marx, all the technological advancements made prior 
to the separation of labour from the conditions of 
production were not only both slow and haphazard, but 
that they were for the most part localized, which 
greatly restricted their diffusion, thus providing 
little or no assurance of their permanence and 
hence their further and "universal" ("world- 
historic") development. 
In a very broad, generalized, classification Marx and 
Engels distinguish between the emergence of 'the 
difference between natural instruments of production 
and those created by civilisation. '(2) The earth, 
water, or as they put it, the 'field (water, etc. 
)# 9 
are here considered as 'natural instruments of 
production'(3), without further elaboration as to why 
and how these could be considered as 
"instruments". 
The use of the term "instrument" can perhaps 
be 
justified on the basis of utilization; i. e. that 
these factors are simply used directly 
for the 
purpose of production. But, as 
it can be seen from 
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the discussion presented in chapter twoo although 
utilization is clearly an important factor in the 
definition of production technology for Marx, it is 
not in itself a sufficient qualification. 
However, despite the weakness of such a statement, 
what Marx and Engels are here concerned with is the 
relationship between forms of property/division of 
labour and that of instruments of production in a 
general historical (materialist) sense. Thus, the use 
of "natural" instruments of production, according to 
them, 'presupposes that the individuals are united 
by some bond: family, tribe, the land itself, 
etc. 1(4) The division of labour is based on "family" 
or kinship ties, or communal organization, which is 
itself a naturally evolved social form corresponding 
with the direct use of materials and forces of 
nature. 
But beyond this what I think Marx and Engels are 
attempting to convey here with the use of the term 
"natural" instruments is the critical role of the 
nature, character and forms of instruments in the 
determination of the relation of individuals to 
production. The term "natural" instruments is meantq 
I would suggest, in a similar sense as that of 
"natural economy" which was at the time extensively 
used for pre-capitalist modes of production. It is a 
short-hand reference to the socio-technical unity of 
productive activity and the instruments of production 
(that fusion which is the characteristic feature of 
the Aristotelian notion of techne mentioned in 
chapter one). 
The main point here is that in all 
forms of social 
production where "natural" instruments 
(specifically 
if I 
land) are used, social relations of production are at 
once directly personal or Communal relationsý rather 
than social relations mediated by material relations: 
Thus, according to Marx (and Engels)t when 'natural 
instruments of production' are predominant, as they 
are in pre-capitalist societies, 'the domination of 
the proprietor over the propertyless may be based on 
personal relations, on a kind of community'. (5) 
Whereas, however, in capitalism, the social relations 
Imust have taken on a material shape in a third party 
- money. '(6) 
If land is the main instrument of production, then, 
for example, the relationship between the landowner 
and the direct producers is not mediated through the 
exchange of products as such, but dýrectly, since the 
direct producers are in one way or another tied to 
the land itself. When one speaks of "landed property" 
it is obviously not the ownership of land in itself 
- i. e. as merely the legal title - which is 
considered, but the combination of land and the 
labour which is tied to it. And in this case, the 
'individuals are subservient to nature'r but not as 
yet 'to a product of labour. '(7) 
Moreover, land as a natural instrument of productiong 
not only entails a particular form of appropriation 
and social/class division, but also a particular form 
of distribution of labour which is communal or 
familial, rather than individual or atomized as with 
"free" labour. It is the characteristic of land as 
the chief (natural) instrument of production which 
necessitates a natural form of co-operation as 
in the 
case of peasant family-households, or the ancient 
Asiatic communities, etc. It is, I would suggest, 
in 
this sense that, for Marx, the predominant use of 
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land as a natural instrumentp and the simple 
character of craft tools have a direct bearing on the 
form of property and the division of labour. As Marx 
writes: 'in small-scale industry and agriculture up 
till now property is the necessary consequence of the 
existing instruments of production... '(8) 
Furthermoreq intertwined with this form of co- 
operation, the predominance of land (or agricultural 
production) necessarily corresponds to a high degree 
of isolationism, of localized communities. And thus 
the locality is of paramount importance, which is 
directly related to the natural bondage to the soil, 
and which entails a whole number of cultural and 
behavioural aspects; such as a high degree of 
conservatism, superstition, and a low, backward and 
limited level of social (society-wide) intercourse. 
With the exception of the few commercial towns, this 
condition applied equally to the towns that were 
already in existence or to those which were being 
formed. 
In this caseq therefore, I would suggest that, the 
"instruments" of production, according to Marx, have 
a domineering role only because nature itself is 
objectively dominant; hence 
'individuals are 
subservient to nature', rather than to the product of 
labour as in the case of general commodity 
production, or capitalist production, whereby we 
have, according to Marx, a form of domination which 
is manifested universally through money relations and 
technically at the point of production through the 
'domination of accumulated, past, materialized 
labour' (i. e. dead labour of production technologies 
and techniques) 'over direct, 
living labour'. (9) 
43 
It is partly for this reason, I believe, that Marx 
and Engels here use the qualification of "natural" 
instruments of production. For what they are 
attempting to clarify is that the social division of 
labour (the basic organizational form of activity and 
hence the form of property relations) is not 
something which can be viewed in abstraction from the 
conditions and processes of the production of 
materials of life. Thus, landed property 'appears as 
direct natural domination'(10). In other words, the 
division of labour which corresponds to the various 
forms of landed property is conditioned by, and 
based directly upon, the exchange between human 
beings and nature 'in which the labour of the former 
is exchanged for the products of the latter. 1(11) The 
"instruments" used are simply inorganic and natural 
extensions of social existence; they have in 
themselves no "power" over human beings (except in 
the sense that nature has, and is perceived to have, 
such a power). 
Human beings relate to these "natural" instruments as 
the inorganic nature of their social mode of life. 
Therefore, even though there exists certain forms of 
'small-scale' industries, since the form of social 
division of labour here is 'determined by the 
utilization of the natural instruments of production' 
there is no detailed 'distribution of labour among 
various individuals'. (12) At this stage therefore 
because of the unity of the objective 
(material) 
conditions of production (i. e. the technological 
conditions of production) and the community of 
direct 
producers, the instruments of production are simply 
nothing more than "natural" mediatory elements. 
The 
direct producers are not socially and systemically 
separated from the means, 
instruments and 
ý If 
technologies, of production. For ' example, the land 
belongs to a landlord, but so does the direct 
producer as a serf who is tied to the land and who 
possesses other instruments as simply the "natural" 
extension of his/her being a direct producer, 
Now, even with the separation of town from country, 
which for Marx and Engels was of great historic 
-significance, there was initially and for a fairly 
long time little advancement of production technology 
and the division of labour. Yet this process of 
separation is historically significant for them, for 
it begins a process of concentration of human and 
material forces, and a first manifestation of a new 
social stratification within the towns itself. Thus, 
as they write: 'Here first became manifest the 
division 6f the population into two great classes, 
which is direct based on the division of labour and 
on the instruments of production. The town is in 
actual fact already the concentration of population, 
of the instruments of production, of capital,.. '(13) 
The "capital" which Marx and Engels speak of here is 
something completely different and unlike capital as 
such which became the dominant feature of the later 
periods of European historical development. It is, 
what they call, 'a naturally evolved capital, 
consisting of a house, the tools of the craft. and 
the natural, hereditary customers.. 
1(14) The 
particular form of this 'naturally evolved capital', 
which was 'directly connected with the particular 
work of the owner' and 
'inseparable from it', 
corresponds with the particular 
form of division of 
labour in the Medieval towns between the various 
guilds, and that within the guild system 
of 
production itself: 'Every workman 
had to be versed in 
if 5 
a whole round of tasks, had to be able to make 
everything that was to be made with his tools. '(15) 
But since the very structure and processes of the 
economic life of the towns were still dependent upon 
a mode of production dominated by landed property - 
i. e. by the cultivation of the soil, by land as the 
most fundamental instrument of production - the 
isolationism and local restrictions which was a 
necessary feature of this mode affected the social 
framework, the division of labour, and the general 
social relationships in existence in the towns. For 
Marx (and Engels) it is this background that 
conditioned the peculiar form of the system of craft 
industry being realized in the towns - the guilds. 
And their reference to "capital" at that time as 
'natura evolved capital' is meantq I would 
s uggest, in the sense that: (a) instruments and 
material conditions of production were inseparable 
from craft labour; and also simultaneously that (b) 
the structure and process of craft industry was as 
yet nothing more than a very limited "break" with2 or 
rather a "natural" extension of, the localized form 
of agricultural co-operation and division of 
labour: 'In the towns2 the division of labour between 
the individual guilds was as yet very little 
developed andq in the guilds themselves2 it did not 
exist at all between the individual workers ... The 
limited intercourse and the weak ties between the 
individual townsq the lack of population and the 
narrow needs did not allow of a more advanced 
division of labourt and therefore every man who 
wished to become a master had to 
be proficient in the 
whole of his craft. 
1(16) 
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Two points can be discerned from the above analysis: 
Firstly that for Marx the particular character of 
instruments of production being used (in the above 
case, for example, land as the "natural" instrument, 
or simple tools, etc., as if naturally evolved 
capital") is one of the most important conditioning 
factors of the form of productive co-operation and 
division of labour. Secondly, however, that the 
character of instruments is something which is 
socially determAined. 
Thus the character of land as an instrument of 
production is considered by Marx as "natural" in pre- 
capitalist modes of production not simply because it 
is obviously something natural (nature given), but 
because of the specific relation between it and human 
productive activity during that period of human 
history. But at the same time, its being a "natural" 
instrument (its socially determined character, i. e. 
as landed property, whether communal or otherwise, 
etc. ) sets a limit to the form of co-operation and 
division of labour, and therefore that of social 
intercourse. 
The form of social organization of life, of social 
interaction and intercourse, according to my 
interpretation of Marx, depends in the first place 
upon the historically given, acquired and hence 
already existing material conditions of production of 
life, or the material mode of social productive 
activity. That said, as human beings express 
their 
life and live, this very act of living and expressing 
their life can mean nothing but the modification of 
those "natural" and historically acquired material 
conditions they find already 
in existence which thus 
also begins to modify the existing social 
structure 
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of production and social organization of life. For 
Marx (and Engels) therefore - as it is apparent from 
The German Id - the move towards capitalism is 
based upon a "series" of extensions in the division 
of labour (e. g. the division of material and mental, 
the separation of town and country, the separation of 
production and commerce, etc. ). 
However, what is not quite clear from the text is the 
relation between the development of productive forces 
(particularly of techniques and technologies) and the 
progressive extension and development of the division 
of labour. There is a definite ambiguity concerning 
this problematic of, so to speak, the "prime mover" 
or the "determining" factor(s). One can argue that 
this is basically due to the as yet undeveloped state 
of Marx's theoretical system - this is often attested 
to by, for example, Althusser and others, by 
referring to the distinction between the "young" as 
against the "mature" Marx. And although this may be 
partly true, I believe that there is a more 
fundamental reason behind this ambiguity. It is, I 
would suggest, the very enigmatic process of 
development of the pre-capitalist social formations 
towards capitalism itself which is reflected in 
Marx's thoughts, and which Marx and Engels attempt to 
convey in The German Ideology - though the issue is 
hardly examined or analysed. 
What I mean by this is that in pre-capitalist social 
formations, far more openly than under capitalism, 
certain social forces (e. g. the state or 
political/ideological agencies and relations, 
population, kinship relationsq etc. 
) have a more or 
less direct and determining role in the shaping of 
social production. In other words, what 
is often 
q9 
analytically distinguished as social and of superstructural" relations as against the "material" 
and productive forces, are in fact in the reality of 
pre-capitalist social life often firmly intertwined. 
Thus, for example, the state, or religion, 
population, etc., can act directly as a force of 
production and can have a significant and determining 
role in the advancement of material production and 
the transformation of the social formation. 
I have already noted this point (see chapter one) in 
relation to Marx's conception of the productive 
forces and his view on the "primacy" of these forces 
and what is meant by it. Nevertheless, what is 
certain at this stage, in my view, is that Marx not 
only appears ambivalent towards the issue of 
"primacy" - at one level social intercourse (tradey 
commerces, etc. ) is heavily stressed, at another the 
productive forces - but that he also fails to take 
adequate account of the complex of socio-political 
forces and relations that helped shape the new 
(bourgeois) socio-economic order. He stresses the 
importance of $civil society'ý but is almost 
exclusively concerned with its economic aspects. What 
is also far f rom adequately considered is the 
importance of the development of new organizations 
(socio-political, villageg town and municipal) to the 
process of transformation. 
However, we are here only concerned with his views on 
technology, and it is, therefore, important to stress 
that although production technology 
(instruments of 
production) is for Marx one of the most 
important 
factors of the "productive forces"q and 
hence by 
implication its development is considered as crucial 
to the process of historical transformation, 
it is by 
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all means neither the only factorg nor the dominant 
one at all stages of human social productive 
evolution. The primacy of the productive forces for 
Marx (even if one were to accept it in the historical 
sense -I have suggested in chapter one), therefore, 
does not necessarily mean the primacy, or perhaps 
more to the point, the dominance, of production 
technology at all times, under all modes of 
production. 
For Marx (and Engels) what is crucial is how and why 
the technical relations and structures tend to become 
determinantg and the development of the productive 
power of labour and technology becomes a necessary 
and systematic function of the process of production 
itself. Here we come to the process of "separation" 
so often referred to by Marx (which is an issue that, 
perhaps according to some views, he may have placed 
far too much emphasis on). Thus Marx and Engels move 
from the separation of town and country to that of 
production and commerceo 
With the dominance of "natural economy" (landed 
property, etc. ) the technical development of 
production (i. e. the development of the productive 
power of labour) tends not merely to ýe slow and 
limited, but, what is more crucial, as I have already 
mentioned, is that any advancement made 
is generally 
restricted to given localities because of the very 
nature of social production itself. 
The diffusion of 
technologies and techniques, and also their 
further 
development, therefore, becomes dependent upon the 
social, political, etc., forces 
(e. g. the movement 
and increase of population, the role of 
the state, 
wars of conquest, etc. ). 
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Under such a condition of social productiong the 
development of technologies and techniques here and 
there (in different localities) would remain 
unconnected - there is no systemic linkage between 
the various developmental processes. Therefore, 
according to Marx (and Engels), what may have been 
an important development and advance of productive 
power, of technology and techniqueý in one place and 
at one time, becomes isolated and ýhus in danger of 
being lost forever due to the restrictive form of 
social intercourse(17); a restriction which reflects, 
as it in turn conditions, the existing form of 
production. Thus as they write: 
'It depends purely on the extension of intercourse 
whether the productive forces evolved in a locality, 
especially inventions, are lost for later development 
or not. As long as there exists no intercourse 
transcending the immediate neighbourhood, every 
invention must be made separately in each localityg 
and mere chances such as irruptions of barbaric 
peoples, even wars, are sufficient to cause a country 
with advanced productive forces and needs to have to 
start right over again from the beginning. In 
primitive history every invention had to be made 
daily anew and in each locality independently. That 
even with a relatively very extensive commerce, 
highly developed productive forces are not safe from 
complete destruction, is proved by the Phoenicians, 
whose inventions were for the most part lost 
for a 
long time to come through the ousting of this nation 
from commerce, its conquest by Alexander and 
its 
consequent decline. '(18) 
What is important about the above statement is the 
emphas is placed on social intercourse or general 
social interaction. And despite a 
degree of 
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exaggeration characteristic Of Marx and Engels, 
especially when they attempt to stress a point, there 
is no doubt that the role of social intercourse in 
the diffusion and hence further development of 
productive forcesq of technology and technique, is 
clearly highly significant. Moreover, one may broadly 
accept that, the restriction and limitations imposed 
by the form of production and localized co-operation 
can mean that the decline of some civilizations 
(e. g. the Inca, central African civilizations, etc. ) 
could lead to the loss of certain advanced 
productive forces. But what is perhaps more 
important, which Marx does not mention, is the rate 
of diffusion (how fast or slow it is) which has some 
bearing on the development of new techniques and 
technologies. 
However, it is important to point out that, contrary 
to Marx's views, the extent of "localization" or 
isolation should not be over-stressed. Clearly many 
aspects of advances in productive forces were 
diffused through both general interaction and 
interc ourse (however limited) as well as through 
wars. (19) Nevertheless, what is also clearly evident 
is that the limitations imposed by the form of 
localized social production meant that the time scale 
of diffusion of technologies and techniques was quite 
extensive and the rate of diffusion far slower 
than 
when the form of production came to 
be dominated by 
exchange and commodity relations. 
(20) 
Be that as it may, whatever the complexity of 
the 
process of development and diffusion of 
technologies 
during pre-capitalist history, the main point 
which 
is made here by Marx and Engels 
is that only when 
social intercourse becomes not merely 
systematic but 
5ý. 
a necessary function of the mode of production itself 
(i. e. systemic and structural) will the development 
and diffusion of the productive forces become 
themselves systemic and structural, and hence it is 
then that these forces can be assured of a high 
degree of permanency: 'Only when intercourse has 
become world intercourse and has as its basis large- 
scale industry, when all nations are drawn into the 
competitive struggle, is the permanence of the 
acquired productive forces assured. '(21) 
For the West European historical development the 
process of systematization of social intercourse, 
according to Marx, had began with the separation of 
production from intercourse (commerce), and 'the 
formation of a special class of merchants; a 
separation wbich, in the towns bequeathed by former 
period, had been handed down (among other things with 
the Jews) and which very soon appeared in the newly 
formed ones. '(22) With this separation, trade and 
exchange began to transcend beyond the immediate 
localized forms of intercourse, and gradually broke 
down the local restrictions which had hitherto 
existed. This extension of intercourse, of commerce, 
was of course clearly significant in the eyes of Marx 
and Engels. For it meant not merely an advance of 
exchange of goods (products), but in fact of tools, 
instruments, and methods of production - i. e. of 
technologies and techniques: 'The towns enter into 
relations with one another, new tools are 
brought 
from one town into the otherg and the separation 
between production and intercourse soon calls 
forth a 
new division of production between the 
individual 
towns, each of which is soon exploiting a predominant 
branch of industry. '(23) 
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It also meantq thereforeq a greater possibility for 
the development of production, since now inventions, 
could be transmitted from one place to another. But 
more than this, the development of commerce, or the* 
extension of intercourset generates new needs and 
demands a growth in productive capacity. Thus, 
according to Marx and Engels: 'The immediate 
consequence of the division of labour between the 
various towns was the rise of manufactures, branches 
of production which had outgrown the guild- 
system. 1(24) And with the rise of manufacture we come 
to the subject matter which formed an important part 
of Marx's later writings on the theory of capitalist 
production; it would therefore be inappropriate to 
consider his views on this subject as contained in 
The German Ideology - which are in any case 
extremely limited both in scope and substance. 
As we have seen so far, a fundamental concern of Marx 
at this stage is with the clarification (or rather 
self-clarification) of the historical process of 
separation of the conditions of productive activity - 
by far the most important aspect of the abstraction 
or alienation of labour - which he observes through 
the evolutionary progress of the division of labour. 
And although his conception of technology is still 
quite undeveloped, what we have is not only a close 
linkage between it and this notion of separation 
signified by his particular view of the progress of 
division of labour, but also in fact a 
definite move 
towards what could be said to 
be his unique 
understanding of the socio-technical characteristic 
of production technology 
(indeed, of the productive 
forces) under capitalism. 
6Lý 
Thus having sketched the historical process of 
separation and the division of labour to the rise of 
capitalist relations, Marx and Engels assert that 
under the latter relations: 'the productive forces 
appear as a world for themselves, quite independent 
of and divorced from the individuals, alongside the 
individuals... '(25) Here we have the same assertion 
as in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts,; i. e the appearance of 
technology, techniques, etc., as 'alien' powers. But 
the appearance is not a mere illusion, for now, under 
capital ('the modern form of private property'(26)), 
the 'totality of productive forces.. have, as it were, 
taken on a material form... (27) And as such a 
'material form'9 these forces are no longer the 
forces of 'the individuals themselves' but in fact 
'of private property'. (28) 
If in the earlier periods of social intercourse and 
production we have a totality of productive forces 
that presuppose a socio-technical unity of productive 
activity and the technological conditions, under 
capitalism these forces not only appear as 
indepe ndent (alien) powers vis-a-vis the 
'individuals', but they do so since they have taken 
on a 'material form'. This reference to the 
form of 
productive forces as 'material' seems, however, to 
be 
rather curious given the fact, as we have seen on a 
number of occasions in chapter one, that 
Marx regards 
these forces as 'material' forces in any case. 
Why 
then the reference here to the productive 
forces 
taking on a 'material form'? 
Marx provides little by way of an answer 
to this 
question at this stage. A possible clue 
to what he 
may have in mind is given 
in the statement that with 
capitalism these forces are 
'no longer the forces of 
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individuals' but of capital (private property'). In 
other words, it can be tentatively suggested here 
that if these forces have become 'independent' of 'the majority of individuals from whom [they] have 
been wrested away... '(29)7 then they take on a 
'material form' in the sense that they are now 
separated (abstracted, alienated) from the 
individual's 'real life-content'(30): i. e. the social 
unity or the fusion signified by the Aristotelian 
notion of techne has broken down and hence the 'alien 
power' of these forces is objectively conditioned. 
But, it must be said that my suggested interpretation 
here (which is made on the basis of my reading of 
Marx's later writings) cannot be supported by any 
textual references from The German Ide , and what 
is perhaps far more important, Marx and Engels 
themselves provide nothing to clarify what they mean. 
Although the point about the so-called 'material 
form' of the productive forces is taken up by Marx in 
his later writings, as we shall see in chapter one. 
Nevertheless, while it may be possible to make some 
sense of what they may perhaps mean by this reference 
to the 'material form' with respect to labour, it is 
difficult to understand what such a reference 
signifies as regards the instruments of production, 
for instance. 
Thus, for example, one could argue the case for 
labour as follows: Labour - which 
'has lost all 
semblance of self-activity'(31) - takes on 
its 
'material form' as labour-power and it is as such a 
Imaterial form' that it is alienated, purchased and 
sold as a commodity. Butq although one could say 
that 
in 
,a 
similar sense, toog an instrument of production 
is no longer simply the means of 
human self-activity 
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(e. g. as a tool is, in its strict meaning, a servant 
of the 'individual' , as it were), and hence it takes 
on its 'material form' as, say, a mere "factor" of 
production, yet this does not in any way clarify what 
is supposed to be the significance of the reference 
to the instrument taking on a 'material form'. 
Finally, the reference to the 'material form' is, to 
say the least, far too vague to be useful in itself 
for anything more than, perhaps, a mere glimpse of 
the direction of Marx's thoughts on the question of 
technology. And the reason that this point was 
raised here by me was, therefore, simply to suggest 
that on the question of the 'determinate' character 
and form of production technology (an element of the 
productive forces) there is a degree of continuity in 
Marx's ideas; that he was, even at this stage, 
concerned with the distinctive form of productive 
forces (including of course technology) under the 
rule of capital. And, moreover, that this distinctive 
form is, for Marx, not a mere subjective distortion 
(or as technology scholars like Noble think 'a 
product, ultimately, of our own naivete and 
ignorance. '(32)), but is objectively conditioned - 
thus the reference to the 'materiality' of the form. 
'Never, in any earlier period, ' Marx and Engels 
therefore writey 'have the productive forces taken on 
a form so indifferent to the intercourse of 
individuals as individuals... '(33) 
It is hoped that the above discussion of Marx's early 
views provide some additional insights which would 
help to complement the discussions presented 
in the 
main text. 
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Appendix 4 
Technology in the Process of Value Formation 
In the following pages (which is in fact an appendix 
to Chapter Three) I shall be looking at the manner 
in which Marx considers the role and status of 
technology in the production of value, which is 
crucial for the understanding of Marx's conception 
of technology and the notion of technology as 
capital. For, according to Marx, insofar as the 
process of production of value is concerned, the 
various factors of production have different parts 
in the formation of the value of the product 
produced. (1) 
In producing an article, whatever its nature, both 
means of production and living labour are combined 
and organized to function in a certain way. Within 
this process certain technologies are used to 
fashion a given amount of raw materials into a 
product. The raw materials are worked upon to change 
their form: to produce a piece of cloth, for 
example, the workers take the cotton and the 
spindle, the yarn and the loom, etc-9 and after a 
given amount of time working with theseq the 
form of 
the cotton, the yarn, etc. 9 is changed 
into clothe 
But although the spindle and the 
loomy for exampleg 
are used here, their form as spindle and 
loom has 
not been altered at the end of the process- 
The form 
of the end product, i. e. in our example clothq 
is 
not made up of the various elements of 
the spindle 
and the loom. But by contrastq 
if the piece of cloth 
is, so to speak, put under the microscope 
or 
chemically analysed, it can easily 
be shown to be 
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made of cotton, yarn , etc. ; tha t isy the raw 
materials used up in the process. (2) 
It is a characteristic of production technologies 
(and this is an obvious point) that they must 
maintain, at least for a certain span of life, or 
cycles of productiong their physical structure and 
hence functional principles as they are being used. 
Technologies have 'use value', are socially useful, 
precisely because of this characteristic, which, 
however, is only realized as such when these 
"objects" are combined with living labour which 
actually, according to Marx, preserves them as 
technologies (as such use values). Thus Marx writes: 
'A spindle maintains itself as a use value only by 
being used up for spinning. If it is not, the 
specific form which is here posited in iron and wood 
would be spoiled for use, together with the labour 
which posited it and the material in which it did 
the positing. The use value of wood and iron, and of 
their form as well [i. e. as spindle-RR]t are 
preserved only by being posited as a means of living 
labour, as an objective moment of the existence of 
labour's vitality. As an instrument of labourg it is 
their destiny to be used upq but used up in the 
process of spinning. '(3) 
But if a technology's use value is preserved by its 
use, its value also must be preserved. Forg as we 
have seen earliert in the section on 
"Commodity and 
Technology, etc. ", for Marxq an object has 
"value" 
because it has a "use value" - 'nothing can 
have 
value, without being an object of utility. 
'(4) Thus 
because the quality of technology, its physical 
structure, is not altered during the production 
process, but rather it is preserved, 
its value and 
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exchange value remains also unaltered Luring 
- 
that 
process: 'It lies in the nature of labour itself to 
preserve' the use value of technology, 'by using the 
instrument as instrument... ' And thereby: 'The 
quantity of ob ectified labour [i. e. the costs of 
production contained' in the technology] is 
preserved in that its gualiLy is preserved as use 
value for further labour, through the contact with 
living labour. '(5) 
This preservation of 'value' also applies to other 
means of production (e. g. raw materials, etc. ) being 
utilized. In the case of, for example, cotton used 
in the process of making cloth, its substance and 
materiality is preserved, though transformed from 
one form of use value into another - from being 
cotton as such into being a piece of cloth. 
Now, from this basis, whatever is the worth (or 
value) of the raw materials, is entirely 
incorporated into the end product2 simply because 
the quantity of the raw materials used 
(our cotton, 
yarn, etc. ) has, in a sense, disappeared during the 
process only to reappear at the end of it 
in a 
different form. It is, in other words) completely 
consumed. And thus with its complete productive 
consumption, it has also transferred 
its value, or 
the amount of money paid for it, to the new product 
(our cloth). (6) 
But what of the instruments of production 
used to 
make the cloth? These have also a given 
valuel a 
certain amount of money was paid 
for their purchasep 
and this sum has to be recovered 
in one way or 
another. But since the 
instruments are not 
completely used up during the process 
of making that 
0 
piece of cloth , the producer (the capitalist) 
cannotp for very practical reasonsý add the whole of 
the value or money paid for these to the price of 
the piece of cloth produced - for one thing if 
he/she were to do that it would make his/her piece 
of cloth so expensive that no one would be able to 
buy itq and competition ensures that our producer 
behaves, at least generally, according to the 
established norms. These are considered as his/her 
"capital costs"q investments made to be recovered 
over a number of years and cycles of production. 
For technology can be used repeatedly over many 
cycles of production. Indeed, 'durability', 
according to Marx, 'is a condition for the 
instrument, the means of production, not only on the 
technical ground that metals etc. are the chief 
material of all machinery, but rather because the 
instrument is destined to play the same role 
constantly in repeated processes of production. '(7) 
Technology, therefore, must necessarily be designed 
and constructed to have a quality that does not 
deteriorate with constant use and lasts over a 
certain period of time: 'Its durabiýity as means of 
production is a required quality of its use 
value. '(8) And this has an effect on the 
transference of its value to the commodities 
produced. There is therefore a distinction between 
the way the value of technology and that of raw 
materials is transferred to the end product - 
although the values of both are preserved, remain 
unaltered, and hence can be regarded as constant. 
Firstly, howevert before looking at what Marx 
has to 
say about this -transfer of value of 
technology, it 
is important to examine very briefly 
the 
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implications of this proposition concerning the 
preservation of the value of the means of 
production. For it is argued by some (as for example 
by Habermasq among others (9)), in opposition to 
Marxq that technology can be an "independent" source 
of new value, and surplus-value, 
For Marx this is both logically and in practice 
quite erroneous. If we take the production process 
of cloth as an example, we have, to put it very 
simply, three basic elements involved: (a) the 
spindle; (b) the cotton/yarn; (c) living labour- 
power. Neither the spindle (the technology) nor the 
yarn (the raw material) are as use valuesq and in 
the form that they are, actually produced during the 
process of making cloth. They must, obviouslyq exist 
in their particular (finished) formg and purchased 
as such, for them to become used in the process of 
making the cloth. 'If, ' as Marx puts itq 'in 
addition to the fabric, the worker also had to 
create the yarn and the spindle in the same working 
day, then the process would be in fact 
impossible. '(10) They are purchased precisely 
because they have already in themselves certain 
particular qualities use values already formed by 
previous, past labour suitable for making cloth. 
Thus, their value also (their purchasing costs) 
is 
already posited and given before the act of 
production of cloth even begins. 
Once the technology and the raw material enters the 
production process, and are used 
because of their 
particular use value, their value 
(or its money 
equivalent) is not thereby increased. 
No technology 
once entering a process of production 
adds more 
value to itself (or, so to speak, 
becomes suddenly 
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more expensive). If I have Purchased a spindle for a 
1100, it does not become 1200 when I use it to 
produce cloth. Thus, if there is an increase of 
value at the end of the process of making cloth, it 
cannot be because the spindle and the yarn have in 
themselves added more than their own value to the 
cloth (to the end product): 'The worker has not 
created the objectified labour contained in yarn and 
spindlet which form a part of the value of the 
product; for him they were and remain material to 
which . 
he gave another form and into which he 
incorporated new labour. The only condition is that 
he should not waste them.. '(11) 
The end product, therefore, incorporates both the 
value of the yarn and the spindle (though with the 
latter this is gradually added) and the value added 
during the process of making the cloth: 'It now 
contains objectified labour in two parts - his 
working day, and that already contained in his 
material, yarn and spindle, independent of him and 
bef ore him. ' For, Lis with the use value of the 
technology and the raw material, so with their 
value, the 'previously objectified labour was the 
condition of his [the worker's] labour; 
it was 
necessary to make his labour what it 
is.. '(12) The 
technology must be on hand, as a presupposition; 
its 
value also is presupposed, is given, and 
is 
preserved through its productive use. 
But can it be a source (independently or otherwise) 
of new value as it is productively used? 
Certainlyq 
without technology (andq of coursep raw 
materials, 
etc. ). labour, in the words of 
Marx, 'would be 
equally useless. 
'(13) Yet, though obviously 
indispensable to any form of social production, 
from 
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Marx's standpointy technology cannot be a source 
of value, in the sense of that which serves as its 
ultimate beginning, or "wel I- spring". For technology 
is itself a product of human labourg andq as Marx 
expresses it more strictly, a product 'of alien 
labour merely appropriated by capital'(14); it is 
objectified labour; it is an end product of a 
previous social 2roductive processp which only 
becomes a "technology" as a "means of labour", as a 
presupposition and starting point for another social 
productive process: '[W]hen they [technologies, etc. - 
RR ) are posited as conditions of living labour, they 
are themselves re-animated. Objectified labour 
ceases to exist in a dead state as an external, 
indifferent form on the substancep because it is 
itself again posited as a moment of living labour; 
as a relation of living labour to itself in an 
objective material, as the objectivity of living 
labour. '(15) 
Even when it subjugates living labourg as in the 
capitalist mode of production, human labour (whether 
direct or indirect or both) is technology's 'form- 
giving fire'(16). Marx, howeverg does not deny that 
capital is productive of value, but what he is 
categorical about is that such a productiveness is 
only as a relation', i. e. insofar as capital 
'is a 
0 coercive force on wage-labour ... It only produces 
value as the power of labour's own material 
conditions over labour when these are alienated 
from 
labour; as one of the forms of wage-labour 
itself, 
as a condition of wage-labour. 
'(17) 
But if capital is simply considered as a 
"thing", or 
in economistic terms as 
"stored up labour" 
(technologies, materials, commoditiesq etc. as 
such 
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or in the abstract), and not as a social relation of production, then 'capital - like all conditions of labour, even the unpaid natural forces functions 
productively in the labour-process, in the 
production of use-values, but it is never a source 
of value. '(18) Technology is a moment of capital, is 
capital, but, as far as Marx is concerned, it 
'creates no new value.. it itself consists in 
materialized labour-time, so that labour is the 
source of its value. '(19) 
Technology as a of capital-good" is certainly, 
according to Marx, a source of revenue for its 
owner. (20) But the fact that technology, its 
ownership, control and use, provides the capitalists 
'the power to appropriate a part of the value 
created by labour, ' does not make it a source of 
#the value which they appropriate. '(21) The role of 
technology as a "capital-good" in this case can be 
compared with the wages of labour as capital, which, 
according to Marx, is also not the source of value: 
'But it is equally wrong to say that wages are an 
original source of exchangeable valueg although 
wages, or rather the continuous sale of labour- 
power, ' is a source of income for the labourer. It is 
the labour and not the wages of the labourer that 
creates value. Wages are only already existia& 
value, or if we consider the whole of productiong 
the part of the value created by the labourer which 
he himself appropriates; but this appropriation does 
not create value. His wages can therefore rise or 
fall without this affecting the value of the 
commodity produced by him. '(22) 
Technologies similarly are 'only already existing 
value'; they are crucial to 
'set in motion the 
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original source'(23) of value, but are not in themselves that source. 
For Marx, therefore, technology 'produces value, 
i. e. increases the value of the producty in only two 
respects: (I) in so far as it has value; i. e. -L S itself the product of labour, a certain quantity of 
labour in objectified form; (2) in so far as it 
increases the relation of surplus labour to 
necessary labour, by enabling labourg through an 
increase of its productive powery to create a 
greater mass of the products required for the 
maintenance of living labour capacity in a shorter 
time. '(24) 
It is important to point out here, however, that 
many social scientists, and particularly economists, 
have severely criticized the "hypothesis" upon which 
Marx's theory of value is based - i. e. Marx's 
propositioti ý. hat the value. of a commodity is 
determined j-, Y the quantity 0f abstract labgur 
socially necessary for its production. And, it is 
argued, [, Jar, -, 's sought-for common property of 
commodities could be other than labour. In the words 
of Bohm-Baý-i,: ýrk, whose critique is still highly 
regarded, 'i-D support of this latter proposition' - 
that 'if the use value of commodities be disregarded 
there remains only one other property, that of being 
the products of labour' - 'Marx has not adduced a 
shred of positive evidence. '(25) But 
it is also 
interesting to note that so far as I am aware no one 
has as yet 'adduced a shred of positive evidence' 
in 
support of technology as an original source of 
value, 
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Whatever the case, the controversy over the question 
of value is beyond the scope of our discussion. 
Whether right or wrong on the question of the source 
of value, Marx uiidoubtedly linked the transfer of 
value of technology to the quality of its use value 
- but not to its purely materi. al substance. What is 
important for Marx is not the fact that a machine is 
made with metal, which lasts longer than wood, for 
example. But wherher made of wood or metal, it is 
designed and constructed to function as "I 
technology in rýýpý, ated cycles of production. As he 
remarks :' the grea er durabilLty of f ixed capital 
must not be conceived aS 11 purely physical 
quality. '(26) What [s crucial [s that technology 'is 
destined to play the same role coils tantly. .' (27) 
Here the emphasis is placed oil the role an(] function 
of production technology. BUt 111-thOUgh Marx does not 
disregard the "purely" material aspect (e. g. the 
metal machinery is made of) he seems quite ambiguous 
on its importance, ind certai. nly does not pay near- 
enough attention to the significance of material 
inputs with respect to the role and function of 
Fo rin the case of objects as LecIiiioL og ies. 
It durability" for example , this is obviously 
directly related to the actuaL materials used to 
construct a technology. A wooden spindle ha sa 
shorter span of life, in strictly material, terms, 
than a metaL one. This affects not only the cost of 
construction, bu taI so the overall cost of 
replacement of Le. chnology (thLs latter issue is ill 
fact quite important in Marx's schema). It should be 
said here that, Ma rx is certainly aware of this 
question, 'I ,iIiewrL 1ý es: 'Th e mo re often it [i. e. 
technology-RR] must be replaced, the costlier it is; 
the larger the part of capital which would have to 
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be spent on it uselessly. '(28) But he leaves the 
matter undeveloped. 
History of modern technotný-, y in fact confirms the 
great importance of the (levelopment of materials for 
use in the construction of machinery, devices, 
buildings and workshops, precisely in order to make 
them, at least partly, more durable. The 'purely 
physical q tial ity and the material input are 
therefore cruciat factors in the role of an object 
as technology; they are crucial considerations if 
technologies are, in the words of Marx himself, 'to 
retain their original shape', and for them to be 
'ready each morning to renew the process with their 
shape unchanged. '(29) Yet Marx fails to take 
adequate account of this specifically ("raw") 
material aspect of technology in his economic 
considerations. 
The material. input Link,, durability to function, use 
and wear and tear: The consumption of an object as 
technology 'within the production process is, ' Marx 
writes , 
'in fact use, weari g-out. 1(30) And since 
machinery, tools, %vorkshops, etc., wear out as they 
are repeatedly used, according to Marx, the amount 
of money invested in Purchasing these has to be 
gradually recovered in order to replace them at some 
later date. General business experience (now well 
incorporated into accountancy, etc. ) allows the 
producer to estimate the life-span of his/her 
technologies. If, for instance, the spindle or the 
spinning machine, is generally calculated to last, 
say, ten years , then what was paid 
for it (its 
value) is spread over ten years. And to the output 
of one year's cloth must be added one-tenth of the 
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value of the technoLogies used, so that at the end 
of the ten-year period these can be replaced. (31) 
In this connection, the question of "lifetime" and 
the "wearing-out" of technology has particular 
meaning for Marx which should be mentioned here. 
Again, in my opinion, Marx seems somewhat ambiguous 
on this issue. According to my understanding, what 
Marx appears to be c_, specially concerned with is not 
so much the "purely" physical deterioration of 
technology in the sense of the gradual wearing-out 
of its material substance. The emphasis, so it seems 
to me, is placed on the deterioration or wearing-out 
of its physical fori - n, 
of its use value (or, if you 
will, its usefulness); that is, of its utility or 
functional usefulness as an appropriate and working 
technology ("means of labour"). And this 
interpretation seems to me to be evident from the 
following passages: 
In Capital (vol. 1), Marx writes: 
'Tools, mach*,. nes, workshops, and vessels, are of use 
in the labour-proces-s, only so long as they retain 
their original shape ... And just as 
during their 
lifetime, that is to say, during the continued 
labour-process in which they serve, they retain 
their shape independent of the product, so, too 
they do after their death. ' 
Thu: D, although the technology's 'shape' is retained, 
Marx continues-. 
we find that duriný, this period its use-value has 
been completely consumed, and therefore its 
exchange-value completely transferred to the 
product. '(32) 
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In a letter to Engels, Marx writes on the same 
issue, referring to the replacement of 'fixed 
capital' (the concept he uses for technology, etc., 
which I shall come to later): 
'Fixed capital can only be replaced in kind, in say, 
10 years for example. In the meantime, its value is 
returned partially and gradatime ["gradually"-RR] by 
the sale of commodities produced by it. This 
progressive return on fixed capital is only 
necessary for its replacement (apart from repairs 
and such like) as soon as it is dead in its material 
form, for example as a machine. '(33) 
Therefore, as it ca n be seen , the complete 
consumption of the use value of technology does not 
mean for Marx that it has lost its physical, 
material substance (i. e. the complete wearing out, 
or physical destruction through productive use or 
consumption of the material inputs - metals, wood, 
or whatever - that makeup the particular 
technology). The technology is 'dead' only as a 
production technotogy, is a prevailing and 
functioning means of production (Marx says, 
'as a 
machine', for example). The 'material form' is dead, 
while the physical 'shape' - the artificial (in the 
strict sense of artful/skilful designed and 
manufactured) configuration of its, as it were, nuts 
and bolts, material parts, etc. - may be (more or 
less) as it were during its 'lifetime. 
Here , thus , we have a 
distinction made by Marx 
between the material form or use value of technology 
which refers to its strictly being an actually 
functioning (working) object (i. e. a socially 
necessary, productively usefu12 object), and its 
material inputs (as its substance, so to speak) or 
qo 
its nuts and bolts configuration. And what he 
appears t0 1) e say I tip, 1 s, that however much the 
particular device or technology is physically 
intact, with changed circumstances it may no longer 
be socially necessary (i. e economically viable). A 
steam engine made and used in the early 19th century 
may still retain its 'shape' (and even capable of 
functioning if kept in repair), but for all that it 
is a 'dead' technology today; it is a corps of a 
technology; it has no use value as a production 
technology. 
This consideration is crucial for Marx's conception 
of technology as capital. If the steam engine has a 
value" today - or [nore strictly, an exchange value 
it is not as capital, but merely as a museum 
piece, an "antique", or a collection item - this is 
its 'utility' today, and not as a production 
technology; it is now simply a product, and not 
technology as capital (though It may certainly, as 
an antique, be "I very valuable source of 
investment). The notion of technology as capital, 
therefore, is not concerned with the exchange-value 
of production technology as such, or the investment 
of money In technology in itself; it is concerned 
with its socio-technical function only in relation 
to living labour at the point of production. 
In summary, for Marx, technologies play a different 
part, to ra%ý materials, etc. 9 in the formation of 
the value of the output. According to him, their 
value is preý-, erved, and remains constant, as with 
raw materials, etc., during their use within the 
production process. This value is transferred to the 
output, and technologies 'can never add more value 
to the product than they themselves possess 
7/ 
independently of the 1) rss in which they 
assist. '(34) 
The consideration of the value of production 
technology and its transfer (which are in fact quite 
problematic) is for Marx ba sod on the use value of 
technology. As already menti oned, his explanation of 
this, of technology's LI s (-' value, is somewhat 
ambiguous: it is physical ( ,, inrl "material") and yet 
not in the "pure" (or "raw" material) sense, not in 
a non-functional sense. Iw ouLd suggest that it is 
meant in a, for want of a better term, "Socio- 
technical" sense - with the crucial proviso that the 
"technical" , -oi), ildcration 
i-ý; only pertinent when and 
as it is (at any given time. ) socially actualized and 
not because it is silliply technically contingent. 
E. g. the invention of a device, even after its 
testing, does not thereby me,. rin that it has a use 
value, even though it iý-, a technically viable 
instrument. (35) At this stage it has a mere 
potential usefulness or use vatue as a technology of 
production. Only as a resul. t . of 
its application in a 
process of production can its potential usefulness 
become real, and hence its ijse value (and thus also 
its value) realized. What therefore signifies a 
production- technology' s ust. -ý value is its technical 
structure and fuliction Ln r Jation to labOUr. 
However, as ýje have seen durability is important to 
Marx's meaninp of use valuo of technology - which, 
once again, is somewhat , imt)iguously explained. In 
any event, the durability factor is related to what 
can be called the operational life of technologies. 
On the basis of this as[)ezt of the use value of 
technology, for Harx, the transfer of the value of 
technology is gradua L, over many cycles of 
5ý1 
production. Technology, Marx writes, 'while always 
entering as a whole into the labour-process, enters 
into the value-begetting process only by bits. It 
never adds more value than it loses, on an average, 
by wear and tear. '(36) The durability of the 
technology effects the rate of value transfer: 'there 
is a great difference between the value of a 
machine, and the value transferred in a given time 
by the machine to the product. The longer the life 
of the machine in the labour-process, the greater is 
that differerice. '(37) 
Thus, because of the specific way in which, 
according to Marx, technologies play a part in the 
formation of value, in the I value-begetting 
process', following the classical economists, Marx 
incorporates theiii within a concept that better 
expresses this role; namely, fixed capital, or, more 
accurately according to Marx , fixed constant 
capital. And it is with fixed capital that Marx 
identifies proluction technology (more specifically 
the system of iiiachi-ne technology) as the 'adequate 
form' of capital - thus, technology as ce. pital. (see 
Chapter Three) 
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20. ibid. 
I 
21. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, CW, vol. 5,1976, 
p. 31 
22. ibid. pp. 35-6 
23. A variation of th is also ties at the heart of 
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abstraction' wh i (- 1) ,1tL ý-, Ili 1. ) tst. o def ine the 'material 
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Karl Marx's Theory of 11istory, 1984, Chapt. IV. 
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the verb "to ? ive" is, as in the English edition, 
translated in the present rather than the future tense 
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[present tense of "to give"-RRI eine GeselIschaft m 17t 
Feudalherrn, die Da mpf muh te eLne Gesellschaft III it 
industriellen Kaptt-, flisten. ' See K. Marx: Das Etend der 
Philosophic, Ber!. i 1-: Netz Ver La g9 19711 p. ilo my 
emphasis. 
43. As we have seen ( see note above) in both the French 
original and the German edition, the statement does not 
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society with (avec and iiiit) feudaf-lord, etc. 
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46. CW, vol.. 6, p. t(33 
47. ibid. p. 186 
48. Capital, ill, p. 38l, my emphas. Ls 
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capitalist. ' See his Karl Marx's Theory of History, 1987-, 
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80. See M. M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History, 
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81. K. Kumar, Prol); k, ---(ýv and Progre'3, S, 
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p. 660 
89. See, for example, WiHner 1977, pp. 57-73 
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does not set 'some goal-in advance', do not different forms 
of societies generate certa. Ln needs which in one way or another 
come to influence, and indeed determine, what is or should be, 
the 'goal' of science? 
How does one explain (as Kuhn does not) this socio-historically 
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Ollman, Alienation, 1971, Chapt. 20 
47. Rattansi, 19 , p. 71 48. See Marx, Capital, 1, p. 432 
49. Rattansi, 1982, p. 70 
50. Marx, Early Writings, 1977, p. 275 
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55. See Rattansig 1982, pp. 70-1 
56. See ibid. p-69 
57. ibid. p. 96 
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70. ibid 
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another, but also according to the degree of mechanization or 
automation. Indeed, the main objective of his study, it seems 
to me, is to argue that the state and intensity of alienation 
has decreased, and wilt continue to decrease with automation. 
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103. ibid. p. 39 
104. See ibid., my emphasis 
105. ibid. pp. 39-40 
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possible because it belongs to a man other than the 
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knew other forms of unfree- labour than strict "slavery" 
("chattel slavery", if you like), ... But in general slavery 
was the most important form of unfree labour at the highest 
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Avineri, Social and Political Thought of Marx, 1968, p. 153 
113. Thus, to say, as tor example Loyd Eastoi writes, that 'In 
The German Ideoloý-, v Marx deals with alienation in its moral and 
10 
political aspects.. ' (see Fas ton, "Alienation and Empiricism in 
Marx's Thought"jin McQuarie(ed. )j1978, p66)p isq I believe, to 
miss an essential aim of Marx even in that early work: namely, 
the grounding of moral and political aspects of alienation upon 
the objective conditions of capital's rule. And what is crucial 
in this case (though there are also other factors) is the 
"technological" aspect of alienation, of the domination of 
labour - and more specifically, the role of machinery. 
114. Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, Selected Works (SW), 
1970, p. 47, my emphasis 
115. See Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Prograinme", SW, 1970, p315 
116. See ibid. 
117. Grundrisse, p. 489 
118. See Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, 1973, p. 30 
119. See Grundrisse, p. 489 
120. ibid. 
121. Early Writings, t977, p. 326 
122. Capital, I, p. 179 
123. Early Writings, 1977, p. 270 
124. The quotes are from ibid. p. 295 
125. ibid. p. 270 
126. ibid. 
127. See the Poverty of Philosophy, Gkq, vol. 6, p. 183. In fact, I 
would suggest that, Marx reuognizes the technical division of 
labour as essentially a techniq, ue of production, and in this 
sense as distinct from the division of labour in society. it is 
in this sense of "technique" that Marx regarded - as we shall 
see later and in more detail in connection with his concept of 
"co-operation" - the technical division and organization of 
labour as a productive F-orceý while excluding the workshop 
itself as such a force. For the "workshop", or tfie early 
"factory" system, is the historically specific form of the 
social division of labour in the sense of the distribution of 
Tal; -our in society; it isq in other words, accor to Marx, an 
expression of social relations of_2roduction. This distinction 
is important not only for an understanding of Marx's conception 
of the role of production technology under capitalism, and its 
relations to techniques and inethods of labour, but it is also 
crucial for his conception of technological change. The 
distinction essentially rests on the fact that while techniques 
(the actual technical methods of organiziný labour, the 
subdivision of labour at the point of production are purposive 
applications of objectified (though non-tangible) knowledge 
within the production process - i. e. they are determinate means 
5-n-d--"*models" which are utilized for a specific combination of 
instruments or technologies and labour - by contrast, the 
distribution of, or the division ofq labour in society (at 
least in capitalist society) - i. e. the social differentiation 
and stratification which divides society according to 
occupations, each adequate to a particular branch of production 
- is not governed by the same principles or based on a 
purposive application of objectified knowledge. 
It is, for example, to this distinction between techniques of 
production and the ý-rýci, al- division of labour, that Marx is 
referring to in this following passage from The Poverty of 
Philosophy: 'Society as a whole has this in common with the '7- 
interior of a workshop, that it too has its division of labour. 
If one took as a model the division of labour in a modern 
workshop, in order to apply it to a whole society, the society 
best organized for the production of wealth would undoubtedly 
be that which had a single chief employer, distributing, tasks 
to the different members of the community according to a 
previously fixed rule. But this is by no means Me case. While Tn side the modern workshop the division of labour is 
meticulously regulated by the authority of the employer, modern 
society has no other rule, no other authority for the 
distribution o labour than free competition. ' (ibid. p. 184, ly F-1 an 
emphasis )Furthermore, what is also noteworthy is that Marx in 
fact gives a prominent position to the techniques of 
production, rather than to production technology, specifically 
with regard to the process of development and rise of modern 
industry -a reflection which is 
1"mportant to bear in mind in 
relation to his aII eg ed "technological determinism". He 
criticises Proudhon for not taking into account the real 
historical d ev eI opin cý nt0( the modern workshop and 
machinery: 'flow was this workshop brought into existence7' Marx 
asks. And goes on: 'In order to answer this question we shall 
have to examine how manufacturing industry, properly so-called, 
has developed. I am ý'paTT_ng here of FF-a-tindustry which is riot 
yet modern industry, with its machinery, but which is already 
no longer the industry of the artisans of the Middle Ages, nor 
domestic industry. '(ibid. p. 185, my emphasis) 
The development of modern production technology (i. e. 
machinery) and modern techniques associated with the 
latter as 
exemplified by the technical division of 
labour inside the 
workshop (the factory) have their roots, 
for Marx, in the 
historical development of the manufacturing methods and 
industry as distinct from the guilds. The technique or method 
of production, initially and also as an essential princiVle, 
was based on the 'concentration of instruments and workers in 
one place, or, as it were, Linder one roof. (see 
1ibid-_p_pD_. TR6-7j 
my emphasis) It is only, a(-cording to Marx after this method 
theI of production - which unliko techniques involved 
in the 
fiuild system meant the grouping of relatively 
large numbers of 
free" labourers under one- authority - had began to diffuse and 
become established that one can observe 
(historically) a real 
movement in the developmental process of both the technical 
division of labour and of modern industrial technology. 
For Marx this concentration of instruments and workers under 
one authority, this new technique and method of production, 
is 
nothing less than the t- echnical aspect of the 
historical 
process of accumulation ang 
-concentration of capital, and what 
he earlier (in The German Ideology) called the se aration of 
it natural capita17 f rom labour (see Appendix 
3ý, or the 
dissolution of the guilds and craf t methods of production. 
However, as Marx remarks, 'once the men and the instruments had 
been brought together, the diLvision of labour, such as it had 
existed in the form of the guilds, was reproduced, necessarily 
1.2 
reflected inside the workshop. '(ibid. p. 186) 
128. ibid. p. 187, my emphasis. The reference to the 'division of 
labour' here is actually a reference to the social 
distribution, or the sociqL division of labour; the splitting 
up of social production into different branches: 
'The invention of machinery brought IhOUt the separation of 
manufacturing industry from agricultural. industry. The weaver 
and the spinner, united but lately in a single family, were 
separated by the machine. . Thanks to the application of 
machinery and of steam, the division of labour was able to 
assume such dimensions that large-scale industry, detached from 
the national soil, depends entirely on the world market, on 
international exchange, on an international division of 
labour. ' And, finally, Marx continues, 'the machine has so 
great an influence on the division of labour, that when, in the 
manufacture of some object, a means has been found to produce 
parts of it mechanically, the manufacture splits up immediately 
into two branches independent of each other. I (ibid. ) 
129. Already quoted, see note 11 above. 
130. See "Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political 
Economy", Early Writings, 1977, p. 270 
131. See Wage Labour and CapitaIgSW919709p. 8l, my emphasis 
132. ibid. p. 79, emphasis in the original 
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Chapter Three 
1. Marx, Capital, I, p. 368 
2. On this idea see, for example, S. A. Marglin, "What do bosses 
do? ", in Gorz (ed. ), The Division of Labour, 1978, pp. 13-54 
3. Marx, Capital, I, p. 367 - 
4. See Marx, Early 1, Jri tiruýs, already quoted, see note 44 
previous chapter. 
5. CapitalI, p. 35, my einptiztsis 
6. ibid. p. 35, n. 3, my emphasis 
7. ibid. p. 36 
8. See ibid. p. 47; Marx is here, of course, referrin, -',, to 
commodities in general and not to technology as such. But the 
same holds true , in principle, for technology as with any "product" of labour as a commodity. 
9. ibid. 
10. ibi. d. p. 61 
11. ibid. p. 72 
12. ibid. p. 41 
13. ibid. p. 42 
14. Grundrisse, "Introduction", p. 85; see also the commentary 
by T. Carver, Karl Marx: Text on Method, 1975, pp. 88ff. 
15. Marx makes this point repeatedly in his A Contribution to 
the Criti 4 ue of Political Economy, t970, with regard to tF-e 
'-c-om(nodTit-y T-. 
16. Grundrisse, p. 86, my emphasis 
17. Capital, l, footnote- on p, 81 
18. ibi. d. I have used this statement of Marx with reference to 
technology; lie is in fact referring to the "process of 
production", but in essence the Rrinciple is equaI14 applicable 
to technology as a crucial 'factor" of the sprocess of 
production". 
19. ibid. p. 81 
20. A note of clarification is in order here as regards Marx's 
notion of "general" production: '14henever we speak of 
production' , Marx writes, 
'then, what is meant is always 
production at a definite stage of social development - 
production by social individuals. ' Nonetheless, Marx further 
explains: 'Production in general is an abstraction, but a 
rational abstraction in so F-ar as it really brings out and 
fixes the common elements and thus saves us repetit*. Olon. 1 
However, although certain common elements or 'de teri-nina t ions 
belong to all epochs', some do not, I 
and 'others only to a few. ' 
It is, therefore, essential that the elements which are not 
general and common,... be separated out from the determinations 
valid for production as such... ' For more details on this issue 
see Grundrisse, "Introduction"; quotes are from p. 85. 
21. As Marx writes: 'The fact that the productiion of use- 
values, or goods, is carried on under the control of a 
capitalist and on his behalf does not alter the general 
character of that production. We shall, therefore, in the first 
place, have to consider the labour-process independently of the 
particular form it assumes under given social conditions. ' 
Capital, l, p. 177. 
/1/ 
22. ibid. 
23. ibid. p. 178 
24. See, for example, 011man, Alienation, 19719p. 113 
25. On this see Braverman, 197_ý_., Chapt. l. 
26. Capital, l, p. 178, my emphasis 
27. See Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 1985, pp. 64-6 
28. Early Writings, 1977, p. 328 
29. ibid. pp. 328-9 
30. ibid. p. 329 
31. ibid. p. 328 
32. Capital, l, p. 181 
33. ibid. p. 179 
34. ibid. p. 178 
35. ibid. p. 179, my empliýisis 
36. ibid. 
37. ibid. p. 180, my emphasis 
38. 'Property is, 'it is true, ' Marx writes, 'originally mobile, 
for mankind first seizes hold of the ready-made fruits oF -the 
eartht among whom belong e. g. the animals ... Nevertheless even 
this situation - huntiný,, fishing, herding, gathering fruits 
from trees etc. - always presupposes appropriation of the 
eartht whether for fixed residence, or for roaming, or for 
animal pasture etc. ' Grundrisse, p-492. 
39. Capital, 1, p. 179 , iny einplvisis 40. ibid., my emphasis 
41. Though there appears to be no 'documented instances of an 
animal using a tool to make a tool, ' as Elster, for example, is 
forced to admit despite his rather unwarranted cavilling at 
Marx oil this point. See Elster, 1985, p. 66. 
42. 'Relics of by-gone iris truments of labour possess the same 
importance for the investigation of extinct economic forms of 
society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct 
species of animals. ' Capital, 1, pp. 179-80 
43. ibid. p. 180, my emphasis 
44. ibid., my emphasis 
45. ibid. 9 my emphasis 46. See ibid. p. 182 
47. ibid., my emphasis 
48. ibid. 
49. ibid. p. 180 
50. ibid. p. 181 
51. ibid. p. 183 
52. Grundrisse, p. 362, iwý omphýisis 
53. Capital, i, p. 203 
54. ibid. p. 184 
55. And, in the words of MarK, 'free in the double sense, that 
as a free inan lie can dispose of his labour-power as his own 
commodity, and that oil the- other hand lie has no other commodity 
for sale, is short of everything necessary for the r, ýýalization 
of his labour-power. '(ibi. d. p. 169) In order that lal-)our-power 
can be offered for sale (not marely incidentally but 
systematically), a number of conditions, according to Marx, 
'must first be fulfilled. '(ibid-pp-167-8) For the individual to 
be able to offer his/her labour-power for sale as a commodity, 
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'he must have it at Hs disposal, must be the untrammelled 
owner of his capacity for labour, i. e. , of his 
person. ' (ibid. p. 168) For this to be a sYs tematic process and 
have continuance, 'tho owner of the labour-power should sell it 
only for a definite period, for if he were to sell it rump and 
stump, once for all, fie would be selling himself, converting 
himself from a free man into a slave, from an owner of 
commodity into a corninodity. (ibid. )Moreoverg the individual 
only becomes obliged to sell his/her labour-power, if he/she is 
not in a position of beiný able to sell 'commodi ties in which 
his labour is incorporated . 
(see ibid. pp. 168-9) In other words, 
the essential condition for labour-power to become a commodity 
is the separation of the labourer from the means of production, 
from instruments and materials necessary to produce commodities 
(whether for direct consumption or for sale). 
56. ibid. p. 184 
57. ibid. pp. 184-5 
58. ibid. p. 186 
59. For a criticism of Marx's theory of value and surplus value 
see Elster, 1985; Steedinan, 19 77; and as related to 
"exploitation" see Roemer, 1982. For a defense of Marx's theory 
see Mattick, 1983; Sh; ii-khý 1977; Weeks, 1981; Yaffe, 1973. See 
also the collection of essays on this issue in Mandel and 
Freeman (eds. ), 1984; Fine (ed. ), 1986; and also Steedman et 
al, 1981. 
'0. Capital, I, p. 184, my emphasis 
61. See ibid. p. 178 
62. See ibid. p. 180, my emphasis 
63. Production by deFinition cannot be "spontaneous", nor can 
it be "purposeless". An "ultimate" 
to 
purpose is, of course, the 
satisfaction of human "wants"; but wants" (or "needs") are far 
from being merely abstract or static; they are socio- 
historically determined and dynamic, subject to a wide 
variation of changed conditions and circumstances. The advance 
of production actually generates . 
9ew "needs" and "wants" over 
and above the basic physiological ii-e-eds. 
64. Early WritiTIgS, 1977, p. 329 
65. See ibid. pp. 328-30 
66. N. Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and 
Society, 1954, P-57. 
67. ibid. p. 38 
68. See Marx, Wage Labour and Capital, SW, 19701p. 81 
69. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value (TSV), Part 1,19697 p. 390. 
See also, Marx, Results of the Immediate Process of Production, 
in McLellan (ed. ), Marx: Sele-cted Writingsq 1977, p. 515: 'Even 
in the purely formal relati'onship , Marx writes, 
'the means of 
production, the material conditions of labour, are not subject 
to the worker, but it is fie who is subject to them: it is 
capital which employs labour. In this simple manner, this 
relationship enhances the personification of objects and the 
reification of people. ' 
I 70. It must be noted here that this aspect of Marx s economic 
ideas has not only been criticised but in fact rejected as 
being false. For ex,, imple, Elster has arpued that, 'Marxian 
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economics errs by exaggerating the importance of structural 
constraints and by minimizing the scope for rational choice. ' 
See Elster, An Introduction to Marx, 1986, p. 62. 
71. Marx, TSV, 1, pp. 390-1 
72. ibid. p. 391, my emphasis 
73. ibid., emphasis in the original 
74. The term "moment" is an important philosophical concept 
often used by Marx to express an "element" or "factor" as a 
manifestation of a "totality" or a "whole" in motion, in the 
course of development or historically. Thus also, since for him 
the whole, or any system, is always in motion (and, as a 
process, it develops), an essential consideration is time. The 
term "moment" expresses this combined sense of t'ime and 
movement (hence also contradiction). Capital, then, is a 
process in whose varLous moments' (as technology, money, 
commodity, etc. ) 'it is always capital'. (The quote here is from 
'158. ) The term "moment" emphasises the Marx's Grundrisse, p.. 
determination of the particular "element" (e. g. technology as a 
factor of production) by the whole (i. e. as an aspect, a 
manifestation, of the whole's - or the social system's - 
movement in time or histroical process). The terms "element" 
and "factor" tend to place the emphasis on the "thing" 
(technology, product, etc. ) as a fixed part of a system at rest 
- in which case, therefore, time and movement (hence 
contradiction) is absent. On the difference between Marx and 
Hegel on this notion of "moment" see Martin Nicolause, 
"Foreword" to the Grundrisse, pp. 29-30. 
75. Grundrisse, p. 258 
76. TSVjIjp. 392 
77. ibid. 
78. See ibid. 
79. See Braverman, 1974, pp. 229-30 
80. See, for example, J. Ellulj The Technolo&ical Society, 1965. 
81. Braverman, Labor and Monoploy Capital, 1974, p. 229 
82. See TSV, I, p. 408 
83. ibid. 
84. ibid. p. 392 
85. ibid. pp. 391-2 
86. ibid. p. 408 
87. See Braverman, 1974, pp. 228 and 230 
88. Grundrisse, p. 304 
89. Braverman, 1974, p. 229, my emphasis 
90. Grundrisse, p. 312 
91. ibid. p. 31t, my emphasis 
92. ibid. 
93. ibid., my emphasis 
94. ibid. 
95. Capital, I, pp. 195-6 
96. See Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy, 1971 , p. 28, my emphasis. 
Similar statements can be 
found in other works of Marx (e. g. in Capital, Grundrisse, 
etc. ), and these are often gi-ven as support for claiming at 
Marx regarded use-value as independent' of social form. Yet, 
as we have seen in the discussion presented in this section 
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(and others), there is also ample tectual evidence - from, for 
example, Marx's Theory of Surplus Value, Marginal. Notes on A. 
Wagner, as welr as Z_r_un_d_r__i_sse_ and Capital themsel es - 
indicating quite the opposite. 
97. On the question of the significance of "use-value" in 
Marx's theory and in his critique of political economy, see 
Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx's 'Capitall, 1977, pp. 73-95; also 
Harvey, The Limits to Capital, 1984, pp. 5-9 
98. See Sweezy, TReory of Capitalist Development, 1970, p. 26, 
my emphasis 
99. In this connection, it should be mentioned here that many 
recent commentators are either dismissive or have (as, for 
example Elster (1985) has) categorically denounced any claims 
to a distinctive Marxian method, as well as rejecting Marx's 
dialectical reasoning (as, for example, it seerns Wright, Levine 
and Sober (1992, p. 6) have, and, indeed those associated with 
the so-called school of "Analytical Marxism" - Cohen, Roemer, 
etc. ). Nevertheless because Marx himself was so deeply 
committed to such a inethod and mode of thought, for any 
reasonably faithful interpretation (though not necessarily for 
a critical evaluation) of his writings, I believe, it is 
important that at the , oi, y le: ist a reference should be made to his philosophical approach. 
100. See Marx's "Notes on A. Wagner", in Carver (trans. & ed. ), 
Marx: Text on Method, 1975, pp. 1.98-9 
1-0 ibid. p. 200 
102: ibid. p. 207 
103. ibid. 
104. See Marx, Contribution, 1-971, p. 28, my emphasis 
105. Capital, Ip771_6_ 
106. ibid. Here Marx talks about the "means of production"" as 
a wliole - i. e. not only technology, but also raw materials, 
etc. 
107. ibid. 
108. ibid. 
109. ibid. p. 314 
11.0. ibid. p. 315 
111. See Grundrisse, p. 595 
112. ibid. p. 336 
113. Thus, for example, if in a worki[ig-day of 12 hours the 
'lwaýýevl of the worker is equivalent to a necessary labour-time 
of, say, 6 hours - surplus labour-tirue therefore being also 6 
hours - and the capitalist increases this total time to 14 
hours, while 6 hours still suffices to reproduce the products 
socially required to maintain the worker as a worker, then 
surplus labour-time put in by the worker has thereby been 
increased by 2 hours. 
114. See Capital, I, Chapt. XI[, pp. 312ff 
115. ibid. p. 314, my emphasis 
116. ibid. p. 319 
117. 'ISV, I, p. 93, my emphasis 
118. Capital, I, p. 196, my emphasis 
119. Marx is not essentially concerned with the form of 
combination of the labourers under the early regime of merchant 
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capital, which is 'merely formal, and concerns only the product 
of labour, not labour its_eTT_'rTGrundrisse, p. 586) In short, he 
is not concerned with the earliest stages of the "putting-out" 
or the VeELa -system organized by merchant-manufacturers, which 
entails capital's employment of, for example, 'different hand 
weavers, spinners, etc. who live independently and are 
dispersed over the land. '(ibid. ) However, this "putting-out" or 
"Verlag-system" is a method the principles of which does not 
ent'ir-ely vanish even with the rise and development of modern 
industry (and even today). 
120. Thus, Marx writes: 'Capitalist production only then really 
begins.. when each individual capital employs simultaneously a 
comparatively large number of labourers; when consequently the 
labour-process is carried on on an extensive scale and yields, 
relatively, large quantities of products. A greater number of 
labourers working together, at the same time, in one place (or, 
if you will, in the same fieLd of labour), in order to produce 
the same sort of commodity under the mastership of one 
capitalist, constitutes, both historically arid logically, the 
starting-point of capitalist production. ' Capital, I, p. 322 
121. ibid. 
122. ibid. p. 324 
123. Capital, l,. p. 330 
124. ibid. 
125. There are two interrelated points involved here: On the 
one hand, that for Marx co-operation as a technique of 
productiong under any circuwstancesq requires co-ordination. 
Thus, as he remarks: 'All combined labour on a large scale 
requires, more or less, a directing authority, in order to 
secure the harmonious working of individual activities, and to 
perform the general functions that have their origin in the 
action of the combined organism as distinguished from the 
action of its separate oý'gans. And the example he gives 
illustrates this point: 'A single violin player is his own 
conductor; an orchestra requires a separate one. '(ibid. pp. 330- 
1) On the other hand, that because of the form of labour as 
wage-labour - i. e. that the labourers are separated from the 
means of production, and therefore have individually or 
collectively no access to these means, and no means of gaining 
access except by selling their labour-powers - for Marx it 
appears quite "natural" 
(Le. something which appears to spring 
from the very fact of co-operative production itself) that the 
capitalist who has the means should naturally become the 
directing authorf-E-yPThe work of directing, superintending, and 
adjusting, becomes one of the functions of capital, from the 
moment that the labour under the control of capital, becomes 
co-operative. ' (ibid. p. 331) 
126. Thus, according to Marx-'The control exercised by the 
capitalist is riot only a, special function, due to the nature of 
the social labOUr-process, in(] peculiar to that process, but it 
is, at the same time, a function of the exploitation of a 
social-labour-process, and is consequently rooted in the 
unavoidable antagonism between the x loiter and the living and 
labouring raw material- he exploits. ' ibid. p. 331) The fusion of 
Iq 
"co-ordiria t ion" and "con t ro I" is thus , for Marx, an incorporated aspect of the capitalist technique of co-operative 
production as a form of "exploitation". 
In the previous chapter we saw a connection between 
"alienation" and techilology , here Marx makes a connection between the techniques of co-operation and alienation: 'Their [i. e. wage-labourers' -RR] union into one single productive 
body and the establishment of a connexion between their 
individual functions, are matters foreign and external to them, 
are not their own act, but the act of the capital that brings 
and keeps them to gether. '(ibid. ) We also saw that even in his 
early writings Marx seemed to indicate that the "purpose" of 
the capitalist appears incorporated into technology, here also 
he seems to indicate the same proposition with regards to the 
technique of co-operation: 'the connexion existing between their 
[wage-labourers'] various labours appears to them, ideally, in 
the shape of a preconceived plan of the capitalist, and 
practically in the shape of the authority of the same 
capitalist, in the shape of the powerful will of another, who 
subjects their activity to his aims. '(ibid. ) 
127. See ibid. p. 331-2 
128. The technical aspect of control, however, is always, for 
Marx, determined by the social, and expresses, in its modus 
operandi, the latter within and through the structural 
organization of the labour-process. In other words, in essence, 
the capitalist's control of the production process is an 
attribute of his/her social position which is (whether directly 
or indirectly) expres's-e-7 -tectinically: 'It is not because he is a 
leader of industry [i. e. a co-ordinator and organizer -RRJ that 
a man is a capitalist; on the contrary, he is a leader of 
industry because he is a capitalist [i. e. because of "his" 
social standing, status, and position as the personification of 
capital-RRI. '(4-bid. p. 3.32) 
129. Although Marx does not specifically refer to this 
beginning of the capitalist's use and application of the 
principles of "hierarchy" an(] " bu r ý, a tic racy" to the production 
process - principles which were itilierited from past forms of 
organizations, e. g. f roil) the simple but rigid mas ter- 
journeyman-apprentice hierarchy of the guild system, as well as 
from the wider context of the military and state 
administration. (See Marx's remarks , for example, about the 
ancient forms of co-operation, ibid. pp. 333-4. ) Nevertheless, 
it is certainly clear that lie had such a form in mind, as the 
following passage showq: 'Just as at first the capitalist is 
relieved from actual labour so soon as his capital has reached 
that minimum amount with which capitalist production, as such, 
begins, so now, he hands over the work of direct and constant 
supervision of the individual workmen, arid groups of workmen, 
to a special kind of wage-labourer. An industrial army of 
workmen, under the command of a capitalist, requires like a 
real army, officers (managers) ,and sergeants 
ýforemen, 
overlookers), who, while the work is being done, command in the 
name of the capitalist. The work of supervision becomes their 
established and exclusive function. '(ibid. p. 332) 
Ac 
130. See Lewis Mumford, 'jhe th of the Machine. 1967 
131. Sidney Pollard, Genesis 5T-Ki5-dern -Manag-ement, 1965, p. 7 
132. See Capital, I, p. -T"37-- 
133. ibid. p. 336 
134. ibid. p. 338 
135. See Grundrisse, p. 505 
136. For it is important to recognize here that the process of 
objectification, partirularly insofar as the technologies of 
production are concerned, is extremely limited in scope and 
character in the sense of the transference and materialization 
of skills, knowledge and experience of the direct producers. As 
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9. See Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 1971, p. 104. 
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and Thompson (eds. ), Information Technology, 1987 
36. Capital, 1, p. 387 
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